Borrowing constraints and the trade balance–output comovement

The countercyclical trade balance ratio is among the key stylized facts about open economies. The magnitude of the correlation between the trade balance and output, however, differs from country to country. In particular, the trade balance ratio is more negatively correlated with output in emerging economies than in developed economies, suggesting that the trade balance is more sensitive to output changes in the former than in the latter. This paper explores whether this difference is caused by international borrowing constraints imposed on emerging economies.By modeling borrowing constraints as conditional on macroeconomic performance, this paper shows that when there is a positive shock takes place in an emerging economy, GDP increases and the borrowing constraint becomes less binding, resulting in a decreased incentive to accumulate foreign assets. When there is a negative shock, by contrast, GDP falls, and the representative household must increase the trade balance to avoid possible binding borrowing constraints.     

Macroeconomic adjustment under loose financing conditions in the construction sector

We provide a model with sector-specific debt-collateral constraints to analyze how asymmetric financing conditions across sectors affect the aggregate investment, credit and output composition. In our model, investments in the construction sector allow for higher leverage than investments in the non-durable consumption goods sector. When borrowing constraints bind in both sectors, unit returns in the construction sector are lower due to a positive pledgeability premium, and changes in interest rates have a non-monotonic effect in the sectoral composition of investment. Specifically, a fall in interest rates triggers a relative rise in investment in the consumption goods sector when rates are relatively high, whereas the opposite effect obtains when rates are sufficiently low. We argue that this prediction of the model, which depends critically on the asymmetries of financing conditions across sectors, is consistent with the evidence for a number of OECD countries during the decade before the 2007/2008 crisis     

Credit market imperfection,labor supply complementarity,and output volatility

This paper argues that output volatility depends on the degree of credit market imperfection. In the early stages of financial development, agents are constrained in their borrowing ability. As a result, the individual savings, affected by the labor supply, play a dual role in the economy, having repercussions on the interest rate. On the one hand, high savings imply high investment, low marginal product of capital and thus low interest rate. On the other hand, high savings affect the agents' ability to run highly productive investment projects, which increases the interest rate. When the former effect is dominant, a dynamic complementarity between individual and aggregate labor supply arises. This leads to a local and global indeterminacy of equilibrium paths. If the borrowing constraint is relaxed, the complementarity between individual and aggregate labor supply decisions weakens, equilibrium becomes globally unique and the possibility of having aggregate fluctuations in output disappears.     

Education and growth with endogenous debt constraints

When future human capital cannot be alienated, households are allowed to borrow up to the point where it is in their own interest not to default. In such a framework, endogenous borrowing limits arise as the outcome of individual rationality constraint. In a model where education is the engine of growth, we show that endogenous borrowing constraints imply global indeterminacy. Comparing outcomes across the various equilibria we show that the relation between growth and yields is hump-shaped. Maximum growth can arise in an equilibrium with binding borrowing constraints, specially if the elasticity of human capital to education spending is large. Deepening financial markets promotes long-run growth in the case of a poverty trap, but not necessarily otherwise. On the methodological side, our approach stresses the importance of studying borrowing limits in general equilibrium, not only in small open economies. Philippe Michel passed away on July 22, 2004. His death is a great loss for his friends and for the overlapping generations and optimal control community.     

A Critique of Economic Theory

Abstract:

Faced with home foreclosures, a stagnant economy, and weakly-effective federal programs of relief, Richmond, California, considered using eminent domain to acquire mortgages, modify loans to be more affordable, and thus prevent further erosion of the tax base. Strong objections have been lodged against such alteration of property rights, except through bankruptcy and foreclosure processes. The Richmond proposal is considered in the historical context of changes in the use of eminent domain as described by John R. Commons. Just as economic change forced U.S. courts to change the working definitions of property in the late nineteenth century, current contradictions in the way in which we think of households, and the systemic consequences of their management of debt, may produce changes in law and should alter the way in which economists analyze aggregate consumer spending and borrowing.     

Optimal non-linear income taxation for reduction of envy

This paper examines the optimal non-linear income taxation problem based on λ-equitability. An allocation is λ-equitable if no agent envies a proportion λ of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated allocations for various λ-equitability requirements. When there is one output, the marginal income tax rate can increase only if leisure is a luxury. In a multi-commodity model with commodity taxes, the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and/or those with high Hicksian elasticities are taxed more heavily. When preferences exhibit quasi-linearity, we can show that the introduction of the λ-equitability constraint increases the marginal income tax rates of the entire population.     

An income fluctuation problem

A consumer has a t period planning horizon problem, at each period, he gets additionals incomes that are i.i.d. random variables, and he must decide how much of his income will be spent in consumption, yielding some utility, and how much will be saved to maximize the total expected utility. No borrowing is allowed, and for the amounts saved no interest is paid. Using the concepts of competitive prices it is shown that as t → ∞ the corresponding limit of the consumption policy is strictly bounded above by the expected value of the random income.     

History’s a curse: leapfrogging, growth breaks and growth reversals under international borrowing without commitment

A simple open-economy AK model with collateral constraints accounts for growth breaks and growth-reversal episodes, during which countries face abrupt changes in their growth rate that may lead to either growth miracles or growth disasters. Absent commitment to investment by the borrowing country, imperfect contract enforcement leads to an informational lag such that the debt contracted upon today depends upon the past stock of capital. The no-commitment delay originates a history effect by which the richer a country has been in the past, the more it can borrow today. For (arbitrarily) small delays, the history effect offsets the growth benefits from international borrowing and dampens growth, and it leads to both leapfrogging in long-run levels and growth breaks. When large enough, the history effect originates growth reversals and we connect the latter to leapfrogging. Finally, we argue that the model accords with the reported evidence on changes in the growth rate at break dates. We also provide examples showing that leapfrogging and growth reversals may coexist, so that currently poor but fast-growing countries experiencing sharp growth reversals may end up, in the long-run, significantly richer than currently rich but declining countries.     

Growth,selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection under short-term contracts. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, the optimal level of investor protection increases with development.     

“Overreaction” of Asset Prices in General Equilibrium

We attempt to explain the overreaction of asset prices to movements in short-term interest rates, dividends, and asset supplies. The key element of our explanation is a margin constraint that traders face which limits their leverage to a fraction of the value of their assets. Traders may lever themselves, furthermore, either directly by borrowing short term or indirectly by engaging in futures and options trading, so that the scenario is relevant to contemporary financial markets. When some shock pushes asset prices to a low enough level at which the margin constraint binds, traders are forced to liquidate assets. This drives asset prices below what they would be with frictionless markets. Also, a shock which simply increases the likelihood that the margin constraint will bind can have a very similar effect on asset prices. We construct a general equilibrium model with margin constrained traders and derive some qualitative properties of asset prices. We present an analytical solution for a deterministic version of the model and a simple numerical computation of the stochastic version.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G1, E0.     

Why Do Some Households Save So Little? A Rational Explanation

This paper offers an explanation for the puzzle of low wealth holdings among a significant fraction of the elderly. Instead of invoking irrational, nonrational, or nonoptimal behavior to resolve the puzzle, it is shown that widespread low wealth holdings are consistent with a rational life-cycle model of saving with uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint. When there is uncertainty about the length of life, it is optimal for some individuals to save little and exhaust their wealth early. The characteristics of these individuals are derived. The simulation results support that the model can account for low wealth holdings as well as early terminal wealth depletion. The analysis also rejects the common perception that uncertain lifetime reduces dissaving. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D11, D91, E21, I12, J14.     

On the determinants of household debt maturity choice

This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.     

Assessing Recent Determinants of Borrowing Costs in Sub‐Saharan Africa

This study explores macroeconomic implications of the sovereign bond rush that has been taking place in sub‐Saharan Africa since 2006. The focus is on the sub‐Saharan sovereign bond yields as proxies for the region's ability to raise new funds on international markets. Despite the subcontinent's tour‐de‐force entrance to the international bond market, this paper reveals that recent (since early 2000s) borrowing in foreign currency is not without macroeconomic risk. Empirically this paper finds that sovereign bond yields are significantly influenced by global volatility, commodity prices and global liquidity—all factors that are out of the control of the sub‐Saharan economies in question. These findings suggest that portfolio repositioning by institutional investors prompted by improved growth prospects and implicit monetary policy tightening in the advanced economies or heightened risk perceptions, are likely to result in increased borrowing costs for the sub‐Saharan bond issuers and affect their ability to raise funds in international markets. Furthermore, a change in borrowing costs might lead to higher debt‐service costs and policy uncertainty, which in turn could lead to suboptimal investment levels and, ultimately, hinder economic development.     

Index-linked bonds from an academic,market and policy-making standpoint

The view put forward in this paper is that the index-linking of long-term public debt today represents a financial instrument thatfostersa low average rate of inflation. In particular, bonds that are fully linked to the prices of a representative basket of goods and services permit a reduction in the inflation risk premium, which weighs significantly on the nominal cost of the public debt and,ex post, gives rise to substantial real costs that distort the mechanisms of allocation and distribution and, ultimately, could lead to the debt becoming unsustainable. After re-examining the reasons for the “orthodox ” aversion to index-linking —notably on the part of the monetary authorities of the more stable countries and especially the Bundesbank —the case is put for the leading industrial countries, and notably Italy, to issue index-linked government bonds. By issuing such bonds, the Treasuries of the various countries would send a strong stabilizing signal to the markets because recourse to the inflation tax in the future would no longer be advantageous, reduce the real cost of government borrowing by eliminating the inflation risk premium that currently has to be paid on issues with fixed nominal interest rates, benefit from the positive correlation between the quality of revenue and expenditure, and obtain valuable information on forward inflation rates and the real interest rates implicit in the prices of the bonds. The long-term real interest rate offered by index-linked bonds would act as a sort of “lighthouse ” set up by the monetary authorities to illuminate the path of economic growth and enable operators and markets to co-ordinate their actions more effectively.     

State appropriations and undergraduate borrowing: more debt,less money

When state appropriations decrease, public universities respond by raising tuition. Students borrow more in response to both tuition increases and appropriation cuts. This article investigates the feedback of how borrowing and tuition influence state appropriations. Using a panel data set of 450 four-year public universities from 1999 to 2012, we employ three-stage least squares techniques to control for the endogeneity between state appropriations, tuition and student borrowing. There is evidence that state policy-makers respond to increases in university tuition and student borrowing by decreasing future appropriation levels. After controlling for the effect of appropriations on tuition and borrowing, a one-dollar increase in student borrowing reduces state appropriations per student by $0.06, and a one-dollar increase in tuition results in a decrease of $0.45 in state appropriations per student. When universities increase tuition for reasons other than a reduction in state appropriations, policy-makers respond with a significant cut in future appropriations which could signal an incentive strategy.     

Ramsey Equilibrium in a Two-Sector Model with Heterogeneous Households

We prove an existence theorem for a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium under borrowing constraints in a two-sector model with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. The most patient agent holds all the capital in this solution. We also show that if the capital goods sector is capital intensive and capital income is increasing in the aggregate capital stock, then the aggregate capital stock eventually is monotonic and converges to the steady state stock. If the consumption goods sector is more capital intensive and capital income is increasing in aggregate capital we prove convergence to the steady state under more restrictive conditions. Periodic equilibria are shown to exist under weaker hypotheses. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D90, E13.     

财富不平等会抑制金融素养对家庭借贷行为的作用效果吗*——基于CHFS数据的经验分析

本文基于2013年中国家庭金融调查（CHFS）数据,选用工具变量法,考察了金融素养对城乡家庭借贷行为影响的差异性,并验证了财富不平等扩大会抑制金融素养对家庭借贷行为的影响。研究发现：（1）金融素养是影响家庭借贷行为的重要因素。户主金融素养水平的改善显著提高了家庭发生借贷的概率与家庭借贷规模。（2）金融素养对城乡家庭借贷行为的影响存在明显差异,金融素养的提高对信贷约束较为严重的农村家庭借贷行为的促进作用更大。（3）财富不平等对家庭借贷行为存在明显的抑制作用,财富不平等的扩大减少了家庭借贷需求,降低了家庭发生借贷的概率和家庭负债规模。（4）随着家庭财富不平等程度的扩大,金融素养对家庭借贷行为的促进作用受到抑制。基于以上结论,政府应该大力开展消费者金融素养教育,注重家庭收入分配合理性,从而推动我国消费金融市场的健康发展。     

Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance*

We derive empirical implications from a theoretical model of bank–borrower relationships. The interest‐rate mark‐ups of banks are predicted to follow a life‐cycle pattern over the age of the borrowing firms. Because of endogenous bank monitoring by competing banks, borrowing firms initially face a low mark‐up, and thereafter an increasing mark‐up as a result of informational lock‐in, until it falls for older firms when the lock‐in is resolved. By applying a large sample of predominantly small unlisted firms and a new measure of asymmetric information, we find that firms with significant asymmetric‐information problems have a more pronounced life‐cycle pattern of interest‐rate mark‐ups. Additionally, we examine the effects of concentrated banking markets on interest‐rate mark‐ups. The results indicate that the life cycle of mark‐ups is mainly driven by asymmetric‐information problems and not by concentration. However, we find evidence that bank market concentration matters for older firms ? 2 Correction added after online publication on 20^th February 2012; the original text read ‘However, we find evidence that bank market concentration for older firms’, omitting the word ‘matters’.
     

收入不平等与家庭借贷行为*——家庭为追求社会地位而借贷的动机真的存在吗

本文利用中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)2011年度的调查数据,考察了收入不平等对家庭借贷行为的影响,并验证了家庭是否存在为追求社会地位而借贷的动机。研究表明：（1）收入不平等并不是影响家庭是否借贷的主要因素,但是对家庭的负债规模存在十分显著的抑制作用;（2）收入不平等的扩大并不会促使中低收入家庭寻求借贷或提升家庭负债规模,我国家庭并不存在为了追求更高的社会地位而进行借贷的动机;（3）收入不平等的扩大有利于高收入家庭获得更多的正规金融借贷,中低收入家庭则会较多地依赖于非正规金融借贷;（4）户主的人口统计学特征、家庭经济特征以及家庭所处地区特征均是影响家庭借贷行为的重要因素,在正规金融和非正规金融市场上,影响家庭借贷行为的因素存在较明显的差异。