Do Funds Make More When They Trade More?

We model fund turnover in the presence of time‐varying profit opportunities. Our model predicts a positive relation between an active fund's turnover and its subsequent benchmark‐adjusted return. We find such a relation for equity mutual funds. This time‐series relation between turnover and performance is stronger than the cross‐sectional relation, as the model predicts. Also as predicted, the turnover‐performance relation is stronger for funds trading less‐liquid stocks and funds likely to possess greater skill. Turnover is correlated across funds. The common component of turnover is positively correlated with proxies for stock mispricing. Turnover of similar funds helps predict a fund's performance.     

Informed trading around earnings and mutual fund alphas

We examine whether informed trading around earnings announcements drives mutual fund performance. The measure is motivated by prior studies arguing that a mutual fund is skilled if it buys stocks with subsequent high earnings announcement returns. We find that this measure predicts future mutual fund returns. On average, after adjusting for Carhart’s four risk factors, the top decile of mutual funds outperforms the bottom decile by 44 basis points per quarter. By decomposing fund alphas into two components in their relations to earnings, we find that this measure is only associated with earnings-related fund alphas. This measure can also be used to predict stock returns at future earnings announcements.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

Active management, fund size, and bond mutual fund returns

Conventional wisdom holds that bonds are relatively homogenous investments compared to equities. Consequently, factors that explain variation in returns among bond mutual funds may differ in magnitude from those for equity mutual funds. In this study, a time-series cross-sectional analysis is employed to investigate the relationship between a bond fund's risk-adjusted return and specific fund attributes. Results indicate that a bond fund's past performance does not predict future performance and that bond fund managers are generally ineffective at increasing risk-adjusted returns. However, unlike equity mutual funds, bond mutual funds do appear to enjoy economies of scale.     

Flow-Performance Relationship and Star Effect: New Evidence from Chinese Mutual Funds

In this paper, we reexamine the mutual fund flow-performance relationship and star effect using mutual funds in China that have unique features of high risk and low performance persistence. Confirming prior studies, we find that fund performance is positively related to flows in subsequent periods. However, our results show that funds that performed well in the past do not attract additional inflows after controlling for performance. In addition, a star fund, a fund with a five-star Morningstar rating, does not have any significant effect on the fund's flows. These results suggest that it is important to recognize the difference in investor groups and factors that affect performance persistence when analyzing the mutual fund flow-performance relationship.     

Blurred stars: Mutual fund ratings in the shadow of conflicts of interest

Using unique data on trading commission payments to mutual fund rating companies (MFRCs) by mutual funds in China, this paper investigates whether the conflicts of interest arising from trading commission payments bias MFRCs’ mutual fund star ratings and hence affect their informativeness. We find the rating of a mutual fund is more optimistic when the MFRC either (i) receives trading commission fees from the mutual fund or (ii) can potentially receive fees in the future. The paper further shows that the usefulness of ratings in terms of predicting a fund’s future performance is negatively impacted by conflicts of interest. There is also evidence that investors can see through the problem, responding less enthusiastically (in terms of fund flows) to the ratings of conflicted MFRCs. We further find that the introduction of a rating qualification system that aims to improve mutual fund rating quality exacerbates the rating bias.     

UK equity mutual fund alphas make a comeback

In this study, we re-visit the performance of 887 active UK equity mutual funds using a new approach proposed by Angelidis, Giamouridis, and Tessaromatis. The authors argue that mutual funds stock selection is driven by the benchmark index, so if the benchmark generates alpha, there will be a bias in interpretation of manager's stock-picking ability. In their model, the alpha of a fund is adjusted by the benchmark's alpha. By applying this method, we eliminate bias inflicted by the persistently negative alphas of FTSE 100 Index in the period 1992–2013. We find that adjusted Fama–French and Carhat alphas of UK equity mutual funds are higher than those implied by the standard three- and four-factor models and are overall positive, contrary to most of the existing literature on UK fund performance. This result is consistent across funds' investment styles and robust to the use of FTSE Small Cap as benchmark for a sub-sample of small cap funds.     

The Client Is King: Do Mutual Fund Relationships Bias Analyst Recommendations?

This paper investigates whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms influence sell‐side analyst recommendations. Using a unique data set that discloses brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client as well as the share holdings of these mutual funds, we find that an analyst's recommendation on a stock relative to consensus is significantly higher if the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of the analyst's brokerage firm. The optimism in analyst recommendations increases with the weight of the stock in a mutual fund client's portfolio and the commission revenue generated from the mutual fund client. However, this favorable recommendation bias toward a client's existing portfolio stocks is mitigated if the stock in question is highly visible to other mutual fund investors. Abnormal stock returns are significantly greater both for the announcement period and, in the long run, for favorable stock recommendations from analysts not subject to client pressure than for equally favorable recommendations from business‐related analysts. In addition, we find that, subsequent to announcements of bad news from the covered firms, analysts are significantly less likely to downgrade a stock held by client mutual funds. Mutual funds increase their holdings in a stock that receives a favorable recommendation but this impact is significantly reduced if the recommendation comes from analysts subject to client pressure.     

Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?

We examine the performance and investment behavior of female fixed‐income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed‐income mutual fund managers. We find that male‐ and female‐managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Our results suggest that differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Despite the similarities between male and female managers, we find evidence that gender influences the decision making of mutual fund investors. We find that the net asset flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial year managing the fund.     

Jensen's alpha and the market‐timing puzzle

Theory predicts that market‐timing activities bias Jensen's alpha (JA). However, empirical studies have failed to find consistent evidence of this bias. We tackle this puzzle in a nested model analysis and show that the bias contains an exogenous market component that is unrelated to market‐timing skill. In a comprehensive empirical analysis of US mutual funds, we find that the timing‐induced bias in JA is mainly driven by this market component, which is uncorrelated with measured timing activities. Measures of total performance that allow for timing activities are virtually identical to JA, even if timing activities are present in the evaluated fund. Hence, we conclude that JA is a sufficient measure of total performance.     

The performance of US bond mutual funds

We evaluate the performance of the US bond mutual fund industry using a comprehensive sample of bond funds over a long time period from January 1998 to February 2017. In this one study, we examine bond fund selectivity, market timing and performance persistence. We evaluate bond funds relative to their self-declared benchmarks and in terms of both gross-of-fee returns and net-of-fee returns. We document considerable abnormal performance among funds both to the fund (gross returns) and to the investor (net returns). Bond fund performance is found to be superior in the post financial crisis period. However, past strong performance cannot be relied upon to predict future performance. Finally, while some funds exhibit market timing ability; we find a predominance of negative market timing among US bond mutual funds.     

Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism

This paper extends the literature on analyst optimism. Our analysis of a large sample of recommendations issued from 1995 through 2006 indicates that sell-side analysts are likely to assign frequent and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts’ affiliated mutual funds invest in that stock. Controlling for a number of variables, including the ties between analysts and investment banks, we find that the greater the portfolio weight of a stock in the fund family, the more optimistic the stock ratings from affiliated analysts become. Since 2002, analysts’ optimism on stocks held by affiliated mutual funds has declined. However, an analyst's decision of upgrading a stock to a “strong buy” rating is still significantly associated with the portfolio weight of that stock in the fund family.     

Do mutual funds have information advantage? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings in China

By integrating the literature on institutional investors with that on seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this paper investigates the role played by mutual funds around SEO announcements in China. To the extent that shareholdings already held by mutual funds in a firm prior to the firm's SEO issuance represent funds' information advantage, our first finding suggests a positive association between such information advantage and funds' decision to participate in certain SEOs. Second, we find that certain SEO firms that have attracted fund participation at issuance outperform peer firms without fund involvement when performance is proxied for by accounting-based measures. Collectively, our findings are consistent with the notion that mutual funds have an information advantage over other types of investors, and such an advantage would allow them to be able to invest in the “right” SEOs.     

Do Focused Funds Offer Superior Performance in an Emerging Market? Evidence from Taiwan's Stock Market

We examine the effects of the number of stock holdings and industry concentration on Taiwan's equity fund performance. The quadratic regression model is applied to explore the optimal number of stock holdings for mutual funds. The empirical results suggest that funds with a smaller number of stock holdings and with a higher level of industry concentration achieve better performance. We also find that mutual fund performance and the number of stock holdings have an inverted U-shaped relationship, and funds that hold twenty-four to twenty-eight stocks can generate superior performance.     

The Corporate Governance Premium,Returns, and Mutual Funds

Mutual funds with a preference for strong corporate governance (CG) have performance similar to mutual funds with a preference for weak CG. We find a direct relation between overall mutual fund CG preference and the corporate governance premium (CGP). Furthermore, the investment preferences of mutual funds forecast the change in the CGP. We provide evidence that the investment activities of institutional investors can affect stock performance, and that shifts by institutional investors in CG preference impact the appearance of the CGP.     

Board Independence and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover

This paper studies the relationship between board independence and manager turnover in the mutual fund industry. Using the Lipper 2003 mutual fund board data, we find that manager turnover is more likely to happen to funds with poor prior performance and more independent boards. Consistent with previous studies such as Tufano and Sevick (1997), our research provides new evidence in support of the Securities and Exchange Commission's approach of improving fund governance by promoting board independence.     

Who Charges More: Hedge Funds or Mutual Funds?*

Explicit mutual fund fees are typically less than 1% of the assets under management. By comparison, the typical hedge fund charges a base fee of 2% plus a performance fee equal to 20% of net profits. Thus, hedge funds appear to charge far more for even comparable performance—unless one takes account of the following:

• ? For most mutual funds, a very high percentage of performance is driven by its passive exposure to the market, even though the fee is applied to the total fund.
• ? Many hedge funds are designed to provide returns that are completely independent of market performance.

Using these two assumptions, the author provides a simple example that shows that a representative mutual fund's performance can be replicated by combining an index fund, which represents the mutual fund's passive component, with a hedge fund, representing the mutual fund's active component. When analyzed in this way, the fee of the combined fund turns out to be remarkably close to the actual fee of the mutual fund. This in turn suggests that the implicit fee for the mutual fund's small active component is comparable to the fees of the hedge fund.     

MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE AND COMPETITION: A CROSS‐SECTOR ANALYSIS

Existing work on mutual fund performance persistence obtains diverse results, depending on the group of funds studied. We examine whether performance persistence within a peer group of competing mutual funds depends on the group's composition. The U.K. mutual fund industry is ideal for such an examination because funds compete within strictly defined sectors. We consider several attributes related to the intensity of competition within a sector and use them to explain sector‐level persistence. We find robust evidence that persistence is higher in sectors where concentration of assets under management is higher.     

Dividend or growth funds: What drives individual investors' choices?

We study dividend fund buying behavior using over 80,000 individual Chinese mutual fund investors from a private Chinese mutual fund account dataset. Based on a variety of specifications and logistic regressions, we empirically investigate investors' characteristics in choosing dividend-paying and/or growth mutual funds under different market scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, this research represents an initial attempt to study individual dividend investors in mutual fund markets. We find that older Chinese investors prefer dividend-paying funds less than growth funds, but this depends on different market conditions, and the age effect shows a nonlinear mode when considering age grouping. Moreover, investors' prior experience plays a crucial role in choosing the fund type; however, the conclusions vary with market scenarios. In addition, female investors prefer more dividend-paying funds than do male investors, but investing experience counteracts this difference. We also find that geographic location is a contributor when investors decide the fund type.     

Learning about Mutual Fund Managers

We study capital allocations to managers with two mutual funds, and show that investors learn about managers from their performance records. Flows into a fund are predicted by the manager's performance in his other fund, especially when he outperforms and when signals from the other fund are more useful. In equilibrium, capital should be allocated such that there is no cross‐fund predictability. However, we find positive predictability, particularly among underperforming funds. Our results are consistent with incomplete learning: while investors move capital in the right direction, they do not withdraw enough capital when the manager underperforms in his other fund.