Bank stability and market discipline: The effect of contingent capital on risk taking and default probability

This paper investigates the effects of financial institutions issuing contingent capital, a debt security that automatically converts into equity if assets fall below a predetermined threshold. We decompose bank liabilities into sets of barrier options and present closed-form solutions for their prices. We quantify the reduction in default probability associated with issuing contingent capital instead of subordinated debt. We then show that appropriate choice of contingent capital terms (in particular the conversion ratio) can virtually eliminate stockholders' incentives to risk-shift, a motivation that is present when bank liabilities instead include either subordinated debt or additional equity. Importantly, risk-taking incentives continue to be weak during times of financial distress. Our findings imply that contingent capital may be an effective tool for stabilizing financial institutions.     

Multiple Trigger CoCos: Contingent Debt Without Death Spiral Risk

This paper starts with the observation that the average issue size during 2012 of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds was more than $1 bn. Typically a CoCo is converted into shares when a pre‐defined capital ratio such as the core tier 1 ratio (CT1) drops below a minimum level. In some other cases, the contingent convertibles investors will suffer from a pre‐defined haircut instead of a conversion into shares. Investors could dynamically hedge the equity exposure embedded within a contingent convertible by taking an offsetting short position in the underlying shares. This dynamic hedging can in some circumstances have a negative impact on the share price of the bank. It could indeed lead to a spiral of falling share prices. This so‐called death spiral effect can only be avoided if the size of the contingent convertible is moderate compared to the amount of outstanding public traded shares. In this contribution we advocate the use of contingent debt where there is more than one conversion trigger. Banks should move away from one large single CoCo issue towards issues with multiple accounting triggers spread across an extended range. This will alleviate the death spiral risk. The expected dynamic behavior of a CoCo bond has been modeled using a credit derivates approach. From these models we then quantify the equity sensitivity and the negative gamma resulting from the design of a contingent convertible and illustrate the possible pitfalls of a death spiral on the share price.     

CoCo Bonds,Conversion Prices and Risk Shifting Incentives. How Does the Conversion Ratio Affect Management's Behaviour?

The aim of this paper is to analyze risk shifting incentives for managers and shareholders of the financial institution issuing a CoCo bond. We assess the role of the conversion price settlement in enhancing both shareholders’ and management's discipline. Three recent contingent reverse convertible deals are analyzed, with the intention of showing how shareholder conversion returns are linked to the conversion ratio. The findings demonstrate that, in the case of an ingoing or ongoing crisis, a poor settlement of the conversion ratio could exacerbate both debt overhang and risk shifting issues. This will end in discouraging bank management from issuing new equity and from investing in low risk assets. We argue that a contingent bond triggered on Basel III capital requirement ratios and having a significantly discounted conversion price reduces risk shifting incentives. Moreover, we illustrate how the unexpected wealth transfers between CoCo bondholders and shareholders tends to zero when the bond face value is higher than the current stock market price and there is a concentration of bond subscribers. Accordingly, regulators should consider and oversee not only the conversion trigger but also all the other features of a contingent capital security, especially the conversion ratio.     

Close form pricing formulas for Coupon Cancellable CoCos

Contingent Convertibles (“CoCos”) are contingent capital instruments which convert into shares, or have a principal write down, if a trigger event takes place. CoCos exhibit the undesirable so-called death-spiral effect: by actively hedging the equity risk, investors can (unintentionally) force the conversion by making the share price deteriorate and eventually trigger the conversion.In this paper we introduce and analyse Coupon Cancellable CoCos (“CoCa CoCos”), a new type of CoCo where coupons can be cancelled during the lifetime of the note. We provide closed-form pricing formulas for CoCa CoCos, we study the impact of coupon cancellations in the price of the bond and we show that death-spiral effect is reduced.     

Dynamic capital structure and the contingent capital option

The financial crisis has emphasized the difficulties for financial companies to raise funds through conventional liabilities. In this environment, hybrid securities are becoming popular. In this paper we study the optimal capital structure of a company issuing a particular type of hybrid security: perpetual contingent capital, i.e., debt that converts into equity under some conditions. A two-period model with endogenous bankruptcy for a company with equity, straight debt and contingent capital is analyzed. We investigate the instrument under different conversion rules: automatic or optimally chosen by equity holders. We show that contingent capital reduces the coupon of straight debt and expected bankruptcy costs but can require a high spread. A trigger imposed by the regulatory authority in terms of par value of debt may induce a little use of contingent capital with an increase of bankruptcy costs.     

Enhanced equity-credit modelling for contingent convertibles

Contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds are characterized by forced equity conversion under either an accounting or regulatory trigger. The accounting trigger occurs when the capital ratio of the issuing bank falls below some contractual threshold. Under the regulatory trigger, sometimes called the point-of-non-viability (PONV) trigger, the regulatory authority may enforce equity conversion when the financial health of the bank deteriorates to certain distressed level. In this paper, we propose an equity-credit modelling of the joint process of the stock price and the capital ratio that integrates both a structural approach for the accounting trigger and a reduced-form approach for the PONV trigger of equity conversion. We also construct effective Fortet algorithms and finite difference schemes for numerical pricing of CoCo bonds under various forms of equity conversion pay-off. The pricing properties of CoCo bonds are examined under different assumptions for the state-dependent intensity of the PONV trigger, the contractual specifications and market conditions.     

Aligning Incentives at Systemically Important Financial Institutions: A Proposal by the Squam Lake Group

To address the moral hazard problem that can motivate bank executives to take excessive risks and to fail to raise capital when needed, a group of 13 distinguished financial economists recommends that systemically important financial institutions be required to issue contingent convertible debt (CoCos) and to hold back a substantial share—as much as 20%—of the compensation of employees who can have a meaningful impact on the survival of the firm. This holdback should be forfeited if the firm's capital ratio falls below a specified threshold. The deferral period should be long enough—the authors suggest five years—to allow much of the uncertainty about managers' activities to be resolved before the bonds mature. Except for forfeiture, the payoff on the bonds should not depend on the firm's performance, nor should managers be permitted to hedge the risk of forfeiture. The threshold for forfeiture should be crossed well before a firm violates its regulatory capital requirements and well before its contingent convertible securities convert into equity. The Swiss Bank UBS has paid bonuses to its top 6,500 executives that have been structured in exactly this way. Management forfeits its deferred compensation if the bank's regulatory capital ratio falls below 7.5%, and its contingent convertible debt is set up to convert into equity if the bank's capital ratio falls below 5%.     

An Experimental Analysis of Contingent Capital with Market‐Price Triggers

We report an experiment that evaluates three market‐based regimes for triggering the conversion of contingent capital bonds into equity: a “fixed‐trigger” regime, where a price threshold triggers mandatory conversion; a “regulator” regime, where regulators make conversion decisions based on prices; and a “prediction market” regime, where regulators also observe a market that predicts conversion. Consistent with theory, we observe inefficiencies and conversion errors in the fixed‐trigger and regulator regimes. The prediction market somewhat improves the regulator's performance, but inefficiencies and conversion errors persist. The regulator regime has conversion errors over the widest range of shocks.     

Determinants of Institutional Responses to Self–Tender Offers

I examine how institutional investors respond to self–tender offers for common shares. I find that institutions sell more shares in larger offers and with higher proration factors. Institutions also sell more shares when officer and director holdings are not at risk in the offers. Banks, investment advisors, and other managers respond similarly, selling more shares in larger offers. Although institutions as a group do not respond differently by offer type, insurance companies and investment advisors sell more shares in fixed–price offers. Mutual funds, which differ from other types of institutions, sell more shares for firms with greater increases in leverage.     

CONTINGENT CAPITAL: INTEGRATING CORPORATE FINANCING AND RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

Financial executives of companies that face a sharp increase in business or financial risks have two basic ways of protecting the solvency and strategic viability of their organizations: they can transfer those risks using insurance or derivatives; or they can raise additional capital, typically by issuing equity, to cushion the firm against the higher expected volatility. But CFOs now also have a third means of managing risk, known as "contingent capital," that effectively combines capital raising and risk management.
A contingent capital facility gives a company the right to raise capital after the realization of a loss arising from one or more specified risks, thus ensuring access to capital in potentially difficult times. For example, Swiss Re recently granted Michelin a five-year right to issue ten-year subordinated debt at a fixed spread over LIBOR, though only under conditions in which the tire maker expects its own earnings to be down. To the extent that it eliminates the need to keep more capital on the balance sheet, the use of such contingent capital has the potential to increase shareholder value by reducing a company's overall cost of capital. This article provides an introduction to some recent innovations in contingent capital, along with discussion of their role in integrating corporate finance and risk management.     

The Information Environment of China's A and B Shares: Can We Make Sense of the Numbers?

In 1990, three stock exchanges were opened in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing. Partial privatization of China's enterprises began with offering two types of shares: A shares are sold only domestically to locals and are denominated in local currency; B shares are denominated in dollars and are sold only to foreign investors. All listed firms offer A shares, but to qualify for offering B shares, the firm must prepare financial statements in accordance with International Accounting Standards and also meet other requirements. Firms issuing A shares only adopt domestic accounting regulations.As a way of generating capital funds, market segmentation has been a success. Both types of shares, however, have two different information environments. The environment of A shares appears to be dominated by local regulations and customs at the time of offering or trading. The information environment of A shares appears to be relatively unstructured and is affected by informal communication between various groups. Other than the roles played by state officials and appointed managers, external monitoring of A shares appears to be limited. Independence and social acceptance of auditing appear to be making slow progress, especially when the majority of domestic CPA firms are government owned. In contrast, the information environment for the B shares is more structured because (1) financial reporting adheres to International Accounting Standards, (2) financial statements are audited by CPA firms with international practice; and (3) foreign investors — mainly large financial institutions — also act as external monitors.We elaborate on the differences between these two information environments and suggest that accounting earnings and A share prices are not correlated, but earnings and share prices are correlated for B shares. In an event-study approach, we find results inconsistent with both hypotheses — for 1994 and 1995 we find that earnings and unexpected returns are correlated for A shares but not for B shares. The high price volatility, the significant and continuing dominance of government officials, and the thinness of trade in B shares are offered as possible explanation for these results.     

Laddering IPO shares

Regulators, investors, and the financial media argue that underwriters tie Initial Public Offering (IPO) allocations to investor post-listing purchases in the issuer shares. Using unique data from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) I investigate if these tie-in agreements are driven by price stabilization (reducing price falls below the offer price) or laddering (inflating prices above the offer price). I find that both stabilizing and laddering investors are rewarded with increased allocations for their service. However, only laddering investors increase allocations in very oversubscribed future issues. Secondary investors also lose from falling returns following laddering. I conclude that underwriters use both price stabilization and laddering across different IPOs. However, the rewards for cooperating investors and the economic consequences for secondary investors are much greater following laddering.     

基于EGARCH-CVaR方法的保险资金直接入市风险分析——以吉林省为例

本文基于EGARCH模型和GED分布下的CVaR模型对保险资金直接入市的风险进行度量,实证测算了八只股票的个股及投资组合的绝对CVaR值和相对CVaR值,描述了各自的极端损失状况;金融机构可以根据个股值和组合值,设置风险资本或提取风险准备金,从而有效地监控潜在的极端损失。     

Capital Gains Tax Overhang and Price Pressure

I study whether the capital gains tax is an impediment to selling by some investors and if so, to what degree associated delayed selling affects stock prices. I find that selling decisions by institutions serving tax‐sensitive clients are sensitive to cumulative capital gains, a pattern not observed for institutions with predominantly tax‐exempt clients. Moreover, tax‐related underselling impacts stock prices during large earnings surprises for stocks held primarily by tax‐sensitive investors. The corresponding price reactions are less negative (more positive) with higher cumulative capital gains. This price pressure pattern is more severe when arbitrage is more costly.     

Risk, Reputation, and IPO Price Support

Immediately following an initial public offering, underwriters often repurchase shares of poorly performing offerings in an apparent attempt to stabilize the price. Using proprietary Nasdaq data, I study the price effects and determinants of price support. Some of the key findings are (1) Stabilization is substantial, inducing price rigidity at and below the offer price; (2) I find no evidence that stocks with larger information asymmetries are stabilized more strongly; (3) Larger underwriters stabilize more, perhaps to protect their reputations with investors; and (4) Investment banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize much more than other banks, inconsistent with the view that stabilization benefits primarily institutional investors.     

Presidential Address: Asset Price Dynamics with Slow‐Moving Capital

I describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities. The pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal. The amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade, such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries. I discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions, which subsided afterward. After presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings, I offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow‐moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors.     

我国境内上市银行操作损失事件披露对市值的影响分析

近年来随着商业银行的损失事件不时出现,操作风险日益受到金融机构的广泛关注。本文通过收集我国境内上市的5家银行2002～2006年6月披露的308个事件的相关数据,运用Tobin#Q比率来测算企业绩效和公司成长性,从而验证操作风险损失事件披露对银行市值的影响。实证结果显示,上市银行的股价波动同操作风险损失事件的披露存在显著的负相关,而且市场价值的损失会显著高于操作事件自身金额;对于不同资质的上市银行,Tobin#Q比率高的银行,损失的比例也会偏高,这意味着对于高成长性银行,操作损失事件对市值的影响更大。     

外资金融机构对中国国有商业银行收购定价的博弈分析

研究表明,当商业银行经营状况好,无论是否具有高的附加价值,在知道外资金融机构的收购概率时,商业银行的最优选择应以高价售股。当商业银行经营状况差,但附加价值高,并且清楚知道外资金融机构的收购概率时,商业银行的最优选择是以高价出售。当商业银行经营状况差,附加价值低,并且清楚知道外资金融机构的收购概率时,商业银行的最优选择是以低价出售。     

Bank Contingent Capital: Valuation and the Role of Market Discipline

This paper develops a structural model to evaluate contingent capital notes (CCN) of Basel III under alternative regulatory closure rules. Our dynamic model has a fixed default barrier and at specific discrete time points an additional higher default barrier depending on the closure threshold. The closed-form expressions of CCN and subordinated debts (SD) in the simple Merton model are presented to understand the convex relationship between the price and capital ratio trigger of CCN and to examine the effects of closure rules on CCN and SD through their derivatives’ properties. Our numerical results in the more general model show that a lax closure rule increases the price of SD and distorts the risk information of issuing banks, but not so for CCN. The policy implications are that CCN are more effective than SD in terms of enhancing market discipline because the price/yield information of CCN is more sensitive to the issuing bank’s risk than SD and will not be distorted by regulatory closure rules.