广东家族企业上市公司职业经理人的现状分析

本文以在深市上市的广东50家家族控制的上市公司为对象,根据他们当前的聘用经理人的现状,发现广东上市家族企业有超过一半的企业未聘用职业经理人,基于对广东上市家族企业中职业经理人的年龄、学历、资历、性别、年薪等现状分析,指出职业经理人制度在广东家族上市公司还不能得到很好的普及,这样不利于我们经济的发展,实际上对应了我国较弱的投资者保护水平,这方面工作需要我们以后加以改善。     

家族企业职业经理人与审计费用:代理成本效应与声誉效应的双重检验

家族企业接班人选择问题是近年来理论界与实务界关注的重要话题。选取2008—2018年沪深两市上市的家族企业为研究对象,从审计成本角度出发,分析了职业经理人对审计费用的作用机制,检验家族企业聘用职业经理人对审计费用的影响。研究表明：聘用职业经理人的家族企业支付的审计费用更高;在两者之间同时存在代理成本效应与声誉效应,但代理成本起主导作用,声誉效应可抑制审计费用的增加;进一步分析发现聘用职业经理人的家族企业,其代理问题更为严重,内部控制较差,但这与高管的任职年限有关,职业经理人任职年限更长,内部控制状况更好,但同时代理冲突也在增加。因此,家族企业在选任职业经理人作为继任者时,应多关注其带来的代理问题,进行利益权衡,同时应该关注企业内部控制的完善与治理。     

内部经理人：百年欧莱雅传承的制胜秘笈

利利亚娜、雀巢与欧莱雅之间稳定的三角结构,为家族企业在保持家族所有——家族控制和转向机构投资者主导——职业经理人控制这两种模式之间,提供了一种中间道路或说是第三条道路,即家族和真正的战略投资者共同稳定持有——内部成长的职业经理人管理。     

创始人和经理人要“同观”

对于企业的发展一定要有经理人这样的角色。无论是创始人还是经理人，当你面临退休的时候都要找一个经理人，不管这个人是家族传承还是外部聘用，目标都是要企业有序地经营下去，这是大家割舍不去的情结。更重要的是，创始人跟职业经理人往往会出现不同的看法，甚至会产生冲突，我认为这应该是在价值观的认同上需要调和的问题。     

小企业如何开发人才资源第二讲 重视激励，用好职业经理人

小企业绝大多数是民营企业。当小企业发展到一定程度，再靠创业者本人，或者家族成员打理企业的方方面面，多数会面临力不从心的问题，这时必须聘用家族外的成员进入企业经营管理层，甚至担任企业要职。这些担任企业要职的人员，拿现在流行的说法，就是职业经理人。     

我国家族式企业如何走向正规化经营之路

在市场经济体制和经济全球化的大环境中,适合纯粹的家族企业生存空间越来越小,推行企业改制,走正规化经营之路已成为家族企业可持续发展的必然选择。家族企业主要存在所有权和经营权合一、人力资源管理模式落后、家族成员间责权利不明三方面的局限性,但其可以通过走职业经理人道路,完善人力资源管理,引进现代企业制度,这样能充分发挥家族企业的合力与活力,促进企业的发展。     

家族企业：老板与经理如何协作双赢

美国42％的企业为家族所控制，欧洲43％的企业是家族企业或家族关联企业，我国90％以上的民营企业是家族企业，可见家族企业在国民经济中占有多么重要的位置。但随着市场经济的深入，竞争加剧，我国家族企业正面临生存和发展的“瓶颈”，要么消亡。要么转型。关于目前我国家族企业的发展存亡，业界基本达成共识：家族企业家族管理必然死路一条，家族企业非家族管理才是必由之路，即引进职业经理人，实行经营权与所有权分离，实现管理的专业化、规范化、现代化。可是。目前我国家族企业中老板与职业经理人往往同床异梦，老板侵犯经理人权益和经理人损害老板利益的事件时有发生，双方互信、协作机制难以建立。难道老板与经理人之间注定不能相融？     

契合还是冲突:家族企业职业经理人退出补偿意愿

本文在文献回顾的基础上,分别设计家族企业主和职业经理人版调查表来收集相关数据,借助SPSS21.0统计分析软件,采用交叉表、皮尔逊卡方检验和皮尔逊相关分析对数据进行综合分析。研究表明:家族企业主与职业经理人退出补偿意愿总体上契合性不高,家族企业主与职业经理人退出补偿意愿以冲突为主;家族企业主和职业经理人退出补偿意愿的强弱与各自所处的区域、企业规模、企业经营年限、任职经历等属性、特征存在一定的相关性。最后,从建立和完善家族企业职业经理人退出补偿若干机制、构建多元化的家族企业职业经理人退出补偿体系、进一步完善职业经理人退出补偿法律体系等方面提出了相应管理对策。     

新世纪打造职业经理人

职业经理人的定位和素质要求 所谓职业经理人,是以管理为职业,以企业行政为专业,以合同为依据,接受投资者聘用,通过管理、经营手段,运用全面的经营管理知识和丰富的管理经验,独立对一个经济组织(或一个部门),开展经营进行管理使企业盈利的人.     

民营企业治理问题的典型案例

处理好企业主与经理人之间的关系，是中小民营企业走向现代化的关键。企业主总想把自己的企业做大做强，但单靠自身的能力把握并不大，因此许多企业主开始聘用有能力的经理人，寄希望于两者形成合力，把企业管理好、经营好。但是，企业主在聘用经理人的同时，又会产生诸多问题。比如，企业主聘用经理人为其服务，就必须给他们授权，使他们有条件和机会接触企业的核心资源、信息、技术和客户；而当经理人看到这些核心资源能够带来如此多的利润后，他们也许会想：我为什么不利用这些资源自己干？     

The impact of ultimate controller’s ownership on cash dividend policy based on a comparative analysis between owner-management and professional-management modes

This study uses Chinese listed firms to examine the relation between the ultimate controller’s ownership and cash dividends under different allocation modes of management rights. The empirical results show that under the professional-management mode, the ultimate controller’s ownership and dividend payments form an inverted U-shaped relation which results from the ultimate controller’s monitoring and collusion with the executive. Under the owner-management mode, the ultimate controller’s ownership and dividend payment levels assume a U-shaped relation which is attributed to its interest encroachment and convergence effect. The shape flip from professional-management to owner-management is the result of the changing opportunity cost of the controller’s dividend payments.     

Combining the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process and the fuzzy Delphi method for developing critical competences of electronic commerce professional managers

This study proposes a novel approach that integrates the qualitative approach, the quantitative approach, and fuzzy set theory for developing a framework of critical managerial competences of electronic commerce (EC) professional managers. The approach combines a focus group, a fuzzy Delphi method and the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (Fuzzy AHP) for identifying competences via experts’ opinions and questionnaires for developing the framework of managerial EC professional managers. Comparing the competences of traditional managers and EC managers reveals main differences in the emphasis on EC manager professional skills. Furthermore, competency weights for EC managers lie particularly in domain knowledge and information management skills. Research results reveal that our proposed EC competence framework not only help firms in selecting/hiring high quality EC professional managers more objectively, but also in evaluating the performance of EC managers.     

Lateral hiring and the performance of professional service firms: the moderating effects of leverage ratio

We theorized and tested the performance implications of the lateral hiring by professional service firms (i.e. law firms). Using a longitudinal dataset of lateral partner hires in 148 US law firms between the years of 2004 and 2008, the results indicated that the size of lateral hiring had a reversed U-shape relationship with the financial performance of a firm. In addition, the leverage ratio (i.e. the ratio between associate lawyers and partners) significantly moderated the reversed U-shape relationship between lateral hiring and firm performance, such that the placement of the bend in the curvilinear relationship, that is, the threshold, occurred more quickly at a low than at a high leverage ratio. This study contributes to the literature on strategic human resource management in professional service firms by providing empirical evidence on the effect of lateral hires and by emphasizing that lateral partner hiring should be considered with other important HR issues to fully capitalize lateral partners.     

论供应链视角下中国职业篮球联赛表演权的产权归属

通过中国职业篮球联赛供应链的构建,来分析中国职业篮球联赛表演权的具体形成及其表现形式。同时从经济学、著作权法、不完全合同理论三个角度分析中国职业篮球联赛表演权的最终产权归属。旨在对中国职业篮球联赛表演权的归属有个直观、全面的认识,并保护职业篮球运动员、教练员和职业篮球俱乐部的合法权益。     

The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.     

企业股权结构与股权转让效率——以中国大陆A股上市公司为例

通过对中国大陆A股上市公司股权转让数据的分析表明,企业股权转让更容易发生在股权较为分散的公司中,但是股权转让后的企业效率并没有明显的改善,公司控制权的转移往往对企业绩效产生负面的影响。由此可见,通过鼓励企业股权结构分散化并对控制权私人收益加以必要的管制,对提高股权转让的效率将起到非常重要的作用。     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

民营企业公司治理中家族冲突的解决路径

民营企业公司治理的核心任务就是要解决企业治理和家族治理之间的冲突。以血缘和信任为纽带的家族情感与以法律和经济契约为纽带的现代公司理性本身就存在冲突。在民营企业公司治理层面,当所有权与经营权分离时,民营企业家就必须设计和探索出一条既能保障家族权益、又能实现企业有效管控的健康发展的公司治理路径。民营企业的家族商业表现同家族和睦与家族冲突息息相关。代民营企业公司治理需要在经济理性与家族情感、文化传统与现行法律、专业化运营与家族控股中找到合适的平衡点。民营企业公司在成长过程中,需要在公司治理的关键环节上进行设计和把握,从而找到家族冲突的解决路径。通过规范化与专业化的公司治理,实现企业的可持续发展。