Does an Entrepreneurial Career Pay for Women in China?

Using data from the Chinese Household Income Project survey in 2013, our male–female pay‐gap decomposition illustrates that the gender earnings gap is larger among the self‐employed than the wage‐employed after controlling for the effect of various pay‐determining characteristics. Our self‐employed versus wage‐employed decomposition also controls for selection into self‐employment as well as those pay‐determining characteristics. We find that wage‐employed women would earn less than their current earnings if they shifted to self‐employment, while wage‐employed men would earn more than their current earnings if they became self‐employed. In essence, self‐employed women suffer from double jeopardy. They not only earn less than men in self‐employment due to lower returns for the same pay‐determining characteristics, but women in self‐employment also earn less than women in wage employment when they have the same pay‐determining characteristics.     

Back‐to‐Front Down Under? Part‐Time/Full‐Time Wage Differentials in Australia

We investigate part‐time full‐time hourly wage gaps using panel data from the first four waves of the new Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey. We find that, once unobserved individual heterogeneity has been taken into account, part‐time men and women typically earn an hourly pay premium. This premium varies with casual employment status, but is always positive. We advance some hypotheses as to why there is a part‐time pay advantage in Australia.     

Moving Up or Falling Behind? Gender,Promotions, and Wages in Canada

We estimate that Canadian women working full time are 1.8 percentage points less likely to be promoted, receive fewer promotions, and experience 2.8 percent less wage growth following promotions than similar men. Significant “family gaps” exist among women. Women without children are less likely to have been promoted than similar men but experience similar wage growth following promotions, while women with children are as likely to have been promoted but experience less wage growth following promotions. Weekly hours and overtime hours explain significant fractions of these gender gaps. Though not precisely estimated, gender gaps in promotions also exist among part‐time workers.     

Does Individualizing the Labor Contract Hurt Women?

The twenty‐first century has been marked by a retreat of the collective bargaining rights of public employees throughout the United States. This study exploits the variation in legal environments resulting from these reforms to estimate the causal impact of different collective bargaining policies on public employee compensation. Using data from the American Community Survey, results show a modest wage penalty at the aggregate level for employees covered by constraints on collective bargaining. However, this wage penalty is differential and is concentrated on women in all but one case—a legal environment in which collective bargaining over wages has either been prohibited or directly constricted, allowing governments to periodically institute wage freezes and caps on raises for public employees. In this case, a pre‐existing wage gap in which men earned more than women is disappearing as male and female earnings converge at a lower wage. The paper suggests that the long‐term effects of restricting collective bargaining occur through the individualization of the labor contract and should be examined along individual‐level characteristics, such as gender.     

Decentralized Wage Formation in Sweden

Recent Swedish collective bargaining agreements have incorporated provisions for local pay review talks and opportunities for individuals to negotiate their own wages. Using trade union data, we show that members who participate in local pay review talks and members who negotiate their own wages have significantly higher monthly wages than those who do not. Pay decentralization either improves an individual's bargaining position or attracts more productive trade union members. Either way, trade union wage policies to increase individual‐level wage variance are achieving their intended effects.     

Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy

Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid‐1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers' heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry‐wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial relations.     

The Gender Pay Gap for Private‐Sector Employees in Canada and Britain

The gender earnings differentials for private‐sector employees in Britain and Canada are similar, substantial and significant. Using linked employer–employee data, we show that women are more likely to be employed in low‐wage workplaces than men in both counties. After accounting for the workplace, women continue to earn less than comparable men. Although men and women face a more equal pay structure within their workplace than they do across workplaces, a substantial portion of the gender pay gap in both countries remains unexplained by the individual characteristics or workplace effects considered in this study.     

Minimum Wages and Collective Bargaining: What Types of Pay Bargaining Can Foster Positive Pay Equity Outcomes?

Using data from interviews and collective agreements in five European countries, this article analyses the relationship between collective bargaining and the minimum wage. In a context of changing minimum wage policy and competing government objectives, the findings illuminate how pay bargaining strategies of trade unions and employers shape the pay equity effects of minimum wage policy. Two general forms are identified: direct responses to a changing national minimum wage, and responses to the absence or weakness of a national minimum wage. The article explains how particular intersections of minimum wage policy and collective bargaining, together with country and sector contingencies, shape the form of pay bargaining and pay equity outcomes.     

Who Works for Whom and the UK Gender Pay Gap

This study reports novel facts about the UK gender pay gap. We use a representative, longitudinal and linked employer–employee dataset for 2002–2016. Men's average log hourly wage was 22 points higher than women's in this period. We find that 16 per cent of this raw pay gap is accounted for by estimated firm-specific wage effects. This is almost three times the amount explained by gender occupation differences. When we decompose a pre-adjusted measure of the pay gap, we find less than 1 percentage point or a 6 per cent share is accounted for by the gender allocation across high- and low-wage firms. In other words, only a small share of what is traditionally referred to as the ‘unexplained’ part of the pay gap is explained by the differences between men and women in whom they work for.     

Global Collective Bargaining on Flag of Convenience Shipping

The most significant case of transnational union bargaining co‐ordination in existence is in the maritime shipping industry. A global union association, the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), and a global employers’ federation, the International Maritime Employers’ Committee (IMEC), now negotiate over pay scales for seafarers on Flag of Convenience (FOC) ships. These negotiations set the pattern for pay and working conditions for a signifi‐cant portion of the global seafaring work‐force. The ITF brought about global wage bargaining by building and enforcing a global inter‐union consensus between developed and developing countries around a uniform wage rate.     

The Part‐Time Wage Gap in Norway: How Large is It Really?

Norwegian working‐life legislation has strict rules against discrimination between full‐time and part‐time work. Partly as a consequence of this, a large proportion of Norwegian women work part‐time. The purpose of this paper is to establish whether there are systematic differences between part‐time and full‐time workers regarding the selection process and earnings capacity. We find wage differences between part‐time and full‐time workers are small in Norway, and there is no evidence of systematic selection bias. The results may be explained by some features of the Norwegian labour market, including, equal rights for part‐time workers, strict rules against the discrimination of part‐time workers, and a generous family policy enabling women to combine work and family life.     

Collective Bargaining and Wage Dispersion in Europe

The level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining wage levels and wage inequalities. Two different situations are considered: a first in which bargaining is only ‘multi‐employer’, and a second in which it is ‘multi‐level’, in the sense that workers can be covered by both a ‘multi‐employer’ and a ‘single‐employer’ contract at the same time. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of these different institutional settings on pay dispersion. The study is carried out using the European Structure of Earnings Survey, which is a large dataset containing detailed matched employer–employee information for the year 1995. The countries analysed are Italy, Belgium and Spain. The empirical results generally show that wages of workers covered by only a ‘multi‐employer’ contract are no more compressed than those of workers covered by both ‘multi‐employer’ and ‘single‐employer’ contracts. This implies that where workers are not covered by single‐employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers.     

Pay Secrecy and the Gender Wage Gap in the United States

Legislators and advocates claim that pay secrecy perpetuates the gender wage gap and that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) should be amended to outlaw these practices. Using a difference‐in‐differences fixed‐effects human‐capital wage regression, I find that women with higher education levels who live in states that have outlawed pay secrecy have higher earnings, and that the wage gap is consequently reduced. State bans on pay secrecy and federal legislation to amend the FLSA to allow workers to share information about their wages may improve the gender wage gap, especially among women with college or graduate degrees.     

Collective Bargaining and Within-firm Wage Dispersion in Spain

This paper analyses the effect of collective bargaining on within‐firm wage dispersion for the case of Spain. What is relevant in the Spanish case is to compare the effect of the two basic levels of bargaining (firm and sector) on wage dispersion. By using the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, this paper concludes that collective agreements at firm level have a negative effect on wage dispersion. At the same time, firms that have signed these types of agreements show greater wage dispersion than those covered by agreements at the sector level, owing to the positive and compensating effect of firms’ and workers’ features.     

Generating Equality? Equal Pay,Decentralization and the Electricity Supply Industry

Despite the existence of effective equal pay legislation in the UK since 1975 aimed at eradicating pay discrimination, women are still in receipt of only 79.5 per cent of the hourly earnings received by men (EOR 1994b). Whitehouse (1992) claims that a centralized collective bargaining model is more likely to lead to equality for women in the labour market than a liberalized individualistic model. The model was tested at an aggregated level for 13 OECD countries. This article provides a case study which charts a trade union claim for equal pay over a period often years (1984–94), which may be seen as an examination of the Whitehouse proposition at a disaggregated level. The paper highlights the barriers to equality bargaining and analyses the case study to identify the criteria necessary for achieving equality.     

The Greek Public Sector Wage Premium before the Crisis: Size,Selection and Relative Valuation of Characteristics

We examine the Greek public–private wage differential before the debt crisis to evaluate the prospective impact of the recent public sector pay cuts. We find a large public premium which persists after controlling for individual and job characteristics. For men, much of this is accounted for by self‐selection into the sector that rewards better their characteristics, while for women it is largely driven by sectoral differences in returns. We attribute these effects to more egalitarian pay structures in the public sector and to demand problems in the private sector. The recent policy measures only partially change this situation, as wage deflation extends to the private sector, preserving public premia for the low paid.     

The Coverage of Collective Pay-setting Institutions in Britain, 1895–1990

Fewer than 50% of British employees now have their pay and conditions affected by collective pay-setting institutions — collective bargaining or wages councils. This paper charts the historical context for the current picture of a decollectivized Britain, constructing a time series on coverage from 1895 to 1990. Extant estimates and sources of coverage data are presented and discussed alongside estimates drawn from a source used only sparingly before now — the number of workers affected by changes in wage rates of national agreements or wage orders. The recent decline in collective bargaining coverage is the most prolonged ever recorded and has been noticeably steeper than the fall in union density, such that the proportion of British workers covered is lower now than in the 1940s. With the abolition of wages councils in 1993, collective pay-setting machinery now affects the pay and conditions of fewer workers than it did in the 1930s.     

The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm‐Level Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland

This paper uses a linked employer‐employee dataset to analyze the impact of institutional wage bargaining regimes on average labor costs and within‐firm wage dispersion in private sector companies in Ireland. The results show that while centralized bargaining reduced labor costs within both the indigenous and foreign‐owned sectors, the relative advantage was greater among foreign‐owned firms. The analysis suggests that there are potentially large competitiveness gains to multinational companies that locate in countries implementing a centralized bargaining system. Furthermore, the results provide additional support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within‐firm wage inequality.     

Immigration, Ethnic Wage Differentials and Output Pay in Canada

Recent work suggests that ethnic minority wage differentials in Canada are smaller among those receiving performance pay and that the returns to performance pay are larger for ethnic minorities. This article adds to these findings. First, it demonstrates critical gender differences. The earlier findings are generated almost exclusively by males, as we show that the minority wage differential is small or zero for women in both the time rate sector and the performance pay sector. Second, accounting for immigration and language tends to move the ethnic wage differential in favour of minorities. Minority women on output pay are shown to earn more than non-minority women. While the differential often remains negative for minority men on time rates, it becomes insignificant in our most narrow comparison.     

Wage councils,product markups and wage markdowns: Evidence from Uruguay

In 2005, after a leftist coalition won the national election for the first time, Uruguay returned to sector-level wage bargaining councils with active government participation. We estimate product markups and wage markdowns using firm-level data for the period 2002–2016, and report decreasing wage markdowns and increasing -to a lesser extent- firm-level product markups. We find statistically significant impacts of minimum mandated wages on product markups and wage markdowns, and additional effects of unions on wage markdowns. The evidence suggests that firms operate in monopsonistic labor markets. Though their bargaining power in the labor market was reduced over time as a result of wage councils, firms were able to pass a sizable part of the increases in labor costs to consumers.