THE EFFECT OF CROSS‐LISTING ON TRADING VOLUME: REDUCING SEGMENTATION VERSUS SIGNALING INVESTOR PROTECTION

We examine the relation between cross‐listing on the U.S. and UK regulated and unregulated exchanges and trading volume for a sample of 500 foreign firms from 34 countries. We find that the increase in trading volume is a function of both reducing segmentation and signaling investor protection. In addition, we find that home market trading volume, firm size, firm returns, and analyst forecast accuracy are the major determinants of a firm's trading volume. We also show that U.S. and UK investors trade foreign securities that originate from low‐investor‐protection countries more than they trade those from high‐investor‐protection countries, which is consistent with the bonding hypothesis.     

Postprivatization corporate governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection

We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. Using a sample of 209 privatized firms from 39 countries over the period 1980 to 2001, we find that the government relinquishes control over time to the benefit of local institutions, individuals, and foreign investors, and that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. Firm size, growth, and industry affiliation, privatization method, as well as the level of institutional development and investor protection, explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. The positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection.     

Investment allocation decisions,home bias and the mandatory IFRS adoption

We examine the familiarity hypothesis of home bias by studying how foreign ownership of Swedish firms is affected by the mandatory adoption of IFRS. We decompose foreign investors into institutional and non-institutional investors. Foreign investors are further decomposed into EU (IFRS adopting countries) and non-EU residents (non-IFRS adopting countries). We analyse the equity investments of these foreign investor groups in Sweden during the period of 2001–2007. We find that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, foreign ownership/owners from countries that adopted IFRS and particularly those from the EU increased. These effects are particularly strong in small firms. Foreign institutional investors increased their ownership stake after the mandatory IFRS adoption, whereas foreign non-institutional investments were not affected significantly by the IFRS adoption. In contrast to ownership from non-adopting countries, ownership from the EU increased in firms with both more and less tangible assets. Similarly, foreign ownership from the EU increased in firms with both concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership after the adoption. Because Sweden has already had strict legal enforcement and a low level of earnings management prior to the adoption, our results suggest that increased foreign ownership is due to better abilities to compare firms rather than an improved quality.     

The contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings around the world

Using corporate payout data from 33 economies, this study investigates the contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings in different country-level investor protection environments. We find that stock repurchases contribute more to firm value in countries with strong investor protection than in countries with weak investor protection. We also report that dividends contribute approximately 60% more to firm value than repurchases in countries with weak investor protection. Furthermore, as the proportion of repurchases in total payouts increases, the marginal value of cash increases in countries with strong investor protection, whereas it declines in countries with weak investor protection. In a poor investor protection environment, the marginal value of cash for a firm that makes 100% of its payouts via repurchases is 12 cents lower than that for a firm that distributes 100% of its payouts via dividends. Overall, our findings highlight that stock repurchases are less effective than dividends in mitigating agency problems associated with free cash flow in countries with poor investor protection.     

The performance of newly privatized firms in selected MENA countries: The role of ownership structure, governance and liberalization policies

The paper analyzes 95 newly privatized firms (NPFs) in four Middle Eastern and North African countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey). We find that these firms experienced significant increases in profitability and operating efficiency, and significant declines in employment and leverage. We also document strong performance improvements for firms that did remain state-owned, that were not sold to foreigners, and that came from Egypt. Job losses are higher in Egypt and in firms where the state is no longer in control. Also, the results indicate that revenue firms and NPFs in Morocco display significantly less leverage than control firms and those from other countries. We find that profitability changes are negatively related to state control and positively related to foreign ownership. Trade openness, change in real GDP over the privatization window, index of investor protection, and foreign ownership are important determinants of the changes in sales efficiency and output. These findings suggest that NPFs become more productive in environments where property rights are better protected and enforced and that foreign investors influence firms' productivity through their monitoring role.     

Diversification and ownership concentration

If controlling shareholders can divert profits, equity ownership is more concentrated the higher the stock returns correlation. A higher returns correlation reduces the benefits of diversification, giving rise to both a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in the asset that he controls and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model: equity ownership is more concentrated in countries where the stock returns correlation is higher; moreover the intensity of the relationship between the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is amplified by poor investor protection.     

The Role of Foreign Shareholders in Disciplining Financial Reporting

We investigate the role of foreign shareholders in improving the quality of accounting information provided by firms domiciled in countries with low de facto institutional quality. Using a sample of firms from four South European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) for which we observe detailed ownership evolutions over the period 2002–2007, we find that increases in foreign ownership lead to increases in financial reporting quality but only if the foreign shareholders are domiciled in countries with strong investor protection mechanisms. Further, we find that the improvement in financial reporting quality is more pronounced in the case of foreign institutional investors. Finally, our results hold before and after the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005.     

Does the difference in valuation between domestic and foreign investors help explain their distinct holdings of domestic stocks?

This paper proposes an investor heterogeneity approach to the different domestic stock holdings between domestic and foreign investors. Specifically, we hypothesize that domestic and foreign investors evaluate domestic stocks via different models and thus arrive at different valuations for them; consequently, the two investor groups are attracted to different sets of domestic stocks. Using panel data from Korea, we find strong support for our hypothesis. More precisely, we find that the foreign ownership of a stock increases with foreigners’ valuation for the stock in excess of that of domestic investors. As we control for various firm characteristics known to be correlated with foreign ownership, our results indicate that the valuation difference between domestic and foreign investors can help explain the allocation of domestic stocks between the two groups over and above the existing explanations.     

投资者法律保护、股权集中度与大股东行为

在不同的法系和国家中,对投资者的法律保护存在很大的差异。作为对投资者法律保护的替代,在投资者法律保护薄弱的国家,股权结构相对集中。为了保护投资者的利益,我国应该完善对投资者的法律保护,提高执法质量和会计质量,促进股权的适度集中,限制控制股东的掠夺行为。     

Transparency,Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence on When Transparency Matters Most

We examine the relation between firm‐level transparency, stock market liquidity, and valuation across countries, focusing on whether the relation varies with a firm's characteristics and economic environment. We document lower transaction costs and greater liquidity (as measured by lower bid‐ask spreads and fewer zero‐return days) for firms with greater transparency (as measured by less evidence of earnings management, better accounting standards, higher quality auditors, more analyst following, and more accurate analyst forecasts). The relation between transparency and liquidity is more pronounced in periods of high volatility, when investor protection, disclosure requirements, and media penetration are poor, and when ownership is more concentrated, suggesting that firm‐level transparency matters more when overall investor uncertainty is greater. Increased liquidity is associated with lower implied cost of capital and with higher valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Finally, a mediation analysis suggests that liquidity is a significant channel through which transparency affects firm valuation and equity cost of capital.     

To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation

Data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within‐country variation that decreases with the strength of investors' legal protection. A simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation: investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership structure. Using firm‐level governance and transparency data from 27 countries, we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices, and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets. All relations are stronger in less investor‐friendly countries, demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices.     

Do minority acquisitions transfer better corporate governance practices? An analysis of UK's cross-border minority investments

This study examines the influence of minority shareholders on the transfer of corporate governance practices into companies in other countries where they invest. By analysing UK firms that acquired a minority ownership in foreign firms between 1993 and 2014, we find evidence of better corporate governance in the board structure of target foreign firms following UK firms taking a minority shareholding, the extent and nature of the changes varying depending on the quality of investor protection in the country the foreign target firm is located. Our findings contribute to the on-going debates on the spillover effect of better corporate governance practices via cross-border mergers and acquisitions as well as relationship between internal (board of directors) and external (country's quality of investor protection) corporate governance mechanisms.     

Cultural influences on home bias and international diversification by institutional investors

We investigate determinants of international diversification in institutionally managed portfolios from more than 60 countries. Survey-based country-specific variables on cross-cultural behaviors help to explain both home bias and diversification among foreign equities. In particular, investment funds from countries characterized by higher uncertainty avoidance behavior display greater home bias and are less diversified in their foreign holdings. Portfolios from countries with higher levels of masculinity and long-term orientation display lower levels of home bias, and portfolios from countries with higher levels of masculinity are more diversified abroad. Portfolios from culturally distant countries invest less abroad and underweight culturally distant target markets. The economic significance of cultural variables is high and comparable in magnitude to geographical distance, a consistent influence on foreign diversification in prior studies. Culture impacts investor behavior directly and not merely though indirect channels such as legal and regulatory framework.     

Incentive and entrenchment effects in European ownership

In a large sample of European firms we analyze the value discount associated with disproportional ownership structures first documented by Claessens et al. (2002). Consistent with a theoretical model of incentive and entrenchment effects, we find higher value discount in family firms, in firms with low cash flow concentration, and in industries with higher amenity value. Furthermore, the discount is higher in countries with good investor protection and higher for dual class shares than for pyramids. We find no impact on operating performance, likelihood of bankruptcy, dividend policy, or growth. Finally, we discuss policy implications of these findings.     

FOREIGN INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATIZATIONS: DOES THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT MATTER?

We examine the determinants of foreign investors' participation in the privatization process of developing countries. First, we estimate the probability that foreign investors target privatized firms in a given country. We show that a favorable legal environment where investor protection is higher enhances foreign investors' participation. Foreigners also prefer large, strategic firms from high‐growth economies and socially stable countries with low political risk. Second, we restrict our analysis to privatized firms that foreign investors actually choose and show that the stakes foreigners hold are larger if the firms are privatized by private sales as opposed to public offerings.     

Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions

Recent empirical research suggests that country-level and firm-level governance institutions are substitutes with respect to their effect on firm value. In this paper we demonstrate that during a crisis these institutions may actually become complements. Specifically, we find that the decline in companies’ valuation during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was more sensitive to firm-level transparency in countries with stronger investor protection. We propose a theoretical model that reconciles our findings with the results in the literature. In our model, during “normal times” strong firm-level governance is crucial to attract outside financing in countries with weak investor protection, but is less important in countries with good investor protection. During a crisis, however, investment opportunities decline even in countries with strong investor protection, and, as a result, relative importance of firm-level governance increases in such places.     

Foreign institutional ownership and stock market liquidity: Evidence from Indonesia

From January 2002 to August 2007, foreign institutions held almost 70% of the free-float value of the Indonesian equity market, or 41% of the total market capitalization. Over the same period, liquidity on the Jakarta Stock Exchange improved substantially with the average bid–ask spread more than halved and the average depth more than doubled. In this study we examine the Granger causality between foreign institutional ownership and liquidity, while controlling for persistence in foreign ownership and liquidity measures. We find that foreign holdings have a negative impact on future liquidity: a 10% increase in foreign institutional ownership in the current month is associated with approximately 2% increase in the bid–ask spread, 3% decrease in depth, and 4% rise in price sensitivity in the next month, challenging the view that foreign institutions enhance liquidity in small emerging markets. Our findings are consistent with the negative liquidity impact of institutional investor ownership in developed markets.     

What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks?

We examine the portfolio rebalancing, measured by the equity churn rate, of mutual funds from 29 countries based on annual stockholdings over the 1999–2006 period. We find that funds more often trade the stocks of companies located in countries with higher degree of information asymmetry and are less familiar to fund managers, after we control for the effects of stock market development and investor protection. Consistent with the behavioral bias, fund managers more often rebalance stocks in foreign markets that perform well. This bias is exacerbated when fund managers are less familiar with and less informed about those markets.     

Legal Institutions,Ownership Concentration,and Stock Repurchases Around the World: Signal Mimicking?

One of the central puzzles of signaling theory is how to assess signal quality, in particular the potential for signal mimicking. Our study provides evidence of signal mimicking in the context of stock repurchases. Employing an ex-ante proxy for the likelihood of mimicking stock repurchases and data on open market stock repurchases from 30 countries, we find that long-term operating and market performance following stock repurchases improve less for suspected mimicking firms. This finding contradicts the conventional characterization that managers use stock repurchases to signal undervaluation and enhanced future performance. We find that mimicking firms have smaller capital investments, need greater external financing, buy back fewer shares, and issue more new shares (and/or resell more treasury shares) in the year of the repurchase. Our analysis further shows that mimicking is more likely in countries with weak investor protections and in firms with higher ownership concentration. Further, mimicking associated with concentrated ownership is mitigated in countries with stronger investor protections and by the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Altogether, our findings provide evidence of signal mimicking in stock repurchases in international data that is influenced by market, ownership, legal, and financial reporting characteristics of countries.     

Information friction and investor home bias: A perspective on the effect of global IFRS adoption on the extent of equity home bias

This paper provides a perspective on the effect of IFRS adoption on the tendency of investors to under-invest in foreign equities. We consider explanations for the equity home bias described in prior research and discuss research relevant to the informational consequences of global adoption of IFRS. Specifically, we evaluate whether IFRS adoption reduces information processing costs or decreases investor uncertainty about either the quality of financial reporting or the distribution of future cash flows. We predict that the effect of any reduction in information processing costs from the adoption of IFRS is likely to be small relative to the effects of other determinants of home bias such as the strength of investor protection mechanisms in foreign countries, behavioral biases toward familiar equities, and informational advantages related to geographical proximity. We argue that the quality of the information that investors have (or perceive they have) decreases with distance, conclude that global IFRS adoption is unlikely to affect home bias, and propose avenues for future research.