非理性征地补偿的制度诱因

我国现行征地补偿的非理性来自征地制度本身：征地补偿原则回避被征土地的真实价值,不符合“等价交换”的市场规则;征地补偿依据掩盖土地的预期收益并使补偿趋于最小化;征地补偿方法缺少科学的理论基础,使政府定价成为现实。因此,只有重新构建适应市场经济的征地制度框架,才有可能使征地补偿回归理性。     

嵌入讨价还价博弈的经营者报酬对公司绩效影响研究

文章研究表明:董事会与CEO之间的权力博弈是影响CEO报酬和公司绩效关系的重要因素.中国国有上市公司董事会与CEO之间的博弈扭曲了CEO报酬机制,损害了CEO报酬对公司绩效的促进作用,应当从博弈的制度环境入手矫正上述博弈机制,理顺CEO报酬机制的作用机理.     

高流动性对我国企业劳资冲突的影响——基于完全非完美信息动态博弈模型的分析

国际金融危机持续扩散蔓延,我国劳动力市场呈现出高流动性的特征。文章根据金融危机下我国企业劳资冲突的现状构建博弈模型,分析国际金融危机下劳动力市场高流动性对我国企业劳资冲突的影响。结论是：无论是国有企业还是非国有企业,劳动力的高流动性都可能会使原本不可置信的威胁变成现实。在非国有企业中,要做好使工人回复序贯理性的工作,搞好再就业与创业。另外,我们必须考虑国有企业面临金融危机时,是不是应该以摆脱包袱为改制的唯一目的。而且,即使实行了私有化的改制,就必须采取措施让工人意识到他们的权益不会被侵犯。     

An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This “holdout problem” is a common feature of the land‐assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi‐person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff‐improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi‐period bargaining treatments relative to single‐period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi‐period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single‐period treatments, both with and without delay costs.     

Compensation negotiation and corporate governance: the evidence from China

This paper examines CEO pay dispersion for the listed companies in China. We apply a two-tier stochastic frontier model to the CEO compensation framework where asymmetric information generates a surplus between the minimum wage that CEOs accept and the maximum payment that firms offer. This surplus leads to CEO pay dispersion coming from the negotiation power between the CEO and the firm. We generate the surplus extracted by each CEO-firm pair and analyze how corporate governance affects them. An empirical analysis finds that: (1) On average, CEOs are paid 23.26% more than the benchmark; (2) additionally, we examine the bargaining power in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We find that CEOs in SOEs have less bargaining power due to compensation regulations. We then examine compensation for new CEOs hired externally and find that CEOs hired externally have less bargaining power on average; and (3) corporate governance has a significant effect on the salary bargaining power of each agent. More specifically, the CEO-Chairman dummy has a significant positive effect on the bargaining power of firms and CEOs, but the latter is larger. Board size has a negative effect on both. Independent directors help improve the bargaining power of the firms and board meeting times help enhance the bargaining power of the CEOs. Equity concentration has a significant negative effect on both sides.     

双重二元经济条件下失地农民经济补偿问题研究

在农村与城市、计划与市场的双重二元经济条件下,失地农民问题日显突出。由于地方政府权力定位不当、村集体所有权虚置等原因,农民经济补偿方面存在较大分歧。本文简述了失地农民现状,分析了现行征地补偿安置标准,指出了失地农民经济补偿问题,并提出了相关对策。     

Is Audit Committee Equity Compensation Related to Audit Fees?*

Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.     

征地制度改革与发展方式转变

建立市场经济体制以后,国家征地补偿依然延续计划经济时期的做法,使农民不能参与工业化、城市化进程,不能分享土地增值收益,导致社会矛盾激化。我国目前发展方式存在的主要问题是资源粗放利用,低效、浪费;吃子孙饭,透支未来;发展成果不能共享,利益分配不公,社会矛盾日渐突出。这都与现行征地制度有着直接或间接的关系。因此,转变发展方式,必须进一步解放思想,从根本上改变现行征地制度。     

农村土地征收补偿原则研究

我国现行土地补偿采用不完全补偿原则,造成了我国现行土地征收补偿的不完全、不科学和不合理。不仅损害了农民的权益,更在一定程度上加剧了土地征收权的滥用。因此,本文就我国现行土地补偿原则加以研究,分析得出应在立足我国国情的基础上,借鉴国外土地征收公平补偿原则,建设具有中国特色土地征收补偿原则。     

Endogenous,Intra‐household Decision‐making and its Impact on the Labor Supply of Couples in Rural India*

Using data for rural India, this paper analyzes households' labor supply decision‐making, taking into consideration non‐participation, endogenous intrahousehold bargaining and nutritional status. Analyses of unitary and collective models suggest that bargaining between household members forms the basis of households' decisions, and these decisions alter households' internal power balance. Analysis of households' internal bargaining process suggests that women's bargaining power increases when their wages are higher and they are better educated. The results indicate that it is crucial to account for the mechanics of decision‐making within households when studying the effects of changing labor market conditions or designing development policies to improve individual well‐being or to empower women.     

征地补偿与农村减贫

征地后农业收入及土地权益的减少会阻碍农户家庭经济水平的提高,但征地补偿的存在可以扩大农户生产经营的可选集,为持续提高农户家庭经济水平,促进农村减贫提供了必要前提。基于中国家庭收入调查中2013年的农村住户数据,文章设立了以家庭财富为基础的农户经济水平的衡量指标,并建立三元联合分布计量模型,在处理了内生性问题的基础上研究了征地和征地补偿对农户贫困的影响。研究发现,征地过程中减贫效应起主要作用,征地能够显著增加农户财富,促进农村减贫。征地的减贫效应存在异质性：征用宅基地形式下的减贫效应最为显著,征用耕地时效果则会下降;不同补偿方式下的减贫效应存在差异,资金补偿和非资金补偿组合下的征地减贫效应最强,而单独资金补偿的减贫效应最弱;征地减贫效应在东部地区、市场化水平较高的情况下及高财富农户中更加明显。处理效应结果表明资金补偿和非资金补偿的组合能够为农户带来最多的财富收益,具体为233578.8元。最后文章还检验了征地的影响机制,发现征地补偿是征地减贫效应的重要实现途径之一,但不是唯一途径,补偿在征地的减贫效应中起部分中介作用,其效应所占比重约为59.5%。文章结论表明政府征地不仅有助于国家现代化建设,还具有促进农户减贫,推动农村发展的作用。     

从我国土地征用制度的变迁论土地征用制度的完善

文章在回顾和总结我国土地征用制度变迁的基础上,总结出我国土地征用制度具有实行相当补偿原则、补偿金额较低、重视安置责任等特点。并针对以上特点,从严格土地征用制度、有条件实行完全补偿原则等方面提出了完善土地征用制度的对策建议。     

Risk Aversion and Wages: Evidence from the Baseball Labor Market

We develop a bargaining model to assess how workers and employers might allocate wages inter-temporally in order to cope with risk. We then apply this model to 106 long-term contracts for major league baseball players’ services. Most of these agreements not only smooth employee compensation over time but suggest greater relative risk aversion for teams than players. Compared to the wages they might pay to retain these players on a succession of one-year contracts, teams often pay a premium on longer-term agreements to protect against market volatility and potential inability to replace a key player on the open market.     

农村土地征收补偿的法律问题探讨

近年来,随着工业化、城市化的迅猛发展,土地征收过程中的问题和矛盾日渐突出,已经成为构建和谐社会、建设社会主义新农村的制约性瓶颈。本文通过对我国现行农村土地征收补偿制度存在问题的剖析,探讨了土地征收补偿制度的缺陷,并提出了完善我国土地征收补偿制度的建议。     

伊宁县失地农民补偿安置问题调查分析

随着市场经济的快速发展,城市化进程的不断加快,建设用地逐渐增多,占用大量土地的问题越来越突出,由于补偿标准低、补偿项目缺失且范围狭窄、补偿方式单一、补偿费落实不到位等问题,严重损害了农民的利益,影响了社会稳定。因此,对伊宁县失地农民补偿问题进行了调查及分析,以更深一步了解伊宁县失地农民补偿现状及存在问题,并在此基础上提出改进措施,从而保障失地农民的权益,进而促进生活水平的提高。     

Does Land Rent between Acquaintances Deviate from the Reference Point? Evidence from Rural China

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates whether acquaintance networks influence the deviation of land rent from the reference point advanced by Hart and Moore. The coefficient of variance and the range of land rent are used to represent the degree of deviation from the reference point. Based on village‐level data from the 2015 China Household Finance Survey, the estimated results indicate that land rent between acquaintances is more likely to significantly deviate from the reference point. Although rental transactions are conducted between acquaintances, larger deviations from the reference are also associated with a longer time to close deals. Our analysis using household‐level data further supports our findings, indicating that land rental markets embedded in the acquaintance networks of rural China are in a transition period and have characteristics of both relational and market orientation. The policy makers should introduce more outer village lessees or other market ingredients to increase the voluntary marketization of land rentals inside acquaintance networks.     

The land question in KwaZulu: Is land reform necessary?

Land reform in the ‘homelands’ depends on whether or not a viable economy can emerge in these areas. If not, the only alternative may be to accept the failure of rural development and follow the new state policy line of ‘positive urbanization’. Outside the limits of state policy, the apparent consensus on freehold tenure may be illusory. Black‐held priorities for land appear to differ at base from those held up by white groups. White business interests want to see large‐scale commercial farming, while blacks want the free and secure right to hold and deal in land, together with a right to use rural land for residential purposes.

There is renewed international interest in land reform. Some of the Far Eastern market economies have obtained startling rises in production under a reform regime of owner‐operated mini‐farms. It is doubtful if this type of reform is appropriate in KwaZulu, where the tenure system already strongly protects the universal right to hold land, and where the community's small role in land matters is still important to local self‐organization capacity. More appropriate models might be found in Zimbabwe and China, which have also achieved sharp rises in small‐farm production without full freehold tenure. Zimbabwe's village committee system recognizes existing land rights and allows for substantial local option. In China, decentralization policies seem to be encouraging a new rural economy in which most of the population may eventually be absorbed into self‐generated nonfarm activity. This kind of enterprise‐led rural development, may offer a possible pattern for KwaZulu.     

论西方市场征收制度及其对我国土地征收立法的借鉴

市场征收法律制度是在以市场交换为资源主要配置机制的社会中产生的一种土地征收法律制度,市场调节机制和土地私有制对土地征收制度产生了巨大的影响,充分地体现公共利益、公正程序、公平补偿、公权保障等方面的特点.这些特点对于克服我国现行土地征收法律制度存在的缺陷,重构具有中国特色的土地征收制度有着重要意义.     

Competitive fairness and the concept of a fair price under Delaware law on M&A

The entire fairness test that the Delaware Court of Chancery developed in the famous Technicolor case defines what constitutes fair dealings and fair pricing. This study introduces a new concept of fairness, called competitive fairness, that covers entire fairness. It develops what I call open market bargaining theory and demonstrates that the Technicolor outcome is an open market bargaining equilibrium, which can be thought as competitively fair under the nondiscrimination rule of markets.     

Market Structure and Audit Fees: A Local Analysis*

This study conducts a local analysis of the relation between market structure and audit fees. The research question of interest to us is how audit fees are determined by each practicing local office, after taking into account the auditor's own position in a local market and the influence exerted by his or her clients. Appealing to the economic theories of monopoly and monopsony power, we hypothesize a positive audit fee‐concentration relation, and a negative audit fee‐client influence relation. Results indicate that auditor market concentration is positively associated with the non‐Big 6 audit fees but is unrelated to the Big 6 audit fees. Evidence is mixed concerning the client influence hypothesis. When this construct is proxied by the number of rival auditors operating within a geographic area centered on the municipality, the prediction of negative audit fee‐client influence relation is strongly supported for both groups of auditors. Results are much weaker using measures developed based on the relative importance of a municipal client to its auditor's audit portfolio. The issues addressed in this study are important at a time when the Canadian municipal sector is undergoing major changes because of municipal amalgamation, altering the underlying market structure for audit services and the bargaining position of a municipality vis‐Ã‐vis its auditor. More broadly speaking, our analysis implies that when assessing an auditor's report for signs of client pressure, the professional oversight bodies and regulatory authorities need to consider the relative, rather than the absolute, bargaining position of the client in question.