我国保险市场结构的福利分析

本文基于产业组织理论模型分析了保险业市场结构及其相应的福利影响.以社会福利最大化的情形作为基准,考察了寡头竞争市场结构下低、高价保险的产出以及相关的社会福利状况.研究结果表明,保险业寡头竞争的市场结构并没有实现社会福利最大化.政府应对低、高价保险采取不同的政策,以谋求最优产出配置.     

论中国保险市场结构的调整

本文以中国保险业的市场结构现状作为逻辑起点,采用实证分析和规范分析相结合的方法,对我国保险市场结构变迁的原因进行了分析,得出结论:目前中国保险业市场结构属寡头垄断型,市场集中度极高。但高集中度与理论界的共谋假说和有效结构假说不相符,由此认为,我国目前的保险市场结构不合理,应由寡头垄断模式向垄断竞争模式转变,并提出了相关政策建议。     

我国保险业的市场结构与绩效研究

我国保险业的市场结构与绩效相关性的实证研究表明：共谋假说与有效结构假说在我国保险业并不存在;相反,寡头垄断型市场结构与国有保险公司绩效低下并存却是独有的现象.应积极采取措施,使寡头垄断模式向垄断竞争模式转变,构建有利于我国保险公司绩效优化和竞争力提高的有效市场结构.     

跨国公司转移定价与公平交易原则探析北大核心CSSCI

从市场结构角度出发,利用寡头竞争模型,分别考虑跨国公司为集权与分权两种组织形式的情况,分析不完全竞争市场中公平交易原则税基保护的有效性及其对社会福利的影响。结论表明:基于完全竞争假设、旨在保护税基的公平交易原则在不完全竞争市场中实施,反而可能会导致税基减小,社会福利降低。具体来说,公平交易原则会降低低税率国家的税基与社会福利,提高高税率国家的税基与社会福利,而后者的提高是以前者的降低为代价的。相比于集权形式,分权形式下由于转移价格的策略性效应,公平交易原则使得税基减小以及社会福利降低的幅度会进一步扩大。     

我国人身保险市场结构变化与预测分析

虽然保险业经受了本次金融危机的考验,但是保险业可能成为系统性风险传导链条上的一环,因此,保险监管机构需要转变审慎监管方式,建立适合保险业的宏观审慎监管框架。在这个背景下,对中国人身保险市场结构现状有一个较为清晰和准确的认识就显得十分必要。研究发现:从全国范围来说,我国寿险市场主体数量较少,人身险市场集中度过高,市场结构为寡头垄断,但各地区的人身险市场结构又各有特点,经济发达地区人身险保险市场结构已经过渡到垄断竞争阶段。根据成分数据预测结果分析,在"十二五"期间,我国人身险的市场集中度继续呈下降趋势。     

我国保险业市场结构:现状与趋势分析

根据保费收入的市场集中度和赫芬达尔指数可以看出，我国保险业的市场结构属于寡头垄断，而从资产利润率，保费利润主和偿付能力来考察市场绩效，发现市场绩效和市场结构不匹配。因此，目前的市场结构不合理，由此提出我国保险业将向垄断竞争模式转变，并提出相关建议。     

广东财产保险市场结构分析——兼论广东中小产险公司发展瓶颈及监管建议

一、广东财产保险市场结构实证分析市场结构,在产业组织理论中,是指企业市场关系的特征和形式,其实质反映了市场竞争垄断关系。罗宾逊（J．Robinson）将市场结构分为完全竞争、垄断竞争、寡头垄断、完全垄断四种类型。这种分类已成为经济学理论的经典。据此,保险业市场结构也可分为这四类。     

我国财产保险业存在的问题及解决方法

尽管我国的财产保险业经过近三十年的发展,取得了举世瞩目的成就,不仅具备了良好的产业体系框架,而且一个金融保险产业资源共享的业务融合性的"寡头主导,大中小共生"的寡头垄断竞争格局的开放大市场逐渐形成。但不可否认我国的财产保险业仍然存在一些不足和亟待解决的问题。本文就是通过对我国财产保险业现状的分析,提出一些解决的建议。     

我国财产保险业存在的问题及解决方法

尽管我国的财产保险业经过近三十年的发展,取得了举世瞩目的成就,不仅具备了良好的产业体系框架,而且一个金融保险产业资源共享的业务融合性的"寡头主导,大中小共生"的寡头垄断竞争格局的开放大市场逐渐形成。但不可否认我国的财产保险业仍然存在一些不足和亟待解决的问题。本文就是通过对我国财产保险业现状的分析,提出一些解决的建议。     

我国保险业市场化改革及其绩效:理论模型及实证分析

保险业市场化改革改变了其市场结构和产权结构。市场化改革有利于增进消费者、政府、保险企业员工福利,但因其强化了竞争,使得对其他类型保险公司而言,原先享受较高程度政策优待的国有保险公司经营状况恶化。     

Unemployment insurance in a three-state model of the labor market

The paper extends the model of Krusell et al. (2010) to study the welfare effects of unemployment insurance. The model unemployment insurance program includes four realistic features: 1) a 50% replacement rate up to a benefit cap; 2) finite duration of eligibility during a jobless spell; 3) limited eligibility; and 4) and an imperfectly monitored job search requirement. The model is parameterized to fit the size of scope of unemployment insurance in the United States. Removing unemployment insurance from the model leads to only a 0.1% consumption equivalent increase in average welfare. Simplifying assumptions about the structure of unemployment insurance, such as allowing all job losers to receive benefits, lead to much larger welfare effects similar to the effects found in the past literature. Understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance requires careful modeling of the structure of the program.     

Insurance markets and unisex tariffs: is the European Court of Justice improving or destroying welfare?

We analyze the effects of mandatory unisex tariffs in insurance contracts, such as those required by a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice, on equilibrium insurance premia and equilibrium welfare. In a unified framework, we provide a quantitative analysis of the associated insurance market equilibria in both monopolistic and competitive insurance markets. We investigate the welfare loss caused by regulatory adverse selection and show that unisex tariffs may cause market distortions that significantly reduce overall social welfare.     

U.S. tax policy and health insurance demand: Can a regressive policy improve welfare?

The U.S. tax policy on health insurance is regressive because it subsidizes only those offered group insurance through their employers, who also tend to have a relatively high income. Moreover, the subsidy takes the form of deductions from the progressive income tax system giving high income earners a larger subsidy. To understand the effect of the policy, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents and an endogenous demand for health insurance. A complete removal of the subsidy may lead to a partial collapse of the group insurance market, reduce the insurance coverage and deteriorate welfare. There is, however, room for improving the coverage and welfare by extending a refundable credit to the individual insurance market.     

Social security, life insurance and annuities for families

In this paper we ask whether an aspect of social security, namely its role as a provider of insurance against uncertain life spans, is welfare enhancing. To this end we use an OLG model where agents have a bequest motive and differ in sex and marital status and where families are formed and destroyed and their characteristics evolve (exogenously) according to U.S. demographic patterns of marriage, divorce, fertility and mortality. We compare the implications of social security under a variety of market structures that differ in the extent to which life insurance and annuities are available. We find that social security is a bad idea. In economies where the private sector provides annuities and life insurance, it is a bad idea for the standard reason that it distorts the intertemporal margin by lowering the capital stock. In the absence of such securities social security is still a very bad idea, only marginally less so compared with economies with annuities and life insurance. We also explore these issues in a world where people live longer and we find no differences in our answers. As a by-product of our analysis we find that the existence of life insurance opportunities for people is important in welfare terms while that of annuities is not.     

社会资本与中国农村养老保险——基于CHIPS数据的实证研究

党的十八大以来,习近平总书记多次发表重要论述,阐明自己的"民生观",指出中国养老问题的重要性。改革开放以来,中国经济、社会、政治都发生了巨大变化。福利一词也越来越多为人所谈论。本文以农村养老保险为切入口,研究社会资本、党员身份与农村养老保险的参与程度、知情程度、未来参与意愿之间的关系,从一个侧面反映中国农村的福利情况。通过文献综述,提出了六个假设。根据中国家庭收入调查(CHIPS)数据,建立Logistic回归模型,发现社会资本对是否参加农村养老保险、是否知道个人账户有多少钱、将来是否加入农村养老保险都有积极作用;党员身份与是否参加农村养老保险、是否知道自己的个人账户有多少钱、将来是否可能参加无关。结果表明,提高村民的社会资本,加强他们的社会交往有助于他们获取信息,改善福利,所以可以提高村民小组活动和村民大会的频率以增加农民的社会资本。     

The Welfare State in a Changing Environment

We analyse how the welfare state, i.e., social insurance that works through redistributive taxation, should respond to increases in risks and to increases in the cost of operating the welfare state. With respect to risks, we distinguish between risks that can be insured and such that cannot (background risks). Insurable risks can be reduced by costly individual self-insurance and by costly social insurance. We show: (i) Self-insurance will be higher the more costly is the welfare state and the larger are background or insured risks. (ii) Full social insurance can only be optimal in a costless welfare state. (iii) The optimal welfare state is not necessarily larger the less costly it is. (iv) The welfare state need not optimally expand when risks increase that it insures. (v) It should, however, expand when risks increase that it does not insure.     

The welfare cost of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets

We consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets, which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs. We propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss. After identifying some “types” which determine expected risk and insurance demand, we derive the key factors defining the demand and cost functions in each market induced by these unobservable types. These are used to quantify the efficiency costs of unpriced heterogeneity. We apply our methods to the US Long‐Term Care and Medigap insurance markets, where we find that unpriced heterogeneity causes substantial inefficiency.     

强制保险能否提高保险市场效率分析

本文以社会福利为衡量保险市场效率的标准,分析了实施强制保险是否有助于保险市场效率的提高。文章首先证明了在信息不对称的保险市场中存在着市场失灵现象;然后通过比较实施强制保险前后社会福利的差异,得出结论:实施强制保险有助于社会福利的改善,从而可以提高保险市场效率。     

Depositors' Welfare,Deposit Insurance,and Deregulation

We develop an analytical model to address the question of optimal deposit insurance policy and to examine the impact of deregulation on depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. We find that the optimal level of regulation depends critically on the functional relationship between risk and return. We show that in general deregulation of bank activities and/or of deposit rate ceilings will in volve tradeoff between depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. Our analysis also indicates that risk-sensitive premium and capital requirement schedules may not be efficient in managing the risk of banks.     

基于统一税收制度下的银行存款保险制度改进研究

多年来,我们对于存款保险制度安排的创新不足,对社会福利的影响研究较少,研究重点主要集中在基于银行缴纳保费的存款保险计划制定、定价方法、道德风险的规避及对银行体系的效用方面。事实上,只有通过统一的税收制度建立存款保险计划才能提高社会福利,并在该框架下实现对民间借贷的有效调节。