The impact of political connections on government bailout: the 2008 credit crunch in the United States

Why is there so little money in contributions to political action committees (PAC) in United States’ politics? While there may be several explanations for this puzzle, we consider corporate PAC contributions as an insurance-like instrument that induces firms’ expectations of safeguard at times of grave need, with the 2008 credit crunch as a case in point. Given the unlikely occurrence of a credit crunch, few financial firms invest in PAC contributions. However, we find firms that make PAC contributions may gain ex ante benefits of corporate PACs as protection from financial distress by undertaking profitable but risky projects that later become illiquid assets while requiring the bailout money during the 2008 credit crunch. We also find that both consistent PAC investments over election cycles and subsequent lobbying activity to corporate PACs further allow firms to utilize their political ties as safeguard and demand additional bailout money. Our instrumental variable analysis confirms that firms with prior experience in political investments are found to enhance the likelihood and effectiveness of PAC contributions and related political investments.     

On the relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion

This paper examines the effect of increased product substitutability on quantity‐setting firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in a market. It uses a general demand function and the trigger strategy of Friedman (Friedman JW. 1971. A non‐cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies 38: 1–12) to show that while increased product substitutability hinders sustainability of tacit collusion in the case of linear and concave demand functions, it may either hinder or facilitate firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in the case of convex demand functions. Thus, this paper adds to the growing view that one must use a case‐by‐case analysis in judging whether firms in more homogenous product markets find it easier or harder to tacitly collude. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

An optimal-incentive contract for managers with exponential utility

This paper examines the manager–investor relationship in the case of exponential utility when the manager of investments in real or financial assets has an endowment which can be invested in the risky assets for which he has private information. We obtain a relationship showing trade-offs or hedging behavior among the investments the manager can choose for himself and the principal. Even with the hedging ability of the manager, the well-known first-best solution with ‘no moral hazard’ risk-sharing is obtained among these possible solutions to the manager's problem by specifying a ‘no conflict of interest’, zero investment by the manager of his own endowment in those risky assets for which he has private information. Thus, the agent imputes no disutility to the assignment of the principal's investments and the investor is assured of an investment strategy that he would make if he had access to the manager's private information.     

Quality Diversity and Prices in Markets for Experience Goods

We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good’s quality is unobservable to customers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied by a competitive fringe of firms. After purchase the true quality of the good is revealed. To provide firms with incentives to actually deliver promised quality, prices must exceed unit variable costs. We show that for a large class of customer preferences there is “quality polarization,” that is, only minimum and maximum feasible quality are available in the market. For the case without quality polarization we derive sufficient conditions for the incentive constraints to completely determine equilibrium prices, regardless of demand, for all intermediate quality levels.     

Sovereign wealth funds,productivity and people: The impact of Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global investments in the United Kingdom

Sovereign wealth funds have an increasing presence in the global financial ecosystem, principally through their investments in equities, which, in turn, may influence HRM. This study examines the influence of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global (NGPF‐G), on employment in its U.K. investee firms. We find that firms with NGPF‐G investment are significantly less likely to reduce their demand for labour, more specifically in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. When a drop in the demand for labour does occur, it is less extreme when compared to similar organisations without a NGPF‐G shareholding, and this is evident even in the case of relatively small NGPF‐G investments. These findings are in line with the fund's objective of promoting corporate sustainability and Norwegian values. We draw out the key implications of our findings for HR practice.     

Financial Constraints: Routine Versus Cutting Edge R&D Investment

We analyze financial constraints on R&D, where we account for heterogeneity among investments that has been neglected in previous literature. According to economic theory, investments should be distinguished by their degree of uncertainty, e.g. routine R&D versus cutting‐edge R&D. Financial constraints should be more binding for cutting‐edge R&D than for routine R&D. Using panel data we find that R&D spending of firms devoting a significant fraction of R&D to cutting‐edge projects is curtailed by credit constraints while routine R&D investments are not. This has important policy implications with respect to the distribution of R&D subsidies in the economy.     

The impacts of family involvement on R&D investment intensity in firms: Evidence from China

Drawing on the perspective of socioemotional wealth, this paper explores the types of family involvement in family firms and their impacts on R&D investment intensity. Using data from the forecasts issued by A-share family firms listed on Chinese stock markets between 2008 and 2019, the study finds that the separation of ownership and control is negatively associated with R&D investment intensity in non-high-tech firms, whereas potential gains of socioemotional wealth from R&D activities by high-tech firms produce a positive influence that offsets the negative impact of the separation of ownership and control on R&D investments. It reveals the importance of gains of socioemotional wealth. In contrast to the separation of ownership and control, family involvement in management is negatively associated with firms’ R&D investment intensity in both high-tech firms and non-high-tech firms. Our results capture the diversity of family members’ identity recognition, which leads to family members’ different evaluations of the potential gains and losses of socioemotional wealth. Overall, the distinction between high-tech family firms and other family firms is shown to be significant, as is the distinction between the impacts of different types of family involvement.

     

Managing human resources in dynamic environments to create value: role of HR options

HR options as firm investments in human assets in uncertain environments to create the capability to flexibly respond to future contingent events have been recognised as valuable. However, the black box of causal interlinkages between environmental uncertainties, HR options and firm performance is yet to be explored in strategic HRM literature. Based on the data obtained from 108 IT software firms in India, this study empirically explores these linkages using a multi-level causal model. The results suggest that the use of HR options positively mediates the effects of environmental uncertainties on firm performance. The mediating influences of different types of HR options, used by the firms to manage various types of uncertainties affecting their human assets, on the operational and the financial performance of the firms are found to be different. Implications of findings of the study for managing investments in human assets under uncertainty have been discussed.     

Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets

Abstract

This paper investigates the interaction between firms' information acquisition decisions and disclosure of internally acquired information in a Cournot duopoly market under demand uncertainty. The main results are as follows. When the correlation between firms' demands is positive and sufficiently high, disclosure of information on demand uncertainty can enhance social welfare, given that the quality of firms' private information is constant. However, in the setting where firms' private information is endogenously determined, mandatory disclosure is not always desirable. This is because, when disclosure is mandated, firms acquire less precise information compared with the case where the acquired information is not disclosed; hence, their internal information environments are deteriorated. This can lead to unintended consequences such that disclosure regulation decreases social welfare.     

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.     

The financial investment decision of non-financial firms in China

This paper constructs a portfolio model to analyze the determinants of the financial investment decision of non-financial firms in China. Unlike the literature assuming that financial investments are riskless, our model allows risks in both fixed and financial investments. We show that this extension provides an analytically similar but economically different model from the literature. In particular, it is relative risk and risk-adjusted return gap, not pure risk and simple return gap that enter into firms’ financial investment decision model. Using firm-level panel data of 1902 firms listed in Chinese stock market over the period from 2006 to 2016 with semi-annual frequency, we find that the ratio of fixed investment risk over total risk dominates financial investment decisions of non-financial firms. However, rates of risk-adjusted return gap between financial and fixed investments play no role in Chinese firms’ financial investment decisions, which is in stark contrast to the results using a model assuming riskless financial investments. The baseline findings are robust to alternative measures of financialization and investment risk and different firm sizes, ownership structures and time periods.     

Relational Contracting in Partnerships

When performance is not verifiable, firms in a long-term relationship may rely on incentive contracts that are self-enforced or "relational." This paper studies the optimal design and performance of relational contracts in partnerships such as joint ventures or buyer-seller alliances. Optimal contracts look the same in each period as long as the relationship continues, but may require termination of the relationship after bad outcomes. Payments between the partners depend on their relative performance. In the special case of bilateral trade with specific investments, optimal relational contracting results in a price that varies with cost and demand conditions but is more stable than under spot market bargaining. Parallels are drawn with "Japanese style" subcontracting.     

R&D and regional competitiveness: a study of global entrepreneurial firms

We quantify, using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys and the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, the empirical relationship between global competitiveness and R&D investment activity as well as the independent relationship between global competitiveness and R&D investments across geographic regions of economic development. We also explore alternative measures of the effectiveness of R&D investments. Our findings suggest that R&D investments are a possible policy target variable in high-income regions for policy makers to consider for increasing firms’ global competitiveness.

     

Multiproduct Firms in Hotelling’s Spatial Competition

Oligopoly models are usually analyzed in the context of two firms, anticipating that market outcomes would be qualitatively similar in the case of three or more firms. The literature on Hotelling’s location‐then‐price competition is not an exception. In this paper, we show that the main finding of brand bunching in Hotelling’s duopoly no longer holds once three or more firms are allowed to enter the market. That is, in oligopoly with three or more firms, firms proliferate brands.     

The Foreign Exchange Exposure Management Practices of Finnish Industrial Firms

This study employs questionnaire survey and financial accounting data to extend earlier empirical work on the foreign exchange (FX) exposure management practices of Finnish industrial firms. The paper concentrates on: (i) the form that FX corporate hedging policy takes; (ii) the control of FX procedures and trading; and, (iii) our respondents' perceptions about their ability to predict FX rate changes for hedging decisions. Our results indicate that the extent to which firms hedge FX exposure depends on the type of exposure and the form that FX hedging policy takes. Also, a significant number of the firms pursue FX hedging strategies on the expectation of attaining trading profits and this strategy appears to be accommodated within their FX policies. This feature is not explicitly demonstrated in previous studies. Finnish firms hedge a much higher proportion of both transaction and translation exposures compared to economic exposure. We partly attribute this emphasis to the requirements of the Finnish Accounting Act, which came into effect in 1993. The organisational, historical and financial settings of the firms also have significant impacts on exposure management practices. The overall implication of those results is that firms respond to changes in the financial, economic and regulatory environments in which they operate.     

Bank capital regulation,loan contracts,and corporate investment

This paper studies the link between bank capital regulation, bank loan contracts and the allocation of corporate resources across firms’ different business lines. Credit risk is lower when firms write contracts that oblige them to invest mainly into projects with highly tangible assets. We argue that firms have an incentive to choose a contract with overly safe and thus inefficient investments when intermediation costs are increasing in banks’ capital-to-asset ratio. Imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs.     

Product market objectives and the formation of research joint ventures

In this paper we extend the existing literature on research and development (R&D) investments and research joint ventures (RJVs) in two important ways. First, we analyze and compare the case where firms collude in the product market to the benchmark case of competition in the output market. Second, we allow firms to form coalitions endogenously as a separate stage in the game. We develop profit functions that depend on the partition of firms into joint ventures and the nature of product competition between venture partners. Our results illustrate the restrictive nature of some assumptions made in the literature. Typically multiple RJVs of different sizes form in equilibrium. In general, RJVs should not be promoted if they entail product market collusion. Given the information available to policy‐makers, it is unlikely that an R&D policy more refined than analyzing and allowing RJVs on a case‐by‐case basis is feasible. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multitasking,Information Disclosure,and Product Quality: Evidence from Nursing Homes

This paper uses a mandatory quality disclosure policy, the Nursing Home Quality Initiative (NHQI), to investigate how quality ‘report cards’ affect firms’ choices of multidimensional product quality. I show that after the introduction of NHQI: (1) scores of quality measures improve for the reported dimensions but deteriorate for the unreported ones; (2) there is no evidence that nursing homes decrease quality‐related inputs; (3) consumer demand becomes sensitive to changes in the NHQI quality measures. These findings are consistent with the multitasking hypothesis that firms may respond to information disclosure by reallocating effort across dimensions of quality without necessarily increasing overall quality.     

Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization: Role of Changing Environmental Standards,Sustainable Business Initiatives and Global Market Conditions

My study is framed against the backdrop of increasingly stringent environmental demands on the pulp and paper industry to reduce water and air pollution, and the changing global market conditions. I first present an observation‐based analysis conducted by visiting selected paper mills in Finland, the US, Germany and Sweden. Interesting differences and similarities emerge. Some of the observed differences lie in their focus on achieving incremental efficiency gains from better management of production processes, inventories, supply‐chain, product distribution and timing of modernization investments such as information technology. In the second part of the paper I present evidence on firms' productivity paths and the heterogeneity in productivity among relatively similar firms, and selected evidence of firms' investments in specific areas and how these affected productivity. My findings have implications for organizational behavior and business strategies employed by firms to improve their performance and productivity under changing environmental standards and market conditions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment