非对称信息下食品供应商信号传递的研究

在非对称信息下消费者难以判断供应商提供的食品质量,而本文通过信号传递博弈的思想得出了混同均衡和分离均衡,并通过进一步的分析可知,只有分离均衡才可以使高质量的供应商愿意通过广告方式与低质量的供应商划分界限,使得消费者根据这个信号就可以把他们区分开来。     

基于博弈模型的票据贴现信用风险分析

本文将企业的交易背景理解为企业信用的一种信号,通过一定的假设在企业和银行之间构造一个信号博弈模型,并解出分离均衡和混同的均衡存在的条件,以此来观察银行和企业的行为选择。     

基于Stacklberg模型的双寡头厂商不完全信息动态博弈分析

本文基于Stacklberg模型,进行双寡头厂商不完全信息动态博弈分析,为了使该模型更具现实意义,首先对完全信息条件下的传统斯坦克尔伯格模型进行分析,再将不完全信息引入Stacklberg模型,使用信号传递博弈分析方法对双寡头厂商进行博弈分析,并以中国厨电市场为例进行实证分析,分别得出双寡头厂商的分离均衡策略与混同均衡策略.     

政府产业重组规划、信号博弈与企业兼并行为

文章以2009年我国腾中重工公司兼并通用公司"悍马"品牌为现实索引,为水平兼并不存在"整合效应"的负盈利资产提供两种基于信号博弈的理论解释.第一种解释基于限制性定价的思路,说明在成本信息不对称的企业进行产量竞争背景下和在一定的市场环境下,总会对应一定负盈利水平的资产,使得低成本类型企业宁愿选择收购非盈利资产,以向竞争者显示其成本类型而得益.另一种解释引入政府推进产业重组的因素,当高效重组不同成本类型企业的概率条件和资产负盈利水平满足一定条件时,存在使低成本类型企业选择收购非盈利资产,以避免在产业重组中可能被低效兼并的分离均衡.     

不完全信息静态博弈视角下的三度价格歧视分析研究

本文针对三度价格歧视存在信息不对称的问题,讨论了两个寡头垄断企业在成本信息不对称的情况下,在两个细分市场实施价格歧视的产量决策问题.将成本函数分为三种、两种及一种可选成本(完全信息)3类情况,通过海萨尼转换,根据成本甄别系数的不同取值范围,得出了两个寡头垄断企业相互制约下的均衡产量、均衡价格、均衡利润及相互关系.研究结果表明:成本甄别系数越小,成本信息劣势企业的均衡产量越高,均衡状态下的总利润也越高;当寡头垄断企业1采用较高成本时,企业1会更加倾向于隐藏自身成本,他在具有信息优势的同时还具有成本劣势;而当寡头垄断企业1采用低成本时,则不会隐藏自己的信息而更倾向通过信号传递,把低成本信息的优势传递出去,以使寡头垄断企业2按完全信息决策产量等结论.本文的研究结果将为信息不对称下的歧视定价提供理论依据.     

多重价格区间与购房者的选择行为——兼论房价持续上涨的原因

在不完全制度性隔离状态下,商品房的居住性需求和投资性需求无法有效区别,会产生投资性需求对居住性需求的挤出效应。从需求角度看,"混合需求引致"将造成房价不断上涨;从供给角度看,土地供给成本和土地垄断租金上涨、房屋开发成本上升、房地产利润远高于社会平均利润等助推了房价上涨。受需求二重性和供给垄断性影响,商品房的价格均衡是双重的。与此相对应,在卖方市场状况下,利用信号发送和识别模型发现商品房购买者的选择行为会出现分离均衡、混同均衡和半分离均衡。要抑制高房价就需要实现房屋供给主体的多元化,抑制投资性需求,保护和释放居住性需求,规制地方政府过高的土地增值收益,规制房地产开发商过高的垄断收益。     

公共服务购买补贴政策下的企业孵化器与政府信号博弈模型

在考虑科技企业孵化器为科技中小企业提供公共服务取得一定效果的情况下,构建了企业孵化器与政府购买信号博弈模型,分析了信息不对称、信息完全和政府失灵3种类型的有成本信号博弈均衡状态,且均衡效率受到了企业孵化器伪装沉没成本和期望风险成本的影响,故在完全信息时实现分离均衡的关键条件是提高孵化器的伪装沉没成本和风险成本,由此得出相应的解决措施,即致力于严格孵化器评判标准、细化政策,建立多方参与的评价机制;提高孵化器公共服务效果核查效率,加强做假惩罚力度,建立综合性的科技金融服务平台和透明的资源共享数据平台;发挥社会公众、媒体第三方的质询和监督等途径来提高孵化器公共服务质量和效率,从而实现财政资源优化配置,更好地服务于科技企业实现社会效益最大化。     

不对称信息条件下产品质量选择的博弈分析

本文运用博弈论和信息经济学的分析工具研究了不对称信息条件下竞争性企业之间、企业与消费者之间以及消费者的产品质量选择问题.研究表明,高质量产品生产企业总能通过多信号显示传递产品质量信息,市场上的分离均衡总是存在.根据构建的消费者关于产品质量的效用函数的分析,发现消费者的质量选择会影响企业的产品质量决策.     

企业间专利组合收益分成的信号博弈策略

利用信号博弈理论,对专利组合策略领导者存在逆向选择情况下的专利组合收益分成策略进行了规范性分析。主要结论如下:当专利组合策略的领导者有高素质与低素质两种类型时,若低素质领导者的模仿成本大于模仿收益,则专利组合策略领导者制定的专利组合收益分成比率完全可以作为一种传递领导者类型的信号,此时的信号博弈存在一个序列分离均衡;反之,则专利组合策略领导者制定的专利组合收益分成比率的信号传递作用将减弱以至不存在,此时的信号博弈存在一个混合策略均衡或混同均衡。最后,从实践角度给出了对策和建议。     

企业融资主体融资行为的博弈分析

投资者和融资企业之间的不完美且不完全信息动态博弈,其结果为精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,这损害了投资者和融资企业的利益。解决的办法是使博弈转化为完美且完全信息动态博弈。具体措施,一是提高投资者对融资企业类型的甄别能力;二是加大绩差企业伪装成绩优企业的成本。     

Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and also the participants in seminars at GREQE (Marseille), Université de Montréal, UBC, HEC (Paris), in the Location Theory session of the World Congress of the Econometric Society (Barcelona) and in the Game Theory Conference at the University of Western Ontario for their comments. We remain, of course, solely responsible for the content of the paper. Financial support from FCAR (Québec), SSHRCC (Canada) and CNRS (France) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Tariff Policy and the Foreign Entry Decision in the Presence of a Cost-Based Informational Asymmetry

The paper demonstrates that the standard prediction on the relation between tariff rates and the mode of foreign entry—exports or direct investment—may not hold in the presence of incomplete information. A foreign firm lacks full information on the cost structure of an informed incumbent firm located in the domestic (potential) host country. Within a two‐period model, the local incumbent may behave in a manner which keeps the potential foreign entrant uninformed of its cost structure. In such a pooling equilibrium, the uninformed foreign firm either refrains from entering altogether or serves the host country via exports at tariff rates which would, otherwise under complete information, induce entry via direct investment. When entry mode is altered, other standard full‐information effects of trade policy may also no longer hold.     

Credibility costs in the monetary integration game*

Euro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two‐stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. The policy‐maker decides whether to devaluate the domestic currency or not at two distinct dates; it makes a last choice just before accession to the monetary union. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a ‘last devaluation’, a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss.     

Centralized versus decentralized taxation of mobile polluting firms

We consider a world in which a mobile polluting firm must locate in one of two regions. The regions differ in two dimensions: their marginal cost of pollution and the production cost of the firm. It is shown that under incomplete information on regional marginal costs of pollution, fiscal competition may lead to the sub-optimal location of the firm. We also show that under incomplete information, a sub-optimal location is less likely under centralized than under decentralized taxation.     

Tariffs as Signals of Uncompetitiveness

In this paper, a domestic and a foreign firm compete as Cournot duopolists in the domestic market. The foreign firm has incomplete information about the costs of the domestic firm, but the domestic government and the domestic firm are completely informed. It is shown that the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about the costs of the domestic firm. In the separating equilibrium, the domestic government signals the uncompetitiveness of the domestic firm by setting a lower tariff than is optimal under complete information.     

COMPETITIVE LONG RUN INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM AND FACTOR-PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

In this paper we have considered competitive long run industry equilibrium with factor-price uncertainty. We discussed the long run equilibrium output of firms with risk neutrality, output price and their responses to changes in uncertainty, factor price and industry demand. In the first part of this paper we have derived a result that, given risk neutrality, the firms operate at proper capacity, i.e. where expected long run marginal cost is equal to expected long run average cost, as shown in the case of output-price uncertainty. This result is, however, different from that obtained from Sheshinski and Dréze (1976). From the comparative static analysis we first discovered that even under risk neutrality factor-price uncertainty affects the long run industry equilibrium: that is, a mean preserving increase in uncertainty leads firm's to enter the industry, because they can decrease expected long run costs as the variability of factor price increases. Consequently, output price goes down. In contrast, firm size is kept invariable in response to its increase as long as the cost function is separable, i.e. the separability of the cost function holds when production functions are the Cobb-Douglas and CES types used commonly in empirical work, although firm size might, generally, be affected by the increase. It is an interesting fact that firm size and industry size will express different responses to a change in risk. The result that the long run industry equilibrium with cost uncertainty is explicitly affected is a sharp contrast to the result under output-price uncertainty and provides a new aspect for understanding about the behaviour of the industry with uncertainty. Secondly, increased factor-price causes the number of firms in the industry to decline and output price to rise. In addition, firm's size will expand with its increase if that factor is inferior, while the effect on firm size is ambiguous if it is normal. The firm's output, i.e. firm size, is, however, kept constant if the cost function is separable. Thirdly, the long run equilibrium output of the firm remains intact but the number of firms increases as industry demand rises. This result holds, regardless of the firm's attitude towards risk. Finally, we find throughout the paper that the functional form of the cost function plays a significant role in determining the behaviour of the industry with factor-price uncertainty.     

Exit with incomplete information about cost

This paper presents a model of output decisions by competitive firms which have incomplete information about costs. Unlike other work on this topic, our model incorporates the possibility of exit from the market after a firm has observed its unit cost. At the equilibrium expected aggregate output and the likelihood of exit depend upon the opportunity cost of staying in the market, the number of informed firms, and the intensity of competition. Uninformed firms may be better off than informed firms if exit is feasible. As a result, even if all firms face the same cost of acquiring information, informed firms may coexist with uninformed firms.     

Partial ownership and cross-border mergers

Partial ownership can be used as a screening device by a foreign firm which wants to merge with a local firm whose productivity is private information. As partial ownership is confined to sharing future merger profits, it cannot achieve complete separation in all cases but improves expected merger gains also in an equilibrium which is not fully separating. Without partial ownership, the foreign firm potentially discriminates against high productivities. In a pooling equilibrium with partial ownership, however, it will potentially discriminate against intermediate productivities.     

Horizontal Mergers Under Asymmetric Information About Synergies

This paper analyses a situation in which there are three quantity‐setting firms, two of which are considering whether or not to merge. When these two firms have private information about the potential cost‐saving synergies of the merger, they may have an incentive to overstate them. This is because if they succeed in making the non‐merging rival firm believe that the synergies are high, the rival firm reduces output and the merger becomes more profitable. Under some conditions, anticipating that the rival will form such a belief, low‐synergy firms that would never merge under complete information will mimic high‐synergy firms by merging. Such pooling behaviour by the merging firms can have a negative impact on social welfare.     

组织距离对虚拟产业集群内企业创新的影响

用组织距离衡量虚拟产业集群内企业间的"组织接近",在双寡头古诺模型的分析框架下,研究组织距离对虚拟产业集群内企业的创新水平、产量和利润的影响。结果表明:在完全信息情况下,虚拟产业集群内企业的创新投入水平越高,则企业联合利润越大;在不完全信息情况下,集群内企业的均衡产量都是其创新投入水平的增函数,但若逆需求函数的斜率较大,则不完全信息对不拥有完全信息的企业的影响较小。最后求得要实现集群内企业的均衡产量随着组织距离的加大而增加则企业的创新水平要满足的条件。