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1.
A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let (resp., denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet
winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain , and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain .
Received: August 29, 2000; revised version: November 13, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"We are grateful to Wulf Gaertner and our two referees for insightful comments on a previous draft.
Correspondence to: D. E. Campbell 相似文献
2.
>P>Summary. We provide a set of simple and intuitive set of axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected
Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty.
Received: October 29, 2002; revised version: November 13, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Matthew Ryan for very useful comments and suggestions on related work and for encouraging us to write this
note.
Correspondence to: S. Grant 相似文献
3.
Summary. The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized
in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other
desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's
Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems.
Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title
by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments.
Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark 相似文献
4.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
5.
Assume a finite society, a standard space of allocations of public goods, and an open and connected domain of profiles of Euclidean individual preferences. (There is an additional technical restriction on the domain.) If a social welfare function f satisfies Arrow's independence axiom and generates social preferences that are continuous and transitive, then f is constant or dictatorial or inversely dictatorial. 相似文献
6.
Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which
the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the
number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild
condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly
equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium
of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy,
one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic
existence result for the Cournot-Walras.
Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department
of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau 相似文献
7.
Summary. We consider the problem of efficient insurance contracts when the cost structure includes a fixed cost per claim. We prove
existence of efficient insurance contracts and that the indemnity function in such contracts is non-decreasing in the damage.
We further show that either there is no insurance, or the indemnity is positive for all losses, or efficient insurance contracts
have a unique jump. We study variants of the model and provide a generalization to the case of non expected utilities. Our
results are then applied to Townsend's model of deterministic auditing.
Received: November 8, 2000; revised version: March 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to F. Salanié for pointing out an error in the previous version of the paper and for suggesting Proposition
6 to us.
Correspondence to: R.-A. Dana 相似文献
8.
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in Aswal et al., 2003) are needed to restore random dictatorship and such strengthenings are “almost necessary”. 相似文献
9.
Counterfactual conditional statements are ubiquitous in any scientific endeavour. This paper contains an analysis of the
nature of counterfactual conditionals and the conditions under which they are considered assertable by scientists. The paper
then applies this analysis to the use of counterfactuals in evolutionary economics, arguing that because evolutionary economics
is inherently concerned with historical processes it cannot avoid the use of counterfactual history as one of its tools of
empirical analysis. We discuss the strengths and pitfalls of counterfactual history. We argue that because evolutionary economics
starts from the foundation that randomness may be inherent in any economic system, the very aspects of evolutionary economics
that make counterfactual history a desirable empirical tool also make that tool difficult to employ.
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank the participants of the International Seminar on Evolutionary Economics as a Research Programme in Stockholm, May 1997, for many helpful comments. We also thank Lorri Baier for many helpful substantive and textual comments.
Correspondence to: R. Cowan 相似文献
10.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
11.
It is well known that the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem cannot be circumvented by adding extraneous alternatives that are included in the individual preference information but are never selected. We generalize this by proving that, for any domain on which every strategy-proof rule is dictatorial, the addition of extraneous alternatives will not permit the construction of a non-dictatorial and strategy-proof rule if the new domain is a product set. We show how this result, and our other theorem, can be applied to seven families of social choice situations, including those in which more than one alternative is selected. 相似文献
12.
SANGKYU RHEE 《The Japanese Economic Review》2011,62(2):289-303
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods among couples. Agents in a couple share the indivisible good assigned to them. The main result is that an allocation rule is strategy‐proof, neutral and non‐bossy if and only if it is serially dictatorial. An allocation rule is serially dictatorial if there is a priority order of couples and a function that identifies who chooses in each couple, such that for all preference profiles, a good assigned to couple i is the best element according to the preference of the identified agent in couple i among the remaining goods when the couples with higher priorities have made their choice. 相似文献
13.
Richard Baron Jacques Durieu Hans Haller Philippe Solal 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2002,12(5):563-575
We consider best response dynamics with endogenous noise based on a finite game in strategic form. A player can reduce the
noise level by expending an extra effort and incurring some disutility or control costs. We specify control costs that result
in logit adjustment rules. The stochastically stable states of the dynamic process are partial Nash configurations, that is,
states where at least one player plays a best response against the others. If the game has a potential, then the stochastically
stable states coincide with the Nash equilibria on which the potential is maximized.
RID="*"
ID="*" Instructive comments of a referee are gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to:H. Haller 相似文献
14.
The economic effects of restrictions on government budget deficits: imperfect private credit markets
Summary. The present paper is an extension of Ghiglino and Shell [7] to the case of imperfect consumer credit markets. We show that
with constraints on individual credit and only anonymous (i.e., non-personalized) lump-sum taxes, strong (or “global”) irrelevance
of government budget deficits is not possible, and weak (or “local”) irrelevance can hold only in very special situations.
This is in sharp contrast to the result for perfect credit markets. With credit constraints and anonymous consumption taxes,
weak irrelevance holds if the number of tax instruments is sufficiently large and at least one consumer's credit constraint
is not binding. This is an extension of the result for perfect credit markets.
Received: August 28, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Todd Keister, Bruce Smith, and two referees for helpful comments.
Correspondence to: C. Ghiglino 相似文献
15.
Diego Moreno 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):183-197
Summary. A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education,
transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when␣admissible preferences are those representable by
continuous and increasing utility functions, then strategy-proof allocation mechanisms whose (undominated) range contains three or more outcomes are
dictatorial on the set of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions, a dense subset of the domain in the topologies commonly used in this context. If admissible utility functions
are further restricted to be strictly increasing, or if mechanisms are required to be non-wasteful, then strategy-profness
leads to (full) dictatorship.
Received: August 14, 1995; revised version: September 25, 1997 相似文献
16.
John Geanakoplos 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):585-603
Summary. The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's
Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when
there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,”
i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.”
Received: July 9, 2001; revised version: February 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Don Brown, and Andreu Mas-Colell for helpful comments. I first thought about using Brouwer's
theorem without Kakutani's extension when I heard Herb Scarf's lectures on mathematical economics as an undergraduate in 1974,
and then again when I read Tim Kehoe's 1980 Ph.D dissertation under Herb Scarf, but I did not resolve my confusion until I
had to discuss Kehoe's presentation at the celebration for Herb Scarf's 65th birthday in September, 1995.
RID="*"
ID="*"Correspondence to: C. D. Aliprantis 相似文献
17.
Summary. We provide a detailed portfolio analysis for a financial market with an atomless continuum of assets. In the context of an
exact arbitrage pricing theory (EAPT), we go beyond the characterization of the existence of important portfolios (normalized
riskless, mean, cost, factor and mean-variance efficient portfolios) to furnish exact portfolio compositions in terms of explicit
portfolio weights. Such an analysis has not been furnished before in the context of the asymptotic arbitrage pricing theory
(APT). We also characterize conditions under which a mean-variance efficient portfolio is a benchmark portfolio used in the
EAPT to proxy essential risk. We illustrate our results with several examples of specific financial markets.
Received: May 30, 2002; revised version: August 15, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"Some of the results reported here constituted part of Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper– No. 1139 circulated under the title “Hyperfinite Asset Pricing Theory”; additional results were obtained when Sun visited
the Department of Economics at Johns Hopkins University during March 2002. This paper was presented at the Conference on Economic Design held at NYU on July 6–9, 2002
Correspondence to: M. A. Khan 相似文献
18.
In this paper the long-run trend in RPI inflation (core inflation) for the UK over the 1961–1997 period is estimated within the framework of a multivariate common trends model which extends
the bivariate VAR approach of Quah and Vahey (1995). In this context core inflation is directly linked to money and wage growth and interpreted
as the long-run forecast of inflation from a small-scale, cointegrated macroeconomic system.
First version received: September 1999/Final version received: October 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. Work on this paper was partially conducted
when C. Morana was at Heriot-Watt University. 相似文献
19.
Michael T. Rauh 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):901-906
Summary. We consider static non-cooperative games with a continuum of small players whose payoffs depend on their own actions and
finitely many summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profile. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
without any convexity restrictions on payoffs or the common action space. We show that this result applies to a broad class
of monopolistic competition models.
Received: April 13, 2001; revised version: December 18, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" The result in this paper generalizes a result in my PhD dissertation supervised by M. Ali Khan and Joe Harrington.
I thank them for support and encouragement. I also thank Sung Kim, Bruce Nanney, Ashvin Rajan, Kali Rath, and an anonymous
referee for comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
20.
Summary. This paper studies the equilibria of a stochastic OLG exchange economies consisting of identical agents living for two periods,
and having the opportunity to trade a single infinitely-lived asset in constant supply. The agents have uncertain endowments
and the stochastic process determining the endowments is Markovian. For such economies, the literature has focused on studying
strongly stationary equilibria in which quantities and prices are functions of the exogenous states of nature which describe
the uncertainty: such equilibria are generalizations of deterministic steady states, and this paper investigates if they have
the same special status as asymptotic limits of other equilibrium paths. The difficulty in extending the analysis of equilibria
beyond the class of strongly stationary equilibria comes from the presence of indeterminacy: we propose a procedure for overcoming
this difficulty which can be decomposed into two steps. First backward induction arguments are used to restrict the domain
of possible prices; then if some indeterminacy is left, expectation functions are introduced to make the forward equilibrium
equations determinate. The properties of the resulting trajectories, in particular their asymptotic properties, can then be
studied. For the class of models that we study this procedure provides a justification for focusing on strongly stationary
equilibria. For the model with positive dividends (equity or land) the justification is complete, since we show that the strongly
stationary equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. For the model with zero dividends (money) there is a continuum of self-fulfilling
expectation functions resulting in a continuum of equilibrium paths starting from any admissible initial condition: under
conditions given in the paper, these equilibrium paths converge almost surely to one of the strongly stationary equilibria-either
autarchy or the stochastic analogue of the Golden Rule.
Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: March 22, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful for the stimulating environment and research support provided by the Cowles Foundation at Yale University
during the Fall 2000 when this paper was first conceived. We are also grateful to the participants of the SITE Workshop at
Stanford University and the Incomplete Markets Workshop at SUNY Stony Brook during the summer 2001 for helpful discussions.
Correspondence to: M. Magill 相似文献