The Manufacturers' Choice of Distribution Policy under Successive Duopoly

We examine an asymmetric noncooperative game between two manufacturers selecting the number of retailers who can distribute their products. In deciding whether to distribute through one or both retailers, there are two conflicting effects: the output expansion effect, because the product is sold in more outlets; and the competitive effect, associated with the introduction of intrabrand competition. Product differentiation and demand asymmetries between the two products determine which of these two effects dominates the other. When product differentiation is strong and brand asymmetry is moderate, both manufacturers distribute through both retailers in equilibrium. However, when both product differentiation and brand asymmetry are weak, exclusive dealing through a single retailer is the equilibrium. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one manufacturer distributes through both retailers but the other manufacturer distributes through one retailer. These equilibria can arise when both product differentiation and brand asymmetry are strong.     

How Do Retailers Price Beer During Periods of Peak Demand? Evidence from Game Weeks of the German Bundesliga

This article considers retail beer pricing during game weeks of the German Bundesliga. German consumers exhibit a high degree of brand‐loyalty in their preference for regionally crafted beers, and we exploit the regional brand‐loyalty of German beer consumers to identify brand‐level demand shocks for beers preferred by the home team's fans and visiting team's fans during Bundesliga game weeks. We find retailer price adjustments at the category level mask a considerably more nuanced pricing behavior at the brand level. Retailers in regions hosting Bundesliga games significantly increase beer prices at the category level during game weeks; however, at the brand level, we find retailers selectively discount prices on the home team's sponsored beers and systematically raise prices on the visiting team's sponsored beers. Our findings are consistent with a “tourist–natives” model of retail pricing during periods of increased demand in the German beer market.     

Market and Welfare Effects of Mandatory Country‐of‐Origin Labeling in the U.S. Specialty Crops Sector: An Application to Fresh Market Apples

This study provides a new framework of analysis of the market and welfare effects of mandatory country‐of‐origin labeling (MCOOL) for fruits and vegetables that accounts for heterogeneous consumer preferences, differences in producer agronomic characteristics, and retailer market power. The market and welfare effects of MCOOL are shown to be case‐specific and dependent on the labeling costs at the farm and retail levels, the strength of consumer preference for domestic products, the market power of retailers, the marketing margin along the supply chain, and the relative costs of imported and domestic products. Simulation results for the U.S. market of fresh apples indicate that domestic producers are the most likely beneficiaries of MCOOL, followed by domestic consumers. Being unable to exercise market power on consumers or suppliers of fresh apples, retailers will lose if the implementation of MCOOL entails fixed costs. Imports of fresh apples decline after MCOOL introduction.     

Are trade creditors relationship lenders?

We test the hypothesis that trade creditors are relationship lenders using SME data from Japan. We find that the validity of the relationship lending hypothesis depends on the relative bargaining power between the buyer and sellers. Specifically, we find evidence that longer buyer–seller relationships may matter depending on the buyer–seller relative bargaining power. When a buyer depends too much on its main supplier, the supplier does not provide more credit as its relationship with the buyer matures. However, a longer buyer/main-supplier relationship is beneficial because a non-dependent buyer can obtain more overall credit from sellers. Depending on the extent to which this increase is due to an increase in the credit from the main suppliers, our findings are consistent with the relationship lending hypothesis. However, even if the increase mainly comes from other sellers, our findings imply that sellers extract a positive signal from a longer buyer/main-supplier relationship.     

Vertical Integration and Exclusivity Contracts when Consumers Have Switching Costs

This article extends the literature on switching costs by considering what happens when retailers and manufacturers are separate entities and some customers are locked in with retailers. This separation introduces a dynamic inconsistency problem as manufacturers face the problem of extracting too much surplus from the retailer in which case the retailer has no incentive to build a subscriber base. It is shown that different trading relationships arise according to the nature and magnitude of switching costs. When switching costs are high, then integrated structures are always predicted (or exclusive dealerships in case vertical integration is banned). Vertical integration should be allowed as it provides high-powered incentives to acquire market shares.     

A model of counterfeiting: A duopoly approach

This paper establishes a duopoly model, which considers consumers’ preference exhibits the horizontal differentiation and vertical differentiation simultaneously, to investigate how counterfeiting affects firms’ market power and consumer's purchasing behavior. The effects of government enforcement on counterfeiting are also concerned. The findings tell that (1) the market power of the firms is higher than the one when consumers with only the characteristic of horizontal differentiation or vertical differentiation; (2) when the production cost of a genuine product increases, the consumers who originally purchased this genuine product may continue to purchase the genuine one, purchase the genuine of the other brand, or, quite interestingly, purchase the counterfeiting product of the other brand; (3) If government imposes a (stricter) enforcement on counterfeiting, the consumers who do not have a strong preference on a particular brand of product but originally purchased the counterfeit of this brand of product may instead purchase the genuine one or purchase nothing; the consumers who originally purchased its genuine may instead purchase the genuine of the other brand or purchase nothing.     

The “Services” Explanation for Resale Price Maintenance: Deleterious Results Missed in the Economics Literature and in Legal Decisions

Policy discussions and a U.S. Supreme Court decision interpret retailer services induced by retail price maintenance (RPM) as enhancing consumer surplus (CS) and welfare enhancing, marginalizing dissenting opinions that use similar models but with different parameters. However, if presales services stimulate demand by providing information about a product's value, they need not raise postsale value in use. Inframarginal consumers' presales perceived value may increase, but their postsale value may be unchanged, so their supposed CS gains are ephemeral, and their actual surplus falls proportional to price increase. We show that, even adding in gains to marginal consumers, effects on CS are far more negative than conceived of in this literature. Consequently, in a rule‐of‐reason antitrust environment, if RPM is challenged without alleging collusion or exclusion, presales demand‐inducing information provision is a flimsy defense if CS is the standard and not always convincing if total surplus is the standard.     

考虑引流作用与定价权的网红直播带货定价策略分析

构建一个由制造商与零售商组成的二级双渠道供应链，其中制造商一方面为零售商供货，另一方面通过直播渠道销售产品。考虑到网红直播能够为线下零售引流，分别讨论网红主播有直播渠道定价权与制造商有直播渠道定价权两种情况下供应链成员最优决策问题。研究发现：在制造商拥有直播渠道定价权时，零售价格与直播渠道价格均高于网红主播拥有直播渠道定价权时的情景，制造商与网红主播谁拥有直播渠道定价权谁就在直播带货中更有利可图。当制造商拥有渠道定价权且选择头部主播进行带货时，零售商存在着“搭便车”的现象。     

Leading and Merging: Convex Costs,Stackelberg, and the Merger Paradox

This paper examines the consequences of a Stackelberg leader merging with followers when costs are convex. Such mergers are always profitable for the participants, and the followers often do better merging than remaining excluded rivals. This resolution of the merger paradox cannot be generated either by Stackelberg leadership without convex costs or by convex costs without leadership. In addition, with convex costs, a merger with the leader can actually harm excluded rivals (suggesting why they might object to the merger) and increase social welfare.     

考虑风险规避的闭环供应链对突发事件的协调

以一个制造商、一个分销商、一个零售商构成的三级闭环供应链为研究对象,在考虑零售商风险规避和随机需求的基础上,首先研究了正常环境下为实现三级闭环供应链的协调该如何设计收益共享、成本分摊契约：然后,针对突发事件造成市场需求、生产成本、再制造成本同时扰动时原契约协调作用失效的情况,研究如何对原契约进行改进以使三级闭环供应链依然协调。研究结果表明,运用收益共享、成本分摊契约协调供应链时,零售商损失规避程度的增加会导致制造商采取增加零售商留存收益份额或分销商采取降低批发价的方法来激励零售商多订货,正常环境下三级闭环供应链的协调可通过运用基准契约来实现,突发事件环境下三级闭环供应链的协调可通过运用改进契约来实现。     

Renting Goodwill in International Marketing Channels: An Analysis of Pricing Strategies and Bargaining Power

This paper investigates the pricing decisions of foreign manufacturers in international markets within a bargaining framework with asymmetric information and the rental of goodwill. The key findings are: first, the foreign manufacturer follows a mark-up pricing strategy in which its gross margin and the quality premium over the domestic product are shared with the importer. Second, a manufacturer–importer contract occurs only when the manufacturer’s bargaining power is within an admissible range which shrinks as transaction costs increase. Third, the domestic consumer will only purchase the foreign product if the importer’s goodwill in the domestic market is sufficiently large to signal quality. The paper contributes to the literature on exchange relationships between foreign manufacturers and importers.     

基于进化博弈理论的分销渠道合作分析研究

文章研究了由制造商和零售商组成的简单分销渠道,采用博弈最新发展的进化博弈理论,分析了制造商和零售商的决策问题。研究表明在完全理性下通过讨价还价来分配合作总利润,不会实现帕累托最优策略——合作,并且根据分配比例的不同范围可以得到不同的博弈类型;在有限理性下制造商和零售商通过长期反复博弈,学习和调整,渠道合作的可能性与超额利润成正比;当超额利润趋近无穷时,制造商和零售商完全合作。如果制造商（或零售商）合作,零售商（或制造商）不合作,制造商（或零售商）合作的损失越小,渠道关系趋近合作的可能性越大;渠道合作的可能性与各自的贴现因子成正比。     

Competitiveness and Integration of Product Markets

This article develops a two-country, two-sector model with imperfect competition in one sector and asymmetric labor market structures in the sense that trade unions have wage bargaining power in one country whereas the labor market is competitive in the other country. We use a new approach to model product market integration, and it turns out that the unionized country gains from integration in terms of welfare, and, if the initial level of integration is relatively low, experiences an increase in employment and investment.     

基于区块链的闭环供应链定价及回收策略

考虑区块链技术下新能源汽车闭环供应链定价及回收决策问题,构建制造商和零售商回收模式下链上成员Stackelberg博弈模型。结果表明,随着消费者对绿色产品偏好提升,碳减排努力、链上成员利润及社会福利等均增长;提高梯次利用比例将增加零售商回收模式下零售商利润、两种回收模式下制造商利润及社会福利,尤其引入区块链及制造商回收对社会福利影响显著;采用区块链单位成本满足一定阈值时,采用区块链有利于提升需求量和碳减排努力。     

论我国酒店品牌的经营战略

品牌是一种标志,是消费者身份的体现,也是酒店的核心竞争力和无价的财富.品牌是酒店的取胜之宝,它推动着酒店的发展.因此,确立品牌优势已成为当今世界酒店的一项重要经营战略.酒店品牌策略的战略选择:市场细分战略、创新战略、亲情战略、联合品牌战略以及公共关系战略.     

Optimal Conservatism with Earnings Manipulation

This paper examines the role of conservatism when an agent can manipulate upcoming earnings before all uncertainty is resolved. An increase in conservatism, by reducing the likelihood of favorable earnings, requires steeper performance pay to maintain the same level of incentives, which in turn increases the equilibrium earnings manipulation. Trade‐offs between inducing effort and curbing manipulation predict an interior level of conservatism as optimal. The optimal level of conservatism is positively associated with enforcement, economic profitability and earnings quality, and negatively associated with agency frictions. In particular, we show that more economically profitable firms choose to be more conservative. We also establish that the association between performance pay and manipulation identifies whether conservatism is optimally chosen or exogenously imposed. In an application to debt contracting, we show that optimal conservatism is negatively associated with borrowers’ bargaining power.     

Strategic profit sharing between firms

We introduce the possibility of unilaterally giving profits away to the rival in different oligopolistic contexts. We find that this strategy may be profitable in some circumstances, thus providing a context for partial tacit collusion in one‐shot oligopolistic interactions. Although the strategy in itself may look unrealistic, we argue that it may be hidden behind a more complicated relation of the firms.     

New Compensation Standard for Land Expropriation in China

This paper explores a new compensation standard for use in agricultural land conversion in China during the land‐expropriation process, based on the market value definition. Assuming identical bargaining power between the buyer and the seller, efficient and equitable compensation is obtained through a market transaction and bargaining negotiation mechanism, under the assumpation of a perfect market. From the state‐of‐the‐art viewpoint of land appraising, a practical approximation of the theoretical optimal compensation will provide an effective solution for China, under the current collective‐owned land property rights structure.     

Brand familiarity and product knowledge in customization

I adopt Hotelling's model with two firms. Each consumer has a most preferred variety and possesses a certain level of category‐specific knowledge. When a firm offers customization, consumers must interact with the firm to create their products. Consumers familiar with the brand can do this seamlessly, whereas consumers unfamiliar with the brand have difficulty expressing their individual needs (the difficulty decreases with consumers' knowledge). The firms first simultaneously decide whether to customize, then engage in price competition. Although customization makes the products less differentiated, the frictions caused by consumer co‐design activities relax price competition. Customization by one of the firms occurs in equilibrium.     

新增值税条件下购货方纳税筹划理论探析

2009年新《增值税暂行条例》的实施为增值税纳税人的纳税实务提供了更大的筹划空间。对于购货方为一般纳税人而言,选择供货方的纳税筹划方法为购货价格折让率基础上的议价。而当购货方为小规模纳税人时,纳税筹划方法为最低供货价格的选择。企业可以根据既定的纳税人身份科学地进行增值税的纳税筹划,以达到少缴税或递延纳税并为企业财务管理目标服务的目的。