Slack and the performance of state-owned enterprises

Organizational slack has been recognized as critical to firm performance, although its impact is not always positive. Slack may be used to fuel innovation or alternatively excess resources may be squandered on pet projects. However, most research on slack is rooted in studying private firms in developed economies, especially the United States. Whether prior research on organizational slack can readily inform our understanding of state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) behavior is questionable since SOEs prioritize goals such as social welfare and full employment differently than do the privately owned enterprises (POEs). The differences between SOEs and POEs influence their sources and use of slack due to the nature of their ownership, budget constraints, and agency relations. To bring insight to this issue we develop an institutional change lifecycle model to study the relationship between slack and the economic and social aspects of SOE performance.     

Behind organizational slack and firm performance in China: The moderating roles of ownership and competitive intensity

Extensive studies of the organizational slack–performance relationship offer mixed findings in developed economies while little research attends to transition economies. Replicating and extending earlier work by Tan and Peng (2003), this study examines the relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in China and focuses on the moderating effects of firm ownership and competitive intensity. Empirical findings based on longitudinal data from 60,945 firms during 1998–2002 suggest that the impact of organizational slack on performance is stronger for private enterprises than for SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises. Furthermore, industry competitive intensity positively moderates the effect of organizational slack on performance. In a three-way interaction effect, the moderating effect of competitive intensity on the organizational slack–performance relationship is weaker in SOEs than in private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises.     

Today's state‐owned enterprises of China: are they dying dinosaurs or dynamic dynamos?

This paper raises the question and provides empirical evidence regarding the status of the evolution of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China today. In this study, we compare the SOEs to domestic private‐owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign‐controlled businesses (FCBs) in the context of their organizational cultures. While a new ownership form, many of the POEs evolved from former collectives that reflect the traditional values of Chinese business. Conversely, the FCBs are much more indicative of the large global MNCs. Therefore, we look at the SOEs in the context of these two reference points. We conclude that the SOEs of today have substantially transformed to approximate a configuration desired by the Chinese government when it began the SOE transformation a couple of decades ago to make them globally competitive. The SOEs of today appear to be appropriately described as China's economic dynamic dynamo for the future. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO Share Ownership and Firm Value

This study examines the effect of CEO ownership on firm performance. The findings suggest that CEO ownership and firm performance are jointly determined. Firm performance affects CEO ownership positively and in turn, CEO ownership has a positive effect on firm performance. Our results also show that firms managed by founder CEOs have better performance and that the CEO duality structure is beneficial in a turbulent environment.     

What Makes a Family Firm Innovative? CEO Risk‐Taking Propensity and the Organizational Context of Family Firms

Investigating the new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms connects two important topics that have recently received considerable attention in innovation and family firm research. First, new product portfolio innovativeness has been identified as a critical determinant of firm performance. Second, research on family firms has focused on the questions of if and why family firms are more or less innovative than other organizational forms. Research investigating the innovativeness of family firms has often applied a risk‐oriented perspective by identifying socioemotional wealth (SEW) as the main reference that determines firm behavior. Thus, prior research has mainly focused on the organizational context to predict innovation‐related family firm behavior and neglected the impact of preferences and the behavior of the chief executive officer (CEO), which have both been shown to affect firm outcomes. Hence, this study aims to extend the previous research by introducing the CEO's disposition to organizational context variables to explain the new product portfolio innovativeness of small and medium‐sized family firms. Specifically, this study explores how the organizational context (i.e., ownership by top management team [TMT] family members and generation in charge of the family firm) of family firms interacts with CEO risk‐taking propensity to affect new product portfolio innovativeness. Using a sample of 114 German CEOs of small and medium‐sized family firms operating in manufacturing industries, the results show that CEO risk‐taking propensity has a positive effect on new product portfolio innovativeness. Moreover, the analyses show that the organizational context of family firms impacts the relationship between CEO risk‐taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness. Specifically, the relationship between CEO risk‐taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness is weaker if levels of ownership by TMT family members are high (high SEW). Additionally, the effect of CEO risk‐taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness is stronger in family firms at earlier generational stages (high SEW). This result suggests that if SEW is a strong reference, family firm‐specific characteristics can affect individual dispositions and, in turn, the behaviors of executives. Therefore, this study helps extend the knowledge on the determinants of new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms by considering an individual CEO preference and the organizational context variables of family firms simultaneously.     

Labor Flexibility,Ownership and Firm Performance in China

Developed and developing countries alike areprivatizing or corporatizing state owned enterprises(SOEs), often citing the flexibility to hire and shedlabor as an advantage. However, there is littleempirical evidence on the extent to which thisimproves firm performance. This paper investigates thelinkage between labor flexibility, ownership and firmperformance using China as a case study. We find thatSOEs are much less able to adjust quickly to demandshocks than are other ownership forms and that thedegree of worker input into hiring and firingdecisions slows the ability of firms to adapt,negatively affecting firm performance.     

Contingent value of director identification: The role of government directors in monitoring and resource provision in an emerging economy

Research summary: Although previous studies have explored the value of government directors, less attention has been directed at the antecedents of government directors' engagement in value‐adding activities, such as managerial monitoring and resource provision. Drawing on social identity theory, we offer a novel model that specifies how a government director's dual identifications with the focal firm, and with the government individually and interactively affect his or her governance behavior. An investigation of government directors in China shows that their identification with the focal firm enhances monitoring and resource provision, while their identification with the government affects monitoring and resource provision differently. depending on the dominance of state ownership. The synergistic/substitutable effects between the two types of identification are contingent on state ownership and governance roles. Managerial summary: This study examines how a government director's dual identities—as a government official and as a board member of a focal firm affect his or her engagement in managerial monitoring and resource provision. Using data of Chinese listed firms, we find that government directors who strongly identify with the focal firm or with the government are highly motivated to fulfill their fiduciary obligations. However, the positive effects of their identification with the government differ between state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and non‐SOEs. The combination of the two identifications offers a further boost to monitoring in non‐SOEs, and to resource provision in both SOEs and non‐SOEs, but it acts as a disincentive to monitoring in SOEs. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises

This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs.     

The influence of relative values of outside director stock options on firm strategic risk from a multiagent perspective

Prior work has examined the effects of absolute levels of outside director stock option grants on risk behavior without recognizing that relative stock option values could differentially affect risk taking. Drawing from the house money effect perspective, we extend this literature by examining how positive deviation from prior outside director option grants values influences firm strategic risk. Additionally we draw from the behavioral agency model and the power literature to develop a multiagent contingency framework suggesting the effect of positive director pay deviation depends on the incentives and power of CEOs reflected in CEO stock ownership and CEO duality, respectively. Our empirical results indicate positive pay deviation has a positive effect on firm risk taking while high ownership and duality independently and jointly weaken this base relationship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial ownership and the role of privatization in transition economies: The case of China

Within transition economies, a popular tactic for revitalizing large and inefficient stateowned enterprises (SOEs) is to privatize them. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence related to this issue is equivocal. This study, therefore, explores more deeply what the relationship may be between privatization efforts of SOEs and their financial performance in transition economies. Specifically, we seek to better understand whether privatization reforms per se, or other corporate governance mechanisms that complement or substitute for this effort, are most effective. Using a panel sample of Chinese state-owned public firms over an eight year period from 1999 to 2006, we find that managerial ownership has a more significant impact on firm performance than privatization does. This finding suggests that internal incentives to managers may be more effective than external market mechanisms in economies transitioning from centralized planning to market control. Our results are robust using a wide variety of performance measures and different model specifications.     

State Ownership, Privatization and Performance in Singapore: An Exploratory Study from a Strategic Management Perspective

This paper considers the ownership debate with regard to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) performance, that is, whether superior performance of SOEs can be achieved under state ownership. While the traditional belief has been, supported by empirical work, that private ownership is generally associated with superior performance, the experience of Singapore is a clear example to the contrary. We outline global privatization trends and discuss the impact of privatization programs. We then discuss Singapore Telecom as a case where state ownership combined with several contextual and firm-related factors, especially firm strategy, has led to sustained world-class performance. We develop a theoretical framework for this analysis based on the strategic management field. We lastly outline some theoretical and practical implications of the analysis.     

Self‐selection,endogeneity, and the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance

This study focuses explicitly on the methodological implications of the endogenous theory of governance as applied to firm performance. In particular, if firms choose their governance structures as part of a constrained performance maximization process, then application of an appropriate empirical methodology should reveal statistical evidence of such behavior. In this study we take advantage of the endogenous switching regression model framework to determine whether such predicted optimizing behavior can be corroborated by the data. The model allows us to test explicitly for selection behavior in accordance with comparative advantage and, concomitantly, the presence of selectivity bias, in estimating the impact of CEO duality on firm performance. The selection and performance equations are modeled in accordance with the extant accounting, economics, and management literature on the impact of the dual governance structure on firm performance. Overall, we tested four performance measures for the entire sample of firm‐year observations as well as for the largest three industries in terms of sample sizes. The major finding, robust in all cases, is that there is no evidence to support a contention that CEO duality is a structure purposefully chosen for optimizing performance. If firms are indeed choosing the dual leadership structure, they are doing so for reasons other than improving performance from what it would be otherwise. In fact, for performance measured as market return and earnings per share, there is evidence of a significant selectivity bias that acts to lower performance below what it would have been under random assignment. For performance measured by Tobin's q and return on assets, we found neither evidence of selectivity bias, nor any significant marginal performance impacts of CEO duality. Such findings are inconsistent with an endogenous governance theory, at least when applied to firm performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An empirical study of SOEs' market orientation in transitional China

Using institutional theory, this paper investigates the antecedents and outcomes of market orientation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in transitional China. A survey of 274 SOEs demonstrates a strong positive relationship between market orientation and various measures of organizational performance. Additionally, market competitive pressure, formalized corporate governance, and less government control are found to promote market orientation of SOEs in the transitional period. These results support the views that market orientation leads to better performance and that institutional factors should be considered in studies of strategy in Chinese firms. This paper was supported by NSFC (70472039, 70272023).     

Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?—An empirical study from China

This study examines the impact of CEO power on forced CEO turnover from five perspectives, namely firm performance, structural power, ownership power, CEOs’ political connections, and tenure power. Using panel data of listed companies in China, this study finds that firm performance has negative effects on forced CEO turnover. Similarly, CEOs’ structural power, political connections, and tenure power can increase their ability to be insulated from involuntary replacement. In addition, two factors of CEO ownership power, the state-controlling shareholder and serving as the representative of the largest shareholder, appear to be effective in reducing the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.     

Incentive Mechanisms,Entrepreneurial Orientation,and Technology Commercialization: Evidence from China's Transitional Economy*

Scholars view entrepreneurial orientation as an essential element of high‐performing firms. The extant research has focused extensively on the construct development related to and performance implications of entrepreneurial orientation. Prior research has also identified the significant positive impact of entrepreneurial orientation on technology commercialization. The research community has, however, yet to examine critical antecedents of entrepreneurial orientation and to investigate relevant antecedents and consequences of entrepreneurial orientation in transitional settings such as that of China. Most Chinese firms are embracing significant changes in governance incentive mechanisms as China deepens the economic reform. The extant literature provides limited insight as to how incentive mechanisms such as chief executive officer (CEO) ownership and turnover may affect firm entrepreneurial orientation in China's transitional setting. Furthermore, given the significant changes and uncertainty in the market place, China provides an ideal laboratory to examine the influence of technological turbulence on the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and technology commercialization. Aimed at filling in these glaring gaps, this study develops a conceptual model, with institutional theory as its underpinning, to examine the relationships among governance incentive mechanisms, entrepreneurial orientation, technological turbulence, and technology commercialization. The empirical results from a sample of 607 Chinese firms reveal several important findings. The CEO ownership has a significant positive effect on entrepreneurial orientation, and CEO turnover frequency has an inverse U curvilinear impact on entrepreneurial orientation. Furthermore, entrepreneurial orientation positively affects technology commercialization, with technological turbulence positively moderating this relationship. This study makes several important contributions. First, the present article brings into sharper focus the differing impacts of CEO ownership and CEO turnover on entrepreneurial orientation. The theoretical deliberation and empirical testing offer useful insights into the formation process of entrepreneurial orientation. Second, the examination of the moderating effect of technological turbulence provides additional richness to the extant literature. In addition, different from prior studies, this study was conducted under China's transitional economy context. By integrating unique institutional arrangements and the turbulent technological environment, two key characteristics of China's transitional economy setting, the study broadened and deepened understanding of key antecedents and consequences of entrepreneurial orientation. The article also discusses managerial implications of the findings and suggests directions for future research.     

More Innovation with Less? A Strategic Contingency View of Slack Resources,Information Search,and Radical Innovation

This study investigates the nonobvious interrelationship between slack resources and radical innovation. While organizational slack and innovation literature has implicitly recognized a link between these constructs, at least two important aspects of their relationship have been overlooked. First, little attention has been paid to the mechanisms by which slack resources become beneficial for radical innovation. Drawing on information search and organizational learning theories, we propose distal search activity—searching for information outside the current knowledge domain of the firm—as a mediating variable between slack resources and radical innovation. Second, little consideration has been given to the strategic orientation of the firm as the context in which slack resources are deployed to enhance radical innovation. Adopting Miles and Snow's typology of strategic archetypes, we propose a moderating role of strategy in the slack resources–distal search–radical innovation chain of relations. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of Chinese high‐technology firms, using multiple informant survey data and regression analysis. Our results indicate that slack resources are positively related to radical innovation, and that this relationship is partially mediated by distal search. Thus, there appear to be two routes (one direct, one indirect) to transform slack resources into radical innovation. Further, moderation analysis shows that the effect of slack resources on distal search is strongest among analyzers, while the effect of distal search on radical innovation is strongest among defenders. In sum, our results suggest that analyzers are relatively more dependent on the amount of slack resources compared to other strategy types, that is, resource constraints would have a more negative effect on analyzers. We discuss theoretical and managerial implications of our study and conclude by suggesting future research opportunities.     

From crisis to opportunity: environmental jolt,corporate acquisitions,and firm performance

This study incorporates the external environmental context into the study of corporate acquisitions by examining the performance implications of corporate acquisitions during an environmental jolt that alters the levels of environmental munificence. We posit that compared to the periods before and after an environmental jolt, corporate acquisitions during a jolt would be positively related to firm performance. Furthermore, we suggest that organizational slack would improve firm performance and accentuate the positive relationship between corporate acquisitions and firm performance during an environmental jolt; however, it would have negative impact on firm performance and make the acquisition‐performance relationship more negative before and after a jolt. Using the Asian Economic Crisis as a natural experiment, we found general support for our core arguments based on a sample of firms from Hong Kong and Singapore. Our work demonstrates that firms can capitalize on the opportunities created by the changes in an environmental jolt. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership structure, family leadership, and performance of affiliate firms in large family business groups

Utilizing the agency viewpoint, this research attempts to shed light on the issue of family leadership by examining ethnic Chinese family business groups in Taiwan. The study examines the performance implications of this kind of leadership under the ownership structure concern. The research results indicate that the ownership structure of the affiliate firm influences the likelihood that family leadership will be used. Specifically, if the founding family owns more direct ownership of the affiliate firm, the family will be likely to appoint a family leader at the affiliate firm. However, when the founding family has a greater degree of pyramidal ownership of an affiliate firm, family leadership will be less likely at that affiliate firm. Additionally, family leadership mediates the relationship between ownership structure and affiliate firm performance in a family business group. Family leadership positively affects the effect of direct family ownership on affiliate firm performance but does not significantly affect the negative relationship between pyramidal ownership and affiliate firm performance. The implications of these findings for future research on leadership in family business groups are discussed.     

The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal,firm size,and firm profits

We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner‐controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager‐controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subnational institutional contingencies and executive pay dispersion

This paper investigates the impact of subnational institutional contingencies on executive pay dispersion structure and the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance. Using executive compensation data on Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2011, we find that executive pay dispersion is significantly lower in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while is significantly higher in cross-listed firms and to a smaller degree in firms located in developed regions. There is also evidence that executive pay dispersion is smaller during the voluntary compensation disclosure period. After controlling for endogeneity of pay determination, we find that executive pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, the positive link between executive pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, and stronger in firms located in more developed regions than those not. Our findings are also robust to alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance.