Club governments versus representative governments

The paper compares the legal rules for private clubs with the constitutions of representative governments. Though both institutions are designed to provide public goods for their members they are organized quite differently. In clubs the power to grant power must not be delegated to the agents, while in representative governments it usually is. The design of representative governments is shown to be inconsistent with a contractarian view of the constitution. A nearly perfect laboratory case for a club government can be found in the example of Switzerland. In this country citizens are absolute sovereigns over their constitution. The Swiss do not have a constitutional court, but have developed instead a system of popular voting rights serving as a substitute for a judicial review by a constitutional court. Though this system does not work perfectly, it has relative advantages compared to a constitutional court which often tends to become a political decisionmaker. The author is indebted to Pio Baake, Peter Moser, and Richard E. Wagner for helpful comments.     

Economic Growth,Public Debt and Welfare: Comparing Three Budgetary Rules

Abstract. We present an endogenous growth model with externalities of capital and elastic labor supply where we allow for public debt and welfare‐enhancing public spending. We analyze different debt policies as regards convergence to a balanced growth path and their effects on long‐run growth and welfare. Three budgetary rules are considered: the balanced budget rule, a budgetary rule where debt grows in the long run but at a rate lower than the balanced growth rate and a rule where public debt grows at the same rate as all other economic variables but where it guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint is fulfilled.     

Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation

The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylize this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission: free mobility, admission by majority vote, admission by unanimous consent, admission by a demand threshold for public goods. In a simple model we characterize the equilibria that result from these rules, and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rules will be chosen.     

A form of government organization from the perspective of transaction cost economics

Taking the approach of the superfirm, we characterize government organization through six different features. First, citizens are viewed as sovereign owners of a superfirm; elected officials are employees of the sovereign citizens. Second, in analogy to the economic principle of the division of labor and specialization, a division of labor between five independent branches of government is advocated: the legislative, the budgetary, the executive, the law enforcement, and the judiciary branch. Third, we do not suggest a mechanism of checks and balances between government branches but deal with the threat of tyranny using the principle of separation of decision control and decision management developed by Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen. Fourth, with election as a decision control device, we demarcate the constituency of the budgetary branch by age groups to provide an explicit control mechanism for intertemporal and intergenerational trades. Fifth, to strengthen sovereign citizens' decision control, the powers to recall elected chief public servants, to declare emergency and war, to sign into international treaties, and to amend the constitution are vested with a national assembly. Sixth, there is no head of state.     

Fiscal Constitutions

In this paper we examine how taxes, subsidies and the design of constitutional agendas should be regulated in order to allow for an efficient allocation of public goods and a limitation of tax distortions. We show that if public goods are socially desirable, the simple majority rule, combined with taxation constrained to majority winners or a ban on subsidies, can achieve several desirable objectives. Equal treatment regarding taxes and subsidies is undesirable. Super majority rules and equal treatment of all citizens with respect to taxes and subsidies, however, are first-best provided public goods are socially undesirable. Finally, we suggest that constitutions with amendments eliminate excessive taxation and allow treatment rules to universally improve welfare.     

Public investment and budgetary consolidation in Portugal

In this paper we find that public investment in durable goods has a positive effect on long-term economic performance in Portugal. We also find that these positive effects are not strong enough for public investment to pay for itself in the form of future tax revenues. Therefore, cuts in public investment in durable goods, although costly in terms of long-term economic performance seem to be an effective way of alleviating pressure on the public budget. It is important to note, however, that this general result contrasts sharply with the evidence found in this paper for public investment in equipment, a small component of public investment in durable goods, as well as with evidence elsewhere for public investment in transportation infrastructures. For these, the effects on output are strong enough for public investment to pay for itself. Therefore, cuts in these two types of public investment, would have negative long-term economic effects as well as negative long-term budgetary effects. Clearly, not all public investment is created equal. We would like to thank the editor as well as two anonymous referees for unusually useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Fiscal rules and extrinsic uncertainty

Summary This paper analyzes the effect of two fiscal policy regimes on the set of equilibria. A general equilibrium model with public goods is used to re-examine Friedman's [9] proposal for fiscal reform. The issue is whether a constraint upon fiscal policy requiring budget balance under all contingencies increases the stability of the economy. Stability is modelled in terms of neutralizing extrinsic uncertainty or sunspots. The government consists of bureaus providing public goods. The budgetary rules entail fixed shares of revenues and arrangements for budget balancing. Existence of equilibrium and properties of the equilibrium set are established. The Friedmanite rules permit extrinsic uncertainty to affect outcomes, while a policy that allows the bureaus greater discretion in the pursuit of their objectives neutralizes it.This paper is based on Goenka [11]. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Roger Guesnerie, Christophe Préchac, Bruce Smith, and Steve Spear for helpful comments. I would especially like to thank Karl Shell for many discussions and advice, and Michael Woodford whose detailed comments have sharpened the paper. This paper has benefitted from presentations at Buffalo, Cornell, VPI, CMU, LSE, and the 1991 European meetings of the Econometric Society. Research support from N.S.F. Grant SES-8606944 and the Center for Analytic Economics at Cornell University is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are mine.     

Leviathan: Revenue-maximizer or glory-seeker?

We argue that the Hobbesian assumption of glory-seeking behavior, especially when applied to holders of high office, is both more realistic and has greater predictive power than Brennan and Buchanan's hypothesis of revenue-maximization. Whereas traditional public finance theory sees the sovereign as a benign agent without an objective of his own and Brennan and Buchanan endow him with the objective of revenue maximization, Hobbes's political construct envisages a sovereign-principal who devises rules and incentives to induce his subjects-agents to contribute to his own preservation and glory. We examine the implications of this Copernican revolution in public finance theory by referring to Brennan and Buchanan's key claim that the Leviathan ought to be constrained by a fiscal constitution. We argue that the interplay of the pursuit glory and the concern for self-preservation implies that the government cannot be bound by rules set by citizens.     

Commitment and matching contributions to public goods

We study multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public goods. In the first stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be conditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their own contributions and fulfill any commitments made in the first stage. Equilibrium contributions are characterized under different assumptions about the commitment ability of players, the number of public goods and whether players commit to matching rates or to discrete quantities. We focus on contribution mechanisms that can emerge and be sustainable without a central authority, and that may be particularly relevant for international public goods. Efficient levels of public goods can be achieved under some circumstances, while in others commitment is ineffective.     

Endogenous growth, welfare and budgetary regimes

Within an optimizing endogenous growth model with productive public capital and government debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path a set of welfare-maximizing fiscal rules under different budgetary regimes. It is shown that optimal fiscal policy depends on the specific budgetary stance considered.     

WHAT DO CITIZENS THINK ABOUT PUBLIC ENTERPRISES? SUBJECTIVE SURVEY DATA ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE GERMAN PUBLIC SECTOR

We analyse the legitimacy of public enterprises that perform economic activities by focusing on the citizens’ subjective preferences, i.e. determining their political legitimacy. Using data from a representative survey conducted among 318 citizens of the German state of Rhineland‐Palatine, we explore determinants for the support of either privatisation efforts or the instrumental thesis, a widespread principle in German‐speaking countries, which considers public enterprises solely as instruments to fulfil economic policy objectives. Our results indicate that the respondents’ perception of the efficiency of public enterprises as well as their personal economic situation are important factors for the support of privatisation. The influential factors for the use of public enterprises as policy instruments are political ideology, the perception of a higher security of supplying goods and services as well as opinions regarding corporate social responsibility. The subjective preferences of a (democratic) country's citizens are thus an important reason why the public sector should or should not play an active part in providing goods and services. This can play an important role when decision makers from the public sector are keen to take into account the citizens’ approval or disapproval of privatisation measures.     

Democracy,visibility and public good provision

We examine the role of visibility in influencing government resource allocation across a multiplicity of public goods. We show that a “visibility effect” distorts governmental resource allocation such that it helps explain why governments neglect provision of essential public goods, despite their considerable benefits. We show that greater democratization widens the gap in resource allocation between more visible (such as famine prevention) versus less visible (such as malnutrition prevention) public goods, up to an intermediate level of democracy. Beyond this level, this gap decreases. Furthermore, public goods with low visibility are prone to multiple equilibria in resource allocation, with voter expectations being shown to be important.     

Debt, Growth and Budgetary Regimes

Within the Barro (1990) model of productive public services, but with the inclusion of public debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path, a set of welfare‐maximizing fiscal rules under two budgetary regimes – one with only the standard dynamic government budget constraint, and the other involving the golden rule of public finance. We demonstrate analytically that the optimal fiscal policy differs in the two budgetary regimes considered. We also analyse two cases within the second regime: one, where the ratio of current spending to tax revenues is parametrically given, and another, where this ratio is optimally chosen by the government.     

Decentralization and international tax competition

This paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions. In the first stage of the game, the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision. In the second stage, the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital. A country's decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists under tax competition. In contrast to standard tax competition models, decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare.     

公共产品的私人供给--以开放源代码软件开发为例

公共产品如何供给的问题,是福利经济学、财政学等关注的焦点问题。在什么情况下,用什么样的激励制度才能促进私人供给公共产品的积极性,长期以来悬而未决。近期出现的开放源代码软件为我们提供了新的案例。开放源代码软件倡导自由和开放的精神,完全打破了以往的商业惯例。开放源代码软件符合公共产品的基本特征,对开放源代码软件特殊供给方式的研究,能使我们在探讨公共产品的私人供给方面开拓更广的视野。同时对开放源代码软件生产过程的研究,还揭示出一种新型的生产关系正在逐步形成。     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

Demand for different types of public goods: evidence from Nigeria

Preferences of Nigerian households vary across different types of public goods. For example, some prefer roads while others favor education even after controlling for the existing supply of these goods. What explains this variation? We argue that the perceived distributional consequences of specific public goods differ conditional on the personal characteristics of households. In particular, households demand the type of public good that (a) increases the utility of assets they already own and (b) resonates with their past experiences involving the lack of particular public goods. We test our argument with data on 123,000 Nigerian households. We find strong evidence for our argument across six types of public goods.     

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Anticipated Price Reform

This paper uses a two-period model to examine the macroeconomic consequences of anticipated price liberalization. In the first period prices are controlled, there is excess demand for goods and consumers must engage in costly queuing to make purchases. In the second period prices are freed, eliminating the need for queues. We establish the possibility of multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria and examine the effects of contingent policy rules. The framework enables us to examine a number of issues of importance, such as the problem of the monetary overhang, the relevance of budgetary policies and the effects of foreign aid.