POLITICS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE

Evidence presented here supports a two-part hypothesis that (1) the Federal Reserve is a powerful political entity, not independent of politics, and (2) it preserves its political power by carrying out the monetary policy desired by the President of the United States. This evidence includes the historical record from the Truman to Reagan administrations, politicization of Federal Reserve research, and political lobbying by the Federal Reserve. Formerly secret minutes of the regional Federal Reserve Banks' boards of directors meetings provide source material. The conclusion suggests a more efficient method of translating political signals and a rule for more predictable monetary policy.     

Misjudging the character of the welfare state: Hayek,generality, and the knowledge problem

What are the limits of collective action? As James Buchanan famously worried, is it possible to empower the productive state without lapsing into the predatory state? This paper uses insights from F.A. Hayek to address problems of public goods and the role of the state. Hayek convincingly argued that no central planner has sufficient knowledge to run an economy. Yet Hayek also allowed for state provision of some goods beyond the prevention of coercion. The question, then, is whether Hayek’s safeguards offer a satisfactory response to Buchanan’s worry. This paper contends that Hayek violated his own conditions for permissible government activity. Nevertheless, he offers a serious research agenda for limiting state abuses.     

Optimal versus realized policy rules in a regime-switching framework

In this paper we compare a deterministic model and a Markov switching model to analyze the behavior of the US economy and the Federal Reserve. We examine both optimal and empirical monetary policies for the US Federal Reserve between 1960 and 2008. We compare the optimal monetary policy to the actual interest rates and to the empirical reaction function. We also evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the preferences assigned to each objective. We find that there is no unique optimal solution that fits the Federal Reserve behavior over the entire period. The best fit to the actual interest rates is obtained by an optimal policy with preference switches following the rule: a high-volatility regime coincides with a priority on inflation alone while in a low-volatility regime there is equal policy priority on output stabilization and inflation.     

Political economy and the science of association: A suggested reconstruction of public choice through the alliance of the Vienna,Virginia, and Bloomington schools of political economy

We argue that in order to answer the challenges that James Buchanan put to contemporary political economists, a reconstruction of public choice theory building on the work of Buchanan, F.A. Hayek and Vincent Ostrom must take place. Absent such a reconstruction, and the significant challenges that Buchanan raised will continue to go unmet.     

信用货币、金融危机与国际金融合作

全球金融危机对传统的以美联储为主导的金融调控方式及美元在世界经济中所扮演的角色提出了严峻的挑战。导致全球金融危机的根源是美国经济的畸形发展与国际金融体制的固有缺陷。化解本次金融危机的出路在于,各国之间要加强政策协调和进行国际货币体制改革,各国央行要采取协调合作的干预措施,共同制订新的国际金融条例,建立广泛的国际金融合作体系。本文首先分析了信用货币的发展及其监管困境,接着对全球金融危机的深层根源进行研究,最后提出了通过加强国际金融合作和改革国际货币体系来应对全球金融危机的建议。     

“Social vs. Military Spending”—A Rejoinder

The transition process in Russia and Eastern Europe was dominated in the literature and in policy making by the shock therapy process. However, shock therapy was short-lived. Governments that implemented shock therapy were not able to sustain the reform program since they lost power after the first term as a result of unfavourable electoral results. The new governments implemented gradualism. While after the first term shock therapy governments were substituted by gradualists, a government in favour of shock therapy never substitute any gradualist governments. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that shock therapy was inconsistent with a democratic process of decision-making. Actually shock therapy was only consistent with a pluralistic political structure in the tradition of Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman. Foreign aid was inadequate to ensure the continuation of the shock therapy reforms within a democratic environment.     

The depression of 1920–1921: a credit induced boom and a market based recovery?

This paper examines the American post-WW1 boom and bust. It argues that the Federal Reserve’s monetary easing from 1919 to 1920 created an Austrian Business Cycle (ABC), or an unsustainable credit boom. The collapse of the boom initiated the Depression of 1920–1921. The subsequent laissez faire policy promoted a swift recovery. In particular, the natural recovery began following a severe liquidation of firms, reallocation of resources, and wage cuts stimulated by fiscal and monetary contraction. Contrary to some other accounts, we find that significant recovery began before the Federal Reserve’s 1921–1922 monetary easing affected the economy. We also address other criticisms of the credit-cycle interpretation.     

INSTITUTIONAL PRESERVATION AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE

This paper explains and presents supporting evidence for the hypothesis that institutional preservation is the central motive for Federal Reserve decision makers' behavior. Welfare maximization can, under certain conditions (i.e., via a vote maximization motive or the direct attribution of socially desirable goals), be a part of the preservation hypothesis, but it is inconsistent with substantial parts of Federal Reserve behavior. This paper presents evidence of this inconsistent behavior that the preservation hypothesis can explain. Such evidence includes opposing better coordination with voters'choices, creating an internally authorized fund that makes foreign loans without congressional authorization, opposing better monetary control procedures, organizing lobbying campaigns to defeat legislation to audit the Federal Reserve and make its meetings open to public scrutiny, failing to take minutes after legislation was enacted, and impairing information dispersal about funding for the Watergate burglars. The paper analyzes, in terms of institutional preservation, the results of recent research on the relationship of central banks' independence from short-run political forces and their anti-inflationary monetary policies.     

A note concerning a credit rule for monetary policy

A technique introduced by Friedman is used to analyze the ability of the Federal Reserve to control the money supply. We find that the necessary conditions for control are so restrictive that a constant growth rate for the money stock may not be achievable. We suggest, therefore, a steady growth rate for Federal Reserve Credit.     

Interest on reserves,settlement, and the effectiveness of monetary policy

Over the last several years, the Federal Reserve has conducted a series of large scale asset purchases. The effectiveness of these purchases is dependent on the monetary transmission mechanism. Former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke argued that large scale asset purchases are effective because they induce portfolio reallocations that ultimately lead to changes in economic activity. Despite these claims, a large fraction of the expansion of the monetary base is held as excess reserves by commercial banks. Concurrent with the large scale asset purchases, the Federal Reserve began paying interest on reserves and enacted changes in its Payment System Risk policy. In this paper, I estimate the effect of the payment of interest on reserves (as well as other payment policy changes) on the demand for daylight overdrafts through Fedwire. Since Fedwire provides overdrafts at a fixed price, any fluctuation in the quantity of overdrafts is a change in demand. A reduction in overdrafts corresponds with an increase in the demand for reserves. I show that the payment of interest on reserves has had a negative and statistically significant effect on daylight overdrafts. Furthermore, I interpret these results in light of recent theoretical work. I argue that by paying an interest rate on excess reserves that is higher than comparable short term rates, the Federal Reserve likely hindered the portfolio reallocation channel outlined by Bernanke. Thus, the payment of interest on reserves increased payment processing efficiency, potentially at the expense of limiting the ability of monetary policy to influence economic activity.     

FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY

The influence of partisan and electoral considerations on the monetary policy voting behavior of Federal Reserve Governors is investigated in the context of a model permitting the estimation of reaction functions on the basis of FOMC voting records. The results suggest that once we have controlled for the state of the economy and for the prevailing stance of monetary policy, both partisan ideologies and partisan loyalties appear to play an important role in the Governors'voting calculus.     

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF MONETARY POLICY

This paper develops some implications of assigning the Federal Reserve the contradictory goals of keeping interest and unemployment rates from rising while at the same time expecting the Fed to control inflation. The resulting imbalance causes Fed officials to engage in the classical psychological defenses of denial, projection, and obfuscation. Prolonged defense of an unbalanced state may lead to protective postures with dysfunctional implications. Federal Reserve secrecy, self-censorship, illusions of unanimity, and perceptions of need for insulation from external threat all are protective postures that may cause the Fed to lose credibility and alienate its professional staff. This, in turn, may promote the cause of monetary reform. This paper distinguishes between radical and piecemeal monetary reform and indicates why the latter could succeed in garnering political support.     

An alternative monetary policy target

For most of the period since the mid-1970s, the Federal Reserve has expressed its monetary policy intentions by announcing the target growth rates of three principal monetary aggregates: the simple-sum M1, M2 and M3. However, the sweeping changes and the deregulation in the financial industry have greatly affected the relevance of these traditional monetary aggregates. The unusual behaviour of the simple-sum monetary aggregates has forced the Federal Reserve to stop setting target range for M1. The measuring of monetary aggregates has become a controversial question. This paper constructs the new-benchmark Divisia monetary indexes which reflect ‘moneyness’ more accurately than the old Divisia indexes. I demonstrate that the historical trends of the Divisia monetary indexes are sensitive to the brenchmark rates chosen in constructing these indexes. In addition, I compare the forecasting performance of the new-benchmark Divisia monetary indexes with the simple-sum and the old Divisia monetary indexes in the estimated money demand functions. I find that the new-benchmark Divisia monetary indexes provide the best statis forecasting performance. The result indicate that the new-benchmark Divisia monetary indexes should be considered as alternative measures of money in studying the relationship between money and the economy.     

Transparent US monetary policy: theory and tests

In 1994, the Federal Reserve System moved to a more transparent reporting of monetary policy. This article assesses the impact of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty about future monetary policy using T-bill rate forecast dispersions and ex post forecast errors from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for monetary policy uncertainty. The empirical findings confirm that Federal Reserve transparency has reduced the uncertainty about future monetary policy.     

Unconventional monetary policy,liquidity trap,and asset prices

This article offers a fundamental critique of monetary policy implemented in the United States following the 2007–8 global financial crisis. It aims to show that the misunderstanding of the mainstream theoretical thinking underlying monetary policy actions led to the ineffectiveness of the policy response to the 2007–8 global financial crisis. The conventional view that monetary policy is the stabilization tool has serious flaws and is ineffective for bringing about economic recovery. The Federal Reserve’s experiment with the so-called unconventional monetary policy exposed the weakness of the conventional belief in understanding how banks operate, how the monetary authority can influence the yield curve, and how the monetary transmission mechanism works, resulting in prescribing an ineffective treatment to boost economic activity. In this regard, it is argued that the Federal Reserve’s decision to let long-term interest rates be market determined represents a significant self-imposed constraint, which limits policy options regarding monetary policy actions and the effective control of long-term interest rates. By limiting the setting of policy rates only to the overnight interest rate, the ability of the monetary authority to influence long-term interest rates is both weak and indirect.     

What should classical liberal political economists do?

In 1964 James Buchanan famously asked “What Should Economists Do?” He argued that economists should focus their intellectual attention on exchange and the institutions within which exchange takes place. This paper reflects on Buchanan’s message and looks at the development of that argument, and its implications in the wake of post-socialist political economy on the one hand, and the post-financial crisis of 2008 on the other. Following Buchanan, the paper argues that classical liberal political economists must embrace the intellectual and practical challenges of the day, and bring a robust theory of political economy to bear on questions of justice, questions of freedom and responsibility, and questions concerning the invisible hand and the appropriate institutional framework which results in peaceful social cooperation and productive specialization in a society of free and responsible individuals.     

The powers that are: central bank independence in the Greenspan era

This paper investigates political pressure from incumbent Presidents and Congress on US monetary policy during the period that Greenspan was the chairman of the Federal Reserve. We propose an expectations-augmented Taylor rule in which we replace realized values with expectations, and use the unemployment gap instead of the output gap. We apply a state-space framework that allows the use of mixed frequency data. Our findings suggest that the Federal Reserve under Greenspan did not create election driven cycles, but also did not strictly follow the Taylor rule. The deviations from the Taylor rule are not driven by partisan politics, but are rooted in the expected economic conditions.     

The moral ecology of markets: on the failure of the amoral defense of markets

Many economists have defended capitalism; most have tried to do so within the self-imposed methodological constraint that economists should employ only empirical arguments, not normative ones. This essay examines three classic amoral defenses of capitalism—by Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, and Friedrich Hayek—and argues that each fails on its own terms, since each implicitly incorporates moral presumptions essential to the author's argument. Constructively, the essay proposes that no one can adequately endorse (or critique) markets without making a moral evaluation of their context—their “moral ecology.” Four issues are identified as necessarily addressed in every adequate evaluation of markets. The essay does not endorse any one position on these elements, but argues instead that seemingly incommensurable standpoints on markets—ranging from Marxist to libertarian—actually represent positions on the these four basic issues.     

Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan

James Buchanan advocated the market mechanism for allocating resources because it is based on voluntary exchange. People engage in market transactions only when they believe they benefit from doing so. Buchanan depicted the political process the same way. People engage in collective activities to accomplish together ends that they would be unable to accomplish individually, or through bilateral exchange. Buchanan’s vision of politics as exchange is a normative framework for evaluating the rules within which political activity takes place. Rules that meet the criterion of agreement are desirable constitutional rules, and Buchanan recognized that not all government activity satisfies that criterion. Buchanan is the father of the subdiscipline of constitutional political economy, and his “politics as exchange” approach provides the foundation for much work in that area. Buchanan has created a foundation that is rich in ideas, but leaves behind a number of unanswered questions that point the way toward a further development of the research program in constitutional political economy.