The labor-force participation of married women in the Soviet Union: a household cross-section analysis

Approximately 80% of women in the Soviet Union ages 15-54 years are employed outside the home. To identify the impact of demographic and economic variables on the high rate of labor force participation among Soviet women, data from an income survey of 1016 2-parent families of emigrants to Israel were analyzed. It was hypothesized that differences in participation rates among Soviet women correspond to differences in other sources of family income, wage rates and market conditions, level of education, and family household conditions, with response to changes in economic variables mediated by the role played by persuasion and social pressure in encouraging women to participate. Overall, 89.3% of the women in the sample were labor force participants. Nonparticipants were, as expected, from families with higher levels of other income. The personal qualifications of nonworking wives were considerably lower than those of working wives, with nonworking wives averaging 9.4 years of schooling compared with 13.2 years for working wives. Offered wages for working wives averaged 69 kopecks/hour in contrast to 40-50 kopecks/hour for nonworking women. A maximum-likelihood functional estimation of participation rates whoed significant coefficients for family income (negative), expected wages and education (positive), and residence in a large city (positive). The coefficients for residence in a medium-sized city, existence of a private plot, presence of nonworking men in the household, occupational status of the husband, and total number of children were insignificant. The supply of hours of work was backward-bending. The results suggest that Soviet women reach the decision to participate in the labor force through consideration of the same factors as their counterparts in nonsocialist countries. The analysis further indicates that, at present levels of fertility and exogenous conditions, the participation rate in the Soviet Union will not decrease. However, policies designed to raise the fertility level, including better facilities for children and more support for women who leave the labor force to raise young children, could ease labor force participation among soviet women.     

Population growth and economic and social development

This article sets forth 3 positions on population growth: 1) rapid population growth is a central development problem that implies lower living standards for the poor; 2) proposals for reducing population growth raise difficult questions about the proper domain of public policy, yet it is acceptable for governments to attempt to influence private decisions about family size; and 3) the experience in many developing countries shows that quick, effective measures can be taken to reduce fertility. Rapid population growth has slowed development because it exacerbates the difficult choice between higher consumption in the present and the investment needed to bring higher consumption in the future. As populations grow, larger investments are needed just to maintain current capital/person. It further threatens the balance between natural resources and people and creates severe economic and social problems in urban areas. Public policy must provide alternative ways for poor families to secure the benefits provided by large family size. That is, governments need to provide tangible evidence that it really is in the best interests of parents to have fewer children. Also required is greater infomation about and access to fertility control. When family planning services have been widespread and affordable, fertility has decline faster than social and economic progress alone would predict. There is a need for immediate action to improve women's status and to make education, family planning, and primary health care more available. Although economic and social progress help to slow population growth, rapid population growth hinders development. Thus, governments must act simultaneously on both fronts. Accumulating evidence on population growth in developing countries shows that is the combination of social development and family planning that reduces fertility.     

The effect of family welfare support on the likelihood of having another child and parents’ labor supply

Governments have recently attempted to reverse the below-replacement fertility rates in Europe by reducing child-rearing costs through child benefits, grants and paid leaves. This article examines the causal effect of family allowances on the likelihood of having another child, and on the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply. Evidence from Switzerland suggests that higher child benefits incentivize parents to have more children but do not affect their employment choice. The effect is larger for low-income families. These findings imply that policies aimed at improving the economic well-being of families are likely to increase fertility rates without distorting labor market outcomes.     

Comparing Care Regimes in Europe

Throughout Europe, the family is still an important provider of care, but welfare state policies of individual countries may support and/or supplement the family in different ways, generating different social and economic outcomes. This article compares and categorizes care strategies for children and elderly persons in different member states of the European Union, while also taking into account the varied modalities for providing care, like leave arrangements, financial provisions, and social services. In EU countries, care regimes function as “social joins” ensuring complementarity between economic and demographic institutions and processes. As these processes and institutions change, they provide impetus for care regimes to change as well. However, because ideas and ideals about care are at the core of individual national identities, care regimes also act as independent incentive structures that impinge on patterns of women's labor market participation and fertility.     

Demographic links to savings in life cycle models: identification of issues for LDCs

The author considers the potential for a link between the recent pattern of demographic transition and intertemporal and inter-country variations in savings rates. Fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy, and levels of female and child labor force participation are among the various demographic factors which affect national savings rates through their effects upon age structure, age-specific individual savings behavior, and their general equilibrium effects upon interest rates, wage rates, and income distribution. The author establishes a simple discrete time life cycle model of savings, explains the issues related to age structure, and discusses the effect of age-specific savings functions, the general equilibrium effects of demographic factors, the effects of life expectancies and child mortalities, and the nature of social security coverages in less developed countries, as well as issues which are especially important for less developed countries. A new strategy for empirically evaluating demographic policies is proposed. That is, one can estimate the age profile of earnings, saving and fertility rates from household survey data. The life tables can then be used to compute the aggregate savings rate and population size. Any demographic policy which affects the fertility rate, life expectancy, and investment in the quality of children will change the aggregate saving and population growth rates. These two aggregate effects could be compared to evaluate demographic policies. The author stresses, however, that changes in different demographic factors will have different short-run and long-run effects upon the savings rate which will also depend upon whether such changes are transitory or permanent.     

Economic-demographic interactions and the impact of investments in population control

The interaction between economic and demographic factors in the Philippines was examined, analyzing the effects of investment in fertility control on the birthrate, population size, and such economic variables as gross national product (GNP), wage rate, and family income. A family planning model that was constructed and is used to project population program cost and births prevented is grafted to and simulated with a larger economic/demographic model. The simulation results are anayzed. The economic demographic model to which the family planning subsystem was grafted is a modified version of the model constructed by Encarnacion et al. (1974). It is basically a neoclassical model, a closed economy in which the real wage rate is determined by the intersection of the demand and supply of labor. The demand for labor is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function on the assumption that labor is paid the value of its margin product, and the labor supply is determined by age and sex specific labor force participation rates and population. Capital accumulation is influenced by population size through its effect on government and private consumption expe nditures. Fertility rate is determined by duration of marriage and the level and distribution of family incomes. The model was used to develop projections from 1970 through 2000. Results show that the effects on per capital income and real wage rate seem significant, yet family income appears largely unaffected and the effect on the traditional investment to output ratio (I/Y) seems minimal. One of the outcomes of the projection without family planning is that, if the economy were to depend solely on its own savings, the average annual rate of growth of gross national product (GNP) would be only about 4.32%, which is less than the historical growth rate of 6% and the present government longterm target of 8%. The result suggests that foreign investments and loans would have to play an increasingly important role in the economic growth of the Philippines unless the gross domestic investment of GNP ratio is increased substantially. Aggregate output is reduced due to a relatively smaller labor force. Thus, it is suggested that if population control programs are accompanied by an increase in the labor participation rate, particularly of women, the payoffs from family planning may be larger. Closer examination of the nature of the payoffs from the family planning program would reveal that they basically stem from the decrease in the number of persons sharing in national output and not from increased production and saving. The observation suggests that population control does not necessarily lead to more rapid economic growth defined as sustained increase in total output.     

The Care Economy in Post-Reform China: Feminist Research on Unpaid and Paid Work and Well-Being

ABSTRACT

As China embarked on the path of economic and social reforms, social provisions from the Maoist era were dismantled, and care responsibilities shifted back from the state to the household. Rural–urban migration, a steep decline in fertility, and increasing longevity have led to changes in the age structure of the population both overall and by region. Using seven different surveys, the eleven contributions in this volume study the distributive consequences of post-reform care policies and the impact of unpaid care responsibilities on women’s and men’s opportunities and gender inequality. Overall, reduced care services have created care deficits for disadvantaged groups, including low-income rural elderly and children. The shifted care burden has also limited women’s ability to participate fully in the market economy and has contributed to rising gender inequalities in labor force participation, off-farm employment, earnings, pensions, and mental health outcomes.     

Reproduction,production and the sexual division of labour

This basically economic treatise elaborates the thesis that the focal point of women's economic activities is provided by their special role in the reproduction of the labor force. Given that change in sex roles is necessary in order not to perpetuate a division of labor which places women in subordinate positions, this paper attempts to analyze the nature and functions of traditional sex roles and to study the structures that have supported them through generations in an effort to conceptualize the relevant issues and to set up a general framework from which change in social structure relating to women and their economic dependency can proceed. In addition, specific studies of concrete situations observed within and across countries and cultural barriers are used for illustration. The argument, simply stated, which the paper seeks to prove, is that male domination develops around the need to control reproduction in its different aspects; the concept of reproduction used here indicates a dynamic process of change linked with the perpetuation of social systems. It includes social as well as physical reproduction, and its meaning therefore goes beyond that of reproduction of human beings. This concept of reproduction is isolated in discussions of production and the sexual division of labor, including agrarian structures and modes of production; the commercialization and proletarization of agriculture; and the availability of labor resources and development of wage labor markets. The implications of this concept of reproduction in population policy, specifically population control, are not explicitly discussed but are tremendously important.     

The power of the family

We study the importance of family ties on economic behavior. We define our measure of family ties using individual responses from the World Value Survey (WVS) regarding the role of the family and the love and respect that children are expected to have for their parents in 81 countries. We show that with strong family ties home production is higher and families larger, labor force participation of women and youngsters, and geographical mobility lower. To assess causality, we look at the behavior of second generation immigrants. Our results overall indicate a significant influence of the strength of family ties on economic outcomes.     

Occupational,Marital, and Life-Cycle Determinants of Women's Labor Force Participation in Mid Nineteenth-Century Rural France

Abstract

The French population census of 1851 is unique among France's nineteenth- and early twentieth-century censuses, as it is the only census to provide information on the market-oriented work of women and children within and outside the home. This study utilizes that information to analyze the demographic, structural, and economic determinants of women's labor force participation in a sample of rural communes in northern France. The data reveal an industrious population in which two-thirds to three-quarters of women in farm families engaged in market-oriented work. The data suggest that women were pushed rather than pulled into the rural labor force, and that poverty was the primary factor driving rural women's participation. The census data throw statistical light on the labor market participation rates of women and children in a preindustrial setting and are likely to produce major revisions in understandings of productivity growth in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France.     

Social classes,demographic transition and economic growth

This paper analyzes the role of the demographic transition in the emergence of sustained economic growth, and shows that these two processes are related. Unlike previous contributions which have focused on the importance of human capital, this paper suggests that capital accumulation, and the existence of different social classes may provide an alternative explanation for the observed pattern of output, fertility rates and wages during the 19th century. The framework presented shows that during the first phase of industrialization, a decline in capital–labor ratio reduces the wage rate and increases the dependency of the family unit on child labor, increasing fertility rates. However, in later phases the increase in the capital–labor ratio, due to the saving of the business elite, reduces the necessity of child labor bringing about the demographic transition.     

Having It All? Employment,Earnings, and Children*

We study the effect of family policies on female employment, fertility, and the gender wage gap. We develop a life‐cycle model of heterogeneous households featuring endogenous labor supply, human capital accumulation, fertility, and home production. Our results suggest that human capital accumulation is important in accounting for the widening of the gender wage gap following children. We find that, in aggregate, childcare subsidies promote maternal employment and fertility, although the effects are heterogeneous across couples. A subsidy on home goods increases female employment, but primarily later in life. Thus, it does not dampen the widening of the gender gap.     

Family planning in developing nations: a global concern,our concern

Rapid population growth is a serious problem in many developing countries and family planning policies developed in response to the problem raise many ethical issues; home economists can help the citizens in their respective countries increase their knowledge of population dynamics and help them assess the ethical implications of population and family planning policies. Most developing countries have high population growth rates. The annual population growth rates for 1975-79 were 2.8% for Africa, 2.6% for Latin America, and 2.1% for Asia. Population grows exponentially: a population growing at an annual rate of 3% increases. 1900% in a century. If current population trends continue the world's population will stablize toward the end of the 21st century at about 10 billion persons, compared to the world's present population of 4.3 billion. Rapid population growth not only threatens the future welfare of society as a whole, but currently impedes the economic development of the world's poorest nations. Consequently, the governments in many developing countries have adopted vigorous family planning programs. It is difficult to reduce population growth in developing countries because these countries have a high proportion of young people in their populations, i.e., a high number of persons of reproductive age. Barriers to family planning acceptance include 1) high illiteracy rates 2) high infant mortality rates 3) the high economic and socialvalue placed on children in developing countries and 4)religious beliefs. Methods used by governments to alter population growth include 1) manipulating access to contraceptives, 2)developing programs to alter social determinants of fertility, 3) using propaganda to encourage or discourage birth control and repressing information contrary to the government's policies, 4) offering incentives to those who further government policies and imposing disincentives on those who do not comply with government policies, and 5) exerting political pressure to force individual to comply with the govermnent's policies. The use of some of these methods raises ethical issues. When does pressure become coercion? Is coecion justified by the need to ensure the future welfare of the world? In India, sterilization was promoted by making payments to sterilization acceptors and promoters and to physicians who performed sterilizations. In Taiwan, savings deposits were made for children of couples with 1 or 2 children, and the deposits were decreased in additional childred were born. In China incentives, disincentives, and polititcal and peer pressure are used to promote the governt's family planning policies. Do these strong measures lead to infaticide and to the abuse of children whose births result in economic loss for other family members? Do they violate human rights? These issues should be discussed in home economics classes, and additional efforts must be made to ensure that male students are also provided with population information. Home economists can promote the critical assessment of the population problem and its solutions.     

Population policy: do we need it? Prospects and problems

A 1983 report by the Whitsun Foundation called upon the Government of Zimbabwe to recognize the urgent nature of that country's population problem and to devise and implement a comprehensive population policy aimed at reducing morbidity and mortality among women and children, reducing the population growth rate, and reducing the fertility level. This article challenges the Whitsun Foundation's view that population pressure is the primary cause of poverty in Zimbabwe and that family planning is a feasible remedy. It is argued instead that poverty in Zimbabwe can be traced to capitalist development policies that have removed from rural people the means to produce their own subsistence. More important that large-scale birth control programs are radical structural and institutional changes aimed at achieving social and economic progress and directly attacking poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Those countries where marked declines in birth rates have been achieved have usually been those that spread the benefits of development throughout their populations. Moreover, the Whitsun report implies that there is no family planning program in Zimbabwe. In fact, in 1982, an estimated 200,000 people received contraception through the Child Spacing and Fertility Association of Zimbabwe's program. It is unlikely that an expanded birth control program and educational campaign to persuade the rural and urban poor to practice family planning will be effective. Policy makers will have to address the cynicism brought about by the colonial regimes' genocidal efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to introduce birth control measures.     

Soviet theories of economic demography: a survey

At this time Soviet demographic scientists maintain the position that population problems may in fact exist temporarily under socialism but that the planning principle will allow society to resolve population problems, through the use of the administrative, moral, and economic levers (subsidies, government policies, propaganda, education) emphasized by Urlanis (1974) and others. For planners to deal effectively with population management, the determinants of fertility and labor force participation must be established. The foundations of Soviet theories of human capital and fertility were laid by several writers. For the sake of simplicity, these are referred to as the Urlanis-Strumilin model, named after 2 pioneer researchers in Soviet demography and manpower economics. The formulations are based upon the writings of Strumlin (1964) and Urlanis (1974), supplemented by writings of numerous other Soviet researchers. Although their models avoid neoclassical terms such as marginal utility and income and price elasticities, they clearly employ these concepts. The Urlanis-Strumilin model, reduced to its basic elements, is a direct household utility maximizing model. The husband and wife, the household decision makers, must select optimal levels of child "quantity," child "quality," leisure, their own human capital (further education and training), and other goods. The Soviet theory recognizes that an increase in household income will increase relatively the demands for income elastic goods. The model postulates that the demand for child quality is inversely related to the price of children. The price of children is the opportunity cost of children, the major element of which is the income foregone by the mother in the course of childbearing and childrearing. The child quantity demand schedule has elastic and inelastic portions. The marginal utility of the 1st child is great. The marginal utilities of higher order children decline substantially. Families with at least 1 child can make substitutions between having more children and raising the quality of children already born. The question is what does the model predict will happen to fertility with economic development. The positive income effect will be limited as increased income is channelled into child quality and other superior goods rather than child quantity. The Urlanis-Strumilin model of labor supply assumes that the household allocates its time among market employment, household production. The model shows that the effect of children on female labor supply is not ambiguous. The presence of young children raises the value of home services and lowers long run market wages, thereby reducing female market labor supply. According to the model, the socialist state can manipulate labor supplies through several channels. It can reduce the value of home services by providing market substitutes. Soviet writers recognize the linkages between labor supply and fertility without formalizing the simultaneous relationship. The comparative statics of the Soviet model are essentially the same as those of the neoclassical model: an increase in "costs" of children will have, at best, a small positive impact on fertility.     

Population and development problems: a critical assessment of conventional wisdom. The case of Zimbabwe

Conventional wisdom, as reflected in reports by the World Bank and the Whitsun Foundation, maintains that control of population growth is the key strategy for stimulating socioeconomic development and ending widespread poverty. The Witsun Foundation has criticized the Government of Zimbabwe for failing to include specific policies for population control in its National Transitional Development Plan. the report further expressed alarm about future availability of land to contain Zimbabwe's growing population. Communal areas are designed for a maximum of 325,000 families yet presently contain 700-800,000 families. This Malthusian, deterministic emphasis on population growth as the source of social ills ignores the broader, complex set of socioeconomic, historical, and political factors that determine material life. Any analysis of population that fails to consider the class structure of society, the type of division of labor, and forms of property and production can produce only meaningless abstractions. For example, consideration of crowding in communal areas must include consideration of inequitable patterns of land ownership in sub-Saharan Africa. Unemployment must be viewed within the context of a capitalist economic structure that relies on an industrial reserve army of labor to ensure acceptance of low wages and labor-intensive conditions. While it is accepted that population growth is creating specific and real problems in Zimbabwe and other African countries, these problems could be ameliorated by land reform and restructuring of the export-oriented colonial economies. Similarly, birth control should not be promoted as the solution to social problems, yet family planning services should be available to raise the status of women. Literacy, agrarian reform, agricultural modernization, and industrialization campaigns free from the dominance of Western capitalism represent the true solutions to Zimbabwe's problems.     

Accounting for Fertility Decline During the Transition to Growth

In every developed country, the economic transition from pre-industrial stagnation to modern growth was accompanied by a demographic transition from high to low fertility. Even though the overall pattern is repeated, there are large cross-country variations in the timing and speed of the demographic transition. What accounts for falling fertility during the transition to growth? To answer this question, this paper develops a unified growth model that delivers a transition from stagnation to growth, accompanied by declining fertility. The model is used to determine whether government policies that affect the opportunity cost of education can account for cross-country variations in fertility decline. Among the policies considered, education subsidies are found to have only minor effects, while accounting for child labor regulation is crucial. Apart from influencing fertility, the policies also determine the evolution of the income distribution in the course of development.     

Theoretical problems of demographic policy in the USSR

The recent emphasis in the USSR on long-range economic and social planning, as well as the country's current demographic situation, necessitates the adoption of demographic policies to create the type of population reproduction which is in the longterm interest of the society. Socioeconomic policies may have bothnegative and positive effects on demographic processes, and these effects may be delayed for 25 years or more. In the past, when economic and social plans covered only 5-year periods, the impact of these plans on demographic factors could be ignored. In longterm planning these consequences cannot be ignored. Population policies must address the longterm consequences of socioeconomic development, the regional variations in population parameters, and the complexities of the relationship between demographic and socioeconomic factors. As socialist societies evolve they eventually reach a stage where it is necessary to develop a theory and a methodolgy for managing demographic processes. The development of appropriate demographic goals and policies will require the cooperation of not only demographers, but of medical professionals, sociologists, and economists. The initial tasks of a goal oriented population program should be to stabilize the birth rate, to prevent further declines in fertility rates, to increase life expectancy to its biological limits, to reduce death rates, to equalize regional living standards, to control immigration, and to improve resettlement programs. Eventually policymakers must address the problem of developing an optimal and uniform level of reproduction for the nation as a whole. An organization structure, both at the national and regional level for developing and implementing the population program must be specified. Regional programs must be coordinated at the national level and developed in accordance with national goals.     

Levels of fertility and reproduction and differential fertility in Sholapur City

This paper presents the main findings of a survey conducted in 1955 regarding the fertility of women in the city of Sholapur. 1203 families (3535 males and 3289 females) comprised the sample. 1337 women were of childbearing age and the total number of children born to women the year before the inquiry was 321. The overall total marital fertility rate for Sholapur women was 7106.01 children/1000 women or about 7 children/woman. Proportion of female births to total births in the sample was 0.4829. Gross reproduction was 2.9 per woman. Paternal and maternal net reproduction rates of 1.8 and 1.5 represented a rate of increase in the male and female populations per 33 and 27 years respectively. None of the biological and social factors considered was found to have any differential effect on marital fertility of the women. This result was expected, as evidence suggest that the various social, religious, educational, and economic classes in Sholapur are quite similar with regards to marriage and contraceptive behavior. Tables on values of chi-square are also appended.     

The demographic transition revisited: lessons for foreign aid and U.S. immigration policy.

"The completed demographic transitions in industrialized countries inspired a model which underlies many well-meant policies affecting the Third World. However, the model's postulate--modernization and prosperity will lower fertility rates--has exacerbated rather than helped control worldwide population growth and the associated environmental degradation. Here we show that perceived economic opportunity leads to raising family size targets and to discarding elements of traditional cultures which formerly held fertility rates in check. Conversely, fertility rates fall when limits are recognized. These observations imply that a liberal immigration policy and large-scale foreign aid are counterproductive for restoring balance between population size and carrying capacity."