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Adverse Selection in an Insurance Market With Government-Guaranteed Subsistence Levels 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that individuals receive the benefit of some type of potential government assistance that guarantees them a minimum level of wealth. For example, this assistance might be some type of government‐sponsored relief program, or it might simply be some type of limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This alters the individuals' demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects the equilibria in various insurance models of markets with adverse selection. 相似文献
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The theory of adverse selection predicts that high‐risk individuals are more likely to buy insurance than low‐risk individuals if asymmetric information regarding individuals’ risk type is present in the market. The theory of advantageous selection predicts the opposite—a negative relationship between insurance coverage and risk type can be obtained when hidden knowledge in other dimensions (e.g., the degree of risk aversion) is present in addition to the risk type. Using the heterogeneity of insurance buyers in either risk type or risk aversion, we first introduce a classroom‐based insurance market simulation game to show that adverse selection and advantageous selection can coexist. We then explain the underlying concepts using two methods: a mathematical framework based on expected utility theory and an empirical framework based on the results of the game itself. The game is easy to implement, reinforces textbook concepts by providing students a hands‐on experience, and supplements current textbooks by bringing their content up to date with current research. 相似文献
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On the Cost of Adverse Selection in Individual Annuity Markets: Evidence From Singapore 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Wai Mun Fong 《The Journal of risk and insurance》2002,69(2):193-208
New evidence is presented on the cost of adverse selection in individual annuity markets using Singapore data. The Singapore annuity market is an interesting setting to examine the cost of adverse selection for three reasons. First, unlike many Western countries, the Singapore government provides very limited public financial assistance for retirees. Second, while social security contributions mandated under the Central Provident Fund (CPF) result in a high forced savings rate, a large proportion of CPF savings, are used up for housing. Third, to ensure that retirees have sufficient funds to meet basic needs, individuals who reach age 55 are required to set aside a minimum amount of their CPF savings, which can be withdrawn at age 62. The CPF Board allows various options for investing the minimum sum, but the most attractive option is to purchase an annuity. The institutional setting in Singapore in effect provides insurers with a large captive market for annuities. It is conjectured that this should be reflected in a significantly lower cost of adverse selection for annuities sold in Singapore as compared with other countries. The results herein, using data for CPF‐approved insurers, are strongly consistent with this conjecture. On average, money's worth of annuities is higher than annuities sold to a similar age‐gender mix in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Adverse selection accounts for less than 13 percent of the cost of longevity insurance compared to 30–50 per‐ cent documented in many previous studies. These results suggest that one way to resolve the adverse selection problem is to adopt a universal individual defined contribution pension scheme that mandates or provides strong incentives for retirees to purchase annuities. 相似文献
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Researchers frequently question whether financial firms benefit by developing new products because barriers to entry common to other industries generally do not exist. Studies of early mover advantages for new financial products provide mixed evidence at best. We find evidence of early mover advantages in the relatively young market for long‐term care insurance (LTCI) using data that allow broad testing of financial performance. Product differentiation, individual lines exposure, firm size, and traditional health insurance experience also affect financial performance. 相似文献
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This article examines the efficiency of the National Football League (NFL) betting market. The standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression methodology is replaced by a probit model. This circumvents potential econometric problems, and allows us to implement more sophisticated betting strategies where bets are placed only when there is a relatively high probability of success. In-sample tests indicate that probit-based betting strategies generate statistically significant profits. Whereas the profitability of a number of these betting strategies is confirmed by out-of-sample testing, there is some inconsistency among the remaining out-of-sample predictions. Our results also suggest that widely documented inefficiencies in this market tend to dissipate over time. 相似文献
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Adverse Selection and Competitive Market Making: Empirical Evidence from a Limit Order Market 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
This article presents a new methodology for testing economicrestrictions on the price schedules offered in a limit orderbook that are based on (i) break-even conditions for marginallimit orders and (ii) rational updating conditions for orderbook revisions over time. Using order flow data from the StockholmStock Exchange, I find strong evidence of insufficient depthin the limit order books relative to the theoretical predictions.An extended model, which allows the model parameters to dependon market conditions, captures some of the systematic variationin the observed order book depth. 相似文献
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Product Ratings as a Market Reaction to Deregulation: Evidence From the German Insurance Market 下载免费PDF全文
This study provides the first investigation of information markets as a reaction to deregulation of product forms in insurance markets. The article studies the case of Germany, where insurance product ratings entered the market after relaxation of product regulation in 1994. The ratings’ potential for enhancing the performance of a deregulated insurance market is analyzed by considering both market structure and governance characteristics of the rating market, since the theoretical literature predicts that both are important determinants of rating outcomes. Data from a unique panel data set containing disability insurance ratings from the three major rating agencies are also examined in light of theoretical predictions. Results suggest that market governance and competition characteristics are favorable for the production of unbiased and informative ratings. Ratings for disability insurance support this interpretation, since the characteristics of the ratings conform to theoretical predictions about ratings in well‐functioning rating markets. 相似文献
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《Risk Management & Insurance Review》2018,21(2):211-242
In this article, we view the demand for reinsurance as a “special case” of the corporate demand for insurance. We analyze the extent to which reinsurance purchases by the global property–liability insurance industry vary across countries and assess the relative importance of country‐level factors compared with firm‐level factors. Using a data set consisting of 21,814 firm‐year observations from 33 (developed and developing) countries during the period 2000–2012, we find that after controlling for firm‐level factors, country‐level factors have economically as well as statistically significant effects on the demand for reinsurance. 相似文献
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De Meza and Webb (2001) indicated that individuals with a higher degree of risk aversion would demand more insurance and invest in self-protection to reduce risk probability when both the preference type and investment in self-protection are hidden from insurers. They referred to the negative correlation between market insurance and risk type as advantageous selection. However, the relationship between risk type and the degree of risk aversion is debatable in both theoretical and empirical research. This paper therefore proposes that advantageous selection could be supported from another angle by directly examining the relationships that exist among market insurance, self-protection, and risk probability. By focusing on the commercial fire insurance market, information on the purchase of market insurance, investment in self-protection, and fire accident records is hand-collected by means of a unique survey. It is found that firms purchasing market insurance have a greater tendency to channel efforts into self-protection. It is also found that firms expending effort on self-protection are less likely to suffer a fire accident. Furthermore, it is found that firms with commercial fire insurance have less chance of suffering a fire accident than those without such insurance. Each of the above three findings jointly supports the view that advantageous selection could play a critical role in the commercial fire insurance market. 相似文献
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The analysis considers an insurance market with adverse selection where individuals' loss distributions may differ with respect to both the frequency and severity of loss. We show that the combination of deductibles and coinsurance can be used to sort rationed policyholders. Because of their screening properties, coinsurance and deductibles may both be equilibrium forms of risk sharing for a particular insurer facing asymmetric information, with different rationed consumers choosing different risk‐sharing provisions. 相似文献
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Hyojoung Kim Doyoung Kim† Subin Im‡ James W. Hardin§ 《The Journal of risk and insurance》2009,76(2):343-366
In the empirical analysis of information asymmetry in automobile insurance markets, prior research used a dichotomous measurement approach that induces excessive bundling in coverage measurements and sample selection biases. To improve on the conditional correlation method for testing information asymmetry, we propose a multinomial measurement approach that constructs coverage categories at ordered multinomial levels. With this approach, we find robust evidence of information asymmetry in both coverage area and coverage amount choices, which we could not find with the dichotomous measurement approach. It thus demonstrates the sensitivity of the empirical findings to the method used to measure insurance coverage. 相似文献
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Yung‐Ming Shiu 《The Journal of risk and insurance》2011,78(2):475-494
Using a data set consisting of statutory returns of U.K. non‐life insurers from 1985 to 2002, I find that insurers with higher leverage tend to purchase more reinsurance, and insurers with higher reinsurance dependence tend to have a higher level of debt. My results are consistent with the expected bankruptcy costs argument, agency costs theory, risk‐bearing hypothesis, and renting capital hypothesis. I also find that the impact of leverage on reinsurance will be weaker for insurers that use more derivatives than those that use less. Moreover, high levels of derivative use increase the leverage gains attributable to reinsurance. 相似文献
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Kuniyoshi Saito 《The Journal of risk and insurance》2006,73(2):335-356
This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation, which prohibits insurance companies from considering some attributes of drivers in setting premiums. Using an individual data set from a heavily regulated automobile insurance market, we arrived at several conclusions, as follows. First, no evidence of adverse selection or moral hazard is found in general: conditional on all the variables observed by insurer, the null hypothesis of independence between risk and coverage is not rejected at reasonable levels of statistical significance. Second, this result is robust in the sense that it holds under several empirical procedures and different definitions of risk and coverage. Third, we find that unobserved variables do not induce adverse selection: the null hypothesis that consumers in risky regions are more likely to purchase insurance is tested against the alternative and rejected. Our study supports the view that the adverse selection phenomenon exists only to a very limited extent in this market. 相似文献
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Flood Hazards, Insurance Rates, and Amenities: Evidence From the Coastal Housing Market 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Okmyung Bin ; Jamie Brown Kruse† ; Craig E. Landry† 《The Journal of risk and insurance》2008,75(1):63-82
This study employs the hedonic property price method to examine the effects of flood hazard on coastal property values. We utilize Geographic Information System data on National Flood Insurance Program flood zones and residential property sales from Carteret County, North Carolina. Our results indicate that location within a flood zone lowers property value. Price differentials for flood risk and the capitalized value of flood insurance premiums are roughly equivalent—both exhibiting a nonlinear relationship in flood probability. Our results support the conclusion that flood zone designation and insurance premiums convey risk information to potential buyers in the coastal housing market. 相似文献
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随着社会经济的进步与发展,提供社会保险日益成为现代政府的重要任务,而信息不对称带来的逆向选择这一市场失灵问题是政府提供社会保险的主要经济依据之一。由此,近年来国际学术界涌现出一大批关于社会保险市场上逆向选择与公共政策干预问题的研究文献,在将理论与数据相结合以分析公共政策的福利影响方面出现了很多研究进展。本文就尝试对这一领域的研究进行总结与分析,为国内学术研究的开展与公共经济政策的设计提供有益借鉴。 相似文献
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Capitation gives insurers incentive to manipulate their offerings to attract the healthy and deter the sick. We calculate the incentives for such service-specific quality distortions using managed care medical and pharmacy spending data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 from the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance Program. Services most vulnerable to stinting are cardiac care, diabetes care, and mental health and substance abuse services. Empirically, the financial temptation to distort service quality increases nonlinearly with supply-side cost sharing. Our empirical results highlight how selection incentives work at cross-purposes with efforts to reward excellent chronic disease management. Initiatives coupling pay-for-performance with risk adjustment and mixed payment hold promise for aligning incentives with quality improvement. 相似文献