利益相关者的博弈与企业年金制度的构建

本文分析了企业年金制度在建立、运营,管理和完善的各个环节中,所涉及的不同层面的各类利益相关者内部及其之间的博弈。认为只有在多层面的各类利益相关者的共同努力下,妥善、协调地解决各种利益关系,一个造福干全社会的科学,合理的企业年金制度才能得以正常、高效地运作。     

企业价值信息供给与需求的均衡分析

信息资源如同其他社会财富一样是一种稀缺资源。对信息资源的优先占有也会带来相关的财富。当某种信息资源被独占的时候，相应的利益就会被垄断。目前，按会计规则要求，企业提供的财务方面信息内容在实务中越来越受到批评与指责，主要原因在于现行财务报告框架不能反映企业的价值信息，从而不利于企业利益相关者投资决策，严重背离了利益相关者的信息需求。因此，现存的企业信息不对称情况多数是制度选择的结果而非制度选择的原因。所以，解决信息不对称就要通过信息需求者与信息供给者之间博弈对信息供需进行“制度安排”，以达到信息供求相对均衡。     

我国民营企业文化的形成与变革分析

制度的供给和需求决定了我国民营企业独特的企业文化,企业中利益相关者互相博弈,达到了一种利益均衡。企业文化变革属于强制性制度变迁,成功变革的充分条件是企业遇到了良好的变革时机,必要条件是满足企业及其利益相关者的盈利性要求。民营企业需要加强社会责任,且在实施企业文化变革时进行充分沟通很关键,同时需要提高员工素质。     

合作博弈视阈下我国航空业的健康发展——东航集体返航事件引发的思考

"3·31"东航云南分公司"集体返航"事件凸显出当前我国航空业在企业治理结构的完善方面,尤其是在和谐劳资关系的构建方面尚存在的沉痼.企业利益相关者之间合作博弈模型均衡解的存在,表明能够实现企业利益相关者之间合作可能性.分析完善我国航空公司的治理结构主要是努力寻求四方参与者或利益相关者之间合作博弈的均衡解:即实现航空公司内部的劳资合作、出资者与经营者的合作、要素所有者之间的合作以及航空公司与相关企业的合作博弈,为全面建立社会主义和谐社会奠定坚实的微观基础.     

企业管理层及其利益相关者会计信息失真的博弈分析

会计信息失真是全球存在的一种普遍现象，而当前研究更多是基于定性上的分析。本文通过引入重复博弈构建了企业管理层会计信息造假的博弈模型并进行了分析，同时通过构建博弈模型开展了企业管理层与利益相关者进行会计信息造假合谋的研究，得到了避免企业管理层及其利益相关者会计信息失真的充分条件。最后，论文进行了政策性探讨。     

企业会计政策选择的经济后果成本

企业会计政策实质上是一种经济和政治利益的博弈规则和制度安排。其经济后果指企业会计报告将影响利益相关者的决策行为，从而可能损害部分相关者的利益。企业会计政策的政治成本主要包括寻租成本、税费管制成本和社会契约成本，会计政策将导致社会资源控制权向制定政策者转移。     

基于Shapley值法的企业利益相关者利益分配博弈分析

企业中不同的利益相关者对其有不同的利益要求。由于各个利益相关者都站在自身利益需求的角度上,不同的利益要求间往往存在着一定冲突。有研究者曾用合作博弈中的讨价还价模型讨论了两个利益相关者在对企业所有权比例争取时的子博弈精炼均衡,但当有多种利益相关者同时存在时,该模型无法发挥作用。本文提出基于Shapley值的企业利益分配方法,既克服了讨价还价模型的不足,又能避免利益平均分配,使得企业的利益分配在各利益相关者之间更加合理,减少了利益相关者间的冲突。     

基于利益相关者理论的税务筹划博弈分析

利益相关者理论在我国尚未引起足够的重视,将其运用到税务筹划研究中,更为少见。从企业利益相关者理论的研究视角出发,把企业作为"利益相关者的契约联合体",提出税务筹划的共赢理念,并进行了企业与税务机关、企业与其职工的税务筹划博弈分析。     

从现代企业理论发展看会计准则的经济后果性

企业契约是由利益相关者共同参与的，而契约的重要特征之一就是平等。因此，会计准则在确定资源和收益计量原则时，首先应该坚持“信息中立”，以保证会计规则的制定在主观上真实反映客观事实。其次，对不同的利益相关者必须采用同样的规则，要充分考虑会计准则的经济后果，以确定会计准则是否考虑了所有利益相关者的利益，而不是仅仅考虑了部分利益相关者的利益。要达到上述目的，我们要在会计准则的制定过程中尽可能征求利益相关者的意见并评估对利益相关者的经济影响；在会计准则制定程序上要力求公正；在会计准则执行过程中要不断分析、反馈，根据经济后果不断完善会计准则。     

旅游景区治理绩效:政府与利益相关者的博弈

从利益相关者理论和博弈论的角度,相关学者对旅游景区开发治理参与各方利益均衡进行了分析.在景区治理过程中,利益相关者之间存在多重利益博弈关系,而地方政府在协调各方利益中扮演着重要角色,实现与各方的利益均衡是提高景区绩效的基本动力.研究表明,地方政府要配合大局,制定规制,从制度上协同各方利益,这是实现利益相关者利益均衡和景区绩效最大化的根本保障.     

基于制度差异视角的贸易摩擦分析

作者从宏观交易成本的角度和微观企业制度的角度分析了制度差异导致贸易摩擦的机制,并且用博弈的方法分析了各国间进行制度差异协调的必要性,得出我国应从政治、经济、历史文化方面采取相应对策加强制度差异的协调,以减少与贸易伙伴间的摩擦的发生.     

Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality

For dynamic games we consider the idea that a player, at every stage of the game, will always believe that his opponents will choose rationally in the future. This is the basis for the concept of common belief in future rationality, which we formalize within an epistemic model. We present an iterative procedure, backward dominance, that proceeds by eliminating strategies from the game, based on strict dominance arguments. We show that the backward dominance procedure selects precisely those strategies that can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality if we would not impose (common belief in) Bayesian updating.     

Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

Aumann (1995) showed that for games with perfect information common knowledge of substantive rationality implies backward induction. Substantive rationality is defined in epistemic terms, that is, in terms of knowledge. We show that when substantive rationality is defined in doxastic terms, that is, in terms of belief, then common belief of substantive rationality implies backward induction. Aumann (1998) showed that material rationality implies backward induction in the centipede game. This result does not hold when rationality is defined doxastically. However, if beliefs are interpersonally consistent then common belief of material rationality in the centipede game implies common belief of backward induction.     

企业群落的生态文化规制博弈

本文从经营伦理角度出发,通过构建随即停止的重复博弈模型,对强生态文化环境对企业经营的诱致作用进行了研究.所获结论是:在集体高度的生态文化信念规制下,企业个体出于对自身利益的考虑,与其他企业合作治污、自发参与清洁生产是其最优策略选择,因而企业的生态经营是可持续的.     

On the Evolution of Pareto‐Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems

I characterize the asymptotic behavior of a society facing a repeated‐common‐interest game. In this society, new individuals enter to replace their “parents” at random times. Each entrant has possibly different beliefs about others' behavior than his or her predecessor. A self‐confirming equilibrium (SCE) belief process describes an evolution of beliefs in this society consistent with a self‐confirming equilibrium of the repeated game. The main result shows that for any common‐interest game, the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium is a globally absorbing state of the behavioral dynamics when the SCE beliefs of new entrants satisfy certain independence and full‐support properties. This result does not involve either of the usual assumptions of myopia or large inertia common in evolutionary models, nor is this result possible if only Nash rather than self‐confirming equilibria are considered.     

制度变迁中的权力博弈分析

制度变迁根源于人们对潜在利益的追求,也是相关利益主体之间的权力博弈过程。本文建立了一个制度变迁的双层演化博弈模型,揭示了制度变迁中利益主体之间权力博弈的动态机理。研究表明,利益主体在博弈中掌控权力的大小,决定他们在制度变迁中的地位,制度变迁会朝着有利于权力占优势的利益主体所追求的方向变革;制度也将随着博弈中各利益主体拥有权力资源的相对比例的消长变化而不断演进。     

Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test

Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players with strongly asymmetric payoffs, consistent with a cognitive/affective effect on priors that may serve as a substitute for experience. These effects occur with a common scoring rule elicitation procedure, but not with simpler (unmotivated) statements of expected choices of opponents. Scoring rule belief elicitation improves the goodness of fit of structural models of belief learning, and prior beliefs implied by such models are both stronger and more realistic when beliefs are elicited than when they are not. We also find that “inferred beliefs” (beliefs estimated from past observed actions of opponents) can predict observed actions better than the “stated beliefs” from scoring rule belief elicitation.     

Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test

Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players with strongly asymmetric payoffs, consistent with a cognitive/affective effect on priors that may serve as a substitute for experience. These effects occur with a common scoring rule elicitation procedure, but not with simpler (unmotivated) statements of expected choices of opponents. Scoring rule belief elicitation improves the goodness of fit of structural models of belief learning, and prior beliefs implied by such models are both stronger and more realistic when beliefs are elicited than when they are not. We also find that “inferred beliefs” (beliefs estimated from past observed actions of opponents) can predict observed actions better than the “stated beliefs” from scoring rule belief elicitation.     

金融机构发展物流金融的思路和对策

物流金融是基于物流增值链中的供应商、终端用户、金融机构和物流企业等各方的共同需要所产生和发展的。物流金融的产生和发展离不开金融机构,同时也给现代金融业带来了前所未有的机遇。目前,物流金融在国内处于萌芽时期,各方需要大力发展物流金融以实现多方的共赢。     

How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?

We study Bayesian coordination games in which players choose actions conditional on the realization of their respective signals. Due to differential information, the players do not have common knowledge that a particular game is being played. However, they do have common beliefs with specified probabilities concerning their environment. In our framework, any equilibrium set of rules must be simple enough so that the actions of all players are common belief with probability 1 at every state. Common belief with probability close to 1 will not do.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.