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1.
We consider a general equilibrium economy with public goods and externalities. Following Boyd and Conley (1997), we treat externality markets directly instead of indirectly through Arrovian commodities. Because such direct externality markets are not subject to the nonconvexities that Starrett [Starrett, D., 1972. Fundamental nonconvexities in the theory of externalities. Journal of Economic Theory 4, 180–199] shows are fundamental to Arrow’s externality markets, this new approach admits the use of largely standard methods to prove welfare and existence theorems in an economy with externalities. We extend the Boyd and Conley model to allow firms to benefit from public goods and be damaged by externalities, and to allow consumers to produce externalities. We state a first welfare theorem and prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Taken together, this can be viewed as a type of general equilibrium Coase theorem. Considered as a special case, these theorems also represent a significant generalization of existing results for pure public goods economies.  相似文献   

2.
We extend a theorem of G. Debreu on the existence of equilibrium in a generalized N-person game (‘A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem’). Applying standard techniques the result can be used to prove the existence of equilibrium in economies with interdependent preferences, price-dependent preferences and preferences which may be both non-transitive and non-complete. This generalizes a recent theorem of A. Mas-Colell.  相似文献   

3.
Abstract This article argues that the impact of globalization on labour markets and human resources on the Asia-Pacific economies may be recognizable but is as yet relatively limited. The sheer variation of geography, population, economies, labour markets, IR and HRM systems there, as well as of values and the like, makes it difficult to talk of 'hard convergence'. We thus emphasize the notion of 'soft convergence'. The article develops a number of empirical propositions regarding the uneven impact of globalization on economies in the region. It concludes that any generalization on this theme should be greatly qualified.  相似文献   

4.
Hurwicz (1979) and Otani and Sicilian (1982, 1990) characterized the Nash equilibrium allocations of the Walrasian demand manipulation game in successively more general exchange environments. In this paper, I extend the analysis to production economies with short-selling. First, I generalize Hurwicz’s and Otani and Sicilian’s theorem that any allocation at which each agent’s consumption bundle lies above her true offer curve can be supported in Nash equilibrium. I then show that for finite economies of any size the set of such allocations is often topologically large.Received: 17 January 2003, Accepted: 4 April 2005, JEL Classification: D51, D82For comments on this and earlier versions of the paper, I wish to thank Rick Bond, Bhaskar Chakravorti, Tom Gresik, Costas Syropoulos and William Thomson. I would especially like to thank Mike Jerison for helping to overcome a difficulty with a previous version. Also, the comments of the anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.  相似文献   

5.
This paper presents an existence theorem for a class of backward stochastic integral equations. The main contribution is a generalization of Duffie and Epstein's [Duffie, D., Epstein, L., 1992. Stochastic differential utility, (Appendix C with Skiadas C.), Econometrica 60, 353–394.] existence theorem of intertemporal recursive utility to allow the information structure to be driven by a Lévy jump process. The existence theorem applies also for a more general class of utility functions, such as recursive utility with habit-formation, and can be used to prove the existence of an equilibrium asset price process as a unique solution to the stochastic Euler equation derived by Ma [Ma, C., 1993b. Valuation of Derivative Securities with Mixed Poisson–Brownian Information and Recursive Utility, McGill University, mimeo.].  相似文献   

6.
We show that for an open dense set of markets with a continuum of traders the number of equilibrium allocations [which by the celebrated theorem of Aumann (Econometrica. 1964, 32. 39–50) coincide with the core allocations for such markets are finite. This presents a limiting case result that complements similar asymptotic theorems for cores of large economies proved by Bewley (Econometrica 1973, 41, 425–454), and Dierker (Journal of Mathematical Economics 1975, 2. 155–169). If we require that the measure on the space of agents be one with a finite number of atoms of equal weight, our reasoning recovers the classical results obtained by Debreu (Econometrica. 1970. 38, 387–392) for economies with a finite number of agents.  相似文献   

7.
The Early History of the Cumulants and the Gram-Charlier Series   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
The early history of the Gram-Charlier series is discussed from three points of view: (1) a generalization of Laplace's central limit theorem, (2) a least squares approximation to a continuous function by means of Chebyshev-Hermite polynomials, (3) a generalization of Gauss's normal distribution to a system of skew distributions. Thiele defined the cumulants in terms of the moments, first by a recursion formula and later by an expansion of the logarithm of the moment generating function. He devised a differential operator which adjusts any cumulant to a desired value. His little known 1899 paper in Danish on the properties of the cumulants is translated into English in the Appendix.  相似文献   

8.
L. Bondesson 《Metrika》1983,30(1):49-54
Summary A simple generalization of the Lehmann-Scheffé theorem is given. It is used to find cases when UMVUE's exist but complete sufficient statistics do not. Another method to find such cases is also presented.  相似文献   

9.
Glicksberg [Glicksberg, I.L., 1952. A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with applications to Nash equilibrium points. In: Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 3, pp. 170–174] generalized the Kakutani fixed point theorem to the setting of locally convex spaces and used it to prove that every k-person strategic game with action sets convex compact subsets of locally convex spaces and continuous payoff functions has a Nash equilibrium. He subsequently used this result to establish the following fundamental theorem of game theory: Every k-person strategic game with action sets metrizable compact topological spaces and continuous payoff functions has a mixed strategies equilibrium. However, in his proof of the latter result, Glicksberg did not show that the expected payoff functions were jointly continuous, something that was required for the existence of a mixed strategies equilibrium.  相似文献   

10.
In this note, we give an equilibrium existence theorem for exchange economies with asymmetric information and with an infinite dimensional commodity space. In our model, we assume that preferences are represented by well behaved utility functions, the positive cone has a non empty interior and the individual rational utility set is compact. Our result complements the corresponding one in Podczeck and Yannelis (2008), in the sense that is applicable to commodity spaces in which the order intervals are (possibly) not compact with respect to any Hausdorff linear topology.  相似文献   

11.
It is known that the classical theorems of Grodal [Grodal, B., 1972. A second remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 581–583] and Schmeidler [Schmeidler, D., 1972. A remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 579–580] on the veto power of small coalitions in finite dimensional, atomless economies can be extended (with some minor modifications) to include the case of countably many commodities. This paper presents a further extension of these results to include the case of uncountably many commodities. We also extend Vind’s [Vind, K., 1972. A third remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 585–586] classical theorem on the veto power of big coalitions in finite dimensional, atomless economies to include the case of an arbitrary number of commodities. In another result, we show that in the coalitional economy defined by an atomless individualistic model, core–Walras equivalence holds even if the commodity space is non-separable. The above-mentioned results are also valid for a differential information economy with a finite state space. We also extend Kannai’s [Kannai, Y., 1970. Continuity properties of the core of a market. Econometrica 38, 791–815] theorem on the continuity of the core of a finite dimensional, large economy to include the case of an arbitrary number of commodities. All of our results are applications of a lemma, that we prove here, about the set of aggregate alternatives available to a coalition. Throughout the paper, the commodity space is assumed to be an ordered Banach space which has an interior point in its positive cone.  相似文献   

12.
We construct an index theorem for smooth infinite economies that shows that generically the number of equilibria is odd. As a corollary, this gives a new proof of existence and gives conditions that guarantee global uniqueness of equilibria.  相似文献   

13.
The purpose of this paper is to present a method to compute the index in an incomplete market economy. We show that generically in endowments and the asset structure the index theorem holds when the deficiency of markets, SJ, is even. The result is based on the indices of homotopies which have been presented for computation of an equilibrium in incomplete market economies.  相似文献   

14.
This paper studies direct systems of finite, that is with finitely many agents, communication structures, finite (balanced and superadditive) NTU games and finite economies. The inductive limit of such a system is again a communication structure, an NTU game or an economy, this time possibly with infinitely many agents. As a matter of fact, each infinite communication structure, each infinite NTU game and each infinite economy, is the inductive limit of a direct system of finite communication structures, finite NTU games and finite economies. A communication game is an NTU game with a communication structure on the set of players. To each economy, there corresponds a balanced and superadditive NTU game. To each economy with a communication structure on the set of agents, there corresponds a communication game. In the paper it is proved that the core of the inductive limit of a direct system of communication games is not empty and in fact the intersection of the cores of the finite communication games of the direct system. It follows that each infinite economy (with or without a communication structure on the set of agents) has a nonempty core. A direct system of economies is a generalisation of the Debreu and Scarf [Debreu, G., Scarf, H. A limit theorem on the core of an economy, International Economic Review 4, pp. 235–246.] example of `replica economies'. The proof of the nonemptiness of the core of the inductive limit of a direct system of economies is along the lines of the proof by Debreu and Scarf. As by-product it is shown that an NTU game is totally balanced if and only if all its finite subgames are balanced.  相似文献   

15.
We prove an equilibrium existence theorem for economies with externalities, general types of non-convexities in the production sector, and infinitely many commodities. The consumption sets, the preferences of the consumers, and the production possibilities are represented by set-valued mappings to take into account the external effects. The firms set their prices according to general pricing rules which are supposed to have bounded losses and may depend upon the actions of the other economic agents. The commodity space is L(M,M,μ), the space of all μ-essentially bounded M-measurable functions on M.As for our existence result, we consider the framework of Bewley (1972). However, there are four major problems in using this technique. To overcome two of these difficulties, we impose strong lower hemi-continuity assumptions upon the economies. The remaining problems are removed when the finite economies are large enough.Our model encompasses previous works on the existence of general equilibria when there are externalities and non-convexities but the commodity space is finite dimensional and those on general equilibria in non-convex economies with infinitely many commodities when no external effect is taken into account.  相似文献   

16.
This study suggests that the behavior of demand of cash by business firms can better be understood by empirical testing theory on data derived from individual units rather than making unrealistic assumptions to justify testing of aggregated data. Using data for firms in the food industry, this study shows that the rate of interest is a significant variable in explaining the demand for cash. Furthermore, the statistical results indicate that the economies of scale in the management of cash depends upon the type of goods produced by the corporations under study. Accordingly, one cannot make any generalization regarding the question of the economies of scale in the management of cash.  相似文献   

17.
We extend Vind’s classical theorem on the measure of blocking coalitions valid in finite dimensional atomless economies (see Vind (1972)), to include the possibility of infinitely many commodities as well as the presence of atoms. The commodity space is assumed to be an ordered Banach space which has possibly the empty positive cone. The lack of interior points is compensated by an additional assumption of a cone of arbitrage that allows us to use Lyapunov’s convexity theorem in its weak form. The measure space of agents involves both negligible and non negligible traders. The extension is proved in the general class of Aubin coalitions for which a suitable version of Grodal’s result (Grodal (1972)) is also formulated. Our results wish to point out the relevance of cone conditions dealing with blocking coalitions of arbitrary measure or weight.  相似文献   

18.
In this paper we show that for a large subset of utility functions in the space of all C1 utility functions and for all prices the mean demand of those consumers whose taste is represented by a given utility function in that subset is uniquely determined. This implies that for a large set of economies mean demand is a continuous function. Our analysis uses derivatives of first and of higher order. The result is essentially a consequence of the multijet transversality theorem.  相似文献   

19.
In a production economy, multiple public goods are produced by firms in competitive markets, and provided by the government together with contributions from consumers. There are widespread externalities: all consumers’ consumption and contributions and all firms’ production enter into utility functions. Public goods can be imperfect substitutes or complements, and they can be local public goods or club goods. Zero bounds that require consumers to make nonnegative contributions complicate the differentiable approach. Applying the transversality theorem for smooth economies in a regular parameterization, we obtain the existence of equilibrium in such an economy, and generically equilibria are regular and locally unique.  相似文献   

20.
In this paper, we prove an existence theorem for equilibria in production economies with increasing returns, which generalizes the classic results on this topic. In particular, we eliminate both the free-disposal assumptions and any smoothness requirements on the boundary of the production sets. For this purpose, we propose a new definition of the topological degree for non-convex-valued correspondences defined on non-smooth topological manifolds.  相似文献   

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