Third Party Effects of Groundwater Law in the United States:

A bstract . Groundwater is an increasingly important component in the nation's total water supply. Although groundwater is one of this nation's most abundant resources, falling water tables and contamination episodes have caused localized water shortages. This has led to news media accounts describing water supply as our nation's next natural resource crisis. The problem with groundwater supply can be attributed in part to the current system of incomplete property rights. This, in combination with the common pool characteristics of underground water and other third party effects, has resulted in technical and allocative inefficiency. Groundwater hydrology , common property, contamination, and other third party effects are examined in seeking the causes of the current water crisis .     

再论会计契约:基于产权理论的会计本质考察

会计有其固有属性和决定因素,但从不同历史时期、不同角度、不同研究者去考察会得出不同结论。从产权理论视角来考察,会计本质是以企业财产权利为基础的各种契约集合体。在现实会计工作中,会计工作的空间范围由"会计契约"构成,会计工作的任何秩序均来源于契约,会计工作的目的在于履行和解除契约。研究会计契约有利于拓展会计学研究领域,为我国制定更加科学的会计准则服务。     

台湾公营事业民营化的发展及其对大陆的启示

台湾自1953年公布"公营事业移转民营条例"正式推动民营化政策至今,其历史已超过50年,文章从民营化法令修订更迭历程分析其趋势,发现台湾公营事业民营化的政策朝加强员工权益保障、容许部分民营化、重视公股管理等趋向发展,据此对大陆公营事业民营化政策推动提出5项启示供参考。     

温州企业债务危机:强产权、弱制度研究

一个产权应该有一束制度围绕着它进行配置,且要一贯地执行下去,才能从最初的产权和制度两个事物融合为"产权制度"这一个事物。当制度的执行力不强时,就会形成强产权、弱制度的局面。温州企业债务危机表明了企业属性明确和发展权不被执行的强产权、弱制度格局。本文提出以下建议:提升"产权+制度"的认识高度;加强产权与制度的融合度;强化制度执行力。     

Social welfare,corruption and credibility

Abstract

Economic development requires that investments by entrepreneurs are not subject to expropriation by government. Unfortunately, public agencies often serve as the instruments by which political elites engage in corruption and extracting rents from the economy. The question is how to design institutions that credibly commit to a stable system of guarantees of property rights and contract enforcement.

Principal agent theory and the new public management favor greater accountability of public managers to elected officials or eliminating public agencies through privatization. We argue for institutional designs that provide a degree of public agency autonomy. We show that public agency autonomy is a by-product of the competition between elites in democracies with multiple veto players. We show that transparency, professionalism, and legality help ensure that public managers do not engage in rent-extraction. The institutional design problem is how to induce public managers to serve the public interest without being fully responsive to elected political officials.     

高校知识产权管理现状研究——对河南省高校的实证分析

河南省现有高校82所,与教育规模迅速扩张相比,市场急需人才的培养和面向经济建设主战场的技术创新却相对滞后。我省高校专利申请总量偏少的问题日益突出,高校知识产权工作形势严峻并亟待加强。从河南省专利申请与授权数量与国内发达省市的横向比较和河南省内的纵向比较入手,分析了河南省高校知识产权管理现状;接着从知识产权观念、知识产权管理机构、知识产权管理制度等方面,分析了河南省知识产权管理中存在的问题以及原因;最后从政府层面、高校层面以及企业层面提出了加强高校知识产权管理的建议。     

A policy proposal for natural resource management in the rainforest of Madre de Dios,Peru: The concession system and land tenure reform

Madre de Dios in south-eastern Peru, like other tropical regions, faces important threats that are resulting in a loss of forest resources. The predominant types of land tenure in the rural zones of Madre de Dios are mining, agricultural and forestry concessions of land given by each Ministry to the settlers. Concessionaires fail to act as owners, because concession contracts do not guarantee secure property rights. Short-term non-sustainable land uses are favored over sustained management practices. The way in which people use the natural resources depends upon the allocation of rights over those resources. Considering communal property as a policy proposal: a system of land tenure which does not facilitate legal titling of the lands occupied by settlers and loggers will continue to hinder the possibility of developing sustainable long-term management strategies. In this article, the main proposal for a policy reform is that the land tenure system of concessions currently employed by the Peruvian government must be replaced with the assignment of legal communal land titles to the settlers' communities (not to isolated individuals) who are currently occupying forest lands in the region. The communal land titles would create an incentive for privately motivated group management of the forests, which could help reverse some of the wasteful and indiscriminate uses of land currently government-owned.     

组织资本会计的产权经济学

本文通过对企业组织资本的产权分析,基于其“不可分性”与“外部性”的基本属性与特征,认为它是企业的一种特殊的共有产权;在此基础上,根据产权与会计的关系,对其会计制度的初步设计进行了探讨。     

北京市农村集体经济组织产权制度改革模式与政策建议

近几年来,北京市大力推进以“资产变股权、农民当股东”为基本方向,以发育社区股份合作制为主要形式的农村集体经济组织产权制度改革,形成了“近郊全面推开,远郊扩大试点”的局面。本文总结了北京市农村集体经济组织产权制度改革的四种模式,分析了在改革的实践过程中出现的各种矛盾和问题,提出了进一步推进北京市农村集体经济组织产权制度改革应坚持的基本原则和政策建议。     

PEASANTS AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Land is the main – if not the only – asset for a majority of people in developing countries. The definition and allocation of rights over land are thus naturally essential aspects of individuals’ daily lives, as well as critical determinants of social and economic development. The privatization of land rights has long been seen as a necessary process, enhancing both efficiency and equity. However, privatized land rights have not always emerged endogenously, while exogenously driven programs of land privatization have not always been successful nor popular. This has raised questions about the expected benefits of land rights privatization. This paper aims at summarizing the main arguments and studies, both theoretical and empirical, on this issue, with a specific focus on the factors that can make privatization inefficient or detrimental for the most concerned individuals.     

水治理改革背景下中澳水核算创新比较与借鉴

中国和澳大利亚均面临水资源短缺、且时空分布不均等共同特点。世纪之交,两国都推行了水量"封顶"政策和水权交易等一系列改革,并进行了水核算理论探索和实践创新。澳大利亚颁布并实施了水会计核算制度,而中国则研究编制了水资源资产负债表。比较中澳两国水资源治理改革和水核算创新的历程,发现中澳两国水资源分布状况、水核算改革背景、面临的具体问题相似,改革的不同点主要表现在水权制度不同、水核算改革的出发点和模式不同、内容和效果不同。鉴于此,应借鉴澳大利亚水治理改革的成功经验,完善水权登记制度和相关法律法规,保护水使用权人的合法权益;转变政府职能,促进水权交易,建立有中国特色的通用目的水核算制度。     

基于产权视角的企业集团内部控制分析

作为在"一体化"趋势下,企业追求规模经济、范围经济的产物,企业集团本质上是一组以产权关系为纽带的多重契约关系,从而赋予了信息不对称问题更广泛的涵义。产权关系作为联接集团各层次的主要纽带,相应地,协调企业集团各层次的产权关系在内部控制制度体系中便占据了特殊的重要地位,而且在某种意义上,企业集团内部控制本质上体现为多层次产权关系的明确界定。     

基于共同治理模式下的公司业绩评价指标体系探索

现代企业理论认为,企业是一系列合约的组合,其中最重要的是企业所有权合约,提高企业所有权安排效率的出路是资本所有者拥有剩余索取权与剩余控制权。在这种理论的基础上产生了“股东至上”理论,公司治理采用“股东至上模式”,与此相适应产生了相关的业绩评价体系。但是这种治理模式和业绩评价体系都存在着缺陷,为适应现代公司经营环境的变化,笔者认为,应该采用“共同治理模式”代替“股东至上模式”,并建立与之相适应的业绩评价体系。     

The Common Heritage Principle:

A bstract An effort is underway to apply the common heritage principle to certain unique global resources while promoting economic development Under this precept, property rights to such resources are said to belong to all nations and their citizens rather than being subject to national sovereignty The doctrine is examined in theory and as applied in the outer space and law of the sea treaties Its possible application to Antarctica is explored in relationship to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) which is now considering a minerals regime for the continent Assessing the international political situation suggests the powerful bloc of ATS nations will ignore the common heritage principle However, a different outcome is possible, given a convergence of the Antarctic mining and global atmospheric issues of the greenhouse and ozone varieties Under this scenario, the global atmosphere and Antarctica would be common property resources whose property rights are owned by all nations     

Incentives Management During Privatization: An Agency Perspective

abstract    This paper explains, through a field study and from an agency perspective, how monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms change to support the interests of a privatized firm's new ownership. In this case, privatization led to important changes in the board of directors and to more formal performance evaluation and compensation systems for top managers, as profitability and financial control gained relevancy with the firm ownership change. Our results show that differences in incentives management before and after privatization are due to different agency relations in the two periods. We also argue that in a privatization framework the relation between monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms is complex, not simply substitutive as agency theory would predict, and this finding allows us to refine and extend agency theory for this specific context.     

‘The Institutions and Governance of Economic Reform'1

This articls uses the reform of New Zealand's state-owned enterprises from 1984–1995 to highlight two lessons for public sector reform from New Institutional Economics. First, failure to apply agency, property rights and transaction cost theory in tandem can lead to time-consuming pauses and policy shifts in a reform programme. Second, a discriminating alignment between the institutional environment and the regulatory governance structure chosen is crucial for successful privatization in industries characterized by economies of scale, large non-redeployable investments and extremely political output such as telecommunications and electricity.     

高新技术企业知识产权保护若干问题探讨

文章认为,随着经济全球化的进一步发展,知识产权日益成为高新技术企业生存发展、克敌制胜的工具和利器之一,我国的高新技术企业在知识产权的保护和管理方面仍存在很多问题。吸取国外先进的经验,根据技术发展和知识产权制度的发展趋势结合企业的具体情况加强和完善企业知识产权的保护,是我国高新技术企业发展的必然选择。     

诺斯经济增长理论对转变我国经济增长方式的启示

诺斯应用现代产权理论说明制度变迁与经济增长的关系,指出制度变迁是经济增长的重要因素之一,有效率的制度促进经济增长和发展,无效率的制度则会抑制甚至阻碍经济增长和发展。发展中国家普遍面临维持经济增长与提高经济效率两大难题,问题根源在于其基本制度框架普遍缺乏发展市场经济的制度背景。因此,在发展中国家,必须发挥政府的"主导"作用,制订一套公开、透明的规则体系,防止寻租、以权谋私和欺诈行为,为市场经济运作创造出公平合理的制度环境,以利于实现市场经济的顺利转型和高效运作。     

THE THEORY OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN MARKET ECONOMIES

Abstract. Four topics are covered: the circumstances under which state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more effective than private firms; the different approaches to modelling public and private firms; the performance of SOEs; and strategies including privatization to limit their more damaging effects. It is argued that ideological or development motives are important in their genesis, but that if efficiency and innovation are key considerations the normative case for their existence is more doubtful. Various types of SOE model are identified, deriving from the variety of circumstances in which they operate, and the theoretical perspective of the modeller. These include the property rights school, the public choice tradition, neoclassical, behavioural and budget maximizing approaches. All models assume the existence of monitoring problems, created by informational asymmetry. The consequences can include high non-pecuniary benefits for managers, a concentration on monitored activities, and lower innovation levels and efficiency than private firms. Curiously this is not necessarily reflected in higher prices or costs. Possible remedial strategies include a change of ownership, a change of objectives, the introduction of incentive-compatible payment schemes, improved performance indicators and privatization.     

Legal institutions and high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship is crucial for economic growth, yet comparatively little research has examined the relationship between institutions and new firm formation. I test the impact of property rights institutions and contracting institutions on high-growth-aspiration (HGA) entrants using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey data for 2000-2005. I find that property rights are more significant for profound market expansion and rule of law is more significant for high job growth. The number of procedures to enforce a contract, the number of procedures to start a business, and the number of days to start a business are negatively correlated with all types of HGA entrepreneurship. A common law legal system is negatively correlated with entrepreneurship combining high job growth and market expansion. These findings add nuance to prior studies that tout the importance of property rights and rule of law for entrepreneurship.