Political embeddedness and firms’ choices of earnings management strategies in China

We examine whether and how political embeddedness influences financial reporting quality in China by investigating how government ownership and political connections affect Chinese listed firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. The results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in particular, central SOEs, are more likely to substitute accrual-based earnings management strategies with costlier but less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-SOEs. The results also indicate that politically connected enterprises (PCEs) are more likely to employ less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-PCEs, so much so that PCEs’ total earnings management level is higher than that of non-PCEs.     

Corporate philanthropy in a politically uncertain environment: does it bring tangible benefits to a firm? Evidence from China

We examine the impact of political uncertainty on a firm’s corporate philanthropy (CP) contribution and the associated direct tangible benefits of CP to a firm. Specifically, we examine two testable hypotheses. (1) When facing political uncertainty, a firm makes more CP, and (2) after a firm makes CP contributions during a period of uncertainty, it will obtain future tangible benefits. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we document that a firm, on average, increases its CP significantly during a period of political uncertainty (e.g. when there is a new local communist party secretary or mayor). In addition, we report that, on average, a firm’s donation in year t is positively correlated with its amount of government subsidies, corporate income tax reduction, and short- and long-term bank loan amounts in year t?+?1. The findings are robust compared to those of placebo tests and fixed effect models, as well as when using an alternative measure of political uncertainty. We observe that the results are more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than those among SOEs, corroborating the notion that during a period of political uncertainty, non-SOEs are more willing to build political connections with new city leaders through CP than are SOEs.     

State ownership and the cost of debt: Evidence from corporate bond issuances in China

Corporate credit risk can be reduced through implicit government guarantees. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China provide a distinctive setting to investigate government roles in corporate debt financing. We find that non-SOEs’ corporate bond issuance costs are significantly higher than those of SOEs. We also observe relatively lower bond issuance costs for firms controlled by the central government (CSOEs) than those controlled by local governments (LSOEs). In addition, we demonstrate that compared with SOEs, non-SOEs’ financial constraints are mitigated to a larger extent after the bond issuances. Overall, we show that state ownership plays an important role in determining corporate bond issuance costs.     

When to go abroad: economic policy uncertainty and Chinese firms’ overseas investment

We study how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) influences firms’ overseas investments for Chinese listed companies. We find a significant negative relationship between EPU and firms’ overseas investments after controlling for firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Chinese firms seem to reduce their overseas investments on fixed income securities when facing domestic policy uncertainty. The negative relationship is pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms relying on government subsidies and with low overseas revenues, and SOEs. Firms operating in high marketisation regions can mitigate the negative effect of EPU on firms’ overseas investments. Our results remain significant when considering endogeneity problems.     

Local corruption and corporate cash holdings: Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.     

Ultimate Ownership and Adjustment Speed Toward Target Capital Structures: Evidence from China

We investigate whether ultimate ownership affects firms’ adjustment speed toward target capital structures for Chinese publicly listed companies over the period 1999–2009. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs according to their ultimate ownership. We find that SOEs have higher leverage ratios and slower adjustment speeds toward target capital structures. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory, implying that the political resources of SOEs can lead to a higher persistence and slower leverage adjustment speeds in comparison to non-SOEs. Finally, our results also raise a question: Why do Chinese companies adjust their capital structure so fast?     

How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China

This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non‐SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non‐SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non‐SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.     

Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.     

Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s listed companies

By tracing the identity of large shareholders, we group China’s listed companies into those controlled by state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises (SOEs) affiliated to the central government (SOECGs), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs), and Private investors. We argue that these distinct types of owners have different objectives and motivations and this will affect how they exercise their control rights over the firms they invest in. In particular, we contend that private ownership of listed firms in China is not necessarily superior to certain types of state ownership. To test our arguments we investigate the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership of listed firms and the efficiency of various forms of state ownership. The empirical results indicate that the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling shareholder. SOECG controlled firms perform best and SAMB and Private controlled firms perform worst. SOELG controlled firms are in the middle. The results are consistent with our predictions.     

The decreasing value of non‐SOEs’ political connections during China’s anti‐corruption campaign: evidence and mechanism

In this paper, we find that China’s anti‐corruption campaign since 2012 significantly reduces the value of political connections for non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We provide evidence showing that the decline of the value of political connections for non‐SOEs is attributed mainly to the decreasing return from political connections, instead of increasing political risk. We further find that the decreasing return of the politically connected firms is driven mainly by the disappearance of the ‘resource effect’ of political connection in facilitating access to bank credit and government subsidies, but not due to the increasing cost of maintaining political connections.     

Ultimate Government Control Structures and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in China's stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government control structures and their impact on firm value: (1) how do government agencies maintain their control of listed companies; (2) what are the impacts of different government control structures on firm value; and (3) are these impacts different in local government and central government-controlled firms? We find that the Chinese government controls listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned enterprises (SSOEs). Taking into account the trade-off between political and agency costs, we show that firm value increases when some control rights are decentralized from the government to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, decentralization improves significantly the performance of local government- controlled, but not central government-controlled firms.     

State ownership and abnormal accruals in highly-valued firms: Evidence from China

We examine how state ownership affects Chinese firms’ abnormal accruals during a period of high valuation. We find the magnitude of abnormal accruals first increases for up to three years of high valuation, and then reduces after the fourth year. We also find that managers turn to using abnormal real transactions after four consecutive years of high valuation. Next, we examine whether the degree of abnormal accruals in highly-valued firms differs between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-NSOEs. Supporting the view that SOE managers have less incentive to sustain high stock prices, we find evidence that highly-valued SOEs have significantly lower levels of abnormal accruals than highly-valued NSOEs during the period of high valuation. Our findings contribute to the literature on the cross-sectional variation in the relation between managers’ pressure to sustain high stock prices and their accounting choices in firms with different ownership structures.     

国企混合所有制能治疗僵尸企业吗？ —— 一个混合所有制类啄序逻辑

本文使用1998-2013年中国工业企业数据库,采用国际前沿方法识别出僵尸企业,然后比较了国企控股、国企参股以及转制民企这三种混合所有制改革策略治疗僵尸国企的效果。实证结果表明:相对于纯国企,混合所有制改革对僵尸国企具有显著的治疗效果;在多种混合所有制改革策略中,转制民企优于国企参股,国企参股优于国企控股,这形成了一种“国企混改类啄序”现象;然而,上述“啄序”现象并非对所有国企都适用,对于那些所处行业垄断程度高、企业政治级别高的国企,单纯民营化导向的混改对僵尸企业治愈的效果较差;最后,混合所有制改革治疗僵尸国企的主要渠道,是降低了国企的期间费用(主要是管理费用)。本文的结果为处置僵尸企业和渐进式改革提供了重要的理论依据。     

Monitoring or colluding: the role of venture capital investors in the IPO process

We argue and provide evidence that instead of playing a monitoring role, venture capital (VC) investors collude with controlling shareholders in the IPO process of Chinese non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We show that VC‐backed IPOs’ applications are more likely to be approved by regulators, especially in firms with excess control rights, but have worse post‐IPO performance. Through investing in firms with excess control rights, VC investors are able to make higher exit returns. We further document that VC investors’ role in the IPO process is stronger when they have political connections, hold higher ownership, and when they make pre‐IPO investment.     

Chairman’s government background,excess employment and government subsidies: Evidence from Chinese local state-owned enterprises

Local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China continue to face government interference in their operations. They are influenced both by the government’s “grabbing hand” and by its “helping hand.” Our study examines how SOE chairmen with connections to government influence their firm’s employment policies and the economic consequences of overstaffing. Using a sample of China’s listed local state-owned enterprises, we find that the scale of overstaffing in these SOEs is negatively related to the firms’ political connections to government. However, this relationship turns positive when the firm’s chairman has a government background. Appointing chairmen who have government backgrounds is a mechanism through which the government can intervene in local SOEs and influence firms’ staffing decisions. We also find that in compensation for the expenses of overstaffing, local SOEs receive more government subsidies and bank loans. However, the chairmen themselves do not get increased pay or promotion opportunities for supporting overstaffing. Further analysis indicates that whereas the “grabbing hand” of government does harm to a firm’s economic performance, the “helping hand” provides only weak positive effects, and such government intervention actually reduces the efficiency of social resource allocation.     

Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong

This paper investigates why Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political connections (i.e., politically connected firms) are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected firms. We find that connected firms' post-overseas listing performance is worse than that of non-connected firms. This evidence suggests that connected firms' managers list their firms overseas for private (political) benefits. Consistent with this private benefits explanation, we further find that connected firms' managers are more likely to receive political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to overseas listing than domestic listing.     

Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

The extant corporate investment literature has documented that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In this study, we investigate whether government intervention, as another form of friction, distorts firms' investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Using Chinese data, we test this by measuring government intervention at two different levels. First, we compare investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs. Second, we measure government intervention by whether a firm is politically connected through the employment of top executives with a government background. We find that political connections significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs. However, we do not find such evidence in non-SOEs. Taken together, our findings suggest that government intervention in SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency.     

产权性质、制度环境与内部控制

内部控制是近年来国内外监管部门、实务界和学术界关注的热点与前沿问题。本文研究我国上市公司最终控制人的产权性质与地区制度环境对公司内部控制质量的影响。利用厦门大学内控课题组(2010)构建的2007-2009年我国上市公司内部控制指数,本文主要发现:首先,相比于中央政府控制的公司,地方政府控制的公司内部控制质量相对较差,而非政府控制的公司内部控制质量与中央政府控制的公司之间则没有明显差异;其次,上市公司所在地区的市场化程度越高或政府对经济的干预程度越低,公司的内部控制质量越高,尤其是对于地方政府控制和非政府控制的上市公司,并且,良好的外部制度环境有助于缩小地方政府控制和非政府控制公司的内部控制与中央政府控制公司之间的差距。本文的研究结果对相关主管部门及监管机构具有一定的政策启示意义。     

Executive turnover in China’’s state-owned enterprises:Government-oriented or market-oriented?

Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China’s SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives’ economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.     

The information transfer effects of political connections on mitigating policy uncertainty: Evidence from China

A key aspect of Chinese-style institutions is that the growth of the economy can be severely restricted by the adjustment and implementation of policy, leading to serious uncertainty in business practices. This paper investigates whether political connections help private firms obtain policy information ahead of public disclosure that would allow them to hedge against policy uncertainty. Using the quarterly data on non-financial private listed companies over 2007:Q1–2017:Q4, we find that the negative effect of policy uncertainty on fixed-asset investment is lower in politically connected firms than in non-connected firms, especially in industries with low asset reversibility and regions with a high degree of marketization. Further, a positive mitigation of policy uncertainty exists in firms whose top executives served as officials rather than deputies, and higher administrative as well as finance-related political connections show more information advantage. In addition, robust evidence is provided that controls the impacts of political connections on financing constraints, business performance and policy burdens, overcoming potential endogeneity, and the cash-holdings perspective. Our findings suggest that political connections are conducive to mitigate information asymmetry between private firms and policymakers in China.