Can a comparative capitalism approach explain fiscal policy activism?

This study investigates the implications of models of capitalism for the responsiveness of countries’ fiscal policies during business cycles using new data for member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and China. We expand the literature by adding the category of East Asian nonliberal capitalism to the established distinction of liberal market economies and nonliberal coordinated market economies. These three differ substantially not just in their fiscal policies, but also in monetary policies, degree of financial market orientation, exchange rate regime, and labor market organization. As in previous studies, we find that governments of liberal economies adopt more countercyclical fiscal policies. Departing from existing studies, however, among the nonliberal models of capitalism, (East Asian) state-led models have more countercyclical fiscal policies than (European) coordinated market economies, perhaps as countercyclical as liberal economies, both historically and during the 2007–9 crisis. This is due to less independent central banks, managed float of exchange rates, and limited financial market orientation and financial openness in East Asia, which allow for more active fiscal policy. Among political factors, left-of-center governments, fractionalized party systems, and election years are associated weakly with countercyclical fiscal policy, as expected. Labor market coordination and welfare generosity have unclear roles in regard to fiscal policy, a topic for future research.     

US Credit Crisis and Spillovers to Asia

We review key highlights of the global credit crisis. We then consider how financial turmoil in the largest advanced economies might be transmitted to East Asia. The focus is on foreign trade links, international capital flows, currency market pressures and mismatches, financial sector fragilities, and countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy actions. We introduce a set of vulnerability indicators and explore whether an ordinal ranking of East Asian economies according to these vulnerability indicators seems to be related to the cross-country differences in estimated slowdowns of economic growth during the crisis. Finally, we discuss how Asian economies might encourage the adoption of a stronger regulatory and supervisory framework in the USA and whether some Asian economies and the USA might pursue a more “balanced” growth strategy after the crisis.     

Neoliberal growth models,monetary union and the Euro crisis. A post-Keynesian perspective

The paper offers an account of the Euro crisis based on post-Keynesian monetary theory and its typology of demand regimes. Neoliberalism has transformed social and financial relations in Europe but it has not given rise to a sustained profit-led growth process. Instead, growth has relied either on financial bubbles and rising household debt (‘debt-driven growth’) or on net exports (‘export-driven growth’). In Europe the financial crisis has been amplified by an economic policy architecture (the Stability and Growth Pact) that aimed at restricting the role of fiscal policy and monetary policy. This neoliberal economic policy regime in conjunction with the separation of monetary and fiscal spheres has turned the financial crisis of 2007 into a sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe.     

Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in the Euro Area?

We test the relationship between the cyclically adjusted primary balance and alternative indicators of cyclical conditions for the euro area and 18 OECD countries over the period 1970–2009. A countercyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy is found during bad times after 1999 in the euro area as a whole and in a few member countries only (France, Ireland and The Netherlands). It is also associated with high public deficits or low public debts. There is no significant case of procyclical fiscal policy after 1999, neither in good times nor in bad times.     

Optimal macroeconomic policies in a financial and economic crisis: a case study for Slovenia

In this paper, we study different and, in particular, “optimal” reactions of fiscal (and to some extent monetary) policies to the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 in Slovenia, a small open economy that is part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Using an econometric model of the Slovenian economy, we simulate the effects of the global crisis under the assumption of no-policy reactions, i.e. assuming that macroeconomic policies are conducted without attempting to deal with the effects of the crisis. Next, we study the possibilities of fiscal policy reducing or even annihilating the effects of the crisis. We also investigate the optimal reaction of fiscal policies based on the assumption that Slovenian policy-makers behave as though they were optimizing an objective function. We show that optimal policies call for only a very modestly active countercyclical role of fiscal policies. There are strong trade-offs between countercyclical fiscal policies and the requirements of fiscal solvency.     

Cyclicality of fiscal policy and the shadow economy

A survey of recent literature on cyclical properties of fiscal policy reveals that fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries whereas it is countercyclical in developed ones. However, there is no consensus on what drives the difference in this specific cyclical property of fiscal policy. Using cross-section and panel data sets for 78 countries we document that procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in countries with a larger size of the shadow economy. We also show that policies reducing the size of the shadow economy lead to a less (more) procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal response to shocks.     

Optimal monetary–fiscal policy in the euro area liquidity crisis

We build an euro-area level DSGE model featuring a liquidity shock in the sovereign bonds market to simulate the strong contraction in economic activity observed during the 2008–2009 crisis. In the model, a sudden deterioration of the liquidity property of sovereign bonds is associated with deep recession and deflation. Against this background we characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy with full commitment. We find that the optimal policy contains three features: (i) the policy rate is lowered until hitting the zero lower bound (ZLB) and then is kept at the ZLB for more periods; (ii) a prolonged central bank’s balance-sheet expansion aimed at restoring the liquidity deteriorated; (iii) a counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus which offsets, to a large extent, the fall in private spending caused by the liquidity shock. Policy regimes involving (i), but not (ii) and (iii), are quite weak in stabilizing output gap and inflation. Monetary policy regimes such as full inflation-targeting or nominal GDP targeting perform remarkably well insofar as they are complemented with an optimally-implemented counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Our results tend to favour the view that, in case of recession, an euro-wide coordinated fiscal policy should supplement the role of the ECB in achieving its primary objective.     

Post-truth Politics,Bullshit and Bad Ideas: ‘Deficit Fetishism’ in the UK

Debates about economic policy in Britain have been dominated by claims that sovereign debt problems are due to loose fiscal policy and excessive spending rather than volatile capital flows and flawed monetary policy. There are strong grounds for believing that these stories are largely nonsense, yet they inform policy and are widely believed among mass publics, and have proved almost impossible to refute in everyday political discourse. The answer to this puzzle, we suggest, is that such claims are better thought of as bullshit (as conceptualised by Harry Frankfurt 2005) rather than outright falsehoods: in other words, as speech acts that are indifferent to the truth and proceed without effective concern for the veracity of the claim in question. In this paper, we examine the characteristics of political bullshit applied to economic policy debates since the financial crisis, and seek to explain its hold on the popular imagination. We assess what makes some particular brands of bullshit more successful than others, and argue that in a world of competing realities as well as competing theories, the power of rhetoric is more likely to settle an argument than evidence and logic.     

Countercyclical taxes in a monopolistically competitive environment

In the context of a neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition, this paper studies the stabilizing effects of countercyclical tax policy when the income tax rate has an additional role of financing government budget deficits. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, countercyclical taxes generally reduce aggregate volatility, unless the fiscal response to debt accumulation is weak. The presence of monopoly power enhances these effects. Even when automatic stabilizers successfully stabilize business cycle fluctuations, countercyclical taxes are welfare inferior, due to reduced precautionary saving motives. While, if the fiscal response to debt is weak and countercyclical tax policy destabilizing, the increased precautionary saving motive is not welfare enhancing as the asset accumulated is government debt rather than capital. These results are generally robust. Nominal inertia may, however, dominate the precautionary saving mechanism.     

Fiscal adjustment in a panel of countries 1870–2016

The financial crisis from 2007 and, even more so, the Covid-19 pandemic caused large increases in public sector deficits and debts in many countries and prompted concern about fiscal adjustment. This paper examines fiscal adjustment to debt and deficits for a panel of 17 countries over 1870–2016 using the Jordà–Schularick–Taylor Macrohistory Database. This long span panel is informative since it contains many examples of large fiscal shocks similar to those recently experienced. The results from reduced-form models suggest that large deficits or surpluses tend to prompt stabilising feedbacks, mainly through changes in revenue, and there is greater pressure to adjust on countries running a deficit versus those running a surplus. However, the debt–GDP ratio prompts much less stabilising feedback by expenditure or revenue.¹     

Macroeconomic Policies for Slovenia in the “Great Recession”

The paper analyzes the effects of different reactions of fiscal (and to some extent monetary) policies to the Great Recession in Slovenia. We use the model SLOPOL8.1, an econometric model of the Slovenian economy, to simulate the effects of the global crisis under the assumption of no-policy reactions, i.e. assuming that macroeconomic policies are conducted without attempting to deal with the effects of the recession. Moreover, we investigate whether (and if so, how) fiscal policy can reduce or even annihilate the macroeconomic effects of the recession. It turns out that in order to achieve reasonable rates of growth and of unemployment, a highly expansionary design of fiscal policies is required, which is neither realistic nor sustainable. There are strong trade-offs between countercyclical fiscal policies and the requirements of fiscal solvency. Acceptable fiscal policies are mildly countercyclical and are not able to shelter the Slovenian economy from the negative effects of a slump like that occurring during the Great Recession.     

The transition crisis in Bulgaria

In 1996-97, while making its way through a difficult processof economic and political transformations, Bulgaria was hitby a severe economic crisis. This paper seeks to reveal andanalyse the underlying factors and causes of this crisis. Itfocuses on empirical issues but also highlights some basic causalitiesand interrelations between economic variables during the crisisas well as the role of economic policy. The economic turmoilin Bulgaria is addressed from three different perspectives:(1) the historic roots of the crisis; (2) the actual evolutionof the fiscal, banking and currency crises, and (3) the politicaleconomy of the transition in Bulgaria.     

To react or not? Technology shocks, fiscal policy and welfare in the EU-3

This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to examine the quantitative macroeconomic implications of counter-cyclical fiscal policy for France, Germany and the UK. The model incorporates real wage rigidity and consumption habits, as the particular market failures justifying policy intervention. We subject the model to productivity shocks and allow policy instruments to react to the output gap and the debt-to-output ratio. A welfare analysis reveals that the most effective instrument-target combination is to use public consumption to stabilize the output gap. Moreover, welfare gains from counter-cyclical fiscal policy are much stronger in the presence of wage rigidities compared with consumption habits. Finally, since active policy and automatic stabilizers are substitutes, it is possible that relatively undistorted economies may be in need of countercyclical fiscal action due to inadequate automatic stabilizers.     

On graduation from fiscal procyclicality

In the past, industrial countries have tended to pursue countercyclical or, at worst, acyclical fiscal policy. In sharp contrast, emerging and developing countries have followed procyclical fiscal policy, thus exacerbating the underlying business cycle. We show that, over the last decade, about a third of the developing world has been able to escape the procyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical. We then focus on the role played by the quality of institutions, which appears to be a key determinant of a country’s ability to graduate. We show that, even after controlling for the endogeneity of institutions and other determinants of fiscal procyclicality, there is a causal link running from stronger institutions to less procyclical or more countercyclical fiscal policy.     

THE GREAT RECESSION, “RAINY DAY” FUNDS,AND COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

We examine the fiscal policy options that were available to Latin American countries at the onset of the current global economic crisis, concluding that most of the major countries in the region possessed the fiscal space (as measured by credible fiscal sustainability and debt headroom) to run prudent countercyclical fiscal deficits. For those countries, the appropriate policy response involved a constrained fiscal expansion focused on productive public spending and financed by drawing on the “rainy day” funds—in the form of large stocks of foreign exchange reserves—that they accumulated in prior years, rather than by market borrowing. (JEL E62, E63, F34)     

Fiscal policy asymmetries and the sustainability of US government debt revisited

This paper empirically investigates US fiscal policy sustainability and cyclicality in an empirical structure that allows fiscal policy responses to exhibit asymmetric behavior. We investigate this over two quarterly intervals, both of which begin in 1955:1. The short sample ends in 1995:2 and is most similar to the one used by Bohn (Q J Econ 113:949–963, 1998), whereas the full sample ends in 2013:3. Our estimation results show that the full sample period is sufficiently different from the short sample period, that the asymmetric (nonlinear) empirical models used in this paper are important and that the sustainability of US government debt topic needed to be revisited. Indeed, the short sample provides evidence of fiscal policy sustainability in line with Bohn’s (1998) findings. However, when considering the full sample, US fiscal policy is found sustainable during good economic times only according to the best fitting nonlinear model, but unsustainable for all specifications studied during times of distress. With regard to cyclicality, both samples show policy is asymmetric. Moreover, both samples show countercyclical policy during times of distress and the full sample results show some evidence that policy may be procyclical during good economic times.     

International Reserves and Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between the pattern of fiscal policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries, and how this relationship is associated with political risk and conditional access to global capital markets. It finds evidence that for developing countries with low political risk, countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policies are associated with higher (lower) international reserve holdings in economic downturns. The relationship is stronger when the countries with low political risk rely heavily on external financing. For developing countries with high political risk, the link between reserves holdings and fiscal policy pattern is not clear-cut.     

The effects of economic policy uncertainty on China’s economy: evidence from time-varying parameter FAVAR

ABSTRACT

This article explores the effects of China’s economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on its fiscal policy, monetary policy and a wide range of macro-economic variables using a time-varying parameter FAVAR model. Based on monthly data from 07/2003 to 08/2017, the time-varying structure of the model allows us to capture the time-varying characteristics of the macro-economic variables and which channel is relevant. Empirical results reveal that the reaction of monetary and fiscal policies to EPU is highly asymmetric across macro-economic circumstances. Loose monetary and fiscal policies are adopted in response to EPU shocks during the financial crisis, while policies are moderately tightened after the crisis. The China Interbank Offered Rate (Chibor) responds more sensitively and severely than M2 to EPU shocks. Additionally, EPU shocks have a significant and negative impact on economic growth, consumption, exchange rates, bonds and the stock market, but showing a positive impact on credit, real estate and fixed asset investment (which might be due to China’s special economic market environment and the high investment return). The results indicate that EPU shocks significantly affect macroeconomic fundamentals through precautionary savings and financial market channels but lose their effectiveness through a ‘real options’ effect.     

Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy in Latin America over the period 1990 ‐ 2015

Latin American countries experienced important changes in the 2000s. The implementation of fiscal reforms, public debt reduction and the high level of accumulated reserves gave them more policy space than in the past. As a result, Latin American countries were able to implement countercyclical policies to face the negative economic and social consequences associated with the recent macroeconomic shock. Some countries performed better than others. In particular, Social Democratic and Centrist governments enjoyed more fiscal space; they had realized larger budget surpluses over the good years and were able to cope with the crisis without impairing their fiscal conditions. Yet, Latin America has experienced a public finance deterioration in the most recent years. While governments are showing an increasing ability on taxation they are still facing some problems on the expenditure side. As a result, fiscal policy returned acyclical after the period of the crisis. The sustainability of public accounts may be strengthened increasing tax pressure on the richest, reducing tax evasion and improving current spending efficiency. However, the increasing political problems are putting many questions about future trends of public finance in the region.     

The effects of financial crisis on fiscal positions

The recent financial crisis was characterized by the sizeable fiscal cost of banking sector bail out operations and the significant automatic and discretionary fiscal policy response to shrinking output, which have put increased pressure on public finances in many industrialized countries. This paper tries to evaluate the impact of financial crisis episodes on debt developments. The findings indicate that severe financial crisis episodes increase the stock of debt by 2.7%–4.0% of GDP, on average in the 20 OECD countries examined. Ιn countries with big financial sectors it ranges from 4.2%–5.3% of GDP and in countries with smaller financial sectors it is about 1.4%–1.7% of GDP. The primary balance and the cyclically adjusted fiscal policy stance ease by about 2.6% of GDP and 1.6% of potential GDP, respectively, in the event of a severe financial market crash. Expansionary fiscal interventions are more pronounced in countries with sizable financial sectors. I find significant evidence that a financial market collapse paves the way for a subsequent deterioration in debt ratios.