Retail Financial Advice: Does One Size Fit All?

Using unique data on Canadian households, we show that financial advisors exert substantial influence over their clients' asset allocation, but provide limited customization. Advisor fixed effects explain considerably more variation in portfolio risk and home bias than a broad set of investor attributes that includes risk tolerance, age, investment horizon, and financial sophistication. Advisor effects remain important even when controlling flexibly for unobserved heterogeneity through investor fixed effects. An advisor's own asset allocation strongly predicts the allocations chosen on clients' behalf. This one‐size‐fits‐all advice does not come cheap: advised portfolios cost 2.5% per year, or 1.5% more than life cycle funds.     

Institutional investor stability and crash risk: Monitoring versus short-termism?

This study tests two opposing views of institutional investors—monitoring versus short-termism. We present evidence that institutional investor stability is negatively associated with 1-year-ahead stock price crash risk, consistent with the monitoring theory of institutional investors but not the short-termism theory. Our findings are shown to be robust to alternative empirical specifications, estimation methods and endogeneity concerns. In addition, we find that institutional ownership by public pension funds (bank trusts, investment companies, and independent investment advisors) is significantly negatively (positively) associated with future crash risk, consistent with findings that pension funds more actively monitor management than other types of institutions.     

Are investors compensated for their sophistication and informedness for company takeovers – An Australian study

I determine the sophistication and information level in takeovers for four investor classes which are individuals, nominees (fund managers), superannuation (pension) funds and incorporated companies. I also calculate their takeover returns. I find that the superannuation funds are informed and sophisticated; individuals are informed but unsophisticated; nominees are uninformed but sophisticated; and incorporated companies are uninformed and unsophisticated traders, and that the investors realise a return which is commensurate with their information and sophistication. This study improves on existing takeover return research which assumes, as a group, institutions are synonymously informed and sophisticated, and individuals are synonymously unsophisticated and uninformed.     

Information,sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance

Using an intraday transaction dataset with trader identity, we study foreign and domestic investors’ trading activities and investment performance ahead of open-ending events of Taiwanese closed-end funds. Simply buying the funds at a discount and holding until open-ending generates large abnormal returns. All information required to execute this strategy is made public, so the events set up natural experiments to examine how investors trade, holding constant access to information. Foreign investors are net buyers ahead of the open-endings, more than doubling their positions and earning large abnormal returns. Domestic investors are net sellers while the discounts are still large, and forego large abnormal returns. The results suggest that investor sophistication in interpreting the same information is potentially an important determinant of investment performance differences across foreign and domestic investors.     

Momentum or contrarian investment strategies: Evidence from Dutch institutional investors

This paper analyses investment strategies of three types of Dutch institutional investors - pension funds, life insurers and non-life insurers - over the period 1999-2005. We use balance sheet and cash flow data, including purchases and sales of equity, fixed income and real estate. We trace asset reallocations back to both active trading and revaluations and link investment decisions to firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Overall, our results indicate that all three investor types tend to be contrarian traders, i.e. they buy past losers and sell past winners. Especially pension funds showed this behaviour in the most turbulent part of the sample - the crash of 2002 and early 2003 - implying that these institutions have a stabilising impact on financial markets when this is needed most. Life insurers tend to be contrarian traders when they have a high proportion of unit-linked policies, while non-life insurers are contrarian when they have a more risky business model.     

Pension Funds’ Asset Allocation and Participant Age: A Test of the Life‐Cycle Model

This article examines the impact of participants’ age distribution on the asset allocation of Dutch pension funds, using a unique data set of pension fund investment plans for 2007. Theory predicts a negative effect of age on (strategic) equity exposures. We observe that a 1‐year higher average age in active participants leads to a significant and robust reduction of the strategic equity exposure by around 0.5 percentage point. Larger pension funds show a stronger age‐equity exposure effect. The average age of active participants influences investment behavior more strongly than the average age of all participants, which is plausible as retirees no longer possess any human capital.     

Investor behaviour and reaching for yield: Evidence from the sterling corporate bond market

We provide evidence on how corporate bond investors react to a change in yields, and how this behaviour differs in times of market‐wide stress. We also investigate ‘reaching for yield’ across investor types, as well as providing insights into the structure of the corporate bond market. Using proprietary sterling corporate bond transaction data, we show that insurance companies, hedge funds and asset managers are typically net buyers when corporate bond yields rise. Dealer banks clear the market by being net sellers. However, we find evidence for this behaviour reversing in times of stress for some investors. During the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’, asset managers were net sellers of corporate bonds in response to a sharp rise in yields, potentially amplifying price changes. At the same time, dealer banks were net buyers. Finally, we provide evidence that insurers, hedge funds and asset managers tilt their portfolios towards higher risk bonds, consistent with ‘reaching for yield’ behaviour.     

Sovereign pension and social security reserve funds: A portfolio analysis

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have been increasing in numbers and in the global reach of their investment activities. At the same time, they seem to experience the adverse consequences of the financial crisis differently than other financial intermediaries. This paper assesses whether and how a retirement-financing purpose has affected their investment strategies since the global financial crisis, as opposed to the strategies of other public pension entities that do not operate as SWFs. We construct a sample of 12 sovereign pension reserve funds (SPRFs) and social security reserve funds (SSRFs) and analyze the effects of size, operational model, country development, the fund's experience, and quality of disclosures on strategic asset allocation for the period 2007–2014. We also investigate the relevance of “home bias.” Our results show that SPRFs invest more aggressively than SSRFs, but are less exposed to domestic investments. We do not find major shifts in asset allocation induced by the financial crisis, except for a recent decrease of home-country exposures.     

Home sweet home: Home bias and international diversification among individual investors

A striking feature of international portfolio investment is the extent to which equity portfolios are concentrated in the domestic market of the investor. We investigate differences in home bias on an individual level by studying portfolios formed as a part of the new defined contribution pension plan in Sweden. We estimate the likelihood of home bias and use individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic features as explanatory variables. Our findings indicate that the likelihood of home bias is caused by both rational and irrational factors. Moreover, we relate home bias to investors’ desire to hedge against inflation, sophistication and overconfidence.     

Deconstructing Herding: Evidence from Pension Fund Investment Behavior

In this paper, we examine herding across asset classes and industry levels. We also study what incentives managers at various layers of the financial industry face when investing. To do so, we use unique and detailed monthly portfolios between 1996 and 2005 from pension funds in Chile, a pioneer in pension-fund reform. The results show that pension funds herd more in assets that have more risk and for which pension funds have less market information. Furthermore, the results show that herding is more prevalent for funds that narrowly compete with each other, namely, when comparing funds of the same type across pension fund administrators (PFAs). There is much less herding across PFAs as a whole and in individual pension funds within PFAs. These herding patterns are consistent with incentives for managers to be close to industry benchmarks, and might be also driven by market forces and partly by regulation.     

When does comparability better enhance relevance? Policy implications from empirical evidence

This study investigates the user-specific contexts under which comparability better enhances relevance of accounting information. We first confirm the intuition in the FASB’s (2010) current conceptual framework by documenting that the short-window earnings response coefficient (ERC) is positively associated with the pre-determined level of comparability. Using the cross-sectional variation in the positive relation between ERC and comparability, we show that the link between ERC and comparability is more pronounced for firms with higher investor sophistication and lower information asymmetry among investors. We further support our predictions using analysts’ earnings forecast revisions and various alternative measures of earnings informativeness. In sum, our paper shows that comparability improves information users’ ability to identify similarities and differences across different firms to a greater extent when investor base is more sophisticated and private information is less prevalent. These results suggest that standard setters, regulators, and practitioners should devote more attention to the role of comparability in firms whose investors are less sophisticated and information environment is more opaque.     

Alphabeticity Bias in 401(k) Investing

Structural factors that cause irrational investment in defined contribution savings plans are of great concern. Using a proprietary database of 401(k) plans we show that alphabeticity—the order that fund names appear when listed in alphabetical order—significantly biases participants’ investment allocation decisions. While we show a larger impact as the number of funds in the plan increases, this bias is strong even when relatively few funds are available in the plan menu. Importantly, our findings suggest that a more strategic ordering of funds could result in favorable outcomes for participants.     

Scale economies in pension fund investments: A dissection of investment costs across asset classes

Using a unique dataset of 225 Dutch occupational pension funds with a total of 928 billion euro of assets under management, we provide a comprehensive cross-sectional analysis of the relation between investment costs and pension fund size. Our dataset is free from self-reporting biases and decomposes investment costs for 6 asset classes in management costs and performance fees. We find that a pension fund that has 10 times more assets under management on average reports 7.67 basis points lower annual investment costs. Economies of scale differ per asset class. We find significant economies of scale in fixed income, equity and commodity portfolios, but not in real estate investments, private equity and hedge funds. We also find that large pension funds pay significantly higher performance fees for equity, private equity and hedge fund investments.     

A COMPARISON OF INDEXING AND BETA AMONG PENSION AND NONPENSION ASSETS

In this article I contrast the investment behavior of institutional portfolios having pension assets with portfolios having nonpension assets. Differences in incentive compensation plans and regulation give pension executives unique incentives to track benchmark indices. Accordingly, pension assets are more likely than nonpension assets to be allocated to index funds. Also, portfolios composed of pension assets are more likely than other portfolios to (i) have low tracking error in absolute value, (ii) be index funds, and (iii) have market betas close to one. Portfolios with relatively large pension asset market share exhibit similar characteristics and the tendency to index increases with asset class risk. Actively managed pension assets are also more likely to be invested in lower risk asset classes than actively managed nonpension assets.     

The efficiency of Greek public pension fund portfolios

Greek public pension funds can invest up to 23% into risky assets and are not allowed to invest outside Greece. This paper seeks to investigate the costs of investment constraints on pension fund portfolios. In particular we try to quantify the losses that portfolios suffer due to under-diversification and sub-optimal asset allocation. We find that the high concentration of Greek equity portfolios imposes a substantial return and utility loss which is further increased when the lack of international diversification is taken into account. Restricting the weight of equities to 23% of the total portfolio, leads to sub-optimal asset allocation that costs as much as 2% (3%) per annum compared to a balanced domestic (global) benchmark.     

Pension Funds and Emerging Markets

This paper focuses on the investment behavior of pension funds in developed and emerging market countries. First, it analyzes the main determinants of the emerging market asset allocation of pension funds in developed countries. Second, it assesses how pension funds in emerging markets have contributed to the development of local securities markets. Third, it analyzes the determinants of pension funds' investment performance. The paper concludes with a discussion of why the emerging market asset allocation of pension funds in developed countries is likely to increase and what the challenges faced by pension funds in emerging markets are.     

Hedging inflation risk in a developing economy: The case of Brazil

Inflation shocks are one of the pitfalls of developing economies and are usually difficult to hedge. This paper examines the optimal strategic asset allocation for a Brazilian investor seeking to hedge inflation risk at different horizons, ranging from one to 30 years. Using a vector-autoregressive specification to model inter-temporal dependency across variables, we measure the inflation hedging properties of domestic and foreign investments and carry out a portfolio optimisation. Our results show that foreign currencies complement traditional assets very efficiently when hedging a portfolio against inflation: around 70% of the portfolio should be dedicated to domestic assets (equities, inflation-linked (IL) bonds and nominal bonds), whereas 30% should be invested in foreign currencies, especially the US dollar and the euro.     

Investor Sentiment and the Closed‐end Fund Puzzle: Out‐of‐sample Evidence

In this paper we examine the proposition that small investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed‐end funds, is an important factor in stock returns. We conduct an out‐of‐sample test of the investor sentiment hypothesis in a market environment that is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment than the USA. We fail to provide supporting evidence for the claim of Lee et al. (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Consistent with Elton et al. (1998) , who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process, our tests do not detect investor sentiment in a capital market that is more susceptible to small investor sentiment. Our results provide additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk.     

Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle

The returns that institutional investors realize from private equity differ dramatically across institutions. Using detailed, hitherto unexplored records, we document large heterogeneity in the performance of investor classes: endowments' annual returns are nearly 21% greater than average. Analysis of reinvestment decisions suggests that endowments (and to a lesser extent, public pensions) are better than other investors at predicting whether follow‐on funds will have high returns. The results are not primarily due to endowments' greater access to established funds, since they also hold for young or undersubscribed funds. Our results suggest that investors vary in their sophistication and potentially their investment objectives.     

Mutual fund flows and investor returns: An empirical examination of fund investor timing ability

We examine the timing ability of mutual fund investors using cash flow data at the individual fund level. Over 1991–2004 equity fund investor timing decisions reduce fund investor average returns by 1.56% annually. Underperformance due to poor timing is greater in load funds and funds with relatively large risk-adjusted returns. In particular, the magnitude of investor underperformance due to poor timing largely offsets the risk-adjusted alpha gains offered by good-performing funds. Investors in both actively managed funds and index funds exhibit poor investment timing. We demonstrate that our empirical results are consistent with investor return-chasing behavior.