论双重买卖

一、双重买卖中买卖合同的效力 所谓双重买卖,指出卖人就特定标的物同时或顺次与数买受人成立买卖契约,买卖合同成立和有效并不以标的物或价金的交付为要件,买卖合同双方当事人就买卖合同的主要内容达成合意,合同即告成立。一般情况下,合同成立即产生效力,因此判断合同效力,其根本要件就是双方的意见是否一致,根据此标准,出卖人与前买受人就买卖合同的主要内容达成合意,其买卖合同依法成立并有效,出卖人再与后买受人就该标的物及价金又达成合意,因此后买卖合同也是一个依法成立并有效的合同。前一买卖合同的有效成立并不能否认后一买卖合同的效力,同样,后一买卖合同的有效成立也不能否认前一买卖合同的效力。另外,由于债权的平等性,二者的效力也没有高低之分,不因成立时间的先后而效力不同。     

浅论合同中风险转移

合同中的风险转移有“交付主义”和“所有权主义”两种立法模式。在以转移所有权为目的的买卖合同中应适用“交付主义”,风险的转移取决于交付,与所有权无关;在不以转移标的物所有权为目的的非买卖合同中,应适用“所有权主义”,风险并不伴随交付行为发生转移。风险的转移与所有权、与交付、与违约以及与收益之间既不存在着对应关系,又是密切联系、有机统一的。     

买卖合同中的瑕疵担保责任辨析

买卖合同中的瑕疵担保责任是指出卖人对其交付的标的物存在权利瑕疵或物的瑕疵所应承担的法律责任.其中,权利瑕疵担保责任起源于古罗马法的追夺担保制度,物的瑕疵担保责任也发端于古罗马法的大法官告示制度.     

谈融资租赁在建筑业中的应用

我国《合同法》对融资租赁有如下定义：融资租赁合同是出租人根据承租人对出卖人、租赁物的选择，向出卖人购买租赁物，提供给承租人使用，承租人支付租金的合同。由此看出，融资租赁是围绕一项服务贸易，涉及两个合同、三方当事人。两个合同是承租人与出租人订立的融资租赁合同和出卖人与出租人订立的买卖合同，三方当事人为出卖人、出租人、     

论货物买卖合同的风险负担

买卖的风险负担是买卖法的中心问题之一，也是关系到买卖双方切身利益的重要问题，各国立法均对如何在当事人之间适当分配风险，设计了不同的负担规则和制度。在考察大陆法系和英美法系有代表性国家采取的所有权转换立法例的基础上，分析了所有权转移时间对买卖合同风险负担规则设计的影响，阐明了两者之间的关系，并说明了我国立法对买卖合同风险负担规则的选择。     

网络购物合同标的物的风险负担问题探析

随着计算机及互联网技术的快速发展,网络购物逐渐成为人们的重要消费模式之一。但网络购物合同相较于传统买卖合同的特殊性,使其标的物风险转移的认定更加复杂。交易的标的物为无形电子信息产品时,以买受人收到电子信息产品或者权利凭证作为风险转移的时点;交易的标的物为有形物时,不论是卖方包邮还是买方自付运费,承运人货交买方时标的物风险才随之转移。     

浅谈商品房预售合同中应关注的几个问题

一、商品房预售合同的法律性质 何谓商品房预售合同，我国的《城市房地产管理法》没有做出明确规定。我们认为，商品房预售合同是指商品房预售方和预购方双方约定，预售方在约定时间内将建成的商品房所有权转移于预购方，预购方向预售方交付定金或部分房款并按期接受商品房的书面协议。商品房预售合同是以建造中的房屋为标的物的，属于买卖合同的一种，但商品房预售合同与一般买卖合同又有所不同，     

第三方物流利弊分析与企业物流模式选择

通过对第三方物流概念的界定进行探讨,分析了第三方物流使企业合理配置资源、降低经营成本、加快资本周转和提升服务品质及创造更多价值等优势,同时剖析了其带来的技术与信息风险、交易价格风险、信任风险和业务控制风险等劣势,从企业发展角度出发,提出了七种情形下的企业物流模式选择方案,为企业商品物流的优质服务提供参考。     

我国第三方物流企业财务风险控制的有效途径探析

随着我国社会主义市场经济的不断完善,第三方物流行业也得到了快速的发展,而当前第三方物流行业,出现了管理能力较低,风险增加的问题,因此控制第三方物流企业的财务风险,可以有效保证第三方物流的持续稳定发展。本文主要阐述了第三方物流具有的财务风险,并从其整体的发展趋势出发,分析评价了财务风险的形成原因,最后提出了相关的防范措施与控制办法。     

第三方物流定义探讨

国内外关于第三方物流的概念存在差异,争论的焦点主要集中在两方面,即第三方物流中第三方的认定和第三方物流提供物流服务的范围和深度。前者应以商品交易为参照,后者不是定义第三方物流的关键所在。就概念而言,第三方物流是指商品交易双方之外的第三方为商品交易双方提供部分或全部物流服务的物流运作模式。     

Experiments on lotteries for shrouded and bundled goods: Investigating the economics of fukubukuro

Fukubukuro (or lucky bag) is a familiar institution in Japan and elsewhere in which the exact contents of a New Year sales item are hidden from the consumer before purchase. Motivated by the fukubukuro example and the lack of evidence on risk attitudes in lotteries involving goods, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which the outcomes are bundled or unbundled goods. The implied gains to a monopoly seller for marketing goods in lottery form rather than separately are only clearly positive for lotteries where there is a higher probability of obtaining the more highly valued good.     

DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLY WITH MAINTENANCE

A two‐period durable‐goods monopoly product model with a competitive maintenance market is examined. Three types of monopoly solutions are calculated and contrasted to the social optimum: rentals, committed sales and uncommitted sales. Among other things, it is shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom a seller with committed power does not wish to commit ‘to act like a renter’ when maintenance is performed by buyers. This is due to the different objective functions of the buyer and seller. Furthermore, unlike earlier works, it is shown that the socially optimal amount of maintenance/repair does not occur in any sales case.     

Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information

This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple deterministic exit option contract, which allows the buyer to refuse trade, achieves the first-best in the benchmark cases where either quality is verifiable or the buyer?s valuation is public information. But, when unverifiable and asymmetric information are combined, deterministic contracts are necessarily inefficient. The first-best can be achieved, however, through simple message games with stochastic terms of trade as off-equilibrium outcomes.     

Promises, trust, and contracts

A transaction involving a buyer and a competitive seller isstudied under the hypothesis that individuals may have a certaintendency to keep promises. The parties can choose a completecontract where costly arrangements are made so that it is verifiablewhether the seller has delivered a certain quality. Alternatively,they can choose an incomplete contract where the quality agreedupon by the two parties is unverifiable, and one party is giventhe residual right to decide whether the quality is indeed delivered.Although complete contracts are always available, it may beoptimal to use incomplete contracts, and social surplus canincrease in contract costs. Social surplus is higher when thebuyer has the residual right if under this arrangement incompletecontracts are optimal; and social surplus is higher when theseller has the residual right if only under this arrangementincomplete contracts are optimal.     

Direct sale of information when precision is unobservable

Abstract.  This paper studies the incentives of an information seller to provide precise information when precision is not observable and investors with rational expectations can extract information from the equilibrium asset price. I show that the seller can verify her precision by employing a non‐linear contract. I derive the equilibrium fee for information as a function of the seller's incentives, the sales volume, and buyers' trading intensity. I also analyse the implications of allowing the seller to trade on her own account for truthfulness and precision choice. JEL Classification: G11, G14, D42     

第三方物流的监督博弈研究

由于物流外包中物流需求方与物流服务商之间的签约后的信息不对称,带来了第三方物流中的道德风险。物流需求方通过对第三方物流服务商的监督激励能够有效地减少服务商的机会主义行为,提高服务商的服务水平,克服第三方物流应用中的负面效应。本文基于物流外包中第三方物流的违规动机和外包的风险,运用非合作博弈论的理论和方法,构建了第三方物流的监督博弈模型,并应用混合纳什均衡模型对第三方物流的监督问题进行了定量分析,详细分析了物流需求方和服务商的决策行为,求出了混合战略纳什均衡点,得出了制约博弈双方决策行为的关键因素,并提出了对第三方物流企业进行有效监督的若干建议,为物流需求方提供了有效监督决策的理论依据和实践参考。     

增值服务价值不可验证下的TPLSP关系契约激励机制

由第三方物流服务提供商(TPLSP)提供服务外包已成为制造业企业在快速变化环境下应对不确定性的一种战略选择。本文针对物流服务外包过程中一些增值服务项目的价值具有难以描述性和不可验证性的特点,设计了基于委托-代理理论的关系契约激励机制,分析了贴现因子对关系契约激励效果的影响。研究结论表明:关系契约能有效激励TPLSP努力工作,且当贴现因子足够大时,关系契约能激励TPLSP实施最优努力,实现服务产出的系统最优。     

西宁市开发区企业的供应销售物流网络结构特征

借助Ucinet社会网络分析工具,构建企业供应销售两类网络,尝试分析内陆高原城市开发区供应销售物流网络的结构特征。研究表明:①供应物流网络在国内呈"U"型结构,即东西部强,中部弱;国际上供应商较少。供应货物流动结构呈地方化、非全球化的特征,表现出显著的地方资源导向。②销售物流网络格局跟供应物流网络大致相似,国内总体也呈"U"型结构;国际上呈现全球化销售较弱。销售货物流动结构呈地方化、弱全球化的特征,表现出企业主要服务青海省内需求的基本特征,同时也表现出东部化、全球化的趋势。③医药卫生、轻工食品及服装纺织行业,产业链完整,可提升地区产业结构;冶金矿产、石油化工及机械电子电工行业,在产业链中处于中游阶段,对产业升级影响较弱;交通运输行业,在产业链中处于下游阶段,一定程度上能促进产业结构的优化升级以及经济发展方式的转变。     

On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems

A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of an indivisible good. While producing the good, the seller can exert unobservable effort (hidden action). Then the buyer realizes whether his or her valuation is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller's effort level (hidden information). The parties are risk neutral—they can rule out renegotiation and write complete contracts. It is shown that the first best cannot be achieved whenever the ex post efficient trade decision is trivial. The second-best contract is characterized and an application of the model to the choice of risky projects is briefly discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D23, D82.     

Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices

A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring. With private monitoring, i.e., when prices are not observable to the competing sellers, all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payoffs coincides with the stage game subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. This is in sharp contrast to the game with perfect monitoring where the folk theorem obtains. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43.