Spillover, Competition and Better R&D Organization

This paper examines several types of R&D organization, including one noncooperative (independent R&D) form and three cooperative ones (R&D coordination, an R&D consortium and a research joint venture (RJV)). We consider the sharing of both research inputs and outputs in an R&D consortium and an RJV. We show that the superiority of a form of R&D organization cannot be determined uniquely, but should be judged by four parameters. In addition, it is shown that there exist possible mixes of these parameters in which an R&D consortium is superior to either R&D coordination or an RJV in terms of technological improvement and social welfare.
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L41.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a three-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing along with R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms generally don't choose intermediate levels of information sharing: they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects: a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. In response to an increase in leakages, RJV members reduce their R&D spending. In addition, they either increase the RJV size while maintaining information sharing unchanged (when leakages are low), or they reduce both information sharing and RJV size (when leakages are high).     

Environmental Research Joint Ventures under Emission Taxes

The effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms. Firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental R&D joint ventures(RJVs). Environmental RJVs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts. Threetypes of environmental RJV are discussed inthis paper: R&D cartelization in which firmschoose R&D efforts to maximize the jointprofit, RJV competition in which firms sharethe R&D fruits to maximize their own profits,and RJV cartelization in which firms share R&Dfruits and maximize the joint profit. An R&Dcartelization minimizes output quantities,maximizes the total emission, and minimizes thesocial surplus. An RJV cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes R&D efforts, minimizes the totalemission, and maximizes the social surplus.     

DEFECTING FROM R&D COOPERATION

This paper introduces defection into the strategic R&D model. In defecting, a firm cheats by choosing its R&D expenditures to maximise its own profits, instead of maximising the joint profits of the cooperating firms. Two cooperative environments are considered: R&D cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities; and RJV cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities and share information. Under R&D cartelisation, defection entails an increase (decrease) in R&D and effective spillovers for low (high) spillovers; whereas under RJV cartelisation, defection always entails a decrease in R&D and effective spillovers. Under R&D cartelisation, consumer surplus and total welfare increase (decrease) with defection when spillovers are low (high). Whereas consumer surplus and welfare always decrease with defection under RJV cartelisation. Under R&D cartelisation, the incentives for defection first decrease then increase with spillovers; they also increase with the size of the market, but decline with production costs and R&D costs. Moreover, the incentives for defection are higher under RJV cartelisation. With low spillovers under RJV cartelisation, a firm prefers to be subject to defection by the other firm, to not cooperating at all. Punishment for defection is considered, under the form of abstaining from information sharing.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures and Market Concentration

This paper studies two asymmetric R&D cooperation structures. In the first structure some firms in an industry organize a research joint venture (RJV) cartel while the remainder engage in independent R&D. In the other structure, each firm joins one of a number of competing RJV cartels. The findings indicate that cooperative R&D may lead to a more concentrated post-innovation industry than standard R&D competition owing to the technology advantage of the (large) cartel obtained from R&D co-operation. Under certain conditions these asymmetric structures are more efficient, but they result in a redistribution of income towards the firms in the (large) cartel.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13, O31.     

International R&D Networks

This paper considers the Goyal and Moraga‐Gonzalez (2001 ) model of strategic R&D collaboration networks in the open economy framework. The R&D is the d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988 ) process innovation and collaboration takes the form of research joint ventures (RJV) in which firms cooperate in R&D but compete in product markets. Countries decide whether to establish free‐trade links while firms decide whether and with whom to form RJVs. A double‐layer pairwise stability concept is introduced to characterize equilibrium network structures. In contrast with conventional wisdom, it is shown that global free trade generally reduces collaborative R&D levels. We give conditions for which pairwise stable R&D networks are welfare maximizing. Stability and efficiency are congruent when R&D cost is either too high or too low. A large public spillover effect is detrimental to an R&D network when trade networks are regional.     

Exports,productivity and innovation: new firm level empirical evidence

This article examines the determinants of Portuguese exports, applying data from 277 manufacturing firms for the period 2006–2010. In 2010, these firms accounted for about 47% of total Portugal’s exports. Both the static and dynamic results of the estimated models confirm the positive influence of productivity on variations in exports. The dynamic estimations also suggest that exports in the previous period hold a positive effect on contemporaneous exports, confirming the Roberts and Tybout (1997) sunk cost hypothesis for exports. In the dynamic analysis, the labour costs and the size of the firm do not have a statistically significant effect on Portuguese exports with the findings also pointing to increased expenditure on research and development (R&D) generating no statistically significant effect on exports. The lagged R&D expenditure was also insignificant in explaining the change of Portuguese exports. Thus, these results suggest that applying a product or process innovation measure returns better results than indirect measures such as R&D expenditure.     

The role of diminishing returns in neo-Schumpeterian growth theory

Summary. This paper generalizes Segerstrom [5], a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth through quality improvements in which innovation and imitation are modeled as the outcomes of research and development (R&D) races. Specific factors introduced into the technologies of both R&D activities achieve diminishing returns to scale in R&D. The comparative-static results of subsidies to R&D activities depend on the degree of diminishing returns to scale in R&D. When there is (is not) a sufficient degree of diminishing returns to R&D, a subsidy to innovative activity increases (decreases) innovative activity. Received: July 8, 1994; revised version: June 9, 1997     

Knowledge appropriability, firm size, and growth

Empirical evidence shows that the number of patents per R&D dollar declines with firm size. In this paper, we propose a Schumpeterian growth model that accounts for this evidence. We analyze an economy with firms that engage in cost-reducing innovation resulting from the accumulation of both codified and tacit knowledge: the former occurs through the purchase of patents, while the latter is the result of R&D conducted in-house by firms. We study the relation between knowledge appropriability and market structure, and we show that a shift from patents to in-house research occurs as firm size gets larger. Since innovation statistics concentrate mainly on patents, this process of research reallocation results into an under-estimation of innovative activity and is responsible for the declining ratio of patents to R&D expenditure. Survey data on UK-based firms provide support to our results.     

Schumpeterian cycles with pro-cyclical R&D

Recent empirical work finds that R&D expenditures are quite pro-cyclical even for firms that are not credit-constrained during downturns. This has been taken as strong evidence against Schumpeterian-style theories of business cycles that emphasize the idea that downturns in production may be good times to allocate labor towards innovative activities. Here we argue that the pro-cyclicality of R&D investment is in fact quite consistent with at least one of these theories. In our analysis we emphasize three key features of R&D investment relative to other types of innovative activity: (1) it uses knowledge intensively, (2) it is a long-term investment with uncertain applications, and (3) it suffers from diminishing returns over time.     

Inter-Firm Technological Cooperation: Effects Of Absorptive Capacity,Firm-Size And Specialization

This paper aims to add evidence on the role played by firms' technological competencies in the determination of their intensity of cooperation with other firms. Using a database composed by patents jointly filcd by two or more firms in the European Patent Office, the paper confronts the hypotheses of complementary or substitutive character of technological cooperation in relation to intra-mural R&D. The results suggest that more technologically and productive specialized firms are more likely to cooperate and find no support for the hypothesis that greater level of R&D expenditure will induce greater reliance on technological cooperation. It is also suggested that firms cooperate with partners that hold cotilplenientary competencies.     

Nonparametric quantile regression analysis of R&D-sales relationship for Korean firms

This paper applies the nonparametric quantile regression estimation procedure to the analysis of the innovation-firm size relationship using Korean manufacturing firms data. Due to the high asymmetric distribution of R&D expenditure, the mean regression does not capture properly the stylized facts of R&D behavior; hence it underestimates the sales elasticity. Comparing the parametric estimates and nonparametric estimates allows us to see that there exists a nonlinear relationship in innovative activity and sales. Dividing the data into three groups according to the sales volume, the elasticity in the medium-sized firms is the biggest for scientific firms. This result conforms that the findings of Scherer (1965) coincide with findings from Korean manufacturing firms data in the sense that R&D expenditure tends to increase faster than firm size with size up to a point and then more slowly among larger firms. For the non-scientific firms, it steadily increases showing increasing returns to scale in innovative activity in large firms.     

Green Technology and Optimal Emissions Taxation

Unless an active environmental policy exists, firms have no incentive to engage in abatement or environmental R&D so policy design is of paramount importance. This design heavily depends on the way R&D spillovers operate. There are two distinct types of R&D spillover: output spillover and input spillover. An input spillover operates on the expenditure toward pollution reduction, whereas an output spillover manifests as the achieved abatement. Under optimal emissions taxation, significant differences arise due to this distinction, in particular, when the spillover operates on R&D inputs. In an oligopolistic setting, the result is higher R&D expenditure, but also higher aggregate emissions and, consequently, higher emissions taxes. By contrast, when spillovers occur in R&D output, there is a U‐shaped relationship between the optimal tax and the spillover, showing a trade‐off between the optimal tax rate and spillovers when these are low. In terms of the relative effectiveness of different R&D organization setups, combining emissions taxes with R&D cooperation, this paper shows that under low levels of R&D spillover R&D cooperation gives higher emissions reductions, whereas when spillovers are high this is not the case.     

RJV FORMATION AND STRATEGIC ENTRY ACCOMMODATION*

This article examines the relationship between cost reduction and public goods effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) and strategic entry deterrence. R&D is process innovation à la Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992 ) and R&D cost sharing between the incumbent and the entrant in a RJV can be asymmetric per Long and Soubeyran (2002 ). It is found that conforming with the conventional wisdom, the incumbents prefer to form RJV to deter entry when the entrant is very inefficient. However, if the entrant is moderately inefficient, it is a better choice for the incumbent to accommodate entry by forming a RJV with it. In contrast, if the entrant is very efficient, then the equilibrium RJV structure depends on the magnitude of spillover effect: it is better to deter entry in the case of high spillover effect.     

政府产品创新补贴下的企业R＆D策略选择

为了研究在政府产品创新补贴政策下企业的R＆D策略选择问题,建立了双寡头市场中面向工艺R＆D的三阶段博弈模型：第一阶段政府以社会福利最大为目标选择产品创新补贴率;第二阶段企业进行R＆D投资以降低生产成本;第三阶段企业在产品市场中进行古诺竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了研发竞争、研发卡特尔、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等四种R＆D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R＆D补贴率。研究表明：从企业的R＆D投入和产品产量的角度看,当溢出效应较高时,研发竞争策略优于研发卡特尔策略;当溢出效应较低时,研发卡特尔策略优于研发竞争策略。研发卡特尔策略与研发竞争策略相比,研发卡特尔更能推动企业利润的提高并且可以改善社会总福利。从产品产量、企业利润和社会总福利最大化角度考虑,研究共同体为四种策略中的最优策略。     

Cooperation in R&D and production: a three-firm analysis

The paper analyzes, in a model of quantity-setting three firms, the interaction between cooperation decisions at the R&D stage and merger decisions at the production stage. We assume that only two of the three firms are capable of doing cost-reducing research. Two types of cooperative research, viz., the knowledge-sharing agreement and research joint venture are considered. Cost reduction in the case of a successful research joint venture is larger compared to knowledge sharing or independent research, due to possible synergies. We show that allowing mergers can change the organization of the R&D process, and admitting cooperative research can affect the occurrence and nature of mergers at the production stage.     

THEY DON'T INVENT THEM LIKE THEY USED TO: AN EXAMINATION OF ENERGY PATENT CITATIONS OVER TIME

This article uses patent citation data to study flows of knowledge across time and across institutions in the field of energy research. Popp [2002, Induced Innovation and Energy Prices. American Economic Review, 92(1), 160–180.] finds that the level of energy-saving research and development (R&D) depends not only on energy prices, but also on the quality of the accumulated knowledge available to inventors. Patent citations are used to represent this quality. This article explores the pattern of citations in these fields more carefully. Evidence for diminishing returns to research inputs, both across time and within a given year is found. To check whether government R&D can help alleviate potential diminishing returns, special attention is paid to citations to government patents. The government patents filed in or after 1981 are more likely to be cited. More importantly, descendants of these government patents are 30% more likely to be cited by subsequent patents. Earlier government research was more applied in nature and is not cited more frequently.     

Non‐Scale Endogenous Growth with R&D and Human Capital

This paper examines the conditions under which increasing knowledge, encapsulated in ideas for new technology through R&D and embodied in human capital through education, sustains economic growth. A general model is developed where, consistent with recent literature, growth is non‐scale (not increasing in population size) and endogenous (generated by factors within R&D and education). Recent models feature the counterfactual assumption of constant returns to existing knowledge and restrict the substitutability of inputs within R&D and education. We find that non‐scale endogenous growth is possible under less stringent conditions. The findings reconcile sustained economic growth with evidence of diminishing marginal returns in education and R&D, which suggests an ambiguous role for R&D policy.