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R esearch summary: In vertical relationships, the potential for scale economy in manufacturing often calls for specialization and outsourcing. Specialization, however, depends critically on the stability of the task and contractual environment. In a highly uncertain environment, the need for frequent mutual adjustments favors integration instead of outsourcing. To evaluate vertical relationships in value chains where one stage competes on product variety under great uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale, we compare operations data at about 300 distribution centers within a major soft‐drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an upstream concentrate producer. We find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm by aligning incentives and reducing strategic information asymmetry, but it worsened coordination for upstream rivals that shared the same downstream facilities. M anagerial summary: Managers make frequent decisions about outsourcing versus integration. This article helps to crystalize the costs and benefits of integration by pointing to two important factors: the potential for economies of scale and the need for coordination under uncertainty. It studies an industry where one stage of the value chain competes on product variety under great uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale. Based on operations data at about 300 distribution centers within a major soft‐drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an upstream concentrate producer, we find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm (by reducing both stockouts and inventory, and improving sales forecasts), but it worsened coordination for upstream rivals that shared the same downstream facilities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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In this study, we extend the analysis of adaptation in theories of economic organization beyond traditional considerations of incentive conflict (hold‐up). We conceptualize adaptation as coordinated and cooperative response to change, and define the adaptive capacity of a vertical relationship as the ability to generate coordinated and cooperative responses across procurer and supplier to changes in procurement conditions. We draw on the concepts of differentiation and integration to dimensionalize the adaptive capacity of different modes of procurement. Using data on all component classes procured internally and externally by Ford and Chrysler, we show that different procurement modes differ in terms of their adaptive capacity and performance. We also show that performance differences across modes of procurement arise as a function of the match between adaptive capacity and adaptation requirements associated with the exchange, and not only the match between governance form and transaction hazards. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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We investigate coordination strategies in integrating distributed work. In the context of Business Process Offshoring (BPO), we analyze survey data from 126 offshored processes to understand both the sources of difficulty in integrating distributed work as well as how organizations overcome these difficulties. We find that interdependence between offshored and onshore processes can lower offshored process performance, and investing in coordination mechanisms can ameliorate the performance impact of interdependence. In particular, we outline a distinctive set of coordination mechanisms that rely on tacit coordination—and theoretically articulate and empirically show that tacit coordination mechanisms are distinct from the well‐known duo of coordination strategies: building communication channels or modularizing processes to minimize the need for communication. We discuss implications for the study of coordination in organizations. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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In the Spanish automobile market between 1990 and 2000, significant reductions in tariff and nontariff protections increased the complexity of the product space, through the penetration of new car brands and models. Acknowledging these environmental dynamics, this study details conditions in which across‐niche (product breadth or intraindustry diversification) and within‐niche (product depth or versioning) product proliferation exerts a positive relationship on firm performance, as well as how key relationships change according to the complexity of the product space in the industry. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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姚书杰 《地质技术经济管理》2011,(12):17-22
企业是一个人格化的通过分工、协作与协调实现生产的实体组织,它是生产性与组织性的统一。企业起源与发展的动力起初可能来源于生存的压力,后来是追求分工经济利益的欲望,企业直接起源于社会协作的困难,其实质是在一定分工、技术和制度条件下的组织创新,作用机制是企业内的分工与协调和企业间的分工与协调之间的相互作用和相互转化;企业的边界无非就是企业组织的分化与整合。 相似文献
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Olav Sorenson 《战略管理杂志》2000,21(5):577-592
Managers must choose to allocate scarce resources either to the maintenance of a range of products tailored to heterogeneous consumer preferences or to the efficient production of a small number of products. In addition, managers must choose the degree to which they periodically cull the product line. Vigorous selection removes poor performers from the product line, but this action simultaneously impairs the firm's ability to monitor changes in consumer preferences. Empirical evidence from the computer workstation industry reveals that the ideal choice of product variety depends on the competitive ecology of the industry. Product variety becomes less valuable as the total number of products on the market increases, but it increases in value as uncertainty makes the accurate prediction of demand difficult. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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组织变革中的企业内分工--对Becker-Murphy分工模型的扩展 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
建立在亚当.斯密分工理论基础之上的经典的企业组织形式,从20世纪80年代开始发生了动摇。团队生产、多任务的小组(或者个人)的生产组织形式开始在企业中出现并不断扩展。然而这种组织变革的发生难以用传统的分工理论来解释。本文通过对Becker-Murphy分工模型的扩展,说明组织变革发生的原因。发现在分工深化的同时协调成本的上升,以及协调成本背后知识的分工与整合,是企业内分工或者说企业组织变革的主要原因。 相似文献
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理解企业外包决策的一个概念框架 总被引：25，自引：2，他引：25
企业在进行外包决策时，应该比较外包的总成本与内部生产的总成本。总成本由生产成本、谈判成本和机会主义成本构成。谈判成本和机会主义成本统称治理成本，其大小取决于产品的复杂性、市场的可争夺性和资产专用性三个因素。按照产品复杂性和资产专用性的不同，可以将企业的外包环境分成四种类型，在不同类型的外包环境下，外包企业应该采取不同的措施。 相似文献
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