Ludwig von Mises on the epistemological foundation for social sciences reconstructed

This paper focuses on Ludwig von Mises’s attempt to establish an epistemological/methodological foundation for the social sciences (praxeology). I reconstruct Mises’s writings by disentangling the distinct realms of ontology and epistemology in his arguments. Although Mises’s line of reasoning is squarely based on the distinction between ontology and epistemology, he nonetheless tends to mix ontological and epistemological viewpoints in his argumentation, thereby clouding the issue involved. I believe this is one reason why the writings of Mises appear to be so difficult and engendered different as well as competing readings amongst Austrian economists. Furthermore, this analysis also allows us to assess whether or not Mises offers a sound theory of knowledge. I conclude that praxeology displays internal tensions and explain the reasons for these tensions.

Micro foundations for meso and macro economic theory

The natures of rational thought and rational lives are described as the basis of an adaptive economizing theory which presents an alternative microeconomic foundation contrasting with but complementary to optimal control theory for modeling mesoeconomic order. Contrastingly, that micro foundation seems to imply the inappropriateness of representing macro data as an optimal economic agent. Rather, direct representation of the emergent causal order in the macroeconomic data is suggested.

Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective

In this paper, we seek to identify causes of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. We note that great salience was attached to issues of self-governance and autonomy of the numerous ethnic groups living within the Empire. From a public choice perspective, the Empire was an over-centralised state and there were clear gains from federalising it. However, such federalisation was not feasible because of the collective action problem arising in bargaining with the central government. Furthermore, the move towards the war economy and the empowerment of the executive state provided the last drop leading to the exit of ethnic minorities from the monarchy and to the ultimate demise of the Empire.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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On good government

Besley’s treatment of principled agents is a major contribution to public choice and political economy. By focusing on politics as an agency problem, he has shown the way to a new generation of research on the interface of politics and economics.

Liberty and national security in Adam Smith’s possible world

Thomas P. M. Barnett argues that globalization’s spread presents the United States and other liberal democracies with two unprecedented national-security problems, and proposes an ambitious military strategy for their solution. This work argues that a successful strategy to solve one of these problems must also include rational policy, public policy that makes Adam Smith’s simple system of natural liberty a reality. Thus, Barnett’s military strategy and rational policy become complementary elements of a more comprehensive strategy to solve this national-security problem. Knowledge that Smith’s simple system of natural liberty moves the world toward peace can create a need for rational policy among voters.

Are voters rationally ignorant? An empirical study of Portuguese local elections

The application of the rational choice postulate to a political context invariably leads to the conclusion that most voters are ill informed when making the decision on whom to vote for. In this paper, the authors conduct an empirical evaluation of the rational ignorance theory, based on the model developed by (Rogoff and Sibert Rev Econ Stud LV:1–16, (1988) and by considering that better informed voters reward political candidates who show better performances. The levels of performance are established through the construction of an empirical frontier using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology. According to our results, based on the 1997 Portuguese local elections, even though swing voters do not necessarily behave as rationally ignorant voters, a large majority of voters are rationally ignorant.

The curious destiny of a heterodoxy: The Austrian economic tradition

The Austrian School has had a curious destiny: while contributing many concepts to contemporary economic theory, it is either ignored or criticised by much of modern economic literature. This article discusses possible reasons for this institutional sidelining and the main futures of a renewal of Austrian thought.

Cournot competition and endogenous firm size

The paper studies the dynamics of firm size in a repeated Cournot game with unknown demand function. We model the firm as a type of artificial neural network. Each period it must learn to map environmental signals to both a demand parameter and its rival’s output choice. However, this learning game is in the background, as we focus on the endogenous adjustment of network size. We investigate the long-run evolution of firm/network size as a function of profits, rival’s size, and the type of adjustment rules used.

The Social Economics of Globalization

There is general agreement on the moral values that globalization should serve. These are widespread prosperity and economic growth, ecological sustainability, and cultural diversity. Proponents believe that neoliberal globalization will achieve these goals, while the critics believe that globalization undermines them. An institutionalist theory that recognizes the reality of economic power and choice posits that globalization enhances the power of the business sector at the expense of the government and moral–cultural sectors. Policies for redressing this imbalance are discussed.

How large is liquidity risk in an automated auction market?

We introduce a new empirical methodology that models liquidity risk over short time periods for impatient traders who submit market orders. Using Value-at-Risk type measures, we quantify the liquidity risk premia for portfolios and individual stocks traded on the automated auction market Xetra. The specificity of our approach relies on the adequate econometric modelling of the potential price impact incurred by the liquidation of a portfolio. We study the sensitivity of liquidity risk towards portfolio size and traders' time horizon, and interpret its diurnal variation in the light of market microstructure theory.

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On local indeterminacy and endogenous cycles in Ramsey models with heterogeneous households

It is well-known that endogenous cycles can occur in Ramsey models with heterogeneous households and borrowing constraints. In this note, we address the issue of robustness in the more general case of endogenous labor supply and we explain the occurrence of local indeterminacy under progressive taxation.

Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented and volatile party system.

Advances in Inequality Measurement and Usefulness of Statistical Inference

Assessment of inequality measurement is the focus for this survey. All measures of inequality must be evaluated based on a set of desirable properties. More importantly, the usefulness of statistical inference for measures of inequality needs examination.

On Laidler regarding the Austrian business cycle theory

The authors welcome criticisms emanating from neoclassical critics of Austrian economics. We congratulate Laidler for transcending the usual modes of macroeconomic analysis to take on praxeological considerations. This paper should be interpreted as a welcome for his efforts in the hope that they will be widely emulated within the profession.

The Austrian roots of the economics of institutions

This paper presents an analysis of the way the Austrian theory of institutions evolved from Menger’s main works. It also tries to advance the idea that the economics of institutions, when it deals with the emergence and evolution of rules and norms from interacting individuals, is inspired by Menger’s work and more generally by the Austrian analysis of the emergence and evolution of institutions. Recent works in the economics of institutions build on this earlier Austrian work to make it more formalized and testable.

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

From scholarly idea to budgetary institution: the emergence of cost-benefit analysis

Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is typically portrayed as a technique for promoting efficiency in government. We don’t deny that CBA can be used in this manner, but instead focus on a different property of CBA, namely, its evolution from scholarly musings into a framing institution within which budgetary processes operate. The evolution of CBA into institutional status, moreover, shows the value of bringing a polyarchical perspective to bear on fiscal organization, wherein budgetary outcomes emerge through structured interaction among participants. CBA is a product of interaction within a political ecology, as distinct from being the product of some person’s optimizing choice.

Does “No” mean “No”? A protest methodology

In this paper, we propose a method of identifying and truncating protesters in Contingent Valuation surveys. We propose using a system of Willingness to Pay (WTP) questions that value multiple goods and that use both discrete choice and open-ended questions coupled with multiple questions about protest beliefs administered to the entire sample. Protesters can then be identified because they reject all bids, declare zero on all open-ended questions, and hold protest beliefs. The proposed procedure has been empirically tested on an air pollution data set from Poland, where 27 of the sample was identified as protesters. The adjustment for protesters increased the estimated WTP values by a factor of more than 3.

On the benefits of fiscal policy coordination in a currency union: a note

It is quite often claimed by politicians that a common currency makes it beneficial to be also endowed with a common fiscal policy. However, if fiscal policy can reasonably be considered to be a source of shocks, national fiscal policies which are steered independently from each other are generally preferable because they allow the possibility to diversify macroeconomic risks. Abstracting from automatic stabilizers, this view is valid independent on whether the ECB targets money growth or interest rates.