Reprint of: Thawing frozen capital markets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed's liquidity programs

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.     

Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities—the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)—that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008–2009. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and, in the case of the TSLF, at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.     

美元定价权外移与美联储危机干预之困

由次级房屋抵押贷款引发的美国金融危机目前已经演变成了全球性金融危机。美联储自去年以来迭创新招进行危机干预,但我们看到的却是危机的愈演愈烈,每一次的干预都显得徒劳,最终不得不由政府出面来进行救助。这一方面与危机涉及的金融产品的复杂性有关,另一方面,笔者通过研究发现,也与美元定价权外移有关。本文通过对美元定价权外移的历史背景以及美联储危机干预的效应分析,发现美元定价权的实际外移给美联储的危机干预带来了相当的困惑,由此阐明全球化环境下保住货币定价权至关重要。     

美国新型货币政策工具及其影响分析

始于2007年的次贷危机在美国纵深发展并波及全世界,不同于20世纪30年代大萧条时期货币当局的反应,美联储迅速采取全方位、创新式、深层次的货币政策对金融市场和大型金融机构进行援助,分别采用了TAF、TSLF、PDCF、AMLF、CPFF、MMIFF等新型政策工具,有针对性地增加市场流动性,借助未来的通货膨胀来转移美国的债务负担,在全球树立了统一行动和政策协调的典范。借鉴美国经验,未来中国要以新视角和创新工具来应对金融的不稳定。     

Implications of a TAF program stigma for lenders: the case of publicly traded banks versus privately held banks

Term auction facility (TAF) was created during the financial crisis as a substitute for the Federal Reserve’s discount window, the lender of last resort. We hypothesize if TAF borrowing is viewed as a bailout then publicly traded banks would borrow relatively fewer TAF funds to avoid a bailout stigma. We find publicly traded banks did borrow less (as a percent of total assets) in the TAF program than privately held banks. Further, too-big-to-fail banks and investment banks borrowed relatively less than other publicly traded banks indicating greater levels of public scrutiny reduces borrowing under emergency government liquidity programs. We also find that publicly traded banks pledged lower quality and less liquid collateral than private banks when borrowing under the program. Our results suggest TAF provided more benefit to traditional privately held banks with strong balance sheets that were able to borrow relatively greater amounts in anticipation of either future liquidity needs as suggested by Ivashina and Scharfstein (J Financ Econ 97:319–338, 2010) or increased lending as found by Berger et al. (The Federal Reserve’s discount window and TAF programs: “pushing on a string?” Working paper, University of South Carolina, 2014).     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.     

浅议借贷管制与金融自由

在商业银行贷款行为日益市场化的今天,贷款仍是商业银行最主要的资产业务之一.随着现代经济与金融的飞速发展,各个金融机构的信贷规模迅速发展扩大,但同时带来的负面影响则是其贷款的风险越来越大,安全系数越来越小.随着全球金融一体化的发展和我国加入WTO,我国金融市场上的不确定因素急剧增加,特别是商业银行的经营管理将面临越来越严峻的考验.是继续加强对贷款的管制,还是顺应金融自由化的浪潮而放松管制,很难有明确划一的答案.本文拟通过对现行商业银行贷款在实体与程序方面所作限制的介绍与分析,找出借贷管制与金融自由化的连接点.     

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.     

The effects of government capital and liquidity support programs on bank lending: Evidence from the syndicated corporate credit market

This study jointly evaluates the effects of the U.S. Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the Federal Reserve's Discount Window (DW), and Term Auction Facility (TAF) on bank syndicated lending during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, using a unique data set that tracks the exposure of each lender in each syndicated credit facility in each year. By comparing lending changes within a group of banks that lend to the same facility of the same firm in the same year, it eliminates the impacts of demand-side factors that often bias the results of empirical studies on bank credit supply. Overall, I find that TARP, DW, and TAF played only a marginal role in increasing bank syndicated lending. By examining lending changes at the facility-lender and firm-lender levels, this study is less prone to the reverse causality problem that is inherent in studies using bank-level data. Therefore, this study complements studies using bank-level data and provides policymakers with a balanced view on the effects of these programs.     

A Comparison of Syndicated Loan Pricing at Investment and Commercial Banks

We reject the hypothesis that investment and commercial banks have identical loan-pricing policies. We find that compared to commercial banks, investment banks lend to less profitable, more lever aged firms, price riskier classes of term loans more generously, and offer relatively longer-term credits, usually with term, not commitment contracts. Investment banks typically establish higher credit spreads, although the premium declines when a commercial bank joins as syndicate co-arranger. Investment banks also price riskier classes of term loans more generously to borrowers than do commercial banks. Commercial-bank funding advantages do not appear to be a source of the pricing differences.     

银行对企业经营的监督效应研究——基于控股股东掏空行为的视角

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。     

Bank loans during the 2008 quantitative easing

We examine the effect of quantitative easing on the supply of bank loans. During the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, lending banks reduced relatively more loan spreads, offered longer loan maturities, provided larger loans, and loosened more covenants for firms whose long-term bond ratings were below BBB and were lower than those with investment-grade bond ratings. Furthermore, we find that new bank loans in this period were associated with a reduction in a firm’s value and an increase in default risk. These results indicate that banks took greater risk during the 2008 quantitative easing by relaxing lending standards to relatively riskier borrowers.     

Foreign banks and credit in Mexico

The role that foreign banks play in developing countries has been arduously debated. Foreign banks can improve the efficiency of the banking sector in the host country but they can also undermine local banks by selecting only the most trustworthy borrowers. In this paper, I analyze the period between 2005 and 2014 and compare the differences between foreign and domestic banks in Mexico and Colombia. Analyzing Mexico is of great importance given that foreign banks control more than 80% of the banking assets. Also, given the difference in institutional development between Mexico and Colombia, I can control for regulatory environment. After controlling for size, institutional development, and country of origin, I find that foreign banks have not stimulated growth in Mexico through commercial loans. Previous studies suggest that this lack of credit to companies may be due to a weak enforcement of contracts rather than to foreign ownership. However, Colombia has a weaker enforcement of contracts environments and foreign banks also do not provide as many commercial loans as domestic banks. This paper is of particular interest to regulators in developing countries that need foreign capital and those that want to intensify the allocation of commercial credit.     

Does political pressure matter in bank lending? Evidence from China

Using provincial data from China between 2002 and 2011, we find substantial evidence indicating a positive association between the growth of bank loans issued by commercial banks and the political pressures faced by provincial leaders. This association is particularly true for state‐owned banks, which are much more politically pressurized than others, but is relatively attenuated in provinces with a more developed banking sector. We also find that bank loans issued under greater political pressures are less commercially oriented and have lower quality. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses and alternative measures of political pressure. Overall, our study contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the role of the political incentives of government officials in fuelling economic growth through credit allocation.     

What Do Banks Evaluate When They Screen Borrowers? Soft Information, Hard Information and Collateral

By applying factor analysis to unique data on loan screening for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan, we investigate the factors that banks actually evaluate when underwriting commercial loans. We find that banks emphasize three factors when they decide whether to grant loans: the relationship factor, the financial statement factor, and the collateral/guarantee factor. We also find that smaller banks place greater emphasis on the relationship and the collateral/guarantee factors, and that banks under competitive pressure emphasize the relationship factor to a greater extent. We interpret these findings based on the theory of relationship lending and lending technologies.     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.     

The influence of thrift competition on bank business loan rates

This article assesses the competitive influence of thrift institutions on the pricing of commercial loans made by commercial banks. Using detailed survey information on the rates that individual banks charge for various types of commercial loans, we attempt to determine which of various proposed weightings of thrift institutions, when incorporated in measures of market concentration, best explains loan rates. After considering several weighting schemes, including those designed to approximate current regulatory practice in analyzing the competitive impact of proposed bank mergers, we find that in all but one of the cases examined, the use of a positive weight for thrift institutions explains bank loan rates, if anything, more poorly than does a weighting of zero for such institutions.     

The Use of Interest Rate Derivatives by End-users: The Case of Large Community Banks

This paper investigates the use of interest-rate derivatives by U.S. commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion. These banks are interesting, because they allow us to focus on the end-users of interest-rate derivatives rather than dealers. Over our four-year test period, 1990–1993, only 10% of these large community banks, on average about 250 banks per year, used any interest-rate derivatives. We find evidence that the use of interest-rate derivatives is positively related to exposure to interest-rate risk as measured by the absolute value of the 12-month maturity gap. In addition, a community bank's decision to participate in interest-rate contracts is positively related to size. Nevertheless, we find no positive relationship between size and the extent of participation in the derivatives market. Finally, our evidence suggests that banks that participate more heavily in interest-rate swaps have stronger capital positions, an indicator of market or regulatory discipline or both.     

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.     

How to explain non-performing loans by many corporate governance variables simultaneously? A corporate governance index is built to US commercial banks

This paper aims to combine the principal component analysis and GMM dynamic panel data methods in order to estimate the effect of corporate governance system on non-performing loans. The first method is meant to construct a corporate governance index for US commercial banks. The second one allows us to study the relation between the built index and non-performing loans. The advantage of the combination of these methods is reducing the number of corporate governance variables into a single one and ensuring the consistency of GMM estimates, given that a high number of variables leads to an increase in the number of GMM instruments, which in turns results in biased estimators. Applying these methods to US commercial banks, for a period including the financial crisis years, we find that small banks are characterized by a sound corporate governance system that reduces their non-performing loans. In opposition, the corporate governance fails to protect medium and large US commercial banks from excessive risk-taking that damages their loans’ quality and even leads to enormous losses especially during the global financial crisis.