Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.     

The council approach to collective bargaining: A report on 3 real world precedents

What will come of the unique situation in public employment to test, develop, refine, and advocate new dimensions in all employer-employee relations? Experimentation is proceeding in several states with several different approaches. The most successful mechanisms may be combined into a total program and advocated—not only to other public employers—but to the private sector as well. The employee-council approach, discussed here, may be the most productive of the possibilities.     

The changing union and bargaining landscape: union concentration and collective bargaining trends

Unions in Western Europe have tended to merge in larger organisations, straddling across traditional bargaining demarcations. Despite the trend towards union concentration, cross‐national differences remain in the degree of fragmentation and the balance across private and public sectors. In the past years, wage moderation was common to nearly all bargaining systems, partly as a result of coordinated incomes policies or pattern‐setting wage settlements. Tripartite concertation has proven more difficult because of increased dissatisfaction with modest pay increases and insufficient employment effects.     

The future of collective bargaining

Kevin Hawkins argues that collective bargaining, long regarded as the most effective method of controlling industrial conflict, is no longer in accordance with accepted norms of behaviour. He contends that this is the most important single factor which should influence the future development of collective bargaining.     

Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment

This paper analyzes data from an investigation of a majoritarian bargaining experiment. A learning model is proposed to account for the evolution of play in this experiment. It is also suggested that an adjustment must be made to account for the panel structure of the data. Such adjustments have been used in other fields and are known to be important as unadjusted standard errors may be severely biased downward. These results indicate that this adjustment also has an important effect in this application. Furthermore, an efficient estimator that takes into account heterogeneity across players is proposed. A unique learning model to account for the paths of play under two different amendment rules cannot be rejected with the standard estimator with adjusted standard errors, however it can be rejected using the efficient estimator. The data and the estimated learning model suggest that after proposing “fair” divisions, subjects adapt and their proposals change rapidly in the treatment where uneven proposals are almost always accepted. Their beliefs in the estimated learning model are influenced by more than just the most recent outcomes.     

The reform of collective bargaining: a managerial revolution?

The company-based reform of collective bargaining has been frequently advocated as a way towards dramatic improvements in industrial relations. In this article the author tests this view against the available evidence, including a case study in a multi-plant manufacturing company.     

The effects of bargaining power on trade credit in a supply network

We develop a multi-tier supply network model, rooted in social network theory, to evaluate the effect of bargaining power on trade credit and to track the effect of buyers' trade credit on suppliers' trade credit. We apply social network analysis to measure companies' bargaining power in the supply network of Hennes & Mauritz AB (H&M, the Swedish clothing retailer). The results show that the buyer's bargaining power significantly affects the choice of trade credit, and that the supplier's “upstreamness” is significantly associated with its trade credit. We find limited evidence to support the notion of a financial bullwhip effect, a result that merits further research, since this study is limited to the network of one company up to its fourth tier of suppliers in one financial year. Our results can be applied by companies seeking to control their cash flow and, therefore, the financial pressure within their supply network. This study contributes to the literature by bringing social network measures into the buyer–supplier financial flow, as well as offering one of the first empirical examinations of the propagation of financial pressure in a multi-tier supply network.     

Collective bargaining and consensus: The potential of a laboratory training input

If collective bargaining is a form of conflict resolution, why hasn't laboratory training been used in negotiations, creating conditions of trust and providing consensus solutions to management-union problems?     

Threats and bargaining in capitalism a differential game view

The paper examines the Nash bargaining equilibrium in a simple model of growth and distribution formulated as a differential game between workers, who may save or consume, and capitalists, who may consume or invest. Optimal threats announced by the social classes to affect the negotiated solution to their own advantage are also derived. It is demonstrated that the workers' threat takes the form of refusing to save while capitalists threaten to refrain from investing. The threats as well as the possible gains from cooperation determine the players' relative importance or bargaining power. It is shown that capitalists are in general in a stronger bargaining position than workers. The dependence of the bargaining power on the parameters of the model is examined.     

With a little help from abroad: The effect of low-skilled immigration on the female labour supply

We examine whether and how the inflow of female immigrants who specialize in household production affects the labour supply of Italian women. To identify the causal effect, we exploit the family reunification motives and network effects (i.e., the tendency of newly arriving female immigrants to settle in places where males of the same country already live) which is used as an instrument for the geographical distribution of female foreign workers. We find that when the number of immigrants who provide household services is higher, native Italian women spend more time at work (intensive margin) without affecting their labour force participation (extensive margin). This impact is concentrated on highly skilled women whose time has a higher opportunity cost. These results also hold after a battery of robustness checks. We present some further evidence that is also consistent with the idea that the impact works through substitution in household work rather than complementarities in the production sector. Finally, we show that immigration arises as a substitute to publicly provided welfare services, although this phenomenon raises concerns regarding the fairness and sustainability of this private and informal welfare model.     

The role of employers in collective bargaining in Britain

Phil Beaumont and Mary Gregory seek to provide some substance to Alan Flanders’ long-held view that employers, in certain circumstances, have played a positive role in influencing the extent of collective bargaining arrangements in the UK.     

The transmission mechanism in a changing world

The paper aims to identify those factors that cause changes in the speed and strength of the international transmission of output shocks from the USA to specified European economies. These factors are identified through the use of generalized impulse response functions conditioned on histories defined by an abrupt transition VAR. The chosen transition variables comprise changes in exchange rates, financial prices, international capital flows, trade links and monetary policy instruments. Besides the identification of asymmetric responses, the proposed model is useful in analyzing the strong effect of the recent US recession on the European economies and changes in business cycle synchronization over time. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The advent of pattern bargaining in Irish industrial relations

Drawing on the international literature on pattern bargaining in Europe and other countries, the article examines the recent advent of pattern bargaining in Irish industrial relations. Qualitative and quantitative data are deployed to explore the genesis, features, institutional and economic context and future of pattern bargaining in Ireland.     

Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining

This paper investigates three distinctive and intuitive renegotiation bargaining protocols that all yield the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. These protocols, built on the multi-bidding procedure of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), allow more freedom in multilateral bargaining where rejected players can further negotiate and form coalitions. The self-duality of the Shapley value plays a key role in the second and third results. Moreover, these renegotiation protocols allow an actual play along the equilibrium path to restore the Shapley value in case of a ‘mistake’ made before.     

The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining

This paper demonstrates that firms hire and train workers efficiently in a matching and intrafirm bargaining economy when the Hosios condition holds and returns to scale are constant. This conclusion stands in contrast to the prevailing view that training costs are a source of inefficiency in imperfect labor markets. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large firms to take into account the negative impact of the training rate on the wages negotiated inside the firm through intrafirm bargaining: untrained workers accept a wage reduction in compensation for potential training that is accessible only following employment. This intrafirm bargaining process solves efficiency problems associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient hiring and training decisions. This conclusion holds true for both specific and general human capital.     

Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

Decisions in Economics and Finance - In this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a...     

Studying work in theory and practice: insights for a globalising academia from the IR trajectory in Italy

This article investigates the relevance of context to the study of industrial relations by analysing the trajectory of an under‐researched case outside the Anglo‐Saxon hotspots, Italy. Three phases are put under the spotlight revealing a trajectory anchored to the pluralist fulcrum, but with influence first from radical perspectives and then from unitarist ones.     

Commitment and strikes in wage bargaining

This paper analyzes the long-run strategic relationship between a firm and a union as a repeated bargaining game, where there is incomplete information on the player's motivation on both sides and each party has a fall-back position. The firm and the union will engage in a reputation-building activity, that will produce a limited number of strikes over time. The bargainer that succeeds in building up a reputation for toughness and obtains a favorable payoff in the long-run is, either the more patient (or alternatively the more centralized), or the party with a higher initial probability of stubbornness, or the party with a smaller fall-back position. Our model also offers predictions on the dependence of strike incidence over time on several parameters.     

The Henry George Theorem in a second-best world

The Henry George Theorem (HGT) states that, in first-best economies, the fiscal surplus of a city government that finances the Pigouvian subsidies for agglomeration externalities and the costs of local public goods by a 100% tax on land is zero at optimal city sizes. We extend the HGT to distorted economies where product differentiation and increasing returns are the sources of agglomeration economies and city governments levy property taxes. Without relying on specific functional forms, we derive a second-best HGT that relates the fiscal surplus to the excess burden expressed as an extended Harberger formula.