Mechanism choice and the buy-it-now auction: A structural model of competing buyers and sellers

A striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms. Items on eBay, for instance, are frequently offered through auctions, posted prices, and buy-it-now auctions. In this article, I study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers. I specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets, in which I consider both sides of the market: On the demand side, buyers' choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game. On the supply side, sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices. I estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on eBay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets: the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed-price listings, respectively. I find that the addition of auctions to fixed-price markets hurts sellers and risk-averse buyers but benefits risk-neutral buyers. Additionally, the consumer surplus increases when buy-it-now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further. I discuss the intuition for the cause of this result.     

List Prices,Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets

Many goods are marketed after first stating a list price, with the expectation that the eventual sales price will differ. In this article, we first present a simple model of search behavior that includes the seller setting a list price. Holding constant the mean of the buyers’ distribution of potential offers for a good, we assume that the greater the list price, the slower the arrival rate of offers but the greater is the maximal offer. This trade‐off determines the optimal list price, which is set simultaneously with the seller's reservation price. Comparative statics are derived through a set of numerical sensitivity tests, where we show that the greater the variance of the distribution of buyers’ potential offers, the greater is the ratio of the list price to expected sales price. Thus, sellers of atypical goods will tend to set a relatively high list price compared with standard goods. We test this hypothesis using data from the Columbus, Ohio, housing market and find substantial support. We also find empirical support for another hypothesis of the model: atypical dwellings take longer to sell.     

Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Search Versus Auction

We propose a model of mechanism choice in the disposition of real estate assets where we consider two alternatives: a search market and an auction. Within the search framework, we derive an equilibrium whereby buyers incur search costs and sellers incur holding costs for the period during which the property is not sold. In the auction alternative, the seller joins an existing pool of sellers in undertaking a multiple–object auction and pays a commission upon sale. Buyers and sellers freely choose their mechanisms, which in equilibrium are optimal given each group's conjectures about the mechanism choice of their counterpart. In equilibrium, an agent cannot benefit from deviating from his choice and each agent's beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium outcome. It is shown that (a) buyers with high search costs will choose auctions because the auction payoff imposes an upper bound on buyers' gains from search, and (b) prices at auctions will be higher. Using vacant lot sales data and a method–of–moment estimator which accounts for the presence of an endogenous discrete mechanism choice variable, we estimated a hedonic regression to detect the price effect. It was determined that, on average, lots sold for $1.44 per square foot more in auctions than in the search market, as predicted by our model.     

Information disclosure in optimal auctions

This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers learn about their valuation of a good to be sold. This setting is related to many real situations such as home sales, antique auctions, and digital platforms such as Google and Facebook selling online advertising slots. Two important questions arise: what is the optimal selling mechanism, and what is the optimal disclosure policy of the seller. Under the assumption of private values, a simple auction with a reserve price is the optimal mechanism. What we show is that the amount of (costly) information provided increases with the number of potential bidders when using the optimal mechanism and is greater than when the object is always sold. Because information changes the distribution of a bidder’s expected valuations, the optimal reserve price also changes, so that the number of bidders (indirectly) affects the reserve price. We show that as the number of bidders increases, the optimal reserve price becomes more restrictive.     

Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation*

Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unit search cost faced by consumers, I show when platforms can profitably obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.     

Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales

We offer a theoretical and empirical comparison of auctions and negotiated sales. We first build a simple model to show that auctions generate a higher relative price than negotiated sales when demand for the asset is strong, when the asset is more homogeneous and when the asset attracts buyers with higher valuations. Using data from property sales in Singapore, we find support for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we find that auctions do not necessarily generate a higher price premium for foreclosed properties than for nonforeclosed properties.     

Quality infomediation in search markets

We examine the effects of informational intermediation by a third party ‘infomediary’ in a search model with heterogeneous seller qualities and asymmetric information. The infomediary earns revenue by selling a list of accredited sellers (a ‘guidebook’) to buyers and selling accreditations to sellers. We show that such information always improves welfare but can hurt informed buyers (as well as the uninformed) if it is not sufficiently informative about seller qualities. The model also provides a number of insights concerning the private and social incentives to create information, and the determinants and nature of demand for infomediation services by buyers and sellers.     

Competing through information provision

This paper studies the symmetric equilibria of a two-buyer, two-seller model of directed search in which sellers commit to information provision. More informed buyers have better differentiated private valuations and extract higher rents from trade. When sellers cannot commit to sale mechanisms, information provision is higher under competition than under monopoly. In contrast, when sellers commit to both information provision and sale mechanisms, I identify simple conditions under which sellers post auctions and provide full information in every equilibrium, ensuring that all equilibrium outcomes are constrained efficient. Sellers capture the efficiency gains from increased information and compete only over non-distortionary rents offered to buyers.     

Why are you really losing sales opportunities? A buyers' perspective on the determinants of key account sales failures

Key account sales are important for business organizations. Understanding why some of these sales proposals fail from the buyer's perspective has organization-wide implications for improving firm performance. Extant literature lacks a clear understanding of the process-based determinants of sales failure within a key account context. Another problem with this research stream is its reliance on data from the salesperson, sales manager, and/or selling firm, which can introduce attribution biases. Our research overcomes sales failure attribution biases by collecting data from the industrial buying center's perspective. Thirty-five semi-structured interview cases were conducted with buying decision makers following failed key account sales proposals. The result of this inquiry is a model which outlines the determinants of sales failures. We identify three common drivers of sales failure: adaptability, relationship-potential, and cost considerations. Results indicate that these established constructs are more complex than previously specified, each having multiple attributes as defined by key account buyers.     

Applying territoriality to steps in the buyer/seller process

Territoriality is the drive of an individual to stake out, establish, maintain, and defend an area of space for personal use. The “area of space” may be physical or psychological. Industrial buyers and others involved in the buying process, as members of organizations, will act to establish individual territories within the organization and may also act to represent an organization's territorial needs. Because an understanding of the behavior of buyers is important to industrial sales people, and because the concept of territoriality is a mixture of psychological processes, physical behavior, and the space surrounding an individual, a Territoriality Scan System is proposed to assist the salesperson in improving his or her sales communications with industrial buyers. A salesperson can gather important information about an industrial buyer's psychological processes by observing the buyer's physical behavior and surrounding physical space using the Territoriality Scan System. These observational measurements can then be used to enhance the entire sales presentation.     

Social media and customer relationship management technologies: Influencing buyer-seller information exchanges

Due to the increasing array of sales technology, salespeople must understand how each application assists them. This study examines how business-to-business salespeople use different forms of sales technology to meet their boundary-spanning roles. Our research draws from social exchange theory and task-technology fit theory to test a model that examines how salespeople use CRM and social media technologies differentially to support competitive information collection, product information communication, and buyer information sharing. Dyadic data from industrial buyers and sellers is used to analyze the technology-behavior relationships. Our study's results reveal social media use and CRM technology both positively influence buyer-seller information exchanges; however, each technology takes a distinct route to enable the information exchange between the buyer and the seller. The results also suggest that managers need to champion the use of both technology applications to their salesforce.     

The bonding effects of relationship value and switching costs in industrial buyer–seller relationships: An investigation into role differences

Despite the established importance of buyer–seller relationships in B-to-B markets, research to determine the differential effects that keep suppliers and customers in a relationship has been scarce. Referring to transaction cost analysis, this study investigates how switching costs and relationship value as perceived by each side unfold their bonding forces in such a relationship. Based on a large scale survey administered in Germany, Korea, New Zealand, and Argentina among marketing/sales and purchasing managers the study shows that relationship value has a stronger impact on intentions for relationship enhancement, search for alternatives and switch intention than switching costs for both buyers and sellers. Only with regard to relational tolerance and only for buyers do switching costs play a greater role than relationship value. Furthermore, buyers base their future relationship intentions more on the current state of the relationship than suppliers. Our results suggest that role differences must be taken into account when studying institutional arrangements in B-to-B markets.     

Price Strategies for Idiosyncratic Goods—The Case of Housing

We determine the mechanism that a rational, profit-maximizing seller would use to revise his reservation price for a heterogeneous or infrequently exchanged good. For instance, while one dimension of a home's quality may be easily determined in competitive markets (e.g., the valuation of floor size, location, etc.), other dimensions of quality may be idiosyncratic (unit specific) and unobservable by the seller (e.g., aesthetics of the home). Here, a seller of a new or infrequently exchanged housing unit may use sales success information to revise his expectation of the unit's market-determined value and hence revise his reservation price. The rational seller will, upon arrival of the first buyer inspecting the unit, determine a sequence of reservation prices for this and expected subsequent buyers. This price sequence falls for subsequent buyers and starts from a lower initial price if the first buyer arrives later than expected. Through this mechanism, we offer an explanation for price dispersion and vacancy durations in housing markets. While we explicitly model the real estate market here, this price revision mechanism is also applicable to rental markets, labor markets, used car markets, and other markets characterized by heterogeneity and infrequent sales.     

Do Out‐of‐State Buyers Pay More for Real Estate? An Examination of Anchoring‐Induced Bias and Search Costs

We explore the questions of whether and why out-of-state buyers pay more for real estate than their in-state counterparts. Theoretically, we develop a model capable of explaining a premium if out-of-state buyers have high search costs, upwardly biased beliefs about prices or an unusually short time horizon to purchase. Empirically, we find that out-of-state buyers pay a statistically significant and economically meaningful premium for apartment complexes in the Phoenix area. We also find some evidence consistent with the premium being driven by high search costs, biased beliefs (anchoring) and haste associated with out-of-state buyers.     

The Impact of LEED Neighborhood Certification on Condo Prices

The U.S. Green Building Council offers LEED certification for existing and new neighborhood developments that meet sustainable urban development standards. Features of sustainable urban development have been found to positively affect residential sales prices. We investigate whether the intangible labeling effects of LEED neighborhood certification add a premium to the sales prices of LEED and non‐LEED–certified condos. Using a quasi‐experiment, transaction data from Portland, Oregon, and a spatio‐temporal autoregressive (STAR) model, we find no evidence that the intangible labeling effects of LEED neighborhood certification directly or indirectly affect sales prices. Our results suggest that, contrary to LEED building certification, which we find adds a premium to condo sales prices, the LEED neighborhood label by itself fails to add value for condo buyers. Explanations for our findings include market acceptance, neighborhood delineation issues and the free rider problem as it relates to public goods.     

Ethnicity in housing markets: Buyers,sellers and agents

This paper examines how ethnicity related to cultural differences arising from ethnic background affects housing market transactions in the Atlanta metro area. Using both the US Census and Wikipedia approaches to infer ethnicity from individuals' names, we find that the interplay of buyer, seller, and agent ethnicity composition affects interaction in the housing market. Sellers working with listing agents in the same ethnic group set higher listing prices and enjoy higher selling prices and quicker sales. Agents working with same ethnicity buyers yield higher prices and liquidity. Even though sellers only communicate with buyers through their agents, houses sold by sellers to buyers of same ethnicity have higher prices and sell faster. And while the ethnic mix of agents and their clients matter, the ethnic mix of agents in the transaction does not.     

Social media: Influencing customer satisfaction in B2B sales

Social media have changed how buyers and sellers interact, and increased involvement through social media may yield positive results for sales organizations if salespeople utilize it in facilitating their behaviors. Through the perspective of value creation, we test the mediating effects of salesperson information communication behaviors between social media use and customer satisfaction. Using salesperson-reported data, within a B2B context, we empirically test a model using structural equation modeling. Salesperson's use of social media is found to impact information communication behaviors, which enhance salesperson responsiveness and customer satisfaction. Also, salesperson responsiveness is found to have a positive relationship with customer satisfaction. Findings suggest that social media plays an important role in communicating information to customers, but as an antecedent enhancing salesperson behaviors to increase customer satisfaction rather than a direct factor. This encourages managers to carefully assess goals related to social media use of their sales force.     

House Search Duration in Hot and Cold Residential Markets

This study analyzes the determinants of house search duration of consumption‐driven buyers and individual investors in different housing market environments. We use data from surveys of recent house‐buyers in “hot” and “cold” housing markets in the 2000s housing bubble in California characterized by rising and declining residential house prices, respectively. The average house price and the surveyed geographical area are the same for both periods. Expected house ownership horizon is shown to be an important determinant of the realized search duration in addition to commonly considered housing and buyer characteristics. We find a statistically significant positive effect of it on the time until purchase in both housing price environments for consumption‐driven buyers. We also find that consumption‐driven house purchases were highly pronounced in coastal areas in the hot market and inland areas in the cold market. In contrast, long‐horizon investment activity leads that of consumption activity in those areas. Short‐horizon investors, on the other hand, concentrated their house search activity in inland areas in both housing market environments.     

DOES COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENCOURAGE PIRACY?*

When copyright enforcement is targeted at high‐value buyers such as corporate and government users, the copyright holder charges super‐monopoly prices, thereby encouraging low‐value buyers to switch to inferior pirated copies. We show that enlarging the copyright holder's captive market through more extensive copyright enforcement reduces prices toward the monopoly level, increases sales of legitimate copies and can increase consumer surplus. Therefore, in contrast with the case of more intensive copyright enforcement, more extensive copyright enforcement over some range can increase the incentive to generate intellectual property while also reducing the loss to consumers from monopoly power.     

Price discrimination by language: Field experimental evidence from a shopping mall

To investigate whether foreign shoppers are discriminated against, we conduct a field experiment at a large shopping mall. We employ 56 female foreigners speaking 11 different languages and 7 Korean natives and collect data on total 2267 store visits. To test price discrimination based on differential search costs, we randomly select buyers to send a signal of lower search cost. Results show that negotiation and signaling induce sellers to lower their price offers. Our experimental findings, combined with auxiliary survey data from foreign visitors, suggest that sellers use the language of buyers as a proxy for the distribution of reservation values.