Industry‐specific Exchange Rate Fluctuations,Japanese Exports and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Panel Vector Autoregressive Analysis

Using a panel vector autoregression approach and industry breakdown data for financial constraints obtained from the Bank of Japan's Tankan (Short‐Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan) database, this study empirically investigates whether and how Japanese firms' financial constraints (internal and external) influence the response of Japanese sectoral exports to an exchange rate shock. Furthermore, we use the industry‐specific real effective exchange rate data developed by to allow for different movements of real effective exchange rates across industries. It is found that financial constraints have a significant influence on Japanese exports in response to exchange rate shocks. Japanese exporters with either lower internal financial constraints or external financial constraints are less affected by the yen's appreciation. In addition, if firms face high external financial constraints, only reducing the internal financial constraints cannot help them mitigate the impact of the yen's appreciation on their exports. Thus, an accommodative financial environment also plays an important role in alleviating the impact that the yen's appreciation has on Japanese exports.     

Does exchange rate volatility deter Japan-China trade? Evidence from pre- and post-exchange rate reform in China

This paper is an empirical investigation of the effect of RMB-JPY volatility on Japan-China trade with a special emphasis on the impacts of the reform of the RMB exchange rate regime implemented on July 21, 2005. We estimated two types of volatility measures (one based on the ARCH model and the other the usual standard deviation) utilizing daily data from Jan. 2002 through Dec. 2011 and examined both short-run and long-run effects of this volatility on exports of each country to the other with an ARDL approach. The results indicate that Japan's exports to China are not affected by the exchange rate volatility, but China's exports to Japan are negatively influenced during the reform period. Furthermore, the level of the exchange rate has no influence on Japanese exports, but it has a significant impact on Chinese exports. This asymmetric result may be due to differences in the depth of financial markets and in the maturity of exporters of the two countries.     

China＇s Import-exchange Rate Linkage： Evidence from the China-bound Exports of Japan and Korea

This paper examines how the China-bound exports of Japan and Korea are related to exchange rates, motivated by the fact that processing trade makes up a large proportion of China＇s trade, and that Japan and Korea are the leading source countries for processing imports. Because processing imports are inputs for exports, the link between such imports and China＇s exchange rates are ambiguous. We estimate export functions that include China＇s RMB real effective exchauge rates （REER） along with bilateral real exchange rates （B RER） using Johausen ＇s cointegration method aud find that the RMB REER significantly affects Japanese and Korean exports to China, even more so than BRER in most cases examined. These two exchange rates appear in the export equations with opposite signs. Subsequently, we use the estimated model to illustrate the importance of accounting for a concurrent change in B RER when analyzing the effects of a hypothetical RMB revaluation on China＇s trade balances despite the apparently weak imports-B RER linkage.     

PROBLEMS IN EXPANDING JAPAN'S IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURES FROM DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: A SURVEY*

The Japanese economy is now the second largest market economy, with a large trade surplus. And yet, Japan's imports of manufactures have long been very low relative to its GNP, when compared with other industrial countries; its ratio of manufactured imports to GNP was in the range of 2.1–2.7% in the 1980-87 period, as compared with 8.5–10.3% for the industrial countries as a whole or 4.7-7.2% for the United States. The share of developing economies in total imports of manufactures in Japan is about the same as, if not higher than, those for most other industrial countries. If Japan's ratio of manufactured imports to GNP were to rise in the future to approach closer to those of other industrial countries, Japan's imports of manufactures from developing economies could be two to three times what they are today, even if Japan's GNP does not increase at all and the share of developing economies in Japan's manufactured imports does not increase. This paper is an attempt to probe the potential of the Japanese market for imports of manufactures from developing economies in terms of rising ratio of such imports to GNP. The paper explores the reasons why Japan's ratio is exceptionally low, on the basis of existing literature. (a) Japan's ratio of manufactured imports to GNP has remained exceptionally low compared with those for other industrial countries. (b) Japan's ratio of manufactured imports from developing economies to GNP has remained distinctly low despite the recent surge in such imports. (c) If a part of the reason for the low ratio for Japan was a market access problem as often alleged, the problem is not with formal import barriers such as tariffs and formal non-tariff barriers because these barriers in Japan are no higher than in other industrial countries. As for informal import barriers, evidence found indicates that: (i) Administrative guidance and flexibly managed competition policy, which in the past had considerable effects of limiting imports, appear to have declined-in importance, but they still have import-limiting effects in certain areas. (ii) Market access difficulties involving import procedures, product standards, testing and certification requirements, which were enormous in the past, may have also decreased in severity over the last decade, but problems in these areas persist. (iii) There are aspects of the Japanese distribution system and practice that seem to make foreign access to the Japanese market significantly more difficult than the access by Japanese exporters to the markets in other industrial countries. Distribution in Japan suffers from overregulation. (iv) Users of manufactured products in Japan are sensitive to quality, perhaps more so, on the average, than in other industrial countries. Does the recent upsurge in Japan's imports of manufactures suggest that the traditional import behavior of Japan is changing? Japan's manufactured imports measured in yen increased by 18 and 27 percent in 1987 and 1988, respectively, and those coming from developing economies increased even more rapidly. There is also some evidence that price and income elasticities of demand for manufactured imports may have increased recently. These are encouraging, but it remains to be seen whether the trends will continue far enough into the future to bring Japan's import behavior more into line with those of other industrial countries. If they do, implications for the market prospects of manufactured exports from developing economies could be far-reaching. Outstanding questions are: (i) How much of the recent increase in manufactured imports is attributable to the appreciation of the yen (price effect)? How much is attributable to the increase in income or industrial output (income effect)? How much is attributable to removal of formal and informal import barriers effected so far (structural change)? Has consumer taste changed? (ii) Why have Latin American countries not been successful in promoting their exports of manufactures to Japan, when Asian exporters have been so successful? (iii) Up until now, the share of developing economies in Japan's manufactured imports has not been particularly low compared with those for other industrial countries, but is this share likely to fall or rise in the future? (iv) What is the likely impact of recently increased direct investment (DFI) by Japanese manufacturers in developing economies on the imports of their products into Japan?     

Japan's inflation under the Bretton Woods system: How large was the Balassa–Samuelson effect?

Japan's real exchange rate appreciation during the post-WWII manufacturing-led growth period has been regarded as a classical example of the Balassa–Samuelson effect. We choose the most conspicuous sub-period—1956–1970—to confirm the effect. Japan was in a rapid growth period under the U.S. dollar peg (real GDP growth, 9.7% per annum). The nominal anchor was weak as Japan's inflation rate (GDP deflator-based, 5.4%) was markedly higher than the U.S. rate (2.6%) during the 15-year period. The decomposition of the annual 2.7% (geometric) Japan–U.S. inflation rate gap (real exchange rate appreciation of the Japanese yen) reveals that the Balassa–Samuelson effect accounted for 0.7%; most of the real exchange rate appreciation (1.7%) was attributed to greater price increases in Japan's tradables. Although Japan's tradable sector achieved high TFP growth, the joint effect of the tradable–nontradable TFP growth difference between the two economies was too small to generate a sizable Balassa–Samuelson effect. Japan's example may suggest that even in rapidly growing economies, the magnitude of the effect in long-run real exchange rate appreciation is generally modest.     

THE RISE AND FALL OF INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE CASE OF A SILK WEAVING DISTRICT IN MODERN JAPAN

The production of habutae, a simple silk fabric, expanded rapidly between 1890 and 1918 in Japan's Fukui Prefecture, with large exports to Europe and the United States. The production of habutae, initially woven by hand, was labour intensive, but it gradually became capital-intensive after the introduction of power looms. Production and export of this fabric declined precipitously from 1918. In this paper, we attribute the rise and then fall of Japan's production and export of habutae to its changing comparative advantage, which is associated with shifts from labour-using to capital-using production technology initiated in the United States.     

Measuring the Competitiveness of China's Processed Exports

China's surplus in processing trade remains large. Processed exports are final goods produced using parts and components that are imported duty free. Because much of the value‐added of these exports comes from East Asia, exchange rates throughout the region should affect their foreign currency prices. This paper presents data on value‐added exchange rates for processed exports over the 1993–2013 period and reports that they significantly affect exports. While the renminbi appreciated 36 percent between the beginning of 2005 and the end of 2013, exchange rates in supply chain countries depreciated. This has mitigated the effect of the RMB appreciation on the price competitiveness of processed exports.     

Vertical trade and China's export dynamics

This paper examines how China's exports are affected by exchange rate shocks from countries that supply intermediate inputs to China. We build a simple small open economy model with intermediate goods trade to show that due to the intra-regional trade in intermediate goods, a devaluation of other Asian currencies does not necessarily hurt China's exports, as imported intermediate goods could become cheaper. The effect of intermediate goods costs depends critically on the share of intermediate goods used in China's export goods production and the degree of exchange rate pass-through in imported intermediate goods prices. If prices for intermediate goods are not very sticky, the effect through this channel could be large, and China's exports could even benefit. We find that these findings do not depend on China's choice of currency invoicing between the RMB and the US dollar or the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes.     

Exchange rate policy and export performance in a landlocked developing country: The case of Nepal

This paper examines the implications of Nepal's exchange rate policy for its export performance over the period 1980–2010. We first document Nepal's long-standing currency peg against the Indian rupee and that Nepal's real exchange rate appreciated substantially from the late 1990s. We then employ a gravity modeling approach to confirm that this real exchange rate appreciation has adversely affected Nepal's exports, especially to third-country markets. Nepal's exchange rate-related export competitiveness trap provides a motivation to reconsider the current peg.     

A dynamic analysis of the impact of uncertainty on import- and/or export-led growth: The experience of Japan and the Asian Tigers

Increasing integration of the Asian Tigers with the world economy through trade has exposed their income and trade to greater uncertainty and volatility. This paper models uncertainty in trade and income and re-examines the stability of the trade-growth nexus for Japan and the Asian Tigers in a dynamic framework. We find that in a volatile environment Japan's GDP growth is only import-led while Hong Kong's GDP growth is both export and import growth-led. On the other hand, incorporating uncertainty breaks the causal link between Korea's GDP growth and trade but it does not affect Taiwan's mutually causative relationship between GDP growth, with exports and imports. Lastly, the varied qualitative and quantitative impact of volatility in imports and exports on income growth among the Asian Tigers provides further thought for policy making.     

Tax reform in Japan: The case of personal taxes

In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of personal taxes (defined to include consumption and income taxes), describe and evaluate the past and present structure of personal taxes in Japan, and based on our findings, make a number of policy recommendations about how to reform personal taxes in Japan. We find that the structure of Japan's current consumption and income taxes is problematic from the viewpoints of both efficiency and equity and propose a reform package that improves both the efficiency and equity of Japan's personal taxes and, at the same time, achieves fiscal reconstruction.     

The pastoral boom,the rural land market,and long swings in New Zealand economic growth, 1873–19391

Higher farm and manufacturing productivity associated with refrigerated exports led to New Zealand's attainment of the world's highest Human Development Index in 1913. Local responses to export opportunities increased the social depth of land ownership and fostered intensive growth. Closer settlement meant that land‐related income gains spread widely, but land market volatility also created instability. New Zealand had the world's highest GDP per capita in 1938, but it experienced long swings in its growth rates. Dramatic swings in rural land market activity engendered by the pastoral boom contributed greatly to a long depression in the 1920s; subsequently a new monetary regime facilitated fast recovery.     

Has pass-through to export prices risen? Evidence for Japan

This paper investigates the exchange rate response of Japanese export prices over the period 1980 through 2007 using sector-specific measures of the yen’s value relative to invoicing currencies. It finds a significant increase in the response of total export prices to the yen in the late 1990s. The rise in the total export price response is traced to increases in the exchange rate response of two key export sectors. These findings for Japanese exports are consistent with the documented decline in pass-through to OECD import prices and suggest the latter could originate with changes in export pricing behavior.     

The impact of the rise and collapse of Japan's housing price bubble on households’ lifetime utility

This study estimates the impact of the dramatic changes in housing prices during Japan's bubble from the late 1980s to the 1990s on households’ asset accumulation and utility over their life cycle. We construct a life-cycle model explaining households’ consumption/saving and housing decisions under collateral and borrowing constraints. We estimate this model using data from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), which includes data on households’ housing wealth estimated from objective information. Using the estimated model, we then conduct a counterfactual simulation in which we assume that housing prices remained constant during the bubble period. Doing so allows us to quantify the gains/losses of lifetime utility due to the housing price boom and bust. We find that 72.2% of the households experienced an average decrease in lifetime utility equivalent to 5.7% of lifetime income. On average, Japan's housing price boom and bust caused a loss in lifetime utility equivalent to 4.7% of lifetime income. Moreover, we compare the impact of the housing price bubble across cohorts and find that the impact was greatest for those who experienced the bubble at ages 35–45.     

Why is the forecast error of quarterly GDP in Japan so large? – From an international comparison of quarterly GDP forecast situation

We examined the accuracy of prediction of Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States from the viewpoint of forecast errors. Compared with the forecast error of each country at the around same time, the forecast error of Japan is about 2 times larger. In case of Japan, even immediately before release of quarterly GDP, the forecast error is over 1 %, which is the same level of forecast error as 94 days before in the United States and 135 days before in Canada.Evaluating the characteristics of forecast errors, it can be pointed out that Japan's forecasts are as efficient as those of other countries, and the addition of major economic statistics is unlikely to improve forecast errors. The reason for Japan's large forecast errors is the fluctuations in the GDP growth rate. These results provide evidence that volatile GDP may make the outlook worse.Large fluctuations in Japan's quarterly GDP have already been pointed out. It is necessary to examine the factors behind the large fluctuations in the rate of change in Japan's quarterly GDP.     

The Japanese–U.S. trade balance and the yen: Evidence from industry data

While it is often assumed that a country's trade balance will improve in the long-run if its currency is allowed to depreciate, this is not necessarily the case for specific goods. In the short run, the opposite might even take place, as fixed quantities and rising import prices cause the trade balance to deteriorate. In this paper, we apply cointegration methodology to assess the short- and long-run impact of fluctuations in the yen–dollar real exchange rate on Japan's trade balance with the U.S. for 117 industries. We find that depreciation causes the trade balance to improve in the long-run for about one-third of Japanese industries. Most short-run effects are in the same direction, indicating a quick improvement in these industries’ trade balance, rather than a period of deterioration such as a “J-curve.”     

The great realignment: How factor-biased innovation reshaped comparative advantage in the U.S. and Japan, 1970–1992

Recent changes in comparative advantage in the largest OECD economies contradict static Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek theory. Japan's rising share of machinery exports and the improved comparative advantage of the USA in heavy industry were accompanied by growing scarcities of factors used intensively in these sectors. We show that under factor-price equalization, directed technical change leads to increasing specialization in goods intensive in each country's abundant factor. Testing this hypothesis with 1970–1992 export data from 14 OECD countries, we find that international comparative advantage was reshaped by biased innovation in the largest economies that increased the effective stocks of their abundant factors.     

Japan's economic slowdown and its global implications: a review of the economic modelling

Despite its role as a driver of global economic growth through the 1970s, in recent decades the rise of China has seen the international importance of Japan's economic performance recede from the public discourse. This is notwithstanding its continuing key role as economic partner to both industrial and developing countries and changes in its economic performance that would otherwise be a matter for global concern. In particular, the tendency for the Japanese economy and its external trade to stagnate not only has immediate consequences for global performance but also foreshadows a path to industrial transition for other key Asian economies. This paper reviews quantitative studies of Japan's performance. It identifies a paucity of results addressing global implications and suggests new research in this direction.     

An empirical analysis of ASEAN's labor-intensive exports

This paper investigates the factors affecting the demand for ASEAN's labor-intensive exports. Results obtained using a panel data set including exports to 25 countries indicate that an appreciation in ASEAN countries would substantially reduce exports of clothing, furniture, and footwear. In addition, an increase in foreign income and an appreciation among competitors would raise ASEAN's exports. These results indicate that profit margins for labor-intensive manufactures are thin and that slow growth abroad will curtail ASEAN's exports. These findings imply that policymakers should seek to promote domestic and regional demand, expand the technological base, and consider exchange rate coordination to mitigate “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies.     

Japan's outward FDI potential

While Japan's outward FDI stock is historically high, it is not necessarily clear whether there is untapped growth potential, given the economic size of Japan and that of partner countries. This paper examines whether Japan's actual outward FDI stock is high or low relative to the FDI predicted by the gravity model using the outward FDI patterns of all OECD nations, which we call counterfactual FDI. The results indicate that the ratio of Japan's actual to counterfactual FDI is the highest among the OECD countries as of the year 2015. The regional distribution of Japan's actual to counterfactual FDI favors Southeast Asian nations, South Africa and the US. These results imply that Japan has no unrealized potential for outward FDI.