Equity Control of Multinational Firms: Effects on Resource Allocation and National Welfare

In this paper, we re-examine the effects of equity control of multinational firms on resource allocation and national welfare in a model with rural–urban migration and urban unemployment. A large number of recipient (host) countries are developing countries with dual economies. We indicate, among other things, that a restriction on multinational investment may lower the unemployment rate and increase the total employment in the host country. Furthermore, we find that the restriction on multinational investment raises the national welfare in the host economy if the tariff imposed on imports is sufficiently large and the difference between domestic and foreign capital rental is sufficiently small.     

Job Creation, Job Destruction, and the International Division of Labor

The authors incorporate equilibrium unemployment due to imperfect matching into a model of trade in intermediate inputs. Firms are assumed to be price‐takers and their size is given by technology. Firms enter the market as long as expected profits cover the search cost they incur initially; jobs are endogenously destroyed by random shocks that affect firms’ price–cost margins. Trade increases productivity in the final good and then demand for each intermediate input. Steady‐state unemployment is reduced after trade integration because the rate of job destruction is reduced, which in turn induces an indirect positive effect on job creation. A more volatile environment faced by firms does not necessarily increase unemployment. However, the rate of job destruction unambiguously rises, and rises more under free trade.     

Offshoring and jobs: The myriad channels of influence

Offshoring reallocates jobs inside firms, between firms, and across sectors, affecting the economy-wide unemployment rate. We study these channels in a model with labor market frictions and two sectors—a differentiated-good sector comprising heterogeneous firms that can offshore, and a homogeneous-good sector. A decline in offshoring costs affects intrafirm and intrasectoral reallocation of jobs in the differentiated-good sector through a selection effect, a productivity effect, and a job-relocation effect. The key parameters determining the impact of offshoring on jobs at various margins, as well as on the economy-wide unemployment rate, are the elasticity of substitution between inputs, the elasticity of substitution between varieties of differentiated goods, and the elasticity of demand for differentiated goods as a whole. Changes in search frictions affect unemployment both directly and through their interaction with offshoring.     

UNEMPLOYMENT,LABOR MARKET TRANSITIONS,AND RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION

It is commonplace in the debate on Germany's labor market problems to argue that low wage dispersion is a major reason for the high unemployment rate. This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dispersion for individuals with comparable attributes. In the conventional neoclassical point of view, wages are determined by the marginal product of the workers. Accordingly, increases in union minimum wages result in a decline of residual wage dispersion and higher unemployment. A competing view regards wage dispersion as the outcome of search frictions and the associated monopsony power of the firms. Accordingly, an increase in search frictions causes both higher unemployment and higher wage dispersion. The empirical analysis attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses for West Germany analyzing the relationship between wage dispersion and both the level of unemployment as well as the transition rates between different labor market states. The findings are not completely consistent with either theory. However, as predicted by search theory, one robust result is that unemployment by cells is not negatively correlated with the within‐cell wage dispersion.     

International trade and directed search unemployment in general equilibrium

We develop an open economy general equilibrium model, with auction‐based directed search unemployment, to study the interactions of trade and unemployment. The theory ascribes all outcomes purely to the fundamentals of technology and endowment. If countries differ by endowment, trade makes both the unemployment rate and the rental in the capital‐(labour‐) abundant country rise (decline) but does not lead to equalization. If, alternatively, countries differ by technology, trade increases (decreases) the unemployment rate in the country whose technology is relatively superior (inferior) for producing the capital‐intensive good.     

FINANCIAL RISK AND UNEMPLOYMENT

There is a strong correlation between corporate interest rates, their spreads relative to Treasuries, and the unemployment rate. We model how corporate interest rates affect equilibrium unemployment and vacancies, in a Diamond–Mortesen–Pissarides search and matching model. Our simple model permits the exploration of U.S. business cycle statistics through the lens of financial shocks. We calibrate the model using U.S. data without targeting business cycle statistics. Volatility in the corporate interest rate can explain a quantitatively meaningful portion of the labor market. Data on corporate firms support the hypothesis that firms facing more volatile financial conditions have more volatile employment.     

Working capital requirement and the unemployment volatility puzzle

Shimer (2005) argues that a search and matching model of the labor market in which wage is determined by Nash bargaining cannot generate the observed volatility in unemployment and vacancy in response to reasonable labor productivity shocks. This paper examines how incorporating monopolistically competitive firms with a working capital requirement (in which firms borrow funds to pay their wage bills) improves the ability of the search models to match the empirical fluctuations in unemployment and vacancy without resorting to an alternative wage setting mechanism. The monetary authority follows an interest rate rule in the model. A positive labor productivity shock lowers the real marginal cost of production and lowers inflation. In response to the fall in price level, the monetary authority reduces the nominal interest rate. A lower interest rate reduces the cost of financing and partially offsets the increase in labor cost from a higher productivity. A reduced labor cost implies the firms retain a greater portion of the gain from a productivity shock, which gives them a greater incentive to create vacancies. Simulations show that a working capital requirement does indeed improve the ability of the search models to generate fluctuations in key labor market variables to better match the U.S. data.     

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets

This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.     

The choice of technology in economic development

The impact of capital accumulation on job creation is an important and interesting issue in economic development. This model provides a general-equilibrium framework for studying technology choice with unemployment in a developing economy based on micro-foundations. Unemployment in the urban sector results from the existence of efficiency wages. Manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose technologies to maximise profits. A more advanced technology uses more capital and less labour. In the steady state, an increase in the amount of capital induces firms to choose more advanced technologies and the wage rate increases. While a higher capital stock always induces firms to choose more advanced technologies, urban unemployment rate may decrease and agricultural sector employment may increase.     

Asset Bubbles,Unemployment, and a Financial Crisis

A tractable growth model with asset bubbles is presented to demonstrate that a financial crisis caused by a bubble bursting increases unemployment rates. A bubbly asset, which is intrinsically useless, has a positive market value because purchasing the asset is a sole saving method for agents who draw insufficiently low productivity, whereas selling the asset is a fund-raising method for agents who draw high productivity to initiate an investment project. The presence of asset bubbles corrects allocative inefficiency regarding production resources, relocating investment resources from low-productivity agents to high-productivity agents. Accordingly, the presence of asset bubbles can promote capital accumulation. As capital accumulates and output increases, the number of vacant positions increases because firms acquire more funds to cover a search cost. As a result, firms are incentivized to increase employment. However, extrinsic uncertainty may burst asset bubbles and cause a self-fulfilling financial crisis, which is followed by increased unemployment.     

Public firms' merger,employment, and welfare in developing countries: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the effect of a merger of state‐owned firms on wage gap, employment, and social welfare in a general equilibrium setting. For a developing economy with state‐owned firms in the urban sector, a merger via a reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can reduce the cost of capital. It then lowers the skilled wage rate through the factor‐substitution effect, while it raises the unskilled wage by the inflow of capital to the rural sector and hence lowers urban unemployment. In addition, the reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can yield a scale effect to the firms. The beneficial effects on higher urban output and less urban unemployment can improve social welfare of the developing economy.     

Managerial delegation and partial privatization in general equilibrium with sector-specific unemployment

This paper explores the effects of managerial delegation in a general-equilibrium, oligopolistic competition model with sector-specific unemployment. It specifically examines the effects of managerial delegation on outputs, factor returns and the urban unemployment ratio. It is found that if the managerial firm is less profit-oriented, managerial delegation can lead to an increase in the urban output, a decrease in the rural output, an increase in the capital rental and a decrease in the rural wage. In particular, it worsens the urban unemployment ratio.     

Creative destruction with on-the-job search

This paper studies the consequences of creative destruction on unemployment in a frictional labor market with on-the-job search. For a benchmark calibration, a 1% increase in growth raises the unemployment rate by 1.72 percentage points in the economy without on-the-job search and by only 0.07 percentage points with on-the-job search. Rather than contributing to unemployment through more frequent job separations, in the presence of on-the-job search, creative destruction induces a direct reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs.     

PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND FIRM SIZE

This paper studies firms' job creation decisions in a labour market with search frictions. A simple labour market search model is developed in which a firm can search for a second employee while producing with a first worker, and this creates the equilibrium size distribution of firms. A firm expands employment even if the instantaneous payoff to a large firm is less than that of staying small – a firm has a precautionary motive to expand its size. In addition, this motive is enhanced by a greater market tightness. Because of this effect, firms’ decisions become interdependent – a firm creates a vacancy if it expects other firms to do the same, creating strategic complementarity among firms and thereby self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria. An increase in productivity can cause a qualitative change in labour market tightness and the rate of unemployment.     

Unemployment and Economic Integration for Developing Countries

While financial or trade integration between countries may increase the size of the market and aid the adoption of more advanced technologies, will it also increase the level of urban unemployment for a developing country? In this model, there is unemployment in the urban sector. Manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Financial firms provide capital to manufacturing firms and they also engage in oligopolistic competition. We show that an increase in the wage rate in the manufacturing sector changes neither the level of technology nor the level of employment in the manufacturing sector. While financial or trade integration between developing countries leads manufacturing firms to adopt more advanced technologies, the level and rate of employment in the manufacturing sector will not deteriorate.     

Effect of labor market policies on unemployment when firms adapt their recruitment strategy

Firms conduct interviews to select who to hire. Their recruitment strategies affect not only the hiring rate but also job destruction rate as more interviews increase the chances of finding the right worker for the job; a link mostly overlooked in the literature. I model this recruitment behavior and investigate the effects of labor market policies on unemployment. These policies change the value of hiring the right worker, altering firms' incentives to conduct interviews. Policies further affect job creation and destruction when firms adapt their recruitment strategies. Net effect of a policy on unemployment depends on the magnitude of change in job creation versus destruction. Qualitative analysis reveals that the effect of a policy on unemployment is mostly weakened with the introduction of firms' recruitment behavior to the model. Firing taxes still increase unemployment, albeit at a lower rate. The effect of hiring subsidies on unemployment is even reversed: Unemployment increases with hiring subsidies if firms adapt. Minimum wage and unemployment insurance policies are also analyzed.     

International Borrowing, Specialization, and Unemployment in a Small Open Economy

The authors show that an increase in international borrowing increases specialization and unemployment in a small open economy that is subject to terms‐of‐trade risks. The economy has a production advantage in the export sector. However, the size of the export sector is limited by the available funds. To insure workers against income fluctuations arising from terms‐of‐trade risks, firms in the export sector offer workers a stable wage rate with the possibility of unemployment. An increase in international borrowing increases specialization in the export sector, which leads to higher unemployment when the terms‐of‐trade shock is bad. A state‐contingent price subsidy can reduce unemployment without inefficiently reducing specialization. The results are robust to the introduction of risk‐averse firms.     

Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?

In this paper, we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment. For that purpose, we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency. Because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous, we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data. Our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service, especially for low-educated and low-skilled workers. They also show that the search effort is more costly for low-educated women and low-skilled adult unemployed workers. This last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial, in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear.     

Unemployment insurance,recalls, and experience rating

In the United States, almost half of the workers who separated from their jobs ended their unemployment spell by returning to work for their last employer. In this study, we explore the impact of the experience rating (ER) system on recalls. In states using reserve ratio ER, and for a firm that is not at the minimum or the maximum tax rate, each layoff of a worker receiving unemployment benefits increases the future tax rate while each recall reduces it. This provides a natural incentive for firms to recall former workers receiving unemployment benefits. We use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators dataset, which provides information on recalls at the county level, and exploit the differences in tax schedule across states to estimate the impact of ER on recalls. We show that the recall share from hires increases with the degree of ER. We then develop a search and matching model with different unemployment insurance (UI) status, endogenous UI take-up, endogenous separations, recalls, and new hires. We illustrate that this model reproduces the effects of ER on recalls admirably. We show that an increase in the intensity of ER translates into a higher recall share at the steady state, especially for unemployed workers collecting unemployment benefits. We then use this model to analyze the labor market dynamics under alternative financing schemes. We show that ER has stabilization virtues—the higher the degree of ER, the less volatile the unemployment rate.     

Labor market institutions and aggregate fluctuations in a search and matching model

This paper explores the influence of labor market institutions on aggregate fluctuations. It uses a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model characterized by search and matching frictions in the labor market and nominal rigidities in the goods market. It finds that firing costs and unemployment benefits can have substantial effects on aggregate fluctuations. Increasing firing costs decreases the volatility of output, employment, and job flows due to the reduction in the mass of jobs sensitive to disturbances and lower incentives for firms to hire and fire workers. Hence, firms adjust to shocks mainly through prices, causing inflation to become more volatile. Raising unemployment benefits has the reverse effect on aggregate fluctuations.