Relative Prices in Monetary Union and Floating

The setting is a small open economy with an open sector and a sheltered sector. If the unions that operate in each sector coordinate their wage claims within the sector, the choice of monetary regime—monetary union or floating with an inflation target—affects the relative prices of tradables and non–tradables as well as real wages and employment. EMU membership results in lower prices of tradable goods and lower relative wages in the open sector, while opposite results hold for sheltered sector prices and wages.
JEL classification : E 5; E 24; E 42; J 5; J 31     

Public or Private Sector Wage Leadership? An International Perspective*

Whether a government acts as a wage leader, placing pressure on private‐sector wages (more open to competition), or whether it plays a passive role and merely follows wage negotiations in the private sector, there are important implications for macroeconomic development, particularly in small open economies and/or countries that are members of a monetary union, such as those of the European Monetary Union. With the notable exception of the case of Sweden, opinion on this issue is still divided. In this paper, we look at public‐ and private‐sector wage interactions from an international perspective (18 OECD countries). We focus on the causal two‐way relationship between public and private wage setting, confirming that the private sector, on the whole, appears to have a stronger influence on the public sector, rather than vice versa. However, we also find evidence of feedback effects from public wage setting, which affect private‐sector wages in a number of countries. When the private sector takes the lead on wages, there are few feedback effects from the public sector, while public wage leadership is typically accompanied by private‐sector feedback effects.     

Is the Swedish central government a wage leader?

Is the Swedish central government a wage leader? This question is studied empirically in a vector error-correction model using a unique, high quality data set. It is first shown that salaries of white-collar workers in the private sector and central government are cointegrated. It is then found that private sector salaries are weakly exogenous to the system of equations. This means that the private sector is the wage leader in the long-run model. It is also found that changes in central government salaries do not Granger cause changes in private sector salaries. Together, these findings clearly demonstrate that the central government is not placing undue pressure on salaries in the private sector. The central government is not acting as a wage leader.     

Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between centralbank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically andempirically, coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated bycollective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within themember states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by an ECB targeting European inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government-union bargains. The Bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in Germany: again its replacement by the ECB – targeting (if at all) European rather than German fiscal policy – loosens fiscal constraints. For underlying structural reasons therefore, it is possible that Germany and other EMU countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Product Market Integration and Heterogeneity—Rent Sharing and Pricing to Market

International product market integration makes market penetration easier and therefore creates both export opportunities and import threats. This changes the competitive position of firms and is associated with changes in trade, production, and specialization structures. The gains and losses in this process are unlikely to be equally shared due to heterogeneity across firms/sectors. In a Ricardian trade model with heterogeneity across firms, we find “pricing to market”—effects not only for exports, but also for pricing in the domestic market even for nontradables. Rents to be shared in wage bargaining differ across tradables and nontradables. It is shown that lower trade frictions affect the scope for “pricing to market” and cause wages to become more closely driven by (relative) productivity. Labor market prospects tend not to improve for low wage jobs, and not to deteriorate for high wage jobs.     

Wage bargaining,trade and growth

We construct a North-South product-cycle model of trade with fully-endogenous growth and union wage bargaining. Economic growth is driven by Northern entrepreneurs who conduct R&D to innovate higher quality products. Northern production technologies can leak to the South upon successful imitation. The North has two sectors: a tradable industrial goods sector (manufacturing) where wages are determined via a bargaining process and a non-tradable sector (services) where wages are flexible. The South has only a tradable industrial goods sector where wages are flexible.We find that unilateral Northern trade liberalization, in the form of lower Northern tariffs on industrial goods, increases the rate of innovation but decreases both the bargained wage in the industrial sector and the flexible wage in the service sector. The wage effects are relative to the Southern wage rate. We also consider a variant of the model with Northern unemployment, driven by a binding minimum wage in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, Northern tariff cuts decrease the innovation rate and the bargained wage rate. In addition, the Northern unemployment rate increases. The model thus highlights the role of labor market institutions in determining the growth and labor market effects of tariff reductions. We also study the effects of unilateral Southern trade liberalization.     

Frictional wage dispersion with Bertrand competition: An assessment

I examine whether a version of the Cahuc et al. (2006) model can match the magnitude of wage dispersion, as measured by the ratio of the average and the lowest wage — the so-called mean-min ratio of Hornstein et al. (2011). I find that the workers? bargaining power is a crucial parameter: the mean-min ratio strictly decreases in the bargaining power up to a point near 1/2 and is essentially flat thereafter, generating the same amount of wage dispersion as the canonical wage ladder model, which is a special case of the CPVR model. Consequently, this model can yield large wage dispersion only for low bargaining power on the workers? side. I show that the share of job-to-job transitions with wage drops is decreasing in the bargaining power, calibrate the latter to the former, and demonstrate that the CPVR model generates an empirically plausible amount of wage dispersion. I also show that negative wages arise when workers have no bargaining power, and discuss the implications for the empirical findings of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b).     

R&D INVESTMENTS AND SEQUENTIAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS*

This paper analyses how the structure of wage bargaining affects R&D investment by firms that increases the productivity of labour in a Cournot duopoly. We find that total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. Thus sequential wage negotiations reduce the incentive for firms to innovate and affect the productivity of labour. When wage negotiations are sequential the productivity of labour is greater (lower) in the follower (leader) firm than when negotiations are simultaneous. We also obtain that for same parameter values it is possible for the firm with the lower productivity to end up paying a higher wage than the firm with the higher level of labour productivity.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

WELFARE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED MARKET WITH BARGAINING

The author analyzes the welfare effects of privatization in a mixed duopoly model in which the wage rate for the privatized firm is determined by Nash bargaining beforehand. The evaluations are based on three-stage privatization frameworks respectively under two regimes: Cournot competition and a public firm acting as a Stackelberg leader. The author finds that the optimal degrees of privatization from the viewpoint of social welfare may be different for various types of competition. The article also shows that even optimal privatization set by a welfare-maximization government may not guarantee welfare improvement, owing to the interference of wage bargaining. (JEL D60, D78, L32, L33 )     

The Link Between Wages and Productivity in Spain

This paper examines the effect of productivity on wages for Spanish industrial sectors by developing a model that captures effects from both sector‐specific and aggregate variables. The results show that a dual behaviour can be inferred, at the sector level, in the wage‐setting mechanism. It is also found that the linkage between wages and productivity varies over time. Some explanations for the increase in wage dispersion are provided, focusing on the increasing decentralisation in wage bargaining after 1986. Finally, we cast some light on the theoretical structure underlying the labour market.     

Rent-sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a linked employer–employee dataset, this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector- and firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific quasi-rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, are associated with a significantly lower responsiveness of wages to firm-level profitability.     

Wage Returns to Experience and Tenure for Young Men in Italy

This paper provides estimates of wage returns to experience‐, firm‐, sector‐ and occupation‐specific tenure for a sample of young Italian male workers. By comparing returns obtained using different estimators, I evaluate the importance of endogeneity and selection problems generated by specific unobserved components and individual fixed effects. After controlling for the role of collective bargaining agreements and occupation categories, results indicate that general labour market experience is the fundamental source of wage growth for blue and white collars, while returns to firm tenure are insignificant. There is some evidence of positive returns to sector and occupational tenure for white collars. Estimates from different sectors suggest that union coverage can be relevant in offsetting the role of search and matching in wage determination.     

Wage spillovers across sectors in Eastern Europe

This paper studies the interactions between wages in the public sector and the private traded and non-traded sector in ten transition countries which are members of the European Union, during the period 2000–2011. The theoretical literature on wage spillovers, as well as the Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis, suggests that the internationally traded sector should be the leader in wage setting, with sheltered and public sector wages adjusting. Using a cointegrated VAR approach we show that a large heterogeneity across countries is present, and non-traded and public sector wages are often leaders in wage determination or at least affect traded sector wages in the short run. This result is relevant from a policy perspective since wage spillovers, leading to costs growing faster than productivity, may affect the international cost competitiveness of the traded sector and thus the catching-up process may be accompanied by accumulation of large international imbalances.     

Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of Unemployment

According to conventional wisdom internationally mobile capital should not be taxed or should be taxed at a lower rate than labour. An important underlying assumption behind this view is that there are no market imperfections, in particular that labour markets clear competitively. At least for Europe, which has been suffering from high unemployment for a long time, this assumption does not seem appropriate. This paper studies the optimal factor taxation in the presence of unemployment which results from the union-firm wage bargaining both with optimal and restricted profit taxation when capital is internationally mobile and labour immobile. In setting tax rates the government is assumed to behave as a Stackelberg leader towards the private sector playing a Nash game. The main conclusion is that in the presence of unemployment, the conventional wisdom turns on its head; capital should generally be taxed at a higher rate than labour.     

Efficiency of two sided investments in an equilibrium unemployment framework

This paper investigates the efficiency of investments by firms and workers in a matching model with high- and low-productivity jobs. Search is sector specific and random within sectors. Search frictions and ex-post bargaining imply that wage inequality arises as a result of the difference in investment costs between the sectors. The efficiency properties of the equilibrium are analyzed under the particular division in bargaining proposed by Hosios (1990). The conclusion is that the equilibrium is inefficient, with a too low fraction of workers and a too high vacancy-unemployment ratio in the high-productivity sector. The opposite happens in the low-productivity sector.     

A wage-bargaining model for Denmark

Recent models of wage bargaining provide the background for formulating a wage-employment model which is estimated for the manufacturing sector in Denmark. Emphasis is laid on an interpretation of the empirical findings in a maroeconomic context. The major results are that wage setting is not characterized by money illusion, shorter working hours lead in the long run to full wage compensation and a fall in total number of hours worked, and expansionary demand management policies induce wage increases which eventually eliminate the expansionary effects on activity.     

Determinants of wage stickiness in a developing economy

We explore wage flexibility in a developing country and compare our results to what has been found in similar studies using European data. In particular, we conduct a survey of 1189 firms in Pakistan to analyze the determinants of wage rigidity. We find that the existence of competitive wages and an interaction with the informal economy are statistically significant determinants of wage stickiness. While the role of competitive wages is similar to what has been found in studies of European firms, the latter find a much larger role for turnover, collective bargaining and employment protection. In contrast, in Pakistan we find that firms hiring from the informal sector are significantly more flexible in changing their wages. This suggests that the informal sector adds to the wage flexibility of the formal sector.     

Dual Labor Markets And Strategic Efficiency Wage *

We consider a dual labor markets model in which the primary sector requires the presence of eMiciency wage, while the secondary sector is competitive. We show that the Solow condition does not hold in a Stackelberg equilibrium where the primary sector acts as a leader and the secondary one as a follower.[J41]     

Wage Bargaining,Privatisation, Ability to Pay and Outside Options: Evidence from Hungary

This article examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a sample of large Hungarian companies for 1996–99. We test the basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between incumbent employees and managers, which the data do not reject. In particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust difference relates to state sector workers versus privatised firms with majority foreign ownership.