Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

Should managerial delegation contracts be made before or after union wage setting? A game‐theoretic analysis

This paper analyzes a multiple‐stage game in which, at the final stage, two (managerial) firms compete over quantities in the product market. Prior to this stage, firm‐specific unions set the workers' wages, while the owners of both firms hire managers and provide them with incentive contracts. Owners can freely decide to arrange the managerial contract before or after the (non‐managerial) wage determination stage. Hence, the endogenous choice of the incentive contract stage is derived. The possibility of multiple equilibria arises, where both owners choose managerial contracts before or after unions' wage setting, crucially depending on unions' preferences. Such results also prove to be true for a remarkable degree of asymmetry in preferences over wages vis‐à‐vis employment across unions.     

The impact of minimum wages on wages,work and poverty in Nicaragua

In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of poverty. We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring. Most workers who lose their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find no evidence that these workers become unemployed.Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker's family will move out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the labor force).     

THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE LABOR MARKET

The literature on the impact of immigration on the labor market is highly controversial. The aim of this paper is to review the existing literature and draw some general conclusions on how wages and employment respond to immigration. Economic studies indicate that the impact of immigration on the average wage and employment of native workers is null or slightly positive. However, because adjustments take time, the immediate labor market effects of unexpected (as opposed to expected) migration episodes can be detrimental. Immigration also can have distributional consequences. In particular, the skill composition of immigrants matters in determining their impact on native labor market outcomes. An inflow of immigrants will tend to reduce the wages of competing native workers (with skills similar to those of the migrants), and increase those of complementary workers (with skills that complement those of immigrants). By affecting the skill composition of the workforce, immigration can create winners and losers among native workers via changes in the wage structure.     

Wage‐setting Decisions on Newly Hired Employees: Survey Evidence from Colombian Firms

This paper uses a survey on wage formation applied to 1305 Colombian firms to study wage‐setting decisions of newly hired employees. The survey indicates that wages of the newly hired are based mainly on a predefined wage structure. This may help to explain, in part, the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities in the Colombian formal labour market, since firms are unwilling to differentiate the pay of new hires from the wages of existing workers. Using multinomial logit models, we find that firm size and the share of temporary workers increase the relative risk of using a predefined internal structure over bargaining between employee and employer when setting the wages of the newly hired employees. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How low can U go?

• ? Although there is growing evidence that wage growth is building in response to low and falling unemployment in the advanced economies, there is scope for unemployment rates to fall further without triggering a pay surge.
• ? For a start, current unemployment rates in comparison to past cyclical troughs overstate the tightness of labour markets. Demographic trends associated with the ageing ‘baby boomer’ bulge have pushed down the headline unemployment rate – unemployment rates among older workers are lower than those of younger cohorts. And in a historical context, Europe still has a large pool of involuntary part‐timers.
• ? In addition, rising participation rates mean that demographics are less of a constraint on employment growth than widely assumed. In both 2017 and 2018, had it not been for increased activity rates (mainly for older cohorts), unemployment would have had to fall more sharply to accommodate the same employment increase. We expect rising participation rates to continue to act as a pressure valve for the labour market.
• ? Finally, unemployment rates were generally far lower during the 1950s and 1960s than now. If wages stay low relative to productivity, as was the case during that prior era, employment growth may remain strong, with unemployment falling further. In the post‐war era, low wages were partly a function of a grand bargain in which policy‐makers provided full employment in return for low wage growth.
• ? There is evidence to suggest that many post‐crisis workers have opted for the security of their existing full‐time job and its associated benefits despite lower wage growth, rather than change job and potentially earn more; the rise of the ‘gig economy’ has led some workers to value what they already have more. Put another way, the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has fallen. So, the role of labour market tightness in pushing wage growth higher may continue to surprise to the downside.

     

Blame the baby boomers for depressed wage growth

• ? While ‘blame’ may sound harsh, the reality is that in an ageing society, the over‐60s accounting for a bigger share of the workforce equals lower wage growth. This is particularly pertinent for the eurozone right now with the baby boomer generation entering the last phase of their working life. Our analysis shows that the very sizeable over‐60 cohort is depressing aggregate wage growth by up to 0.3 ppts annually. That may also help explain why inflation is still subdued .
• ? European policy makers are scratching their heads about why wage growth has not picked up in line with economic growth over the past two years. For the ECB this is relevant as it tries to understand why inflation remains low. While much of the debate centres around unemployment and the Phillips curve, this article looks at the impact of an ageing society on wage growth.
• ? Even though this is more of a structural, rather than a cyclical, perspective, it is particularly important for the eurozone economies right now, because the large post‐World War II baby boomer generation is strongly pushing up the elderly share of employment (measured as those aged 60 and above). As the share of the over 60s in total employment grows, so does their weight in aggregate wage growth.
• ? The crucial point is that wages increase with age, but at a decreasing rate, and stay essentially flat above 55. The main reasons are that the elderly invest much less in continued education and are less inclined to switch to better‐paying jobs.
• ? Our analysis shows how substantial the negative impact of an ageing workforce is on wage growth in the eurozone. By simulating an alternative demographic scenario, we estimate that wage growth in 2015–17 would have been 0.3 ppts per year higher had it not been for the ageing baby‐boomers. Similarly, forecasts for 2018–20 not accounting for the baby‐boomers may overstate wage growth by some 0.2 ppts or more annually.

     

On-the-Job Learning and the Effects of Insider Power

Suppose insiders use their market power to push up their wages, while entrants receive their reservation wages. How will employment and productivity be affected? In addressing this question, we focus on the role of on-the-job learning. We show that on-the-job learning makes insider wage hikes less detrimental to average employment (over booms and recessions), and may even cause employment to be stimulated. Furthermore, such learning can make insider wage hikes more detrimental to average productivity.     

Efficiency Wages and the Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage: Evidence from a Low‐Wage Labour Market*

This article exploits a natural experiment provided by the 1999 introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage (NMW) to test for efficiency wage considerations in a low‐wage sector, the UK residential care homes industry. The empirical results provide support to the wage‐supervision trade‐off prediction of the shirking model and suggest that the NMW may have operated as an efficiency wage in the care homes sector, leading to a reduction in supervision costs. These findings can explain earlier evidence suggesting that although the NMW introduction increased wages dramatically in the care homes sector, it generated only moderate negative employment effects.     

The impact of Greek labour market regulation on temporary employment – evidence from a survey in Thessaly,Greece

This paper uses an original data-set for 186 workplaces in Thessaly (central Greece), to study consequences of Greece's strict employment protection law (EPL) and national minimum wage for temporary employment. We find higher temporary work contract rates among workplaces that pay low wages close to the minimum. We also find that EPL ‘matters’, in particular, managers who prefer temporary contracts because temporary workers are less protected definitely employ more. Our findings thus support the view that a firm's HRM decisions regarding internal versus external allocation of tasks are influenced by labour regulation.     

The labor market consequences of experience in self-employment

Many public policies are designed to encourage self-employment. However, because self-employment experiences are typically brief, it becomes important to understand the long-term consequences of entering and then leaving self-employment. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we examine the effects of brief self-employment experience on subsequent labor market outcomes. We find that, relative to continued wage employment, brief spells in self-employment do not increase—and probably actually reduce—average hourly earnings upon return to wage employment. We also find that those who experience self-employment have difficulty returning to the wage sector. However, these consequences are small compared to similar experiences in unemployment.     

The effect of minimum wage hikes on employment: Evidence from regional panel data from Romania

Minimum wage hikes aim to increase the income of low-wage workers and improve their labour market participation. However, there are concerns that large increases may reduce employment, especially in countries where minimum wages increased quickly and whose competitiveness depends, at least partly, on low production costs. This study examines the employment effect of large increases in the minimum wage in Romania between 2008 and 2016. It uses regional (NUTS III) data and dynamic panel methods. The results do not support the hypothesis that minimum wage hikes reduce employment. They are robust to the use of different econometric methods, plausible variations of the specification and definitions of the key variables. Moreover, the results suggest insignificant effects even for low wage, less developed or high unemployment regions.     

Managers and Wage Policies

Do individual top managers matter for wages and wage policies? Are there general differences in “style” among managers with respect to worker compensation? To shed light on these questions, we exploit a large panel dataset from Portugal that allows us to match workers, firms, and managers, and follow the movements of the latter across different firms over time. While accounting for the effect of worker and firm heterogeneity, we estimate the role of top manager fixed effects in determining wages and wage policies. The estimates suggest that (i) top managers have a significant influence on wages and wage policies; (ii) there exists different managerial “styles”; and (iii) managers’ (observable) attributes matter for worker compensation.     

Managing the Contingent Workforce—Gaining the Advantages, Avoiding the Pitfalls

Part-time employment arrangements constitute a rapidly growing segment of the U.S. labor force. Such employment arrangements offer advantages to both employers and employees. Part-time employees offer employers reduced wage and benefit costs, workforce flexibility, aid for special projects, replacement fill-ins and a chance to preview candidates for full-time employment. Part-time work enables employees to supplement family income, enjoy flexible hours as well as a change in job environment and a chance to substitute for full-time employment when there is no choice. The advantages of contingent employment come at a cost. Employers must comply with laws and give up control over much of the employment relationship in order to avoid co-employment status and to gain the benefits of contingent employment. Employees in contingent work arrangements frequently do not qualify for many of the benefits available to full time employees. Suggestions made for managing contingent workers may reduce some of the problems, but they would also remove some of the advantages.     

If You Are So Smart,Why Aren't You an Entrepreneur? Returns to Cognitive and Social Ability: Entrepreneurs Versus Employees

How valuable are cognitive and social abilities for entrepreneurs’ relative to employees’ earnings? We answer three questions: (1) To what extent does a composite measure of ability affect an entrepreneur's earnings relative to wages earned by employees? (2) Do different cognitive abilities (e.g., math ability, language, or verbal ability) and social ability affect earnings of entrepreneurs and employees differently?, and (3) Does the balance in these measured ability levels affect an individual's earnings? Our (difference‐of‐difference) estimates of the returns to ability for spells in entrepreneurship versus wage employment account for selectivity into entrepreneurial positions insofar as they are determined by fixed individual characteristics. Our robust results provide the following answers to the three questions: General ability has a stronger impact on entrepreneurial incomes than on wages. Moreover, entrepreneurs and employees benefit from different sets of specific abilities: verbal and clerical abilities have a stronger impact on wages, whereas mathematical, social, and technical ability are more valuable for entrepreneurs. The balance in the various kinds of ability also generates a higher income, but only for entrepreneurs: This finding supports Lazear's Jack‐of‐all‐Trades theory.     

Just‐cause provisions,severance pay,and the efficiency wage hypothesis

A simple model of employment contracting is employed to examine the effectiveness of just‐cause provisions in alleviating employer opportunism in two types of efficiency wage contracts—standard contracts, in which wages exceed the worker's marginal contribution, and deferred wages, which are paid after a period of tenure in the firm. It is argued that just‐cause employment policies are necessary and sufficient to prevent employer opportunism when standard efficiency wages are utilized. However, just‐cause policies are not sufficient to deter employer opportunism when employment contracts are of the delayed‐payment type. In these contracts, other contractual provisions, such as severance provisions, are also necessary. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tighter labour markets to finally lift global wages

• Wage growth has been relatively slow since 2007 in advanced economies, but an upturn may be in sight. Slow productivity growth remains an issue but tighter labour markets make a positive response by wages to rising inflation more likely and there are signs that compositional and crisis‐related effects that dragged wage growth down are fading – though Japan may be an exception.
• Overall, our forecasts are for a moderate improvement in wage growth in the major economies in 2017–18, with the pace of growth rising by 0.5–1% per year relative to its 2016 level by 2018 – enough to keep consumer spending reasonably solid.
• Few countries have maintained their pre‐crisis pace of wage growth since 2007. In part this reflects a mixture of low inflation and weak productivity growth, but other factors have also been in play: in the US and Japan wage growth has run as much as 0.5–1% per year lower than conventional models would suggest.
• The link with productivity seems to have weakened since 2007 and Phillips curves – which relate wages to unemployment – have become flatter. A notable exception is Germany, where the labour market has behaved in a much more ‘normal’ fashion over recent years with wage growth responding to diminishing slack.
• ‘Compositional’ factors related to shifts in the structure of the workforce may have had an important influence in holding down wage growth, cutting it by as much as 2% per year in the US and 1% per year in the UK. There are some signs that the impact of these effects in the UK and US are fading, but not in Japan.
• The forecast rise in inflation over the next year as energy price base effects turn positive is a potential risk to real wages. But the decline in measures of labour market slack in the US, UK and Germany suggests wages are more likely to move up with inflation than was the case in 2010–11 when oil prices spiked and real wages fell.

     

Firms' price and wage adjustment in Europe: Survey evidence on nominal stickiness

This paper presents new evidence on the patterns of price and wage adjustment in European firms and on the extent of nominal rigidities. It uses a unique dataset collected through a firm-level survey conducted in 17 European countries and covering various sectors. Several conclusions are drawn from this evidence. Firms adjust wages less frequently than prices, on average every 15 and 10 months, respectively. Price and, especially, wage adjustment exhibit a substantial degree of time-dependence. In particular, wage changes tend to cluster at a specific time of the year, mostly January in the majority of countries. The results of a multivariate analysis indicate that prices are more flexible when competitive pressures in product markets are strong and when labor costs account for a lower fraction of firms' total costs, whereas wages are more flexible when bargaining is decentralized and when the coverage of collective bargaining and the stringency of employment protection legislation are low. Price rigidities are higher in firms with a larger share of high-skilled/white-collar workers.     

How do European firms adjust their labour costs when nominal wages are rigid?

Although workers' nominal wages are seldom cut, firms have multiple options available if they require adjustments in their wage bills. We broaden the analysis of relative (in)flexibility in labour costs by investigating the use of other margins of labour cost adjustment at the firm level beyond base wages. Using data from a unique survey, we find that European firms make extensive use of other components of compensation to adjust the cost of labour. Interestingly, firms facing base wage rigidity are more likely to use alternative margins of labour cost adjustment; therefore there appears to be some degree of substitutability between wage flexibility and the flexibility of other cost components. Changes in bonuses and non-pay benefits are some of the potential margins firms use to reduce costs. We also show how the margins of adjustment chosen are affected by unionisation and firm and worker characteristics.     

The paradox of rising wage growth and falling inflation

• ? Strong labour markets and rising wages in advanced economies stand in sharp contrast to recent declines in economists’ inflation forecasts and market expectations. In our view, though, these developments are not necessarily contradictory. Even if wage growth edges higher, we think demand factors will limit any pick‐up in prices. Instead, we expect firms’ margins will be squeezed.
• ? Although the labour share has risen more sharply than we had expected over the past couple of years, we are sceptical that this will translate into substantially stronger underlying inflation. Not only has the rise been small, it has been employment rather than wages that has surprised to the upside. The strength of employment is probably more about firms’ production preferences than workers’ capitalising on a stronger negotiating position.
• ? True, wages adjusted for productivity now look high by historical standards. But neither theory or empirical evidence suggests that this must inevitably lead to stronger CPI inflation in the short‐term. Our forecast for flat wage growth in 2019 and the absence of strong cost pressures elsewhere are also a comfort.
• ? Inflation tends to be more responsive to demand indicators – and the recent GDP growth soft patch suggests any further pick‐up in underlying inflation pressures will be limited (see Chart below).
• ? More generally, we think that the consensus view on inflation for the key advanced economies is high. Market‐based inflation expectations are typically lower than our own, which may reflect the perception that inflation risks are skewed to the downside. Positive economic surprises could lead downside risks to narrow, but ageing expansions and secular stagnation worries suggest this is unlikely, limiting any future pick‐up in bond yields.