The structure of bias in peer voting systems: lessons from the Eurovision Song Contest

This paper assesses whether and how common characteristics of jury members or peer voters affect the outcomes of voting systems. In particular, we analyze to what extent these common features result in voting bias. We take as a case study the Eurovision Song Contest for which an extensive amount of historical data is available. In contrast to earlier studies we analyze the impact of common factors on the bias individually for each country, which is necessary to substantiate the publicly debated accusations of regional block voting by certain groups of countries. We establish strong evidence for voting bias in the song contest on the basis of geography, even after correction for culture, language, religion and ethnicity. However, these effects do generally not correspond to the usual accusations. We believe that our findings extend to all instances where groups of jury members or peer voters share certain common factors, which may cause voting bias. It is important to identify such structures explicitly, as it can help avoiding bias in the first place. The authors are grateful to Marieke van Dijk for excellent research assistance and to Laurens Swinkels, Ieva Pudane, Gijsbert van Lomwel, Jelena Stefanovic, and Bas van den Heuvel for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

LIVING RATIONALLY UNDER THE VOLCANO? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HEAVY DRINKING AND SMOKING*

This study investigates whether models of forward‐looking behavior explain the observed patterns of heavy drinking and smoking of men in late middle age in the Health and Retirement Study better than myopic models. We develop and estimate a sequence of nested models that differ by their degree of forward‐looking behavior. Our empirical findings suggest that forward looking models fit the data better than myopic models. These models also dominate other behavioral models based on out‐of‐sample predictions using data of men aged 70 and over. Myopic models predict rates of smoking for old individuals, which are significantly larger than those found in the data on elderly men.     

Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic

This paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far-sighted and myopic individuals. All individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short-term view (instant gratification) when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply. Consequently, they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions. Henceforth, when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving. We consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters: the payroll tax rate (that determines the size or generosity of the system) and the “Bismarckian factor” that determines its redistributiveness. Individuals vote sequentially. We examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system. Our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind (all far-sighted or all myopic), while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far-sighted agents. Furthermore, while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far-sighted counterparts, the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics.     

Did political constraints bind during transition?Evidence from Czech elections, 1990–20021

Many theoretical models of transition are driven by the assumption that economic decision making is subject to political constraints. In this paper we test whether the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of economic reform influenced voting behaviour in the first five national elections in the Czech Republic. We propose that voters, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, could predict whether they would become winners or losers of transition. Using survey data we measure the degree to which regions were ‘not afraid’ or ‘afraid’ of economic reform in 1990. We define the former as potential ‘winners’ who should vote for pro‐reform parties and the latter as potential ‘losers’ who should support left‐wing parties. Using election results and economic indicators at the regional level, we demonstrate that there is persistence in support for pro‐reform and communist parties which is driven by prospective voting based on initial conditions in 1990. We find that regional unemployment rates in 2002 are good predictors of voting patterns in 1990 and provide empirical evidence that political constraints bind during transition.     

Voter preferences,direct democracy and government spending

This article uses unique voting data on 331 federal propositions to estimate voter preferences in Swiss cantons. We document that preferences vary systematically with cantonal characteristics. In particular, cantons whose voters are more conservative, less in favor of redistribution and less supportive of public spending tend to have stronger direct democracy. We show that voter preferences have a stable and sizable effect on government spending even conditional on many observable cantonal characteristics. We then revisit the relationship between direct democracy and public spending. Once we fully control for voter preferences, the cross-sectional correlation between direct democracy and government spending declines by roughly 20%. The results in this article provide empirical support for models, in which both voter preferences and direct democratic institutions are important determinants of the size of government.     

The effect of randomized school admissions on voter participation

There is little causal evidence on the effect of economic and policy outcomes on voting behavior. This paper uses randomized outcomes from a school choice lottery to examine if lottery outcomes affect voting behavior in a school board election. We show that losing the lottery has no significant impact on overall voting behavior; however, among white families, those with above median income and prior voting history, lottery losers were significantly more likely to vote than lottery winners. Using propensity score methods, we compare the voting of lottery participants to similar families who did not participate in the lottery. We find that losing the school choice lottery caused an increase in voter turnout among whites, while winning the lottery had no effect relative to non-participants. Overall, our empirical results lend support to models of expressive and retrospective voting, where likely voters are motivated to vote by past negative policy outcomes.     

It's not your peers,and it's not your friends: Some progress toward understanding the educational peer effect mechanism

Using a new administrative panel data set from the University of Maryland, this paper explores conventional peer effects and the effects of socially proximate peers at a large public university where some students are randomly assigned to housing. Results show that there is little evidence of robust residential peer effects on undergraduate performance. The impact of socially proximate peers' characteristics on student achievement is then examined using an instrumental variables technique. Results indicate that social “friends” do not impact performance more than randomized peers. The paper casts doubt on the notion that social tie formation is the route to peer effects, and urges caution in the continued pursuit of peer effects in education without substantial empirical or theoretical innovation.     

Exit polls,turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 11 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.     

Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty

Extensive field evidence shows individuals? decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers? decisions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual?s utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes of peer effects in choice under uncertainty. We find strong peer group effects in the laboratory. Our design allows us to rule out social learning, social norms, group affiliation, and complementarities as possible causes for the observed peer group effects, leaving social interaction effects as the likely cause. We use a combination of theory and empirical analysis to show that preferences including “social regret” are more consistent with the data than preferences including a taste for conformity. We observe spillover effects, as observing another?s choice of one risky gamble makes all risky gambles more likely to be chosen.     

Are estimated peer effects on smoking robust? Evidence from adolescent students in Spain

Adolescent smoking is one of the most pressing public health problems. The objective of this paper is to analyse the influence of peer pressure on adolescent cigarette consumption. More concretely, we explore the significance and robustness of the peer effects using several estimation methods employed in the existing literature. On the basis of the data provided by the 2004 Spanish survey on drug use in the school population, we estimate the probability of being a smoker by two-stage models. The results reveal that when we use standard errors used in the literature the class peer variable appears to be significant. However, the class peer variable is not significant when we calculate more exigent standard errors, a result that is robust across all specifications. The paper suggests the need for a more cautious interpretation of the peer effects found previously in the literature until a deeper analysis confirms the robustness of the peer effects.     

The impact of social mobility and within-family learning on voter preferences: Evidence from a sample of twins

Income-maximizing consumers should vote in predictable ways: support for liberal, redistributive governments should fall as income rises. But weak empirical evidence for these voting patterns might suggest that voters are influenced by alternative factors, such as perceptions of social mobility from within-family learning. To examine these effects, this paper uses a data set of twins and a recently-developed econometric approach to show that within-family learning and family-specific effects are important determinants of voting preferences and preferences for redistribution.     

Testing Social Preferences for an Economic “Bad”: An Artefactual Field Experiment*

We test for social preferences over a commodity in an artefactual field experiment using the random price voting mechanism. Subjects are university staff members, and the commodity is water “contaminated” by a sterilized cockroach. Our results suggest that social preferences exist with respect to commodities and “bads”, supporting a more general utility framework for social preferences. Our empirical test allows for the coexistence of three social‐preference models; our results support the models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002), but not the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Also, we find that incorporating social preferences improves the efficiency of majority‐rules voting.     

How much versus who: which social norms information is more effective?

We conduct an experiment to investigate how different types of information about social norms affect individuals’ stated contributions to a specific pro-environment program, a student ‘green fee’, in the context of a referendum. Compared to students that receive no information about peer contributions, on average, students that receive information about the dollar value range of contributions at peer institutions contribute less while students that learn about the high percentage of students voting ‘yes’ on green fee programs at peer institutions contribute more. The results are economically significant as the absolute values of both effects represent approximately 25% of average contributions. These results suggest that information about participation rates can be more effective than information about dollar amounts in encouraging contributions to environmental initiatives. Of interest to stated preference researchers, we find that results do not change when controlling for self-selection into survey completion.     

What can be learned about peer effects using college roommates? Evidence from new survey data and students from disadvantaged backgrounds

Previous papers which examine the importance of peer effects using exogenous variation in college roommates have found only very limited evidence that a student's first year grade performance is influenced by the observable academic characteristics of his/her roommate. One possible explanation for this finding is that peer effects do not play a particularly important role in the higher education setting. However, another very plausible explanation for this finding is that peer effects are important in higher education but that these previous empirical efforts have simply not been “looking in the right place” to find the evidence of peer effects in this setting. Thus, while these papers have received considerable attention due to the general difficulty of finding credible exogenous variation in peer quality, they have difficulty answering the most fundamental question related to peer effects in this higher education—whether peer effects play an important role or not. This paper provides depth to the peer effects literature using unique new survey and administrative data.     

Mixed Motives: An Empirical Analysis of ILO Roll-Call Voting

In this empirical paper, we look at individual voting behaviour of government delegates to the International Labour Organization (ILO). We distinguish between the instrumental motive for voting, which consists in the chance that one's vote may turn the balance in favour of one's preferred outcome, and non-instrumental motives, such as a desire for good reputation. Empirically, the two can be identified because two alternatives, abstaining and not participating in the vote, do not differ in their instrumental value, but are likely to differ with respect to reputation aspects. The model is estimated by a multinomial logit with country-specific unobserved heterogeneity, using roll-call votes on the final passage of ILO conventions from 1977 to 1995. The hypothesis that voting is only instrumental is clearly rejected by the data.     

ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION*

In this article, we analyze an economy in which agents vote over immigration policy and redistributive tax policy. We show that natives' preferences over immigration are influenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting over future tax policy. We also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobility, the distribution of initial capital among natives, the wealth or poverty of the immigrant pool, and the future voting rights and entitlements of immigrants can have dramatic effects on equilibrium immigration and tax policies. Finally, we provide some empirical support for the model's predictions.     

Deliberative voting

We analyze a model of jury decision making in which jurors deliberate before casting their votes. We consider a wide range of voting institutions and show that deliberations render these equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate. In particular, in the context of a jury setup, all voting rules excluding the two types of unanimity rules (one requiring a unanimous consensus to acquit, one requiring a unanimous consensus to convict) induce the same set of equilibria outcomes. We show the robustness of our results with respect to several restrictions on communication protocols and jurors’ strategies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our observations extend to practically all of the voting structures commonly studied in the voting literature. The paper suggests the importance of accounting for communication in models of collective choice.     

Endogenous neighborhood effects on welfare participation

This article examines the impact of neighborhood welfare participation on individual welfare participation, that is, the endogenous neighborhood effects. Endogenous neighborhood effects generate social multipliers. Few existing empirical studies on neighborhood effects distinguish between endogenous neighborhood effects and exogenous neighborhood effects, that is, the effects of neighborhood characteristics. This article constitutes an early attempt to identify and estimate endogenous and exogenous neighborhood effects separately. I construct an instrumental variable for neighborhood welfare participation rate based on the variation in welfare benefits and neighborhood demographic composition to address the reflection problem and the omitted neighborhood variables problem. A two-step method is proposed to separately estimate endogenous and exogenous neighborhood effects. The results show that neighborhood welfare participation plays an important role in a woman’s welfare participation both before and after the welfare reform in 1996.     

Peer effects in medical school

Using data on the universe of students who graduated from US medical schools between 1996 and 1998, we examine whether the abilities and specialty preferences of a medical school class affect a student's academic achievement in medical school and his choice of specialty. We mitigate the selection problem by including school-specific fixed effects, and show that this method yields an upper bound on peer effects for our data. We estimate positive peer effects that disappear when school-specific fixed effects are added to control for the endogeneity of a peer group. We find no evidence that peer effects are stronger for blacks, that peer groups are formed along racial lines, or that students with relatively low ability benefit more from their peers than students with relatively high-ability. However, we do find some evidence that peer groups form along gender lines.     

Control rights, pyramids, and the measurement of ownership concentration

The recent corporate governance literature has emphasised the distinction between control and cash-flow rights but has disregarded measurement issues. Control rights may be measured by immediate shareholder votes, the voting rights as traced through ownership chains, or voting power indices that may or may not trace ownership through chains. We compare the ability of various measures to identify the effects of ownership concentration on share valuation using a German panel data set. The widely used weakest-link principle does not perform well in this comparison. Furthermore, measures that trace control through ownership chains do not outperform those that rely on immediate ownership, thus questioning the role of pyramids in the separation of control and cash-flow rights. The paper emphasises that there is a distinction between these two aspects of ownership even without pyramids or preferred stock, identification of which requires measures that, like the Shapley–Shubik index, do not simply equate control rights with voting rights.