Environmental Protection and Urban Unemployment: Environmental Policy Reform in a Polluted Dualistic Economy

This paper explores sufficient conditions for the welfare‐improving environmental policy reform in the Harris–Todaro economy. A rise in the pollution tax rate in the urban manufacturing has spillover effects on the two labor market distortions: the less‐than‐optimal manufacturing employment and the urban unemployment. If both are weakened the welfare improves. Otherwise, we need to develop an alternative sufficient condition. It is shown that there exists a range of welfare‐improving pollution tax rates, and that it corresponds to the lower values of tax rate. This range may shrink by the wage subsidy policy and the technological change toward less pollution‐intensive techniques.     

Border tax adjustments and tariff‐tax reforms with consumption pollution

We develop a model of a small open economy, where pollution per unit of consumption between domestically produced and imported quantities of the same good differs. We show that the first‐best policy combination calls for consumption taxes on all polluting goods, and border tax adjustment (BTA) measures, that is, tariffs or import subsidies. We identify conditions under which well‐known tariff‐tax reform policies for developing economies, such as a consumer‐price‐neutral piecemeal reform of trade and a consumption tax, and a consumer‐price‐neutral reform of all trade and consumption taxes improve welfare. We also evaluate whether reforms of trade taxes alone are superior to consumer‐price‐neutral reforms of trade and consumption taxes.     

Capital and Consumption Tax Reforms in a Small Open Economy

The effects of a reform in capital and consumption taxes on private welfare and government tax revenue are examined for a small open, capital‐importing economy. A trade‐off between private welfare and tax revenue is encountered in maximizing social welfare. Nonetheless, lowering capital taxes and raising consumption taxes can increase both private welfare and tax revenue if the initial tax rates are not optimal. In addition, a tax reform by this fashion is a likely response to a rise in the foreign rate of return on capital.     

MACROECONOMIC AND REDISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION TAXES IN THE USA*

This paper studies the effect of an increase in consumption taxes using a dynamic general equilibrium model of overlapping generations calibrated to the US economy. When the proceeds are used to reduce income taxes, the reform raises the aggregate capital and labour supply in the long run. Workers increase labour supply immediately in response to the reform, while consumption rises only gradually. The tax reform also transfers wealth from old consumers to young consumers. As a result, while future generations experience significant welfare gains, current generations, particularly old consumers, tend to experience sizable welfare losses. When the proceeds are used for a lump‐sum transfer, the aggregate capital and labour both decrease in the long run. This reform is welfare‐improving for the current low‐income households.     

Dynamic Games of Environmental Policy in a Global Economy: Taxes versus Quotas

The effects of environmental policy on the global environment as an international public good with a stock externality and national welfare are examined in a model with trade in a polluting commodity. The welfare effects of environmental policy, decomposed into terms of trade, abatement cost, and environmental damage effects, induce governments to adopt a strategic use of their policy measures. In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, it is demonstrated that the emission tax game brings about larger strategic distortions than the emission quota game.     

Growth,intergenerational welfare,and environmental policies in an overlapping generations economy

This paper examines the effects of the environmental tax on long‐run growth and intergenerational welfare in a discrete‐time overlapping generations (OLG ) model. We highlight that the role regarding how the environmental tax revenues are distributed between the young or old generations has important implications for the growth and welfare effects. Our results indicate that raising the environmental tax can exert different effects on the environmental utility of the existing young and old generations, implying an intergenerational welfare conflict of the environmental policy. However, if tax revenues are distributed appropriately, our numerical simulation shows that it is possible for a higher environmental tax to improve the welfare of all generations.     

Excess Burden of Taxation and Environmental Policy Mix with a Consumer‐Friendly Firm

This study examines the environmental policy mix of tradable emission permits and emission taxes in a duopoly model with a consumer‐friendly firm. We analyse the interplay of the two policies and the welfare consequences in the presence of excess burden of taxation. We show that an emission tax can be redundant when both the excess burden of taxation and the degree of consumer friendliness are insignificant. However, when the excess burden of taxation is significant, tradable permits policy with tax treatment should be applied to enhance welfare in the presence of a consumer‐friendly firm. Finally, under the tax revenue‐neutral case where the excess burden of taxation does not matter, the environmental policy mix is also efficient if the degree of consumer friendliness is sufficiently high.     

Strategies for Fiscal Reform in the Context of the EMU: the Case of Portugal

The authors use an endogenous growth dynamic general‐equilibrium model, which accommodates the institutional constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, to study tax reform in Portugal. Simulation results suggest that tax cuts financed in a nondistortionary way increase long‐term GDP; i.e., they are efficiency improving, but do not always increase welfare. The tradeoff between efficiency and welfare is alleviated when reductions in public spending or increased public indebtedness finance the tax cuts. Since these mechanisms are not realistic under the institutional setting of the Stability and Growth Pact, tax reform in Portugal must involve trading off distortionary tax margins. In this case, the best strategy to increase both efficiency and welfare is to increase investment tax credits and finance them either through personal income taxes or through employers’ social security contributions.     

Environmental Protection in the Presence of Unemployment and Common Resources

This paper examines the effects of an export tax (on a processed resource good), the number of harvesters and an afforestation policy in a small, open economy with urban unemployment. The export tax increases the urban unemployment rate, but improves the quality of the environment. Here, the optimal export tax is lower than the adjusted marginal environmental damage. Reducing the number of harvesters has a similar resource allocation effect to that of an export tax. However, the afforestation policy can resolve the trade‐off between urban unemployment and the quality of the environment and may also improve the welfare of a country.     

Open-access renewable resources and pollution: Trade and policy implications in a two-country model

We examine the interaction between the relative inter-industry pollution externality and resource stock externality of harvesting in deciding trade patterns and welfare gains from trade in a two-country model (less-developed countries) with renewable resources in the absence of resource management. This paper focuses on the impacts of trade policies on resource conservation and welfare outcomes in two countries with different environmental management regimes. Differences in pollution management standards between both countries determine the direction of trade flow and gains from trade in a diversified production case. The country with a lower pollution intensity parameter, an exporter of resource goods, certainly experiences welfare loss in the post-trade steady-state and may also suffer a decline in utility throughout the transition path. However, a country with higher pollution intensity and importers of resource goods tend to gain from trade. Under national open-access resources, given that pollution is regulated up to a certain point in both countries, this study finds that implementing better restrictions on only one externality factor is not optimal from a post-trade welfare perspective. Lastly, from the point of view of policy suggestion, this paper offers an optimal trade policy that the economic and environmental effects of enforcing import tax on resource goods are likely to be Pareto-improving consequences compared to the implications of using an export tax.     

The effects of tax reform on labor supply, tax revenue and welfare when tax avoidance matters

We examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well-functioning asset markets affects the study of labor supply. We discuss the implications for tax policy analysis, and we show that a failure to account for avoidance responses may lead to huge errors when analyzing how tax reform affects labor supply, tax revenue and the welfare cost of taxation. Our model may explain a number of otherwise hard to understand dimensions of taxpayer response.     

Tax Policy When Countries Compete for Third Market Exports

We examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duopolists located in two countries compete in prices. With tax competition between governments, we allow for welfare‐maximizing governments in the two countries to delegate tax setting responsibility to policy‐makers who have different objectives than the governments. The unique equilibrium in the tax competition environment involves both governments delegating tax setting responsibility to tax revenue‐maximizing policy‐makers. This equilibrium yields higher welfare for both countries than the outcome when the governments delegate to welfare‐maximizing policy‐makers. The paper also compares tax competition with tax harmonization and shows that when the entire export market is served, tax harmonization improves the welfare of the country that houses the low cost firm, while the other country may be immiserized.     

STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

Optimal Taxation: The Design of Child‐Related Cash and In‐Kind Benefits

Abstract. In this paper, we empirically derive the welfare function that guarantees that the current German tax and transfer system for single women is optimal. In particular, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and assess how recent reforms of in‐kind childcare transfers affect the welfare function. Our analysis is based on a discrete model of optimal taxation. We apply this framework using microsimulation and microeconometric techniques. In general, we find that marginal welfare weights are relatively high for non‐working single women. Further, we show that the reform of in‐kind childcare transfers is only optimal if society increases the marginal welfare weights for the working single women.     

Pollution,Private Investment in Healthcare,and Environmental Policy*

In this paper, we demonstrate that, in a two‐period overlapping‐generations model, the relationship between environmental taxation and economic activity (output level and growth) has an inverted‐U shape when we take into account the detrimental impact of pollution on health and the individual decision of each working‐age agent to improve her health. We also demonstrate that the link between environmental tax and lifetime welfare also has an inverted‐U shape, and that a tighter environmental policy might enhance economic activity while reducing steady‐state lifetime welfare. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the determinants of the optimal environmental tax.     

Tax Reform with Useful Public Expenditures

We examine the effects of tax reform in an endogenous growth with two types of useful public expenditures. The optimal fiscal policy shifts the tax base to private consumption and generally requires a change in the size of government. If a tax reform holds the size of government fixed to satisfy a revenue‐neutrality constraint, then the reform will be suboptimal; theory alone cannot tell us if welfare will be improved. For some model calibrations, we find that a revenue‐neutral consumption tax reform can result in large welfare gains. For other quite plausible calibrations, the exact same reform can result in tiny or even negative welfare gains as the revenue‐neutrality constraint becomes more severely binding. Overall, our results highlight the uncertainty surrounding the potential welfare benefits of fundamental tax reform.     

Strategic Environmental Policies when Waste Products are Tradable

The paper deals with international trade in hazardous waste products when there is an international oligopoly market for waste, and both waste‐importing and waste‐exporting countries act strategically to utilize national environmental policies to attach rents arising from trade in waste. The authors model a multiple‐stage game where waste is generated in an industrialized country as a byproduct of production, and potentially is exported to some less‐developed countries, if not abated locally, or imposed on local residents at a cost of an environmental tax. In the market for waste, an oligopolistic supply is assumed. The demand for waste is perfectly competitive, with waste‐processing firms guided by marginal disposal costs and environmental taxes levied by foreign countries. With each country playing Nash, the analysis finds domestic and foreign taxes to be distorted from the Pigouvian taxes in such a way that the domestic (waste‐exporter) tax rate is set below, and the foreign tax rate is set above, the Pigouvian taxes. However, a global welfare optimum requires tax distortions in the opposite direction, in the sense that foreign environmental taxes must be set below the Pigouvian tax rate.     

The Financing of Foreign Aid and Welfare: Income Versus Consumption Tax

Empirical evidence shows that developed countries use income or consumption taxes to generate tax revenue, of which they transfer a certain fraction as aid to less developed countries. This paper constructs a two-country general equilibrium trade model that takes into account these realities, and examines the terms of trade, employment and welfare effects of international transfers when the donor country increases the fraction of its income or consumption tax revenue transferred as aid. The desirability of each method of aid financing is discussed from the viewpoint of national and world welfare, and conditions are identified under which aid improves world welfare with the one method of financing, and may worsen it with the other.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Regulation on International Transportation

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products. We find that trade liberalization may reduce each country's welfare unless some level of environmental regulation on international transportation is in place. When international trade is liberalized initially, a mutual increase in the common emission tax rates may improve each country's welfare. However, when international trade is highly protected initially, imposing an emission tax may reduce welfare.