Risk assessment of surplus appropriation schemes in participating life insurance

The aim of this paper is to analyze a life insurance company’s risk exposure with respect to different surplus appropriation schemes in participating life insurance. In this regard, three surplus appropriation schemes are considered, including the bonus system, the interest-bearing accumulation, and the system of shortening the contract term. We further examine an insurance company that offers all three schemes, i.e. each system is used for one third of the policyholders. Focus is laid on the effect of different asset portfolios and shocks to mortality on the insurer’s risk situation with respect to the policyholder’s age level at contract inception.     

Optimal insurance in the presence of reinsurance

This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution.     

Informations- und Beratungspflichten des Versicherers nach der VVG-Reform

The insurer’s duty to enable the customer to come to an appropriate decision, providing advice and information, is a central topic of the reform of the German insurance contract law. The obligations of intermediaries given by the Directive 2002/92/EC on insurance mediation are transferred to insurers and thereby enlarged in some aspects. The duty to give advice in §6 I 1 VVG depends on the objective circumstances of each individual case depending upon either the complexity of the insurance contract and problems in understanding its terms, or the characteristics and situation of the customer. Therewith, the regulation both refers to former jurisdiction and exceeds it by implementing a duty for the insurer to ask for the demands and the needs of the customer. Without reason in the special case the customer has to disclose his need for advice to obtain it. During the term of the contract the insurer is only obliged to give advice if he knows or — acting diligently — could know the needs of the policy-holder. On a European level further duties to inform and advise could help to achieve an effective internal insurance market.     

Optimal Insurance With Costly Internal Capital

We introduce costly internal capital into a standard insurance model, in which a risk‐averse policyholder buys insurance from a risk‐neutral insurer with limited liability. The unique optimal contract and internal capital lead to a strictly positive probability for insurer default. Some risks are uninsurable in that the insurer chooses not to provide insurance against such risks. An increase in the cost of capital may lead to a higher optimal amount of internal capital. The results extend to multiple policyholders in a symmetric setting. Our extension of the classical model to include costly internal capital provides a fruitful approach to many real world insurance markets.     

Vergleich von ökonomischen und biometrischen Risiken in der Personenversicherung

In life insurance both the time and the amount of future payments between insurer and policyholder may be stochastic; biometrical as well as financial risks are transferred to the insurer. We present an approach that allows to decompose the randomness of the discounted value of future benefits and premiums to a sum whose addends correspond to the uncertainty of the policy development, the interest rates, the probabilities of death, the probabilities of disablement, etc. Upon modeling the actuarial assumptions stochastically, we quantify these risk factors for typical life insurance contracts and compare them with each other. Contrary to a common folklore, the examples show that the systematic biometrical risks are in many cases not marginal compared to the interest rate risk.     

Hedging Equity-Linked Life Insurance Contracts

Abstract

This paper examines a portfolio of equity-linked life insurance contracts and determines risk-minimizing hedging strategies within a discrete-time setup. As a principal example, I consider the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model and an equity-linked pure endowment contract under which the policyholder receives max(S_T , K) at time T if he or she is then alive, where S_T is the value of a stock index at the term T of the contract and K is a guarantee stipulated by the contract. In contrast to most of the existing literature, I view the contracts as contingent claims in an incomplete model and discuss the problem of choosing an optimality criterion for hedging strategies. The subsequent analysis leads to a comparison of the risk (measured by the variance of the insurer’s loss) inherent in equity-linked contracts in the two situations where the insurer applies the risk-minimizing strategy and the insurer does not hedge. The paper includes numerical results that can be used to quantify the effect of hedging and describe how this effect varies with the size of the insurance portfolio and assumptions concerning the mortality.     

Der Kausalitätsgegenbeweis des Versicherungsnehmers

According to Section 28 para. 3 of the revised German VVG (Insurance Contract Law), a policyholder may prove that his breach of duty did not cause a disadvantage for the insurer by means of so-called causality counter-evidence. In contrast to the former provision, this possibility obtains even in case of an intentional breach. Therefore, in the future, causality counter-evidence will increase in importance—especially with regard to notice and information duties and duties to keep subjective risks to a minimum. However, the new provision does not impose an unfair burden on the insurer: if the causality counter-evidence is successful, the insurer must pay only the actual costs required under the contract. The insurer’s interest in prevention is protected insofar as the introduction of causality counter-evidence is generally precluded in case of malice.     

Understanding Basis Risk in Insurance Contracts

There is a tremendous amount of resources being tied up in litigation between insurance companies and policyholders over things like the extent of coverage for various loss scenarios or allegedly bad faith delays in settlement payments. The fact that policyholders formally dispute insurer coverage positions or claims payment strategies gives credibility to the idea that mismatches exist between what policyholders expect insurance policies to cover and what the insurance contracts actually provide as loss indemnification. This mismatch essentially represents insurance basis risk, the analysis of which can more accurately reflect the value and overall efficiency of insurance contracts and suggest factors that may influence policyholder dissatisfaction and consequently insurance contract disputes. This article takes a detailed look at insurance basis risk and finds that subjectivity plays a prominent role in its definition. Using Bayesian inference, it is shown how factors can affect the magnitude of insurance basis risk depending on the individual situation in which the mismatch between losses and coverage exists.     

Grenzen der Auskunfts- und Belegpflicht in der D&O Versicherung

A large number of claims brought under German D&O insurance regard Insured vs. Insured cases, i.e. claims brought by the company against its own directors and officers (Executive Directors, Supervisory Board Members etc.). After notification of and examination by the insurer of such an insured event, the insurer will in most cases opt to grant the insured defence cover in order to fight off the claim. The insurer hereby expresses that it regards the claim of the company (= its own policyholder) against the board member (= the insured) to be without merit. This situation—where the policyholder is at the same time the damaged party—though typical under (German) D&O-policies is uncommon for liability insurance cover in general. It, thus, raises the issue as to the limits of the policyholder’s duty to disclose information. The scope of said obligation is not unlimited. It rather has to be ascertained pursuant to Sect. 31 VVG (German Insurance Contract Act), by taking into account the policyholder’s interests in commercial and industrial confidentiality and the burden of poof as provided by Sect. 93 para. 2 AktG (German Stock Companies Act). In case legal proceedings ensue between the company and the insured, and, as a consequence, the insurer exercises its obligation to conduct the case for the insured or the insurer joins the lawsuit on the side of the insured (by declaring a Third Party Notice [Streiverkündung]), the insurer clearly becomes an adversary to the company. Under such circumstances, the company is irrevocably released from its duty to disclose information.     

Life insurance in a contingent claim framework: Pricing and regulatory implications

In this paper we develop a contingent claim model to evaluate the equity and liabilities of a life insurance company. The limited liability of shareholders is explicitly modelled. We focus on a specific type of life insurance policy—namely, the profit-sharing policy. In this policy, the policyholder is entitled to a guaranteed interest rate and a percentage of the company's yearly financial revenues. The implicit equilibrium interest rate and profit-sharing ratio are derived and analyzed. We finally discuss regulatory measures frequently encountered in the life insurance business such as rate ceilings, capital ratios, and asset restrictions.     

Improving risk classification and ratemaking using mixture-of-experts models with random effects

In the underwriting and pricing of nonlife insurance products, it is essential for the insurer to utilize both policyholder information and claim history to ensure profitability and proper risk management. In this paper, we apply a flexible regression model with random effects, called the Mixed Logit-weighted Reduced Mixture-of-Experts, which leverages both policyholder information and their claim history, to categorize policyholders into groups with similar risk profiles, and to determine a premium that accurately captures the unobserved risks. Estimates of model parameters and the posterior distribution of random effects can be obtained by a stochastic variational algorithm, which is numerically efficient and scalable to large insurance portfolios. Our proposed framework is shown to outperform the classical benchmark models (Logistic and Lognormal GL(M)M) in terms of goodness-of-fit to data, while offering intuitive and interpretable characterization of policyholders' risk profiles to adequately reflect their claim history.     

Investment guarantees in unit-linked life insurance from the customer perspective

Interest rate guarantees are a typical contract feature in unit-linked-life insurance products. As the financial crisis of 2007/2008 has shown, these guarantees can be of substantial value for policyholders since they ensure that at least a minimum amount will be paid back even if the mutual fund value falls below a specific guaranteed level. However, from the insurance company’s view, these guarantees can be costly—especially in highly volatile markets—due to the required risk management measures which must be undertaken to secure the guarantees promised to the customers. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate whether customers really value these guarantees and if their willingness to pay (WTP) is sufficient to cover the guarantee costs. To elicit customer WTP, we use an online questionnaire and compare these results to the actual guarantee costs calculated with the Black and Scholes option pricing formula. One main finding is that even though most of the participants in the online questionnaire work in the financial industry, subjective prices are difficult to derive and are lower, on average, than the prices obtained using a financial pricing model. However, many participants are still willing to pay a substantially higher price.     

Fair Valuation of a Guaranteed Life Insurance Participating Contract Embedding a Surrender Option

In this article we deal with the problem of pricing a guaranteed life insurance participating policy, sold in the Italian market, which embeds a surrender option. This feature is an American‐style put option that enables the policyholder to sell back the contract to the insurer at the cash surrender value. Employing a recursive binomial formula patterned after the Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) discrete option pricing model we compute, first of all, the total price of the contract, which also includes a compensation for the participation feature (“participation option,” henceforth). Then this price is split into the value of three components: the basic contract, the participation option, and the surrender option. The numerical implementation of the model allows us to catch some comparative statics properties and to tackle the problem of suitably fixing the contractual parameters in order to obtain the premium computed by insurance companies according to standard actuarial practice.     

Überlegungen zu einem fairen Risikomanagement-Mix in Versicherungsunternehmen

This article deals with the question of how a ?fair risk management mix“ that does not lead to a wealth transfer between shareholders and policyholders can be achieved in a joint-stock insurance company. In our financial model of an insurer, the ?fair“ situation, it is assumed that there is no wealth transfer between shareholders and policyholders when both parties receive a net present value of zero on their investments. Taking the default risk of the insurance company into account, we first model a ?fair“ situation for the insurer’s existing portfolio. Surprisingly, closing a new insurance contract that has been priced on a fair basis and then included in the insurer’s existing portfolio leads to a disequilibrium situation because the net present value for the shareholders is no longer zero. This new net present value can be viewed as the fair price of any risk management measure the insurer must take so as to reestablish an equilibrium for both parties, the shareholders and the policyholders.     

Optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance contract with ambiguity aversion in the principal-agent model

ABSTRACT

We discuss an optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance contract in a continuous-time principal-agent framework where the surplus of the insurer (agent/he) is described by a classical Cramér-Lundberg (C-L) model. In addition to reinsurance, the insurer and the reinsurer (principal/she) are both allowed to invest their surpluses into a financial market containing one risk-free asset (e.g. a short-rate account) and one risky asset (e.g. a market index). In this paper, the insurer and the reinsurer are ambiguity averse and have specific modeling risk aversion preferences for the insurance claims (this relates to the jump term in the stochastic models) and the financial market's risk (this encompasses the models' diffusion term). The reinsurer designs a reinsurance contract that maximizes the exponential utility of her terminal wealth under a worst-case scenario which depends on the retention level of the insurer. By employing the dynamic programming approach, we derive the optimal robust reinsurance contract, and the value functions for the reinsurer and the insurer under this contract. In order to provide a more explicit reinsurance contract and to facilitate our quantitative analysis, we discuss the case when the claims follow an exponential distribution; it is then possible to show explicitly the impact of ambiguity aversion on the optimal reinsurance.     

On the Lack of Participating Policy Usage by Stock Insurance Companies

Stock insurers can reduce or eliminate agency conflicts between policyholders and stockholders by issuing participating insurance. Despite this benefit, most stock companies don't offer participating contracts. This study explains why. We study an equilibrium with both stock and mutual insurers in which stockholders set premiums to provide a fair expected return on their investment, and with a policyholder who chooses the insurance contract that maximizes her expected utility. We demonstrate that stockholders cannot profitably offer fully participating contracts, but can profitably offer partially participating insurance. However, when the policyholder participation fraction is high, the fair‐return premium is so large that the policyholder always prefers fully participating insurance from the mutual company. Policies with lower levels of policyholder participation are optimal for policyholders with relatively high risk aversion, though such policies are usually prohibited by insurance legislation. Thus, the reason stock insurers rarely issue participating contracts isn't because the potential benefits are small or unimportant. Rather, profitability or regulatory constraints simply prevent stock insurers from exercising those benefits in equilibrium.     

Insurance Market Effects of Risk Management Metrics

We extend the classical analysis on optimal insurance design to the case when the insurer implements regulatory requirements (Value-at-Risk). Presumably, regulators impose some risk management requirement such as VaR to reduce the insurers’ insolvency risk, as well as to improve the insurance market stability. We show that VaR requirements may better protect the insured and improve economic efficiency, but have stringent negative effects on the insurance market. Our analysis reveals that the insured are better protected in the event of greater loss irrespective of the optimal design from either the insured or the insurer perspective. However, in the presence of the VaR requirement on the insurer, the insurer's insolvency risk might be increased and there are moral hazard issues in the insurance market because the optimal contract is discontinuous.     

Arrow's Theorem of the Deductible with Heterogeneous Beliefs

In Arrow's classical problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, it is well-known that the optimal insurance indemnification for an insurance buyer—or decision maker (DM)—is a deductible contract when the insurer is a risk-neutral Expected-Utility (EU) maximizer and when the DM is a risk-averse EU maximizer. In Arrow's framework, however, both parties share the same probabilistic beliefs about the realizations of the underlying insurable loss. This article reexamines Arrow's problem in a setting where the DM and the insurer have different subjective beliefs. Under a requirement of compatibility between the insurer's and the DM's subjective beliefs, we show the existence and monotonicity of optimal indemnity schedules for the DM. The belief compatibility condition is shown to be a weakening of the assumption of a monotone likelihood ratio. In the latter case, we show that the optimal indemnity schedule is a variable deductible schedule, with a state-contingent deductible that depends on the state of the world only through the likelihood ratio. Arrow's classical result is then obtained as a special case.     

保险市场逆向选择的信号传递博弈研究

在保险市场中,投保人比保险人更了解自己的风险状况,保险双方之间的这种信息不对称难以避免地会产生逆向选择问题,于是在保险人混同定价的情形下,低风险投保人要承受过高的费率而受损,高风险投保人因保险成本过低而削弱控制风险的激励,导致整个市场资源配置低效甚至因逆向选择螺旋而崩溃。通过引入信号传递机制来实现保险市场的分离定价,从...     

Implicit Options in Life Insurance: Valuation and Risk Management

Participating life insurance contracts typically contain various types of implicit options. These implicit options can be very valuable and can thus represent a significant risk to insurance companies if they practice insufficient risk management. Options become especially risky through interaction with other options included in the contracts, which makes their evaluation even more complex. This article provides a comprehensive overview and classification of implicit options in participating life insurance contracts and discusses the relevant literature. It points out the potential problems particularly associated with the valuation of rights to early exercise due to policyholder exercise behavior. The risk potential of the interaction of implicit options is illustrated with numerical examples by means of a life insurance contract that includes common implicit options, i.e., a guaranteed interest rate, stochastic annual surplus participation, and paid-up and resumption options. Valuation is conducted using risk-neutral valuation, a concept that implicitly assumes the implementation of risk management measures such as hedging strategies.