Are business groups different from other family firms? Evidence from corporate investments during political uncertainty

Using a large sample of Indian family firms, we examine the investment behaviour of group-affiliated family firms versus standalone family firms during local state elections. While state elections negatively affect corporate investments, family firms invest more than non-family firms. Therefore, using a difference-in-difference estimation, we find that group-affiliated family firms invest significantly more than standalone family firms. Additionally, we find no evidence of distortive investments by group-affiliated family firms due to political pressure; rather, it appears that the unique structure allows these firms to make value-relevant investments when other firms adopt a conservative approach. Overall, our study improves the understanding of family firm investments during periods of political uncertainty.     

Family Firms’ Corporate Social Performance: A Calculated Quest for Socioemotional Wealth

This study investigates the engagement of family firms in corporate social responsibility. We first compare their corporate social performance (CSP) to non-family firms. Then, following recent evidence on the heterogeneity of family firms, we examine two factors that may influence CSP within family firms: the level of family control and the governance orientation of the country in which they operate. This research is based on a theoretical framework which considers both agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) influences on family firms CSR engagements. Overall, we find that family firms exhibit lower CSP than non-family firms. But when focusing on family firms, our analyses show a curvilinear relationship between family control and CSP. At lower levels of control, family owners invest more in social initiatives to protect their SEW. Beyond a threshold level of control that we estimate at 36 % in our sample, economic considerations prevail over SEW and social performance starts decreasing. We also find that family firms operating in stakeholder-oriented countries are more attentive to social concerns than those operating in more shareholder-oriented countries.     

Do family ties shape the performance consequences of diversification? Evidence from the European Union

This paper examines the moderating effect of family involvement in ownership and control on the relationship between diversification strategies – both product and international diversification – and corporate performance. We argue that this moderating effect is related to the distinctive characteristics of family firms compared to non-family firms. The empirical evidence is provided by a sample of firms from the European Union during the 2005–2009 time period. Our results found that family firms are more profitable than non-family firms when they engage in joint product and international diversification.     

The characteristics of family firms: exploiting information on ownership,kinship, and governance using total population data

Family firms are often considered characteristically different from non-family firms. However, our understanding of family firms suffers from an inability to identify them in total population data; information is rarely available regarding owners, their kinship, and their involvement in firm governance. We present a method for identifying domiciled family firms using register data; this method offers greater accuracy than previous methods. We apply this method to Swedish data concerning firm ownership, governance, and kinship from 2004 to 2010. We find that the family firm is a significant organizational form, contributing over one third of all employment and gross domestic product (GDP). Family firms are common in most industries and range in size. Furthermore, we find that, compared to private non-family firms, family firms have fewer total assets, employment, and sales and carry higher solidity, although family firms are more profitable. These differences diminish with firm size. We conclude that the term “family firm” includes a large variety of firms, and we call for increased attention to their heterogeneity.     

数字金融的公司治理效应--基于非家族股东治理视角

非家族股东治理能够有效助力家族企业实现可持续发展与现代化转型的目标,因而提升非家族股东治理水平具有重要意义。数字金融作为传统金融发展模式的重要创新,能够实现“金融服务实体经济”的目标,促使非家族股东积极参与家族企业治理。基于此,本文以代理理论与社会情感财富理论为基础,探讨了数字金融对非家族股东治理的影响。实证检验发现,随着数字金融的发展,非家族股东治理水平不断提升。其作用机制在于,数字金融能够通过缓解代理冲突、弱化家族控制与强化传承意愿,提升非家族股东治理水平。拓展性分析发现,对于非创业型、融资约束较强、位于金融监管程度较强地区的家族企业来说,数字金融对非家族股东治理的积极效应更显著;数字金融对异质性非家族股东制衡度存在差异化影响,即相较于外资股东与机构股东制衡度,数字金融能够强化国有股东与民营股东对家族股东的制衡;数字金融能够通过提升非家族股东治理水平促进家族企业可持续发展。本文从数字金融视角探究非家族股东治理的动机,丰富了数字金融与非家族股东治理的相关研究。     

Beating the recession blues: Exploring the link between family ownership,strategic marketing behavior and firm performance during recessions

This study explores whether family firms exhibit unique marketing behavior and whether their unique behavior in turn helps them outperform non-family firms during periods of economic contraction. Findings based on a sample of 275 large publicly listed U.S. firms reveal that family firms outperform non-family firms during recessions. This superior performance is partially driven by family firms' proactive marketing behavior and their relatively strong emphasis on corporate social responsibility (CSR). During recessions, while non-family firms tend to decrease their advertising intensities and rates of new product introduction (NPI), family firms are likely to maintain relatively high levels of advertising intensity and rates of NPI. Unlike non-family firms, family firms are also likely to maintain high levels of corporate social performance (CSP) during recessions. These results underscore the benefits of proactive marketing behavior and a continued emphasis on CSR during economic downturns. The authors also add to the scant family-firm literature, demonstrating the family firm to be an effective organizational form.     

Non-family chair and corporate performance

Using a sample of Chinese family firms listed from 1999 to 2014, we investigate the relationship between non-family leadership and firm performance. We find that firms with a non-family member as board chair perform significantly worse than firms whose chair belongs to the family. Moreover, we show that the underperformance of nonfamily-chair firms is more pronounced when firms are under weaker outside monitoring and when the controlling families care less about family business longevity. The negative effect of a non-family chair is robust to a variety of endogeneity tests. We also dismiss alternative explanations other than concern for reputation. Overall, our empirical results suggest that the social norms regarding family reputation are important in shaping the controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives and firm performance.     

Non-family chair and corporate performance

Using a sample of Chinese family firms listed from 1999 to 2014, we investigate the relationship between non-family leadership and firm performance. We find that firms with a non-family member as board chair perform significantly worse than firms whose chair belongs to the family. Moreover, we show that the underperformance of non-family-chair firms is more pronounced when firms are under weaker outside monitoring and when the controlling families care less about family business longevity. The negative effect of a non-family chair is robust to a variety of endogeneity tests. We also dismiss alternative explanations other than concern for reputation. Overall, our empirical results suggest that the social norms regarding family reputation are important in shaping the controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives and firm performance.     

Family firms and financial performance: The cost of growing

This study examines the relationship between financial performance and family involvement for 523 listed and non-listed Colombian firms over 1996–2006. Using a detailed database and performing several panel data regression models, we find that family firms exhibit better financial performance on average than non-family firms when the founder is still involved in operations, although this effect decreases with firm size. With heirs in charge, there is no statistical difference in financial performance. Both direct and indirect ownership (control through pyramidal ownership structures within family business groups) affect firms' financial performance positively. However, this positive effect decreases with firm size. The results suggest that some kinds of family involvement appear to make firm growth expensive.     

Path dependence and resource availability: Process of innovation activities in Chinese family and non-family firms

Employing a process-based perspective and using a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure, this paper examines the difference in innovation activities between family firms and non-family firms in China. We find that the level of research and development (R&D) by family firms is dependent on prior R&D spending and more so relative to non-family firms. Next, we find that R&D investment by family firms is more likely to be motivated by the availability of both internal and external cash flows relative to non-family firms. Further analysis suggests that these findings are unlikely to be driven by firm maturity.     

Family firms and corporate social performance: evidence from Korean firms

This study examines the effects of family firms on the corporate social performance of Korean firms and analyses how their effect varies depending on the presence of family CEOs or chaebols. Based on the agency theory, we find that family firms exhibit lower corporate social performance. In particular, there is no difference in the performance of related stakeholders, such as society, consumers, environment, and employees, compared to non-family firms, but corporate governance registers as low performance. We further find that family firms managed by family CEOs show lower corporate social performance, whereas chaebol firms show higher corporate social performance.     

Firm ownership and productivity: a study of family and non-family SMEs

Motivated by a lack of consensus in the current literature, the objective of this paper is to reveal whether family firms are more or less productive than non-family firms. As a first step, this paper links family business research to the theoretical notion that family involvement has an effect on the factors of production from a productivity standpoint. Second, by using a Cobb–Douglas framework, we provide empirical evidence that family labour and capital indeed yield diverse output contributions compared with their non-family counterparts. In particular, family labour output contributions are significantly higher, and family capital output contributions significantly lower. Interestingly, differences in total factor productivity between family and non-family firms disappear when we allow for heterogeneous output contributions of family production inputs. These findings imply that the assumption of homogeneous labour and capital between family and non-family firms is inappropriate when estimating the production function.     

Revisiting the Effect of Family Involvement on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Behavioral Agency Perspective

This paper sheds light on the incongruent findings concerning the relationship between family involvement and firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). While prior studies have mainly taken the perspective of families’ socioemotional wealth preservation, we approach this relationship from the perspective of behavioral agency theory, highlighting the important role played by CEOs’ family memberships. Specifically, we posit that family firms are more likely to invest in CSR when their CEOs are members of the controlling families. Furthermore, we examine how family firms can employ long-term incentives to encourage non-family CEOs to act in the interests of the controlling families to preserve SEW and thus enhancing family firms’ CSR performance. We tested our hypotheses using hand-collected data of family firms included in the S&P 500 index, in the period of 2003–2010. The empirical findings support our hypotheses that (a) family firms with family members as the CEOs have better CSR performance and (b) family firms tend to provide a high level of long-term incentives to non-family than family CEOs. In addition, long-term incentives strongly motivate CEOs to improve firms’ CSR performance, regardless of their family memberships.     

Financing patterns in transition economies: Privatized former SOEs versus ab initio private firms

We employ 37,987 firms in 30 transition economies to investigate the relation between the origins of private firms and their financing patterns. We find that relative to ab initio (from the beginning) private firms, privatized former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) finance a higher proportion of their fixed assets from bank finance (especially from state-owned banks) and supplier credit. We argue that privatized former SOEs continue to benefit from the political and financial connections established during their SOE era. We document that country governance, financial development and legal origins play an important role in the financing patterns of privatized versus private firms.     

Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms

We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area.     

Entrepreneurial orientation in family firms: a generational perspective

We adopt a generational perspective to investigate entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in family firms. We test a model that determines how the influence on EO of external factors and internal factors differs in first-, second- and third-and-beyond-generation family firms. We argue that while the founder is vital in the first generation, EO is more subject to interpretations of the competitive environment in the second generation and that in the third generation and beyond, access to non-family resources drives EO to a greater extent. Our findings show that perceptions of the competitive environment and EO correlate differently in family firms, depending on the generation in charge, and it is generally stronger in second-generation family firms. Further, we find that non-family managers on the top management team makes a positive difference for EO only in the third-generation and beyond family firms. The significance of non-family investors’ on EO is particularly strong in third-generation-and-beyond firms.     

Bidders’ gains and family control of private target firms

This paper examines the announcement returns of bidders acquiring private firms owned by families versus the returns of bidders acquiring non-family controlled private firms. The sample consists of 391 acquisitions of private targets in seven continental European countries for the period 1997–2008. We find evidence that bidder's cumulative announcement returns (CARs) are lower when they acquire family controlled targets compared to non-family controlled targets. We show that this result holds regardless of whether the deal is paid with shares or cash and whether or not the bidding firm is also privately owned. Moreover, the result is independent of the size of the acquisition relative to the size of the acquiring firm. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the bidder has to pay a higher price in order to convince the family owners to sell in return for giving up private benefits.     

非家族高管更加“患不均”？——家族企业CEO身份对高管薪酬差距的影响研究

文章通过衡量家族企业中CEO与非家族高管之间的薪酬差距,试图探讨非家族高管的激励问题。依据社会比较理论和锦标赛理论的不同解释逻辑,并基于家族高管与非家族高管的不同特点,文章首先考察影响高管薪酬差距的前因变量,提出非家族CEO与薪酬差距之间关系的竞争性假设,并探讨薪酬差距对企业绩效的影响作用。利用2009〖KG-*4〗-〖KG-*6〗2016年中国家族上市公司数据,研究发现,当非家族成员担任CEO时,CEO与非家族高管之间的薪酬差距减小;另外,薪酬差距与企业绩效呈负相关关系,说明非家族高管中“不均”的薪酬安排会影响企业绩效。综合来看,相比锦标赛理论,社会比较理论对解释家族企业CEO身份对其与非家族高管之间薪酬差距的影响更具预测力与解释力。     

Anticorruption,political connections,and corporate cash policy: Evidence from politician downfalls in China

We examine how firms change their cash policies in response to the downfall of corrupt politicians in China. We find that firms connected to their local government increase cash holdings when high-profile politician downfalls occur in the government. Consistent with the precautionary saving argument, the effect is stronger for firms that have greater investment opportunities or face greater financial constraints. Compared to unaffected firms, affected firms save more cash out of cash flows and have a higher marginal value of cash holdings. Overall, we show that the collapse of firms' political connections has significant impacts on those firms' financial policies.     

Not all family firms are equal: The moderating effect of family involvement on the political risk exposure of the foreign direct investment portfolio. Preliminary evidence from Spanish multinational enterprises

We investigate the effect of political risk (PR) exposure and family control on the internationalization strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) using social capital theory. Our results from a negative binomial cross‐sectional analysis in 2007 of Spanish MNEs show family ownership or the limited presence of family members on the board has no effect on internationalization. However, when the conceptualization of family firms (FFs) includes majority ownership and board presence, we find a direct negative effect on their internationalization scope but a positive moderating effect on the relationship between the exposure to PR and internationalization scope. FFs have some specific advantages suitable to be employed in their corporate political activity allowing them to develop long‐lasting relationships with relevant political actors. By disentangling the effects of family control on internationalization and PR, this article explains how FFs can be simultaneously risk‐willing and risk‐averse.