Learning intuition--less college and more kindergarten: the leader's challenge

Learning to think instinctually and to depend on our intuition means, for many of us, going back to kindergarten and focusing more on our instinctual side to balance the linear approach that we've learned in many college and business school courses. It also means building time into our lives for reflection and allowing our brains the time to reorganize the events of our lives into patterns that we will recognize in the future. The process of the incubating experience and data in our minds over time will build the intuition and instincts that will help us all to learn how to be great leaders (Gardner, 1995). We can learn much from the training of clinicians in pattern recognition and intuitive analysis of clinical situations. Many of us who were clinicians first understand the intuitive side of clinical practice and of administrative practice because we were educated in both worlds. We have the advantage of knowing the concepts of intuitive thinking and must remember to apply those concepts daily to our practices in leadership. Toffler said "You can use all the quantitative data you can get, but you still have to distrust it and use your own intelligence and judgment" (Boone, 1999, p. 80). As we acquire more experience and wisdom, we learn to trust our own intelligence and judgment. What we came to know in kindergarten is as valuable as the analytical knowledge we have since acquired. In leadership, we will do well to remember our clinical roots and to continually hone our skills in intuition and thinking with our gut.     

基于教学过程的大学生可雇佣性能力培养途径研究

提高可雇佣性技能是解决大学生就业难问题的重要途径之一。地方性高校人才培养中必须重视课堂教学中可雇佣性技能开发,建设＂双师型＂师资队伍,创新可雇用性的教学方法和教学内容,并积极探索校企合作课堂教学,强调校内的课程实验、案例课堂教学、课程作业、毕业论文与设计、社团活动、职业资格证书考核等内容,管理好校外的专业见习、专业实习、毕业实习等环节,将可雇佣性技能有效融入实践教学和课堂教学之中,以求提高大学生可雇佣性能力。     

视唱的调性技术与歌唱艺术

在视唱练习中,听、跟、学、丢,这四个字是由易到难所排列的,一环扣住一环。应循序渐进地以钢琴由"重"到"轻"地引导由"轻"到"重"的人声来把握调性技术。再由最基本的几个要点一项项地体会歌唱艺术。此外,必须同时讲求三到:口到、手到、心到。     

The averaging mechanism

We consider two-person bargaining games and we assume that the agents want to apply two possibly different bargaining solutions. Problems arise if the allocations chosen by these bargaining solutions do not coincide. We propose a mechanism which mimics a step-by-step bargaining procedure in order to resolve such a conflict and give a characterization of the mechanism.     

Industry-Level Wage Bargaining: A Partial Rehabilitation—The German Experience

In order to reduce unemployment, it is often recommended that industry-level wage bargaining in Germany should be replaced by a more decentralized system. This paper provides a critical assessment of the current wage bargaining institutions and re-examines the case for a more decentralized system. Based on a theoretical model integrating Insider–Outsider aspects into the comparison, the uniformly superior employment performance of a decentralized wage bargaining system is questioned. We conclude that, rather than solely trying to decentralize wage bargaining, a promising policy option may be to improve the skills of the unemployed by efficient labour market policies and to foster institutional reforms such that wage bargaining takes account of the long-run employment consequences of wage setting.     

Communication in bargaining over decision rights

This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. We introduce two different bargaining mechanisms: tacit and explicit bargaining. In tacit bargaining, an uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to the agent, who then decides whether to accept or reject the offer. In the equilibrium of the game, the principal inefficiently screens out some agent types so that the agent's private information cannot be fully utilized when the decision is made. In explicit bargaining in which parties can communicate explicitly via cheap talk before tacit bargaining, however, an equilibrium with no such inefficient screening exists even when the conflict of interest is arbitrarily large. We also follow a mechanism design approach, showing that under certain conditions, explicit bargaining is an optimal bargaining mechanism that maximizes the joint surplus of the parties.     

Death is not an option, how you die is--reflections from a career in oncology nursing

With a combined career of over 60 years in oncology nursing, the authors reflect on the critical elements in the question, "How can we afford to die?" Three high-profile patient scenarios in three different decades promised to improve use of advance directives but did not. Recent societal events, including the debates about health care reform, have brought attention again to end-of-life issues and care. Quickly approaching a "perfect storm" of an aging population, an inefficient and costly illness-oriented health care system, and health care profession shortages, the United States will not be able to afford delivering futile interventions. Nurses, who are consistently seen as the most trusted professionals, must take action in strategies the authors present.     

Moving toward zero: the leader's mandate

Converting to a culture that strives for perfection and accepts no less than zero defects is the work of leadership in health care today. Some cultures are made up of people who believe that average is good enough. The challenge of the leader is to break up those beliefs and embed new models of "Yes We Can." The leader must communicate four very effective messages that must go along with the passion for the work: (a) evidence and "best practice" data trump local, opinion-based beliefs; (b) morphing from an internal view of best practice to a national/international view of practices within and outside health care; (c) transparency; and (d) KISS: "Keep It Simple, Stupid.'     

UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations

We develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationale for the difference in the method of negotiation, depending on the nature of the conflict. We distinguish those negotiations that take place previous to a potential conflict (peacekeeping), and negotiations inside the conflict (peacemaking). In these contexts, we study the role of a mediator who tries to achieve a certain balance between the efficiency of the agreement and the equality of the final sharing. We show that the credibility of the mediator comes from her willingness to impose delays in the negotiation, even if that implies costs. We also find how the player with a “weak” bargaining position in a conflict can strategically profit from the mediator's quest for equality. Finally, we show how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one.     

A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

This note considers a two-sided multi-issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same “side” may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues. The note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlements that they yield. In particular the note examines the possibility that group heterogeneity (conflicting priorities) may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement. The different potential outcomes that are implied by the different procedures explain why we often observe such intense negotiation over bargaining procedures. Moreover, the conflict over procedure can be substantial, among parties with common interest as well as between opposing players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.     

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.     

Implications of nurse-physician relations: report of a successful intervention

Given the evidence linking medical errors to ineffective communication, strategies for improving communication among health care professionals must be implemented. The purpose of this article was to examine the effect of a collaborative intervention on improving communication patterns between nurses and physicians on two study units. The intervention consisted of two nurses and two physicians (per unit) meeting together (8 hours total) to collaboratively develop a solution to communication issues on their respective units. Physicians scored significantly higher on reports of openness of communication within groups, openness between groups, accuracy between groups, and collaboration between groups. Collaboration reported among nurses and physicians improved for both professions, with significance reached for physicians (p = 0.031). Strategies must be identified to break down the barriers set by the current culture, and that expedite the development of a team-centered culture supporting collaborative relations among health care professionals.     

Bargaining Credibility and the Limits to Within‐firm Pensions

Abstract ** ** Résumé en fin d’article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resúmen al fin del artículo. : A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low‐risk investment policy for firms which offer within‐house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined.     

Multilateral Bargaining Problems

In many situations in economics and political science there are gains from forming coalitions but conflict over which coalition to form and how to distribute the gains. This paper presents an approach to suchmultilateral bargaining problems. Asolutionto a multilateral bargaining problem specifies an agreement for each coalition that is consistent with the bargaining process in every coalition. We establish the existence of such solutions, show that they are determined by reservation prices, and characterize these reservation prices as the payoffs ofsubgame perfect equilibrium outcomesof a non-cooperative bargaining model.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, C78.     

校企结合,共建财务管理专业新机制

财务管理是一门理论与实践并重的学科,然而传统的教学中存在着理论脱离实践、重理论而轻实践的问题,校企结合、共建财务管理专业为解决这一问题提供了一种新思路。校企合作、共建财务管理专业,有助于高校加强课程体系建设和教学内容改革;有助于将学生的所学与企业的所需联合起来,有利于提高学生解决问题能力;有助于企业的可持续发展。     

Staff nurse financial management committees--the nurse manager's guide to effective financial performance

As Cohen states (1991, p. 25), "The future role that nursing will play in the health care delivery system is one of many major issues faced by contemporary nursing...Nursing must be able to determine realistically the cost of and evaluate the effectiveness of nursing care provided to its patients." A unit-based financial management committee is one very effective way of teaching the skills needed for the professional nurse to advance the practice in financial management. This will help nursing gain the professional status that they have always worked for. But beyond these very lofty ideals, a staff nurse managed financial management committee can make the nurse manager's life much easier. Staff nurses need to understand and accept the importance of managing the financial as well as the quality side of patient care. When this happens, the budget becomes theirs. Nurses develop a sense of ownership of the budget and learn how to effectively manage the unit's finances. Much staff nurse brain power is not used. Systems must be developed to access nurses' effective ideas for financial management--first in a financial management committee and then on the unit. Not only will this develop the professional status that nurses need and deserve, but it will also impact the cost of health care. In a society where the cost of an appendectomy requires Dayton Hudson to sell 39,000 Ninja Turtle action figures, Atlantic Richfield to sell 192,000 gallons of gas a day, Anheuser-Busch to sell 11,627 6-packs of 12 oz.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Expanding scope of practice: inter-professional collaboration or conflict?

With the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, interdisciplinary fights are becoming more public with more to come. Currently, the most visible fight is over scope of practice (SOP) expansion, state laws that govern advanced practice nursing and vary idiosyncratically by state. Until there is an expansion of SOP, APNs in many states will not be able to provide services to the fullest extent of their training and knowledge, skills, and experience and patients will continue to go without care. For physicians, the values and identity associated with the history of the medical profession being dominant transcend the policy details and budgetary considerations that might be viewed as "interests. For nursing, the values for trust and professional recognition associated with providing high-quality care to all is central to the profession's identity and transcend the interest-based conflict. A mediator can challenge thought leaders from both professions to acknowledge their core values, to facilitate discussions in which each side accepts those aspects of the other's values that it can agree with, and then build on those shared beliefs.     

Making the trains run safely on time: how competent is the organization where you work?

A competent institution is characterized by individual and collective knowledge, skills, and attitudes that enable an organization to operate effectively. In the context of patient safety, a competent organization is one whose structures and processes enable care that is safe, effective, patient centered, timely, efficient, and equitable. Nurses and all health care professionals function best when the systems in which they work are competent and enable them to provide high-quality care. It's time hospitals and other organizations are held accountable for being competent in quality and patient safety, when nurses and other health care professionals are being called upon to do the same.     

On leadership organizational intelligence/organizational stupidity: the leader's challenge

Creating organizations with a high IQ or creating organizations without the necessary intelligence guarantees success or failure of the organization. Without structures such as shared leadership and other forms of participative management, the organization or unit cannot access and use the available information and wisdom in the organization. When nurses and other health care professionals do not feel like they have a shared stake and do not feel like citizens of the organization, they lack passion for the organization's work. When nurses feel a sense of share ownnership and autonomy for the clinical practice, terrific outcomes are achieved. Leaders must accept the challenge to build the infrastructure that leads to excellence in organizational IQ.