Is corporate payout taxation a long run phenomenon? Evidence from international data

This paper examines whether dividend and capital gains taxation influences corporate payout policy using the country level data of 21 countries in panel versions of time series models. We find that dividend relative to capital gains tax penalty is cointegrated with corporate payouts (dividends and share repurchases) i.e. corporate payout taxation may be a long run phenomenon. Further, the cointegrating vector estimates are largely consistent with the traditional view of dividend taxation whereby the tax penalty discourages dividends, while the estimates give limited support to the premise that firms substitute dividends for share repurchases in response to an increase in dividend tax penalty. Long run causality also operates between the tax penalty and payouts in the error correction models. Additionally, dividend tax appears to be more influential than capital gains tax on dividend payout decisions. Lastly, taxation affects dividends more significantly in countries with high investor protection.     

Are Corporate Tax Reductions Real Benefits under Imputation Systems?

Imputation systems integrate corporate and shareholder personal income taxes to alleviate double taxation of dividend income. In this study, we empirically examine whether a corporate tax rate reduction under an imputation tax system benefits shareholders. Using Taiwan as a setting, our analyses indicate that decreasing the corporate tax rate is associated with an increase in dividend payout ratio and foreign investment. Moreover, the increase in dividend payout ratio is even greater for firms that have a higher increase in foreign ownership. Additionally, the market reacts positively to an announcement of a tax rate reduction; specifically, positive stock price reactions are stronger for firms that experienced a greater increase in foreign ownership in response to the tax rate reduction, for firms with greater liquidity constraints and more growth opportunities before the tax rate reduction, and for firms with a bigger decrease in effective tax rates after the tax rate reduction. Overall, we provide evidence that a tax rate reduction is associated with economic impacts and that foreign shareholders appear to be the main beneficiaries of a tax rate reduction under an imputation tax system.     

Changing dividend policies caused by the Tax Reform Act of 1986: An empirical analysis

In this paper the authors analyze the change in dividend yield (and capital gains yield) patterns of the group of 1108 firms listed on the monthly CRSP tapes from 1984 to 1988. It was anticipated that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would lead to a pattern of increasing dividend yields and decreasing capital gains yields in 1987 and 1988 due to the elimination of the capital gains tax rate by 1988 and the overall reduction in personal tax rates. The results were consistent across all dividend groups as expected.     

The effects of tax and regulatory changes on commercial bank dividend policy

The literature concerning the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) is extensive, but generally does not consider dividend policy changes related to TRA’s passage. One exception is Casey et al., but that work omits banking. An examination of banks is especially apt given TRA’s changes in tax rates and municipal bond categorization. Results show bank dividend policy to be different from other industries, as banks show no relation to past growth rates, beta, or an insider ownership as Rozeff’s model holds. The results support the idea that the lower the taxes, the higher the payout which is contrary to the dividend irrelevancy argument. However, the results are not robust in tests using data from a later period meant to more closely examine changing capitalization requirements’ impact on dividend policy.     

Innovation dynamics and fiscal policy: Implications for growth,asset prices,and welfare

We study the equilibrium implications of different fiscal policies on macroeconomic quantities and welfare by utilizing an endogenous growth model that matches asset pricing data well. The fiscal instruments of interest are (i) subsidies to R&D expenditure, consumption and capital investment, and (ii) cuts in labor and corporate tax rates. Our equilibrium analysis provides new insights on the interplay of innovation dynamics and fiscal policy. Importantly, we find growth and welfare to be inversely related when changing R&D subsidies. However, this depends on how well the model reproduces asset pricing dynamics. Moreover, only subsidies to capital investments and cuts in the corporate tax rate have the potential to increase both growth and welfare.     

Corporate investment,dividend decisions,differential taxation and the no-arbitrage condition

Masulis and Trueman (1988) investigated corporate investment and dividend decisions under differential personal taxation. They assumed investors in different tax brackets, a state-preference complete market (which includes pure securities for each state) with a ban on short-selling. They concluded that shareholders prefer non-zero dividend payment. In their model, the restrictions on short-sales were needed to bound tax arbitrage profits, among investors in different tax brackets, so that equilibrium could be reached. However, the joint assumptions of complete markets, and restrictions on short-selling, are inconsistent. By utilizing more recent results, from the tax arbitrage literature, we allow short-selling, and examine the role and implications of the no-arbitrage condition. We show that, with investors in different tax brackets, equilibrium is feasible. We conclude that a revised Masulis and Trueman type model does not explain a non-zero optimal dividend policy.     

A tax-based motive for the underpricing of initial public offerings

This paper presents a model of entrepreneurial wealth maximization for the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). It is an extension of one previously presented in the literature. The model shows that personal tax rates on ordinary income and capital gains may, in part, determine IPO pricing: an increase in the capital gains tax rate should lower the degree of underpricing. An empirical analysis of the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which raised the capital gains tax rate, shows that the average degree of underpricing did decrease as predicted, and that this occurs after controlling for other possible influences.     

Tax Regimes and Capital Gains Realizations

This paper contrasts the individual capital gains realization behavior between progressive and proportional tax regimes. Using a longitudinal panel of over 288,000 individuals in Sweden, I exploit the 1991 tax reform in Sweden that changed progressive capital gains tax rates ranging from 12% to 80% to a proportional tax rate of 30%. Using the proportional tax system to control for non-tax reasons to realize capital gains, I show that individuals are highly responsive to capital gains tax incentives created by temporary income changes under a progressive capital gains tax. More specifically, I find that individuals with temporary negative (positive) income changes sell (hold) shares that they would hold (sell) in the absence of temporary tax incentives. Further, I show that high-income individuals are more tax sensitive than low-income individuals. This result indicates that low-income individuals facing temporary negative income changes could trade predominantly for non-tax reasons.     

Housing capital-gains taxation and homeowner mobility: Evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997

We provide new evidence on the impact of housing capital-gains taxation on homeowner behavior by examining residential mobility before and after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), which generated the most sweeping reform of capital-gains taxation in the last two decades. In addition to lowering marginal tax rates on long-term capital gains for all assets, TRA97 also eliminated any differential treatment of housing gains above and below age 55, allowing all homeowners to qualify for capital-gains exclusions. Utilizing data drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS) on either side of the law change (1996 and 1998) on homeowners just above (56–58 year olds) and below (52–54 year olds) the age-55 threshold and a reduced-form, difference-in-difference empirical approach, our estimates suggest that the repeal of the differential capital-gains tax treatment by age embodied in TRA97 had an economically important and statistically significant impact on the residential mobility of under-55 homeowners. Across a variety of specifications, the repeal raised the mobility rate by around 1–1.4 percentage points, which, for a mean mobility rate of 4 percentage points, represented an increase in the mobility rate of homeowners in their early 50s by 22–31%. Furthermore, the bulk of this effect was concentrated among highly mobile homeowners who a priori were more likely to have wanted to trade down (e.g., divorced, empty nesters), those facing higher capital gains tax rates, and those living in states that had experienced higher rates of nominal appreciation.     

Corporate cash holdings and dividend payments: evidence from simultaneous analysis

This study explores the simultaneous relationship between corporate cash holdings and dividend policy using a large sample of around 400 non‐financial firms for the period from 1991 to 2008. The results show that cash holdings are affected by dividends, leverage, growth, size, risk, profitability, and working capital ratio. Dividend policy is affected by cash, leverage, growth, size, risk, and profit. When controlling for simultaneity, dividend payments do not appear to significantly affect cash holdings, nor do cash holdings affect dividend policy. The empirical analysis suggests that simultaneity is crucial in analyzing corporate cash holdings and dividend policy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sooner or Later? – Paradoxical Investment Effects of Capital Gains Taxation under Simultaneous Investment and Abandonment Flexibility

This paper analyzes the impact of capital gains taxation on investment timing decisions for risky investment projects with entry and exit flexibility under differential tax rates for ordinary income and capital gains. We investigate whether capital gains taxation influences immediate and delayed investments asymmetrically, given the optimal abandonment decision. If capital gains taxation induces a lock-in effect, this effect is anticipated in the investment timing decision. In contrast to prior research, our numerical simulations show that this lock-in effect of capital gains taxation can induce normal as well as paradoxical effects on investment timing under simultaneous entry and exit flexibility. A paradoxical timing effect, i.e., investment accelerated by capital gains taxation, especially emerges for high liquidation proceeds or, more conservative tax accounting, low interest rates, and low volatilities. In these cases, capital gains taxation reduces the value of the option to invest and hereby increases the propensity to invest immediately. As a second paradoxical tax effect, capital gains taxation may favor delayed real investment over financial investment. Facing these results, tax legislators should not use capital gains taxation as a short-term tax policy instrument to influence investors' timing decisions.     

The effect of takeover defenses on the dividend decision

Many firms have sought protection from hostile takeovers by passing defensive amendments to their corporate charter and/or lobbying their state legislatures for statutory protection. Agency theory would suggest that any such takeover defenses alter the principal-agent relationship. A consequence of such a change may be a change in corporate decision making. The objective of this research is to test the effect that passage of antitakeover amendments has on a firm's dividend policy. We use six alternate measures of dividend activity: total dividends paid, dividends per share and dividends relative to earnings, cash flow, market value, and book value. Our results indicate that firms that adopt antitakeover amendments, when compared to an industry control sample, tend to have a slower rate of growth in dividend payout as measured by the proxy variables. These results suggest that entrenchment is not a likely outcome of such amendments.     

Ex-dividend day abnormal returns for special dividends

Past research shows that the difference between dividend amount and ex-dividend day price drop reflects the transaction costs and the differential in the tax rates on dividends and capital gains. Moreover, it is also documented that the higher the dividend yield, the lower is the ex-dividend day return. This paper focuses on large special dividends and tests the two competing hypothesis, tax hypothesis and short term trading hypothesis. Our focus on large special dividends is motivated by the following three considerations. First, special dividends have experienced a surge in recent years. Second, special dividends are important for dividend capture by institutions, corporations and arbitragers. Third, using a sample of large special dividends allows us to reduce the market microstructure effects and focus more directly on the two competing hypotheses. Based on a sample of large special dividends, we find that price drop on ex-dividend day is significantly less than the dividend amount. Furthermore, we show that ex-dividend day returns are positive and hence, are not fully arbitraged away. Our tests indicate that tax hypothesis explains some portion of ex-dividend day abnormal returns even for large special dividends, whereas the support for the short-term trading hypothesis is weak.     

Democracy and dividend policy around the world

This paper investigates how democracy influences corporate dividend policy. With a sample of 228,628 observations from 37 countries, we find that democracy is negatively associated with both the likelihood to pay dividends and the payout ratio. Moreover, we document that this effect is stronger when shareholders (creditors) are weakly (strongly) protected. These findings imply that the effect of democracy on corporate dividend policy is transmitted mainly through democratic procedures. Besides, we find that democracy also negatively affects dividend initiations.     

Asset allocation over the life cycle: How much do taxes matter?

We study the welfare effect of tax-optimizing portfolio decisions in a life cycle model with unspanned labor income and realization-based capital gain taxation. For realistic parameterizations of our model, certainty equivalent welfare gains from fully tax-optimized portfolio decisions are less than 2% of present financial wealth and lifetime income compared to a heuristic portfolio policy ignoring the taxation of profits (capital gains, interest and dividend payments). Compared to a heuristic portfolio policy that only ignores the realization-based feature of capital gain taxation and instead assumes mark-to-market taxation, these gains are less than 0.5%. That is, our work provides a justification for ignoring taxes in life cycle portfolio choice problems – a wide-spread assumption in that literature. However, if capital gains are forgiven at death (as in the U.S.), investors with strong bequest motives face substantial welfare costs when not tax-optimizing their portfolio decisions towards the end of the life cycle.     

Climate Change Policies and Tax Recycling Schemes: Simulations with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of the Italian Economy

A dynamic general equilibrium model of the Italian economy is used to assess the impact of carbon taxation (or auctioned carbon permits), where additional revenue is used to cut either existing taxes on labor or on capital income. Simulation results do not support the existence of the so-called "double dividend" when labor taxes are reduced, whereas lower tax rates on capital have mild positive effects on growth and welfare, with progressivity properties on income distribution. These findings hinge on the assumptions of open economy, given world interest rate, and capital mobility.     

Corporate tax,financial leverage,and portfolio risk

We examine the theoretical implications of corporate income tax for a risky portfolio in a aggregate-endowment economy. In this model, corporate income tax affects the portfolio risk associated with the rebalancing motive during market clearance. An asset is defined as a portfolio of stocks and bonds whose portfolio weights are similar to financial leverage. Corporate tax can decrease after-tax consumption from dividends (increase leverage) and increase the tax shield that increases dividends (decrease leverage). Changes in dividends are responsible for the correlation between expected dividend growth and consumption growth and, thus, affect stock pricing and returns. Overall, the model is characterized by tax-induced portfolio risk associated with financial leverage.     

The coupon-induced tax clientele effect in bond prices

A pricing model for default-free bonds under differentia! taxation of coupon income and capital gains is presented which explicitly considers coupon-induced tax clienteles. Subsequent analysis provides indirect evidence in support of the existence of the coupon-induced tax clientele effect, while direct evidence is provided by analyzing differences in marginal tax rates estimated across different coupon levels for sets of US Treasury bonds with the same maturity date. The results are also generally consistent with the traditional notion that marginal tax rates are inversely related to coupon levels.     

On the “Lock-In” Effects of Capital Gains Taxation

The most important drawback of a tax on realized capital gains is its “lock-in” effect. This paper uses a simple land development model to examine the distortion that the lock-in effect generates. A surprising result is that the lock-in effect does not arise if the basis for the capital gains tax (usually the price at which the current owner acquired the land) is sufficiently high. Rather than delaying the sale, the owner sells the land as soon as possible even if the land will be developed much later. In this case, the capital gains tax creates no “real” distortion because it does not affect the development time. In particular, if the basis is the price formed under perfect foresight, the lock-in effect never arises.     

Optimal Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate Dividends

We explore signaling behavior in settings with a discriminating activity and several costly nondiscriminating ("money-burning") activities. Existing theory provides no basis for selecting one method of burning money over another. When senders have better information about activity costs than receivers, each sender's indifference is resolved, the taxation of a money-burning signal is potentially Pareto-improving, and the use of the taxed activity becomes more widespread as the tax rate rises. We apply this theory to dividend signaling. Its central testable implication—that an increase in the dividend tax increases the likelihood of dividend payout—is verified empirically.