The Trading Decision and Market Clearing under Transaction Price Uncertainty

This paper models an individual's trading decision, given: (1) his/her demand function to hold shares of an asset, (2) his/her expectation on what the market clearing price will be, and (3) the design of the market which determines how orders will be translated into trades. The particular market design we consider is the batched trading (periodic call) regime. Assuming investors are distributed according to their propensities to hold shares, we model the aggregation of orders to obtain market clearing values of price and volume and to show the way in which, with trading friction, these solutions differ from Pareto efficient values. The importance of this analysis for various issues concerning market design is noted.     

Limit Order Trading

We analyze the rationale for limit order trading. Use of limit orders involves two risks: 1) an adverse information event can trigger an undesirable execution, and 2) favorable news can result in a desirable execution not being obtained. On the other hand, a paucity of limit orders can result in accentuated short-term price fluctuations that compensate a limit order trader. Our empirical tests suggest that trading via limit orders dominates trading via market orders for market participants with relatively well balanced portfolios, and that placing a network of buy and sell limit orders as a pure trading strategy is profitable.     

Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets

This paper analyzes price formation under two trading mechanisms: a continuous quote-driven system where dealers post prices before order submission and an order-driven system where traders submit orders before prices are determined. The order-driven system operates either as a continuous auction, with immediate order execution, or as a periodic auction, where orders are stored for simultaneous execution. With free entry into market making, the continuous systems are equivalent. While a periodic auction offers greater price efficiency and can function where continuous mechanisms fail, traders must sacrifice continuity and bear higher information costs.     

Trading and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange: A Bird's Eye View

The trading mechanism for equities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) stands in sharp contrast to the primary mechanisms used to trade stocks in the United States. In the United States, exchange-designated specialists have affirmative obligations to provide continuous liquidity to the market. Specialists offer simultaneous and tight quotes to both buy and sell and supply sufficient liquidity to limit the magnitude of price changes between consecutive transactions. In contradistinction, the TSE has no exchange-designated liquidity suppliers. Instead, liquidity is provided through a public limit order book, and liquidity is organized through restrictions on maximum price changes between trades that serve to slow down trading. In this article, we examine the efficacy of the TSE's trading mechanisms at providing liquidity. Our analysis is based on a complete record of transactions and best-bid and best-offer quotes for most stocks in the First Section of the TSE over a period of 26 months. We study the size of the bid-ask spread and its cross-sectional and intertemporal stability; intertemporal patterns in returns, volatility, volume, trade size, and the frequency of trades; and market depth based on the response of quotes to trades and the frequency of trading halts and warning quotes.     

Nasdaq and The Chicago Stock Exchange: An Analysis of Multiple Market Trading

We analyze a set of 97 NASD-listed securities that trade on both the Nasdaq and Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX) to determine if trading costs and price improvement differ between the two markets. We find that order execution costs, which we define by the traded spread and the signed effective half-spread, are significantly lower on the CHX. This difference is consistent over trade types and for trades of at least 1,000 shares. Also, we find that trades occurring on the CHX receive more price improvement than do those occurring on Nasdaq.     

Market or limit orders?

In this paper we investigate the problem of optimal order placement of an asset listed on an exchange using both market and limit orders in a simple model of market dynamics. We seek to understand under which settings it is optimal to place limit or market orders. Limit orders typically lower transaction costs but increase the risk of incomplete order execution, whereas market orders typically have higher transaction costs but are guaranteed to be executed. Rather than considering order book dynamics to determine if a limit order is executed we rely on price dynamics for this. We look at implementation shortfall in this setup with market impact of trading and propose a dynamic program to find the optimal placement of both market and limit orders for risk-neutral and risk-averse traders. With this we find a bound on the expected cost of trading and show that a trader who behaves optimally should always expect to pay less to trade less. We then solve the dynamic program numerically and examine optimal order placement strategies. We find that the decision between market and limit orders is sensitive to price volatility, risk aversion, and trading costs.     

The Relationship Among Market-Making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders

We study the division of market-making revenue among dealer, broker, and trader. When Knight Securities, a major Nasdaq dealer, interacts with market orders in actively traded stocks during the fourth quarter of 1996, we estimate that its revenue is $0.057 per share. Knight pays brokers at least $0.025 per share (44% of revenue) for orders. To examine whether brokers appear to share these payments with traders, we compare net trading costs (trade price net of commissions) for traders using brokers routing Knight orders with estimated net trading costs for traders using the only discount broker we can determine did not directly receive market-making revenue. We find that the net trading cost of the broker refusing order-flow payments does not dominate the net trading cost of all brokers selling order flow to Knight. This finding suggests that order-flow payments do not unambiguously harm traders and challenges the conclusions of extant studies using only trade prices to assess market quality.     

中国式卖空机制与高管减持——基于融资融券分步扩容的准自然实验

本文以我国的融资融券制度为背景,结合双重差分模型,研究卖空机制对上市公司高管减持行为的影响。研究发现,相对于非融券标的,可融券标的公司高管的月减持比例在允许卖空后下降22%,这种抑制作用在小规模、高盈余平滑度以及非国有公司中体现得更为明显。其次,成为可融券标的后,股价定价效率提高,高管减持收益显著下降。进一步地,本文将高管的减持行为分为定期性与投机性两类,发现卖空机制显著抑制了高管基于信息优势和股价偏差的投机性减持行为。     

Regulation NMS and Market Quality

We show that both the quoted and effective spreads increased, the quoted depth decreased, and the market quality index decreased after the implementation of Regulation National Market System (NMS) (Reg NMS). We also find an increase in the price impact of trades and the dispersion of the pricing error after Reg NMS. The order execution speed is slower, the order fill rate is lower, and the order cancellation rate is higher for most trades after Reg NMS. Hence, contrary to the Securities and Exchange Commission's belief, Reg NMS has proven to be detrimental to most traders. NASDAQ provided faster and more reliable executions than the NYSE/AMEX, and NASDAQ gained market shares from the NYSE/AMEX and other trading venues after Reg NMS.     

Market-Making in the Third Market for NYSE-Listed Securities

This paper empirically examines market making in the third market for common stocks that are listed on the NYSE. Although the same non-NYSE members make a market on both types of stocks, bid-ask spreads are wider on Rule 19c-3 stocks than on Rule 390 stocks. Market-making by NYSE members is minimal and spreads posted by NYSE members are wider than those posted on identical stocks by non-NYSE members. This suggests that NYSE members do not compete on the basis of spread but use methods such as price matching and the internalization of orders to attract order flow to the third market.     

Stealth trading: The case of the Tokyo Stock Exchange

The stealth trading hypothesis asserts that informed traders trade strategically by breaking up their orders so as to more easily hide among the liquidity traders. Using data for the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), a pure order-driven market, we find evidence that price changes are driven by small- and medium-size trades, with small trades making the greatest contribution to price change relative to their contribution to trading volume. We also find that large trades explain a greater portion of the cumulative price change on high volatility days. Hence, our results support the stealth trading hypothesis for the TSE.     

Market Making and Trading in Nasdaq Stocks

This paper examines the relations between the number of market makers, trading activity, and price improvement in Nasdaq stocks, using a model motivated by Grossman and Miller (1988). Results indicate a positive relation between the number of market makers and trading frequency, and that competition among market makers reduces effective bid-ask spreads. Results estimated using a simultaneous equations framework support the model predictions of Grossman and Miller. Results also indicate that trading frequency may be more important than trade size in determining the number of market makers.     

Multimarket trading and liquidity: a transaction data analysis of Canada–US interlistings

We use transaction data for Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) listed stocks to examine the impact on trading costs of the decision to interlist on a US exchange. We measure trading costs using both ‘posted’ bid-ask spreads and ‘effective’ bid-ask spreads that measure actual transaction prices relative to standing bid-ask quotes. After controlling for price level, trade size and trading volume effects, we find that overall posted and effective spreads in the domestic (TSE) market decrease subsequent to the interlisting. However, the decrease in trading costs is concentrated in those TSE stocks that experience a significant shift of total trading volume (TSE and US) to the US exchange after listing. We interpret this result in the context of theories of multimarket trading as a competitive response by TSE market makers to the additional presence of US market makers.     

Order Imbalance in the FTSE Index Futures Market: Electronic versus Open Outcry Trading

Abstract:  This study examines trading activities before and after the transfer of the FTSE 100 index futures contract from open outcry to electronic trading. Daily order imbalance exhibits strong serial persistence in the electronic limit order market, but not in open-outcry trading. Both excess buying and selling reduce liquidity. In the electronic venue, prior market movements barely affect investors' buying or selling decisions. Excess buy orders do not generate any price impact, but sell orders do. Positive imbalances are more strongly autocorrelated than negative imbalances. No trading elements, such as order imbalance, volume, or open interest, are associated with volatility. Moreover, excess buying decreases volatility. Such evidence suggests that the development and growth of electronic trading has changed the dynamics of trading activities in many important ways.     

Information, Trading, and Product Market Interactions: Cross-sectional Implications of Informed Trading

I present a simple model of informed trading in which asset values are derived from imperfectly competitive product markets and private information events occur at individual firms. The model predicts that informed traders may have incentives to make information‐based trades in the stocks of competitors, especially when events occur at firms with large market shares. In the context of 759 earnings announcements, I use intraday transactions data to test the hypothesis that net order flow and returns in the stocks of nonannouncing competitors have information content for announcing firms.     

IPO Trading without Market Makers or Underwriter Price Support

We investigate the trading behavior and liquidity supply of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) that trade in an order‐driven market system with pure limit order books where no market makers or price support is allowed. We find large trades and quoted depths dominate the first day of trading, but this pattern quickly reverses as small trades and quoted depths are more prevalent on subsequent trading days. Quoted depths are positively related to the number of shares offered in the IPO and trade size, but are negatively related to underpricing. Trade size and transaction immediacy are positively related, and large and positive (negative) order imbalance is associated with more aggressive buys (sells). Finally, long‐run performance is not related to initial order imbalance. Overall, our results suggest that despite underwriters not participating in the IPO aftermarket, liquidity provision evolves very quickly and price discovery is immediately reflected in prices.     

Equity trading by institutional investors: Evidence on order submission strategies

The trading volume channeled through off-market crossing networks is growing. Passive matching of orders outside the primary market lowers several components of execution costs compared to regular trading. On the other hand, the risk of non-execution imposes opportunity costs, and the inherent “free riding” on the price discovery process raises concerns that this eventually will lead to lower liquidity in the primary market. Using a detailed data set from a large investor in the US equity markets, we find evidence that competition from crossing networks is concentrated in the most liquid stocks in a sample of the largest companies in the US. Simulations of alternative trading strategies indicate that the investor’s strategy of initially trying to cross all stocks was cost effective: in spite of their high liquidity, the crossed stocks would have been unlikely to achieve at lower execution costs in the open market.     

Institutional Trading and Soft Dollars

Proprietary data allow us to distinguish between institutional investors' orders directed to soft-dollar brokers and those directed to other types of brokers. We find that soft-dollar brokers execute smaller orders in larger market value stocks. Allowing for differences in order characteristics, we estimate the incremental implicit cost of soft-dollar execution at 29 (24) basis points for buyer- (seller-) initiated orders. For large orders, incremental implicit costs are 41 (30) basis points for buys (sells). However, we document substantial variability in these estimates, and research services provided by soft-dollar brokers may at least partially offset these costs.     

卖空者与内幕交易——来自中国证券市场的证据

本文研究上市公司内部人减持、年报、诉讼、分析师评级、停复牌以及高送转等重大公告前后卖空交易行为的变化,系统考察卖空者是否参与内幕交易以及何种因素影响卖空者参与内幕交易,发现卖空率较高的股票具有较低的未来收益,表明卖空者拥有信息优势,属知情交易者;卖空者拥有非常精确的择时交易能力,在重大利空公告前显著增加卖空量,而在利好公告前则显著减少卖空头寸,表明卖空者作为知情交易者的信息优势源自内幕消息;公司内、外部投资者的信息不对称程度越低或公司所在地的法治水平越高,卖空者参与内幕交易的行为就越少。因此,监管机构应密切关注公司重大消息发布前后卖空量的异常变动,同时,完善信息披露规则、健全证券分析师制度并强化法律法规的执行力度,才能有效防范卖空者参与内幕交易。     

Explaining Intraday Pattern of Trading Volume from the Order Flow Data

Based on a comprehensive order flow data from the Taiwan stock market, this study examines directly how the intraday pattern of trading volume is related to the trading behavior of both informed and uninformed traders. The results indicate that both informed and uninformed investors have a strong desire to place orders at the market open and the close. Most of the orders at the market open are conservative and hence are waiting orders for price priority. The findings show that intraday trading volume as well as the real orders from both types of investors are J-shaped. In addition, both information and liquidity trading can explain the intraday pattern of trading volume. However, the impact of liquidity trading on volume is slightly higher than that of information trading.