Corruption and natural resource rents: evidence from quantile regression

This study examines the impacts of oil rents on corruption for 157 countries. While existing studies have primarily focused on average effects, we employ quantile regression to estimate the effects of natural resource abundance for different corruption levels. We consider the effects of natural resource rents, mainly oil rents and then compare them with those of total and non-oil natural resources rents. The estimation results show that, generally, more oil rents increase corruption. Specifically, impacts are larger in countries with an intermediate level of corruption and smaller in highly corrupt countries. While total resource rents increase corruption significantly, non-oil resource rents do not. This may be due to non-oil resource rent management (mainly inland) being more subject to public scrutiny. Non-oil natural resources are concentrated in the less-developed sub-Saharan African countries, where corruption is prevalent; therefore, the impacts of natural resource rents are unremarkable.     

General Equilibrium Tragedy of the Commons

Many poor economies depend on open access resources for their livelihoods. Households in resource-based economies allocate their time and other factors between resource extraction and other activities. As a result, factors may shift from one sector to another as marginal returns change. This has two important implications. First, it implies potentially strong linkages between resource and non-resource sectors. Second, it means that unmanaged resources cause inefficient allocations of inputs across all sectors, and the effects of resource management spill into other sectors. We construct a local general equilibrium model that accounts for inputs that over-allocate to an open access resource and create a general equilibrium tragedy of the commons. This model describes resource rent dissipation more adequately in economies with mobile factors than a model with slowly dissipating rents. Perfectly mobile factors dissipate rent in every period, but endogenous wages cause labor and capital allocations to change with the resource stock. We use the model to illustrate medium-run impacts of a limit on capital in an artisanal fishery in Honduras. Simulation results reveal that fishery management has economy-wide impacts on prices and wages. Managers in developing countries thus should consider these linkages when implementing policies to conserve fish stocks.     

Jurisdictional Tax Competition and the Division of Nonrenewable Resource Rents

This paper presents a model of nonrenewable resource extraction across multiple jurisdictions which engage in strategic tax competition. The model incorporates rents due to both resource scarcity and capital scarcity as well as intra-region Ricardian rents. Regions set taxes on nonrenewable resource production strategically to balance tax revenues and local benefits from investment conditional on other regions’ tax rates. A representative extraction firm then allocates production capital across regions and time to maximize the present value of profits. Generally, we find that the division of resource rent between firms and regional governments ultimately depends on the relative scarcity of natural and production capital, relative costs across space, and the value regional governments place on economic activity. This theoretical result provides policymakers with information on the determinants of optimal tax rates and motivates future empirical research on the factors influencing the division of resource rent in practice.     

Natural resources, democracy and corruption

We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980-2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. They are also robust across different samples, and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources, democracy and corruption.     

质量管理体系对人力资源管理的要求

建立在TQM思想上的ISO90 0 0 (2 0 0 0 )质量管理体系明确了组织中人力资源管理的重要性。本文在分析人力资源基本特征的基础上 ,讨论了质量管理体系对人力资源管理在人员参与管理、人员能力和意识管理及人员培训管理方面的要求 ,对于组织建立和完善质量管理体系并提高人力资源管理水平具有一定的理论指导意义。     

机遇管理与企业竞争优势

本文从企业成长过程中所面临的问题出发,运用机遇管理理论分析了企业辨识、评价、利用和营造机遇的运行机制,阐释了企业发展过程中机遇管理的重要性和必然性。从经济学的视角来看,企业的竞争优势来源于经济租金,经济租金可以分为基于低成本和差异化的张伯伦租金、基于资源和能力的李嘉图租金、基于知识和创新的熊彼特租金。本文分析了企业机遇管理在企业获取经济租金、建立竞争优势中的作用,分析了机遇管理与低成本和差异化、资源和能力、知识和创新之间的关系。本文认为,机遇管理有利于获得与维持企业租金：企业通过机遇管理有助于实现低成本和差异化,获取张伯伦租金;有助于企业获得稀缺资源,提高能力,获取李嘉图租金;有助于企业积累知识,促进创新,获取熊彼特租金。本文从经济学的角度分析了企业竞争优势的来源,论证了企业租金的来源正是企业竞争优势的来源,探索了企业通过机遇管理建立竞争优势的新方法、新途径。     

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States*

The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition uses models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition uses political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium due to changes in the costs and benefits of buying votes. Although they provide considerable insight, these traditions have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study the choice between conflict and democracy. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria.     

When is fish quota enforcement worth while? A study of the Northeast Arctic cod

Many fish stocks are controlled by fish quotas divided among individual firms. Such quota regimes need an enforcement mechanism in order to be effective. Whether or not quota management regimes are worth while depends on whether the rents generated by such regimes cover their costs. Cost-efficient quota regimes would attain an optimal deterrence through minimal control and high fines, but in practice there are likely to be socially determined limits on how high fines could be set. We analyze these questions for the Northeast Arctic cod stock, using data on enforcement of Norwegian fish quotas.     

官员规模、公共品供给与社会收入差距:权力寻租的视角

官员规模、公共品供给效率以及社会收入差距是当下社会比较关注的问题,本文试图把三个问题纳入到一个故事框架下来分析和解释。生产的进行需要官员提供资源帮扶,这需要通过雇佣下级官员来做到;当私人利益进入上级官员的收益函数时,上级官员就会促使资源的供给"人为"稀缺来设租,从而便于下级官员从生产者处收取资源租金;而资源租金的收取使得下级官员的收益高于其外部选择权收益,从而增加了下级官员职位的竞争性,又由于上级官员对下级官员职位任命权的垄断,使上级官员从下级官员处收取职位租金。分析表明,权力的设租寻租行为是造成社会收入差距出现的一个重要原因;在一个能较好限制官员关注私人收益的社会中,官员规模较小、公共品供给效率较高且因权力寻租而造成的社会收入差距较小。     

稻田低密度生态养鱼及其实现产业化的前景

稻田低密度养鱼是一种新型的、具有较强的自我修复能力的农田生态系统模式,它集农产品消费安全、农民快速增收、稻田地力培肥、农副废弃物资源化于一体,且有三省(省工、省肥、省药)、两低(降低生产成本,降低劳动强度)的特点,体现了我国生态农业的特色和精华,即巧妙借用自然力(如养鱼、养鸭等)以实现轻轻松松地种田,既有助于农业的可持续发展,又促进了农村经济的发展和农村工业化、城镇化进程。     

Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes,Even If They Do Not Take Climate Change into Account

Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition and resource extraction to assess the fiscal incentive of imposing a tax on carbon rather than on capital. We explicitly model international capital and resource markets, as well as intertemporal capital accumulation and resource extraction. While fossil resources give rise to scarcity rents, capital does not. With carbon taxes, the rents can be captured and invested in infrastructure, which leads to higher welfare than under capital taxation. This result holds even without modeling environmental damages. It is robust under a variation of the behavioral assumptions of resource importers to coordinate their actions, and a resource exporter’s ability to counteract carbon policies. Further, no green paradox occurs—instead, the carbon tax constitutes a viable green policy, since it postpones extraction and reduces cumulative emissions.     

Frontiers and sustainable economic development

Exploiting new resource “frontiers,” such as agricultural land and mineral reserves, is a fundamental feature of economic development in poor economies. Yet frontier-based development is symptomatic of a pattern of economy-wide resource exploitation in developing economies that: (a) generates little additional economic rents, and (b) what rents are generated are not being reinvested in other sectors. Such development is inherently unsustainable. The following paper explains this phenomenon, and provides evidence that long-run expansion of agricultural land and oil and natural gas proved reserves across poor economies is associated with lower levels of real income per capita. The paper proposes a frontier expansion hypothesis to explain why the structural economic dependence of these economies on frontier land expansion and resource exploitation is not conducive to sustained long-run growth. The key to sustainable economic development in poor economies will be improving the economic integration between frontier and other sectors of the economy, targeting policies to improved resource management in frontier areas and overcoming problems of corruption and rent-seeking in resource sectors.      

PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CRISES IN WORLD FISHERIES: TURNING THE TIDE?

This paper addresses the crises in the world's fisheries involving dwindling stocks, overcapitalization, and jurisdiction disputes from a property rights perspective. In particular, it examines the causes of the problems fishers face and explores the potential of privatizing the right to catch fish as a means to address the crises. The analysis assesses experiences of private harvesting rights with reference to monitoring and enforcement, allocating rights, economic benefits, adjustments in the fishery, and resource rents. It also examines issues such as fluctuating fish stocks, straddling stocks and high seas fisheries, and the endemic poverty of many artisanal fisheries in the context of current fisheries practice.     

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

We model how the “supply and demand” for bribes affects resource use by an economy, and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets. This requires adjusting the World Bank’s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption. The impacts of corruption on long-run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across African and Asian economies from 1970 to 2003. Corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of African countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term, but for Asian countries, corruption is less important than point resources. Corruption influences long-run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries, and is also the “pathway” through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use, trade and abundance.     

SUSTAINABLE CONSTANT CONSUMPTION IN A SEMI‐OPEN ECONOMY WITH EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES*

To sustain constant consumption, Hartwick's rule prescribes reinvesting all resource rents in reproducible capital. However, Hartwick's rule is not necessarily the result of optimization. In this paper, we address this insufficiency by deriving a constant consumption path endogenously in a semi‐open economy with an exhaustible resource, which has full access to world goods and capital markets, while the resource flows are not internationally tradable. Our findings show that, due to the essentiality of both capital and resource to the production process, the economy transforms its domestic assets into foreign ones, consuming a constant interest flow from the latter.     

Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies

Resource-rich countries have tended to be autocratic and also have tended to use their resource wealth badly. The neoconservative agenda of promoting democratization in resource-rich countries thus offers the hopeful prospect of a better use of their economic opportunities. This paper examines whether the effect of democracy on economic performance is distinctive in resource-rich societies. We show that a priori the sign of the effect is ambiguous: Resource rents could either enhance or undermine the economic consequences of democracy. We therefore investigate the issue empirically. We first build a new dataset on country-specific resource rents, annually for the period 1970-2001. Using a global panel dataset, we find that in developing countries the combination of high natural resource rents and open democratic systems has been growth-reducing. Checks and balances offset this adverse effect. Thus, resource-rich economies need a distinctive form of democracy with particularly strong checks and balances. Unfortunately, this is rare: Checks and balances are public goods and so are liable to be undersupplied in new democracies. Over time they are eroded by resource rents.     

基于投入--占用--产出技术的自然资源乘数分析

本文在简要介绍投入—占用—产出系数表的基础上,给出了考虑固定资产占用的资源乘数计算公式。然后,以青岛市为例,研究了青岛市的海洋鱼类资源乘数。结果表明,1997年青岛市渔业部门的海洋鱼类资源乘数,考虑固定资产占用比不考虑固定资产占用有明显增加;考虑经济系统对生态系统的影响比仅考虑生态系统对经济系统投入时的资源乘数也有所增加;进一步考虑生态系统内部各成分之间的联系时,资源乘数又有所增加。     

Endogenous institutional change after independence

Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries.     

Regulation of common property resources under private information about resource externalities

Optimal marginal investment incentives and optimal entry regulations are developed for a case where heterogeneous firms exploit a common property natural resource. The government’s objectives are to correct for resource externalities and to tax away the resource rent. Both individual output and efficiency levels are subject to private information, i.e. it is a model with multi-agency, externalities, and countervailing incentives. There are asymmetric information about the net revenue of the firm and the size of the resource externalities that the firm inflicts on the other firms in the industry. The latter implies that external effects are present both in the firms’ net incomes and in the information rents.