Diversity and integration of science and technology policies

This paper discusses recent conceptual approaches to technical change, based on an emerging diversity of policies and increasing “institutional specialization” and clarification of the role of the private and public incentives to support S&T. This fact is reflected in the trend in developed economies towards increasing private investment in science and technology and we argue for the need to promote public policies in modern societies fostering competence building.This broad concept has motivated the work behind the present special issue, which was launched during the 6th International Conference on Technology Policy and Innovation (ICTPI), hold in Monterey, Mexico, in the summer of 2003. Under the broad designation of “Connecting People, Ideas, and Resources across Communities” the Conference brought together a range of experts to discuss technology, policy and management in a context much influenced by a dynamic of change and a necessary balance between the creation and diffusion of knowledge. Thus, this special issue includes a set of extended and revised contributions to the Monterey conference that are largely grounded on empirical experiences of different regional and national contexts. The aim of this introductory paper is to set the stage for these contributions, with an original contribution on possible views for emerging science and technology policies.     

Public goods, merit goods, and the relation between private and government consumption

In this paper, we investigate the relation between public and private consumption, by constructing a general government spending data set, by function, for 12 European countries. In particular, we split government consumption into two categories. The first category—“public goods”—includes defence, public order, and justice. The second category—“merit goods”—includes health, education, and other services that could have been provided privately. Equations from a relatively general permanent income model are estimated by GMM. The estimates are fairly robust in showing that public goods substitute while merit goods complement private consumption. However, the relation between merit goods and private goods turns out to be stronger than that between public goods and private goods. Thus, in the aggregate government and private consumption are complements.     

Foresight and innovation in the context of industrial clusters: The case of some Italian districts

The “territory” is widely recognized in the literature on business strategy as a critical driver of industrial competitiveness (see, as an example, Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations). The generation and exploitation of new knowledge, both tacit and explicit, through the process of socialization, articulation, combination and internalization (see Nonaka and Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company) is essential to enable innovation of processes and products of “local” firms.Our recent Foresight exercises in the metal working and machinery district of Lecco and in the silk district of Como show that Foresight can play an important role in creating and exploiting new knowledge, and that different methodologies can be more or less effective to this aim.Critical technology list and interactive workshops, with the participation of entrepreneurs of SMEs and technologists, are more suited to foster the transfer of technologies that have overcome the initial stage of the life cycle and that have been already applied in other sectors. However, when radical innovations are needed in order to face the challenges posed by global competition, other methodologies, as Scenarios, are more appropriate. Even if these approaches are complex and time and resource consuming, they may be very effective in actively involving the most relevant private and public stakeholders of a district, and in making them to envisage the long term future of the economic, social, and cultural structure of their district. In this way Foresight drives the small entrepreneurs, the district stakeholders and the medium and large size firms to play the critical roles of Nonaka and Takeuchi's “frontline employees”, “senior managers” and “middle managers” in their “knowledge creating company”: the first ones grasp what the district is; the second ones build the vision of what it ought to be; the third ones, serve as a bridge between the future and the present.     

The Institutional Barriers to Heterodox Pluralism

This paper applies the feminist concept of epistemological communities to the project of promoting pluralism in the economics discipline. I argue that the economics profession does not resemble a unified and coherent epistemological community and is better viewed as many different yet overlapping and intersecting smaller communities. I argue that this reimaging of the community of economists implies a different conception of pluralism. In an environment where theory is developed at different intersections of epistemological communities, pluralism requires distinguishing between the public process of debate that provides critical evaluation of knowledge claims and the private process of determining what is published and it requires different strategies for evaluating work for publication.     

Conflict,Cooperation and Competition in Anarchy

Caplan and Stringham (2002) attempt to rebut the paradox of cooperation (Cowen and Sutter 1999) as it applies to libertarian anarchy. The paradox in the context of anarchy implies that if private defense agencies can cooperate to avoid conflict they can also collude to reestablish coercion. Caplan and Stringham argue that arbitration is self-enforcing while collusion requires solution of a prisoners dilemma. We agree that collusion requires more cooperative efficacy than arbitration, but maintain that arbitration requires considerably more organization than a simple coordination game. If a network of protection agencies can organize sufficiently to arbitrate disputes, they can also create a barrier to entry by refusing to arbitrate with entrants.     

Specifying “regime” — A framework for defining and describing regimes in transition research

It is more and more agreed by research and policy that a long-term sustainability of industrialized societies cannot be achieved without fundamental changes at the level of different societal subsystems, such as the agricultural, transportation or water management systems. This view has lead to an increase in the amount of research carried out about the so-called “transitions”. Transitions comprise long-term, fundamental change in societal subsystems and are seen as encompassing co-evolutionary and mutually reinforcing processes in the economic, technological, institutional and socio-cultural domains. Transition research aims at understanding transitions and at finding methods that facilitate change directed towards societal goals (so-called “transition management”).This paper adds to the growing body of concepts of this young research strand. It suggests a framework for defining and describing “regimes”, the systems resulting from the broad and interdisciplinary view taken by transition research. The concept “regime” is of central importance for transition research, since it defines the level of societal systems on which transitions are mainly analysed. What actually is “the regime” to be researched and possibly managed is however usually not given through clear system boundaries but is a matter of framing and deliberation. In order to guide processes of regime identification, the paper develops five defining characteristics of regimes and gives a definition based on them. Further a method useful to structure and graphically represent knowledge about a regime is introduced. Such a structuring of knowledge is an important first step to understand how a regime “works”.     

Managerial talent,motivation, and self-selection into public management

The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy's best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always higher in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.     

Spillover from private energy research

Technological progress is generally considered a key element in the move towards a less carbon-intensive energy use, and therefore public energy research expenditure has increased in many countries. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether relatively high subsidies to private energy research can be justified by higher external knowledge spillovers from private energy research compared to knowledge spillovers from other private research. Estimation of spillover effects is carried out using an unbalanced panel of more than a thousand Danish private companies observed over the period 2000–2007. We reject that there are higher spillovers from private energy research compared to other types of private research. Instead the results suggest that the external knowledge spillovers from energy research may be lower than for other types of private research. This implies that high subsidies earmarked for private energy research should not be an element in a first best policy to reduce CO₂ emissions.     

Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences

A population of fully rational agents plays a symmetric 2-player game in biological fitnesses, but each agent?s play is determined by his payoffs, which are free to evolve according to “survival of the fittest” pressures. An equilibrium-selection mechanism is assumed to exist, and deliver a unique outcome for any given profile of payoffs; this allows the evolution of payoffs to be modeled as a well-defined replicator dynamics. The existing static stability results that “efficient strict Nash implies stability” and “stability implies efficiency” are translated to this dynamic context, although the latter gives way to indeterminacy in the absence of a specific equilibrium-selection mechanism. A strong form of stability is established for the efficient outcome of games with common interests, whilst a weaker stability result is provided for efficient mixed-strategy equilibria of doubly symmetric games. The results are illustrated using the equilibrium-selection mechanism provided by global games.     

Transfer sciences: management of distributed knowledge production

This paper is concerned to develop the notion of transfer science to take account of what is perceived to be the emergence of a new mode of knowledge production. The new mode which is characterised by the production of knowledge in the context of application, by transdisciplinarity, by homogeneity and organisational diversity, by enhanced social accountability and reflexivity, and by new forms of quality control. The thrust of the new mode of knowledge production is to call into question conventional notions of knowledge transfer and focuses instead on the organisational and managerial implications of the emergence of a socially distributed knowledge production system. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the emergence of the new mode of production. Needed in the new mode are science and technology policies which promote institutional permeability and policies which enable governments, acting through their civil service to act as brokers in the new knowledge production process. Such brokerage is necessary to enhance permeability between institutions within a particular country but also to increase co-operation and collaboration between institutions across countries.     

Evaluation of national foresight activities: Assessing rationale, process and impact

The paper addresses the question of what constitutes an appropriate evaluation strategy for national foresight activities in different situations. The variety of rationales for foresight is explored, ranging from a desire to set priorities through to participation-oriented goals and building new networks around common visions and strategies. A generational model of foresight is used to show the evolution of key evaluation issues. The generic motivations for evaluation of accountability, justification and learning are discussed in the context of foresight. Evaluation grounded in the concept of behavioural additionality and the systems failure rationale is shown to be more suited as a rationale for foresight as public policy.Assessing the effects of foresight requires an understanding that it is only one of several influences on public policy. To be effective it needs to be tuned into the strategic behaviour and cycles of policy and economic actors. Cases are presented of evaluation of foresight programmes in the United Kingdom, Germany and Hungary. It is concluded that there is no “one-size-fits-all” evaluation approach and that the method selected is conditioned by motivation, timing and the level of aggregation. Foresight cannot be fully evaluated independently from its context. Foresight is being strengthened by the emergence of rigorous and systematic knowledge to assist learning and improvement.     

Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation

We study a contracting problem where a principal delegates the decision to implement a “project” to an agent who obtains private information about the value of the project before making the implementation decision. Moral hazard arises because the agent gets private random non-contractible benefits, or incurs private random non-contractible costs, if the project is implemented. This contracting problem is pervasive, when “project” and “benefits” are interpreted broadly.     

Infrastructures, incentives, and institutions: Fostering distributed knowledge bases for the learning society

While much attention has been devoted to information and communication technologies, a more fundamental change at the start of the new millennium is the increasing importance of innovation for economic prosperity and the emergence of a learning society. The analysis in this paper shows that innovation should be understood as a broad social and economic activity: it should transcend any specific technology, even if revolutionary, and should be tied to attitudes and behaviors oriented towards the exploitation of change by adding value.We build on the idea of inclusive learning, which entails a process of shared prosperity across the globe following local specific conditions, and argue that it is crucial to understand the features of knowledge-induced growth in rich countries, as well as the challenges and opportunities for late-industrialized and less-developed countries. To achieve these objectives, we emphasize the relative importance of infrastructures and incentives, but considering the increasingly important role of institutions towards the development of social capital. This is because learning societies will increasingly rely on “distributed knowledge bases” as a systematically coherent set of knowledge maintained across an economically and/or socially integrated set of agents and institutions.This broad concept has motivated the work behind the present paper, which builds on material presented at the 5th International Conference on Technology Policy and Innovation (ICTPI), which was held in Delft, The Netherlands, in June of 2001. Under the broad designation of “critical infrastructures,” the Conference brought together a range of experts to discuss technology, policy and management in a context much influenced by the dynamics of the process of knowledge accumulation, which drives learning societies. Thus, this special issue includes a set of extended contributions to the Delft conference, and the aim of this introductory paper is to set the stage for these contributions, with an original contribution on possible views on the role critical infrastructures play to foster innovation in the learning society.     

Financing R&D in Chinese private firms: Business associations or political connection?

Using a new and unique dataset of Chinese private firms, this paper explores how private firms access bank loans to finance innovative activities. The results reveal that political connection, rather than membership in a government-controlled business association, largely determines private firms' innovations by providing access to bank loans. Furthermore, the “grease-the-wheels” mechanism of political connection is stronger if the firms are more constrained financially, located in regions with low levels of financial development, or located in regions with relatively under-developed institutional environments. Finally, cash flow, used to measure internal financing, and trade credit, used to measure informal financing, are important alternative financing channels and support firms' R&D investments. Our paper implies that China's government needs to continue fostering a good financing environment and supporting innovation activities.     

Research policy and endogenous growth

This paper studies the effects of different types of research policy on economic growth. We find that while subsidies to private research, public funding of private projects, and basic research performed at public institutions have unambiguously positive effects on growth, performing applied research at public institutions could have negative growth effects. This is due to the large crowding out of private research caused by public R&D when it competes with private firms in the patent race.JEL Classification: O31, O38, O40I thank the helpful comments of Jordi Caballé, David Pérez-Castrillo and two anonymous referees. I also aknowledge the financial support of Fundaci ón Séneca project PB/3/FS/02.     

Knowledge sharing and the dynamics of social capital

Mutual aid often entails the sharing of knowledge. We investigate how, in turn, knowledge sharing affects the long-run dynamics of mutual aid. In our economy, agents with specific knowledge are “held up” by their principals. Inside communities, agents aid each other by sharing their specific knowledge. This process generates a new type of knowledge which exacerbates the specificity of the existing types and induces more agents to engage in mutual aid. However, since the knowledge generated is shared, it progressively renders agents inside communities more flexible and, thus, less dependent on mutual aid. We characterize conditions under which in the long-run mutual aid spreads or is abandoned.     

Power,luck and the right index

Summary We have pointed out the theoretical drawbacks of the traditional indices for measuring a priori voting power inasmuch as they are implied in considering the coalition value a private good. This criticism caused us to view the coalition outcome as a public good. From this aspect and additional considerations with respect to power, luck, and decisiveness, we obtained a story describing the characteristics of an adequate measure of a priori voting power. These characteristics were found to be fulfilled by an index presented by Holler (1978). Through the above analysis this index has received its theoretical justification. An independent view of this index was then provided by means of an axiomatic characterization. This characterization makes possible abstract comparison of the index with previously established private good indices.While we have restricted our attention to simple games, the index presented can be generalized to provide a value on games in characteristic function form. We leave this topic for future conideration.     

Scenarios of technology and innovation policies in Europe: Investigating future governance

In Europe, public research, technology and innovation policies are no longer exclusively in the hands of national authorities: increasingly, national initiatives are supplemented by, or even competing with, regional innovation policies or transnational programmes, in particular the activities of the European Union. At the same time, industrial innovation increasingly occurs within international networks. Are we witnessing a change of governance in European innovation policy? Based on some theoretical assumptions concerning the relationship between the “political systems” and “innovation systems” in Europe, the paper speculates about the future governance of innovation policies, trying to pave ways for empirical analyses. It sketches three scenarios stretching from (1) the idea of an increasingly centralised and dominating European innovation policy arena to (2) the opposite, i.e., a progressive decentralisation and open competition between partly strengthened, partly weakened national or regional innovation systems and finally to (3) the vision of a centrally “mediated” mixture of competition and cooperation between diverse regional innovation cultures and a related governance structure.     

Public knowledge partnerships in European research projects and knowledge creation across R&D institutional sectors

This paper investigates the role of public knowledge partnerships in EU-funded framework programmes (FP) on knowledge creation across a sample of European countries. Different from previous studies, we investigate whether the impact of participation in FP on new knowledge (patents) differs across private companies, universities and public research centres. We find that, while all institutional sectors benefit from joint projects, the main benefits (in terms of patenting activity) go to universities and public research centres, while private companies benefit less. We also find evidence of important complementarities between participation in international research projects and internal innovation drivers (researchers), thus highlighting the crucial role of domestic absorptive capacity for fully benefiting from international cooperation in R&D projects.     

The “swing of the pendulum” from public to market support for science and technology: Is the U.S. leading the way?

The structure and financing of science and technology activities are undergoing a slow, but profound, change. This change can be briefly characterized as a shift from relying and supporting public science to a stronger emphasis on “market-based” incentives for science and technology. In this paper we analyze this shift in a historical perspective, discussing both the theoretical explanations and the empirical trends of the ongoing change. While we do not claim to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive identification of the causes of this shift, we argue that it is largely driven by the perception of a shift of the U.S. policy towards market-based, rather than publicly supported, incentives for science and technology. This, in turn—given the strong economic performance of the United States over the 1990s—has influenced policies in most OECD countries, especially in Europe.We conclude by analyzing the evolution of research in U.S. higher education and find two major trends: an increasing diversity in the number of institutions of different types other than universities and a steady and continuous public funding of the leading U.S. universities. This has allowed the construction of an infrastructure now used largely by the private sector, but it also noted that the United States has not compromised public support for core areas or in those fields in which there is a clear perception that market incentives are not sufficient for meeting the strategic targets of the U.S. policy. The implication is that there is a considerable policy diversity in the U.S. practice and that all aspects of this diversity should be considered when using the United States as a reference.