Dynamic price formation in a futures market via double auctions

Summary We report an exploratory study of the process of price formation in a speculative market in the absence of liquidity traders. Traders exchange a futures contract because they interpret information differently. We formulate trading as a sequence of anonymous double auctions and introduce a notion of bounded rationality in which traders use approximate models of market response in forming their bids. We prove existence of a perfect equilibrium in the sequential anonymous auctions game, and show that the equilibrium has a no-regret property. After learning the market price, a trader regrets neither the bid that he made nor the position that he holds. We show that trading volume is related to changes in the distribution of information in the economy. We also show that volume and expected change in price are related to two different attributes of the pattern of private information flow. Fundamentally, no particular relationship between the time series of these variables is always valid for all futures contracts. This point is emphasized by an example.I am thankful for useful comments made by Avraham Beja, James Gammil, Chi-fu Huang, David Scharfstein and three anonymous referees. Financial support from Stanford Graduate School Faculty Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.     

Insider trading and information revelation with the introduction of futures markets

We establish a theoretical model with informed trading in which both of individual stock futures and its underlying stock are traded in the market. With the introduction of the futures, the paper shows that an informed trader's position of futures usually motivates him or her to trade more aggressively in the stock market at the expiration day. This also worsens the adverse selection problem and makes the stock market become less liquid. Moreover, the increase of the informed trading accelerates the information revelation and improves market efficiency on the expiration date. Finally, our results suggest that price manipulation could be one factor that affects the market liquidity and market efficiency when the futures are introduced into the market.     

Order Flows,Investor Sentiments and Feedback Trade in Index Futures Market

This paper examines the presence of feedback trading, and investor sentiment drove feedback trading by traders in the Nifty 50 index futures contract in India. The results of the study using high-frequency data sampled at 10 min interval using VAR and contemporaneous VAR model as applied to market microstructure settings reveals negative evidence of feedback trade and investor sentiment-driven feedback trade in Nifty 50 futures contract. Further, consistency with noise trading hypothesis, order flows in Nifty 50 futures contract is less informative when traders are overly optimistic.

     

Concentration and Liquidity in Mature Markets: Evidence from the US Dollar/Yen Futures Market

The cost of liquidity is the major cost of transacting on organised futures exchanges. Liquidity has value both to traders and to exchanges. This paper argues that liquidity varies directly with market development, and that this relationship provides a major incentive for mergers among exchanges. While previous research on liquidity has focused on spot markets for a range of securities, this paper employs data from the US dollar/Yen futures contract to investigate the relationship between liquidity and volume, between liquidity, volume and volatility, and between liquidity and the speculation ratio. The paper tests for non–linearity in these relationships, and explores the presence of Granger causality between pairs of key variables.
The results include inter alia the presence of a significant negative relationship between the cost of liquidity and volume, and evidence of a significant non–linear relationship in which the cost of liquidity varies directly with volatility and negatively with the conditional fourth moment about the mean of daily prices (a measure of kurtosis). Moreover, there is evidence that liquidity Granger causes volume, that volatility Granger causes volume, and that liquidity Granger causes the speculation ratio.     

异质信念、投机均衡与农产品期货定价*

农产品期货市场套利并不充分,交易者也不是完全理性的。本文假设农产品期货市场有限套利、交易者异质信念并遵循“经验法则”预期,构建了农产品期货投机均衡定价模型,并认为集中竞价规则下产生的农产品期货价格是由交易者的预期决定的;前期期货价格水平、现货价格和前期期货价格的变动趋势、不同类型交易者的比例结构及其预期模式共同影响农产品期货价格的形成与波动;基本分析法交易者占主导地位的农产品期货市场具有更高的套期保值与价格发现效率。针对中国七种主要农产品期货的实证结果显示,农产品期货投机均衡定价模型对解释中国农产品期货价格的形成与波动是有效的。这意味着在期货行情系统中实时披露现货价格信息,培育和引导交易者运用基本分析法预测期货价格走势,有助于提升农产品期货市场的效率。     

Contract settlement specification and price discovery: Empirical evidence in Australia individual share futures market

This study applies Geweke [J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 76 (1982) 304] measures of information flow and dependence between Australian individual share futures (ISF) contract and its underlying stock market to investigate whether the price discovery function of futures price has been enhanced after the switch of futures contracts from cash settlement to physical delivery. It is found that the spot market leads the futures market as the futures trading volume is rather small. Further tests suggest that the switch from cash settlement to physical delivery in the ISF contracts has reinforced the information flow from the spot market to the futures market.     

FUTURES MARKET EFFICIENCY,THE UNBIASEDNESS HYPOTHESIS AND VARIANCE-BOUNDS TESTS: THE CASE OF THE FTSE-100 FUTURES CONTRACT*

The efficiency of futures markets is critical to their price discovery role. This paper investigates the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and unbiasedness of futures prices for the FTSE-100 stock index futures contract. Unlike previous studies, it tests for both long-run and short-run efficiency using cointegration and error correction models. Variance-bounds tests are developed and utilized for examining the question of efficiency. Results show that the market is efficient and provides an unbiased estimate of future spot prices for one and two months away from expiration. However, for three and more months away from expiration this is not the case, which has implications for the users of this market.     

Conservative traders,natural selection and market efficiency

This paper examines the impact of conservative traders on market efficiency in an evolutionary model of a commodity futures market. This paper shows that the long-run market outcome is informationally efficient, as long as in every period there is a positive probability that entering traders are more conservative than their predecessors. Conservative traders are those who correctly predict the spot price with a positive probability, and more importantly, who in their mistakes err on the side of caution, and rarely overpredict the spot price as buyers, and underpredict the spot price as sellers. This result does not require entry of traders with better information than their predecessors.     

Effects of electronic trading on the Hang Seng Index futures market

This investigation of the switch from open-outcry trading to electronic trading on the Hang Seng Index (HSI) futures contract reveals that the bid–ask spread narrows and the futures price plays more of a role in information transmission. Factors, such as anonymity in trading and fast order execution in electronic trading, attract informed traders to the futures market, enhancing the information flow. Our results provide support for the worldwide trend of transforming open-outcry markets into electronic trading platforms.     

Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium

This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature, such as Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as real estate agencies in the housing market and employment agencies (or newspapers) in the labour market, which puts traders into direct contact with each other. With heterogeneity of trader preferences, equilibrium trade is characterized by existing traders on each side of the market trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side (since existing traders have already sampled and rejected each other). Two procedures of trade co-exist, namely a strategic bilateral bargaining process and a competitive bidding process, depending on the number of potential matches a new trader obtains. We characterize the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium to this stochastic trading game.     

Insider trading with public and shared information

We study the impact of public information and shared information on traders' trading behavior in the context of Kyle's (1985) speculative market. We suppose that there are four types of traders in our model: one insider, M outsiders, liquidity traders, and market makers. We explicitly describe the unique linear Nash equilibrium and find that public information harms the insider but benefits the outsiders and noise traders. Also, the market is more efficient because of the existence of public information.     

Effects of Securities Transaction Taxes on Depth and Bid-Ask Spread

This note investigates the effects of introducing a transaction tax on depth and bid-ask spread using a static model where a competitive market maker faces informed and liquidity traders. When the degree of information asymmetry is low, an increase in the transaction tax can result into a smaller rise in the selling price and the depth may even increase in some cases. When information asymmetry is high, the dealer could increase the selling price more than the tax and sometimes lowers the depth. This can result in a market shutdown if the liquidity trader is driven out of the market. We thank Vincent Reinhart and Walter Fisher for helpful discussions. Special thanks are also due to an anonymous referee and the editor C.D. Aliprantis for insightful comments and suggestions which have helped us to improve the paper substantially. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Front-running dynamics

We integrate a monopolist dual trader into a dynamic model of speculation. In static settings, [J.-C. Rochet, J.-L. Vila, Insider trading without normality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 61 (1994), 131-152] establish an irrelevance result—expected equilibrium outcomes are the same whether the monopolist speculator sees liquidity trade or not; and Roell [Dual-capacity trading and market quality, J. Finan. Intermediation (1990), 105-124] shows that with multiple speculators, dual trading benefits liquidity traders. In dynamic settings, these results are reversed: a front-running speculator exploits knowledge of future liquidity trade, extracting greater profits by smoothing profit extraction intertemporally. Front running introduces positive serial correlation to order flow. Accordingly, market makers discount past order flow in prices, but prices retain the martingale property.     

Simultaneity, Rationality and Price Determination in US Live Cattle

The results of recent research on the informational efficiency of the US live cattle futures market are ambiguous. Moreover, simultaneous, rational expectations models of spot and futures markets for non-storables are lacking in the literature. This paper addresses both issues: by developing a simultaneous rational expectations model of the US live cattle market, with functional relationships for short hedgers, long hedgers, net short speculators and consumers, the paper employs a wider information set than in previous research and it thus provides a more powerful test of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Tests indicate the possible presence of non-linearities in the long hedging and net short speculation equations.
The results suggest first, that there is support for Working's hypotheses of selective and operational hedging, for short and long hedgers respectively, second that speculators may be noise traders or risk-loving (although the non-linear version of the speculation function partially corrects this anomaly), and third that beef is a normal good while corn is a complementary input. Time-varying volatility is represented as an EGARCH ( p , q ) process. Post-sample, this model does not significantly outperform the futures price in spot price forecasting, implying non-rejection of the EMH.     

TRADER TYPE EFFECTS ON THE VOLATILITY‐VOLUME RELATIONSHIP EVIDENCE FROM THE KOSPI 200 INDEX FUTURES MARKET

We investigate whether the trading activity generated by investors with different access to information and trading motives has positive or negative impact on index futures volatility. Surprises in non‐member institutional, individual and foreign investors' trading volume are positively associated with volatility in most of the cases. For member institutional investors, unexpected trading volume is positively related to volatility. Long‐run changes in the trading activity also affect volatility differently across trader types. Finally, allowing for time‐to‐maturity effects, surprises in open interest are associated with more volatility towards contract expiration, contrary to the negative effect we find during normal times.     

Market for Information and Identity Disclosure in an Experimental Open Limit Order Book

This paper analyses the effects of pre‐trade transparency on market quality in an experimental open limit order book preceded by a market for information. The design of the trading game is akin to the system in use in an increasing number of financial markets. We find that the disclosure of traders' identities reduces the incentive to acquire information, liquidity and volatility. We also show that a positive relation exists between the proportion of traders buying information and liquidity. The results are consistent with a standard model of price formation where the number of informed traders is endogenous .     

Price Limits, Information Acquisition, and Bid–ask Spreads: Theory and Evidence

A number of futures markets use price limits which, in effect, preclude trade from occurring at prices outside certain exogenous bounds. Noting that such markets are characterized by heterogeneously informed traders, whereas previous work on price limits assumes symmetrically informed traders, we examine the effects of price limits in a setting where market participants are asymmetrically informed. We find that imposing price limits generally lowers the quality of information acquired in equilibrium, but lowers bid–ask spreads as well. Thus, depending on the relative weights placed by society on liquidity versus price efficiency, there may exist a set of price limits that are most efficient in achieving a trade-off between liquidity and informational efficiency. We perform empirical tests of some implications of the model using cross-sectional data on price limits. We find that price limits are strongly negatively related to both price volatility and trading volume. Though other explanations for our empirical findings cannot be ruled out, these results are not inconsistent with the model's implication that price limits should be tighter for contracts which offer greater profit potential for informed traders.     

Market Dynamics,Programmed Traders and Futures Markets: Beginning the Laboratory Search for a Smoking Gun

Recent events have caused a re-examination of the role of programmed traders and futures markets in generating destabilizing price movements. Laboratory experiments provide an ideal environment to isolate their effects on behaviour. In a new series of experiments we find that program traders and futures markets can be crucial for ensuring the informational efficiency of the spot market, even when the former are active participants in bubbles and crashes     

Volatility–volume co-movements: evidence from China metal markets

This article investigates the interactional relationship between price volatility and futures trading activity for three heavily traded metal products on the Shanghai Metal Exchange and the Shanghai Futures Exchange. Using models based on vector autoregression and generalized method of moments, we show, in particular, that futures trading activity has a strong impact on both spot and futures price volatility in copper and aluminium markets. Futures trading activity leads spot market volatility in copper and aluminium markets which suggests that futures markets have a destabilizing effect. In order to disentangle the effect of different traders’ types on asset price movements, we decompose futures trading into speculators’ and hedgers’ trading and investigate their contributions to volatility. As a robustness check, we investigate the impact of endogenous structural breaks on the interactional relationship between price volatility and futures trading.     

Impacts of derivative markets on spot market volatility and their persistence

In this article, we investigate the impacts of futures and options markets on the volatility of the underlying market. Unlike earlier studies, the focus is on their persistence over time. Tests on the Hang Seng index yield several interesting results that often contrast with previous findings. Empirical results suggest that the quality of new information generated by derivative trading determines the impacts on the spot market volatility. The futures market provides new, material information reducing spot market volatility. The Options market, on the other hand, generates noisy information and distorts price, which is followed by an increase in volatility and a decrease in its sensitivity to price change. While the impact of futures persists, that of options mostly disappears as the market matures. Our conjecture is that the futures market is mainly driven by informed, experienced participants, while the options market attracts new, inexperienced investors.