Discontinuous Payoffs, Shared Resources, and Games of Fiscal Competition: Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

We define a class of games with discontinuous payoffs that we call shared resource games and establish a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem for these games. We then apply this result to a canonical game of fiscal competition for mobile capital. Other applications are also discussed. Our result for the mobile capital game holds for any finite number of regions, permits general preferences over private and public goods, and does not assume that production technologies have a particular functional form, or are identical in all regions, or satisfy the Inada condition at zero.     

Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block

The authors examine a two–country general–equilibrium model of a two–country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital and provide an imported public consumption good. Within this framework the authors examine, among other things, how preferences over the public good and the size (population) of a country affect the Nash or cooperative equilibrium values of income tax rates in the two countries. The analysis identifies sufficient conditions under which (i) the Nash/cooperative equilibrium income tax rates are strategic substitutes or complements, and (ii) the Nash equilibrium income tax rates may be greater than the cooperative rates.     

The Role of Central Government in Tax Competition Between Heterogenous Regions

This paper analyzes the role of central government in a Nash tax competition between two heterogenous regions, which differ in their endowments of two production factors. Regional governments use a source-based unit tax on mobile capital to finance their public service expenditures. The central government employs excise subsidies and lump-sum taxes to induce the two regions to efficient resource allocations. We answer to the question that whether the central government can induce an efficient equilibrium, and investigate the effects of endowments difference on the optimum subsidy rates. We find that there exists a unique tax rate under which the efficiency is achieved. We identify the set of endowment allocations for which the subsidy rate to one region is higher (or lower) than the subsidy rate to the rival. The large poor region receives a higher subsidy than the small rich region, but the subsidy to the small poor region may be higher or lower than that to the large rich region. [H2]     

The pre-marital investment game

Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that the trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large. It is shown that mixed Nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much.     

Public Input Competition under Stackelberg Equilibrium: A Note

This paper examines the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and compares it with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Given two asymmetric regions, we show that under the Nash equilibrium the more productive region tends to spend more on public input, which results in this region attracting more capital than the less productive region. The comparison of the two equilibria reveals that the leader region obtains a first‐mover advantage under the Stackelberg setting. This suggests that if regions interact with each other sequentially as in the Stackelberg equilibrium, then the regional disparity that is due to the heterogeneity of productivity is likely to be mitigated or enlarged, depending on which region performs the leadership role in the competition process.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

Strategic Inter–Regional Transfers

We derive the equilibrium level of redistribution from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another possibly mobile factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter–regional transfers and redistributive policies non–cooperatively. It is shown that inter–regional transfers are always desirable (to mitigate the fiscal competition), but cannot be sustained (as a Nash equilibrium) when chosen simultaneoulsy with the redistributive policy. On the other hand, if regions can pre–commit to inter–regional transfers before setting their redistributive policy, their strategic effect makes efficient inter–regional transfers sustainable. However, there are also equilibria with inefficiently small inter–regional transfers or no transfers at all. The effects of regional asymmetries and additional regions on these results are also analyzed.     

Self-reinforcing market dominance

Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, mean-preserving spreads of the initial cost distribution have no effects on aggregate investments. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers.     

Self-reinforcing market dominance

Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, mean-preserving spreads of the initial cost distribution have no effects on aggregate investments. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers.     

A dynamic general equilibrium model for public R&D investment in Taiwan

In terms of economic development policies, public research and development (R&D) investment may be one of the most critical and useful tools in Taiwan, having frequently played a role in leading related overall investment in Taiwan. Although the impact channels of R&D investment are varied and complex, its benefits in terms of the development of human capital, industrial productivity, and basic research are clear. With the rapid growth of the private sector in the Taiwan economy, it is, however, debatable whether the government should continue to use the public financial budget to invest in R&D. By using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the impact of public R&D investment on the economy in Taiwan, the empirical evidence of the present paper is that public R&D investment gives rise to different short-term and medium-term impacts on real GDP that are mostly felt in the third or fourth years of their implementation among different industries. These impacts then gradually converge back to equilibrium in the long run. Public R&D investment boosts the technology of high-tech industries and increases exports, but it also crowds out the output of primary industries. Although the public R&D investment has a positive effect on the real wage, its effect on inflation should not be overlooked. Because of the pros and cons surrounding the impact of public R&D investment on industries and the economy, the study provided by the present paper can serve as valuable reference not only to decision-makers in government agencies but also to academic researchers.     

In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment

The multinationalization of corporate investment in recent years has given rise to a number of international tax avoidance schemes that may be eroding tax revenues in industrialized countries, but which may also reduce tax burdens on mobile capital and so facilitate investment. Both the welfare effects of and the optimal response to international tax planning are therefore ambiguous. Evaluating these factors in a simple general equilibrium model, we find that citizens of high-tax countries benefit from (some) tax planning. Paradoxically, if tax rates are not too high, an increase in tax planning activity causes a rise in optimal corporate tax rates, and a decline in multinational investment. Thus fears of a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates may be misplaced.     

中国农村社区公共物品投资的决定因素分析

本文使用具有全国代表性的抽样调查数据,对农村社区公共物品投资的决定因素进行了初步的分析。本文通过理论分析提出了两个理论假说,进而提出在我国公共投资中要注意的问题:既要考虑各地对公共投资有不同的需求,还要考虑区域协调发展。研究结果表明,除了一些政策因素以外,当地经济发展水平是影响农村公共投资的重要因素,一般来说,在工商业较发达的村公共投资活动也相对较多。对于外出务工人员较多的村,由于本地公共投资对外出务工人员的收入等作用较小,因此这部分村民就不那么愿意对村里进行公共投资。从政策实施角度看,本研究发现,上级政府的公共投资更多地投向贫困地区、偏远山区、农业生产条件差的地区或少数民族地区。这种投资战略有助于统筹区域发展,降低区域差异。     

Human capital investment with competitive labor search

We study human capital accumulation in the presence of labor search frictions. Given that unemployed workers can default on their education loans, skilled individuals with a larger debt burden prefer riskier but better paid careers than is socially desirable. A higher level of employment risk in turn depresses the skill premium and the incentives to invest in education. The equilibrium allocation is characterized by too low employment, underinvestment by the poor, and too little investment in skill-intensive technologies. A public education system funded by graduate taxes can restore efficiency, and it would also reduce wage inequality.     

Strategic accessibility competition

We analyze the effect of competition in market-accessibility enhancement among quality-differentiated firms. Firms are located in regions with different ex-ante transport costs to reach the final market. We characterize the equilibrium of the two-stage game in which firms first invest to improve market accessibility and then compete in prices. Efforts in accessibility improvement crucially depend on the interplay between the willingness to pay for the quality premium of the median consumer and the ex-ante difference in accessibility between regions. From the social standpoint, also the accessibility investment depends on such a comparison. Finally, we endogenize quality choice and check the robustness of the result to some natural modifications of our assumptions.     

Rational conjectures and evolutionary beliefs in public goods games

This paper applies conjectural variations (CVs) to a model of public good provision and shows that CVs are superior to Nash beliefs. In addition to imposing consistency, as Bresnahan, I show that consistent conjectures (CCs) are obtained from individual payoff maximization. CCs emerge as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (NE) in a two-stage game in which beliefs are chosen in Stage 1 and quantities in Stage 2. There is an individual payoff advantage to non-Nash behavior, generating a Prisoner's Dilemma in conjectures in addition to the usual free-rider problem associated with public goods. The correct and payoff maximizing conjecture is the unique equilibrium in an evolutionary framework against a player with Nash conjectures. The consistent conjecture equilibrium is the unique evolutionary equilibrium when both players conjectures evolve. Hence, the NE prediction is too optimistic when players have rational conjectures.     

Would Excess Capacity in Public Firms Be Socially Optimal?

We analyse oligopolistic interactions between a welfare-maximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm in a repeated game. We find that the public firm can hold excess capacity as a strategic punishment device to sustain a subgame perfect equilibrium which is welfare-superior to the static Nash equilibrium. Basically, potential punishment from the public firm in the dynamic game can make the self-interested private firm behave in the public interest. Furthermore, if capacity is endogenous, public excess capacity can occur in a welfare efficient equilibrium when the cost of public capacity investment is higher than that of private investment.     

Factor Ownership and Governmental Strategic Interaction

A fiscal policy of a jurisdiction alters the allocation of mobile factors among jurisdictions, affecting other jurisdictions and creating an externality. Since each jurisdiction does not take into account the externality, the equilibrium fiscal policy on mobile factors is inefficient. However, individuals of a jurisdiction may own immobile factors located in other jurisdictions. The government for the jurisdiction then considers the effects of its policy on the returns to the immobile factor located in other jurisdictions. The cross–ownership of immobile factors thus affects the efficiency of fiscal policies. The present paper considers capital tax competition as an example to illustrate the effects of the ownership structure of immobile factors on the equilibrium fiscal policy, and extends the analysis to other types of fiscal competition.     

税收竞争、经济集聚与地区投资行为

中国财政分权体制下的地区间招商引资竞争广泛存在。本文通过一个纳入经济集聚因素的新古典投资决策计量模型,考察了税收激励对投资地域选择的影响。研究发现目前在中东部地区经济集聚可为地方财政带来一定的集聚租金,这使地区间税收激励政策呈现为差异化竞争策略;投资的流动性、地区经济基础、投资的产权性质等均对地区的税收激励政策选择有重要影响。本文的研究意味着,实现区域均衡发展需要构建稳定的地区间财力分享制度、改善欠发达地区的产业发展基础。     

Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers

We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the ‘poaching’ of their ‘brains’ by larger, wealthier markets.     

文化创意产品的版权博弈分析

以人的创造力和知识创新为核心要素的文化创意产业日益成为未来经济增长的动力源泉。在深入了解文化创意产业的内涵及特征的基础上，为促进这一新兴产业更快更好地发展，本文研究了文化创意产业主体之间为占有市场，选择对创意产品采取竞争或激励措施的博弈问题。本文的研究发现：纳什均衡中，文化创意产品的版权博弈双方为了自身收益最大化会独立进行价值投入；斯坦克尔伯格均衡中，版权受让商的价值投入与版权让与商的努力水平成正比，与价值投入成本成反比，双方在纳什均衡条件下投入较少，而各自的均衡期望收益在斯坦克尔伯格均衡条件下更高。