How does customer recognition affect service provision?

We examine how channel members’ ability to recognize repeat and new customers affects service provision, profits, and welfare. In decentralized channels, when only retailers can recognize customers, customer recognition increases service levels. However, in centralized channels or decentralized channels when both manufacturers and retailers can recognize customers, customer recognition reduces (increases) service levels if service investment persists (diminishes) sufficiently over time. Moreover, in centralized channels, customer recognition reduces firm profits and consumer surplus, whereas in decentralized channels, when manufacturers and retailers can recognize customers, customer recognition increases channel members’ profits but decreases consumer surplus.     

Quality disclosure in the presence of strategic consumers

Consider a market for short-life products, such as smartphones, where a firm and consumers have asymmetric quality information, the firm sells products in two periods, and consumers make purchase decisions strategically. We investigate when a firm should disclose quality and the interaction between consumers' strategic behavior and the firm's disclosure behavior. We obtain several findings. First, regardless of whether consumers have low or high patience, the firm should disclose quality information if product quality is high and conceal it if product quality is low. However, for products with moderate quality levels, the firm will disclose more quality information to consumers with relatively high or low patience levels than when consumer patience is moderate. Second, firms will disclose less information when consumers behave strategically than when they are myopic. Third, when concealing quality information is an equilibrium, product prices are affected only by disclosure costs and independent of true product quality. Finally, the firm can benefit from consumers' strategic behavior and a higher disclosure cost, but greater patience might be detrimental to consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Exploring the influence of envy on service engagement

Consumer retention is central to service firm objectives and is often the focus of firm initiated activities. However, consumer-driven processes that operate independently of firm initiated activities also influence retention. By understanding the consumption goals of service consumers, management can encourage behavioural engagement with service offerings and improve retention outcomes. Positional services provide opportunities for social status enhancement (e.g. higher education) and attract consumers seeking the positional benefits offered. Service consumers compete for positional benefits and monitor their success relative to other service consumers via positional comparisons. Envy, an emotion with benign and malicious types, is experienced if the positional comparison with another service consumer is unfavourable and influences behavioural engagement. This study proposes and qualitatively tests a conceptual model linking positional comparison and envy to changes in consumers’ behavioural engagement with a service depending on the type of envy experienced. The findings support benign envy as a motivator for increased behavioural engagement with a service. The study also supports the existence of a ‘positional’ service category in which envy is an endemic emotional theme influencing behavioural engagement in these service environments. A two-tiered approach to the management of envy involving positional goal recognition and appraisal based tactics is recommended.     

Product differentiation under imperfect information: When does offering a lower quality pay?

In this paper, we extend the Varian (1980) model to examine endogenous quality differentiation by firms, with a particular emphasis on the interplay between the firms’ product quality decisions and the ensuing price rivalry. Specifically, we assume that the price-sensitive (or informed) consumers hold a lower valuation for product quality than the brand-loyal (or uninformed) consumers. It is shown that the firms will choose differentiated qualities for a broad class of consumer utility functions and production technologies. We obtain two results. First, the equilibrium quality choices are efficient as they are also the welfare-maximizing qualities chosen by a social planner. The equilibrium qualities are as if one firm serves only its loyal consumers and the other serves only the price-sensitive consumers, even though they each serve both types of consumers (at least for some fraction of time). Second, the firm choosing the lower quality makes greater profits and also prices more aggressively, in the sense that it maintains a lower maximum price and offers discounts more often. The lower-quality product is more profitable because it yields higher social surplus when consumed by the price-sensitive consumers.

What Do We Know about Success and Failure of Mergers?

Collecting the most important results of about 80 empirical merger studies, this study condenses the bewildering spectrum of results to 18 stylized facts. Most important, no more than a quarter of the mergers increase consumer welfare; another quarter increase profits at the cost of consumers; half of the mergers reduce the value of the firm. Targets' shareholders win, while bidders' shareholders break even upon the announcement of a merger, but lose significantly in the long run. Seen relatively, horizontal mergers fare best, especially if they are focus-increasing. Cash-financed mergers fare better than stock-financed and strategic mergers fare better than financial ones. Confronting the stylized facts with existing merger theory reveals some major paradoxes; confronting them with existing competition policy reveals the need for a modification and intensification, as mergers increase concentration, and corporate policy strives towards still higher concentration. As a summary ten lessons are extracted on what we may have learnt, and on what is still open.     

Quality,Choice, and the Economics of Concealment: The Marketing of Lemons

The quantity of hazardous or ineffective products on national and international markets is higher than can be explained by current theory. Research has shown that “lemons” can indeed occur and it has specified roles for (a) potential future purchases and (b) seller reputation. This paper explores incentives facing sellers of goods containing one or more negative characteristics. The economics of concealment provides the conditions under which some sellers use resources to interfere with quality signals. This allows, at the extreme, a class of product which is a “pure lemon” in that its very existence would not be justified if consumers were fully informed. The paper identifies important variables which have direct policy implications for regulation and for consumer welfare.     

An empirical study of the impact of consumer emotional engagement and affective commitment in firm-hosted virtual communities

ABSTRACT

Emergent perspectives in marketing highlight new opportunities for leveraging social media as a means to build customer–firm relationships through consumer engagement. Drawing from cognitive appraisal theory and aspects of the service dominant logic, this study delineates and empirically tests hypotheses regarding the effects of key components of consumer engagement (cognitive appraisal, affective states, participation) on consumers’ affective commitment, in the context of two service companies where the firms used social media to host virtual communities. The research examines how consumers’ cognitive appraisal of the engagement experience aligned with their online interaction propensity and participation in value-creating activities drive engagement outcomes. The results confirm the need to contextualise, personalise and respond to the consumer’s engagement experience to develop this engagement.     

Product Market Cooperation,Profits and Welfare in the Presence of Labor Union

It is believed that cooperation between the final goods producers hurts consumers and reduces social welfare but increases profits. We show that these results may not hold in the presence of a unionized labor market. The effects of product market cooperation on consumers, profits and social welfare may depend on the union’s disagreement utility, its bargaining power and the degree of product market cooperation.     

Interpersonal Relationship,Service Quality,Seller Expertise: How Important Are They to Adolescent Consumers?

Drawing upon social capital theory and psychosocial development theory, this paper argues that a true buyer–seller relationship is a key determinant of favorable consumer behaviors for adolescent consumers of hairstylist services. Other important determinants include quality of the service delivery process (i.e., service quality as measured by the five SERVQUAL factors) and quality of the core service (in this case, the hairstylist's expertise). A survey of 350 adolescent consumers confirms these predictions. It shows that a true interpersonal relationship negatively moderates the positive effects of service quality on consumer satisfaction with, and overall assessment of the hairstylist. This negative moderating effect is labeled resource substitution benefit and the argument made that this is the fourth social capital benefit. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Reputation-based pricing and price improvements

Dealers often offer price improvements, relative to posted quotes, to their clients. In this paper, we propose an explanation to this practice. We also analyze its effects on market liquidity and traders’ welfare. Enduring relationships allow dealers to avoid informed trades by offering price improvements to clients who do not trade with the dealer when they are informed. A dealer never observes whether a specific client is informed or not but he can avoid informed orders by conditioning his offers on past trading profits. Cream-skimming of uninformed order-flow increases the risk of informed trading for dealers without a relationship. Thus, authorizing price improvements increases bid-ask spreads and impairs the welfare of investors without a relationship. It may even decrease the welfare of investors who develop a relationship as they sometimes need to trade at posted quotes. The model predicts a positive relationship between (a) the price improvements granted to a specific investor and past trading profits with this investor or (b) the frequency of price improvements and bid-ask spreads.     

When do consumers feel betrayal and face-loss? Examining service communality and social presence types in service failures

This study investigates the importance of consumer–restaurant relationship norms (service communality) in connection with consumer–companion social presence types (business versus private) in producing consumers’ feelings of betrayal and face-loss in service failures. The results suggest that consumers felt more betrayed and face-loss in service failures as service communality increased. In addition, social presence types moderated the effect of service communality on face-loss, suggesting consumers in private social presence situations were more sensitive to face-loss as service communality increases. These findings were integrated into a discussion of theoretical and managerial implications regarding restaurant service management.     

Contracting in a Market with Differential Information

Today’s technology allows firms to collect, store and use different types of data. This has prompted a wide discussion on the effects of access to data on competition and consumer welfare. This discussion has also been present in the energy sector in which advanced technology has allowed for the collection of detailed energy consumption data. Prompted by this discussion on the energy sector, this paper studies an industry where two firms have access to the same technology and compete in prices, but one of them has access to better information about customers. The better informed firm obtains a customer contact advantage, whereas the uninformed firm can still offer a menu of prices without being able to pre-identify the customers. We show that the better informed firm is able to exclude the uninformed firm from the market. This result provides policy insights on the usefulness of considering data access models that can ensure non-discriminatory behaviour.

     

International mergers: Incentives and welfare

Information asymmetry creates incentives for firms from different countries to merge. To demonstrate this point, we develop a model of international oligopolistic competition under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. We show that when domestic firms but not foreign firms are completely informed of local market demands, information sharing enhances the profitability of a merger between a domestic firm and a foreign firm. We also examine how such a merger affects the non-merging firms' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

The effect of exogenous product familiarity on endogenous consumer search

When a consumer is familiar with one product but not its competitor, she is faced with a decision: either buy what she knows, or engage in search to learn more. When search is costly, competing firms may attempt to encourage or discourage search by adjusting prices. In this paper we consider how competitive dynamics between two quality differentiated firms are affected if one product enjoys a familiarity advantage. Familiarity is defined as a consumer’s ex-ante knowledge of fit for a particular product. An increase in the level of familiarity for one product allows a firm to charge higher prices since there are more consumers with information on that product relative to the competition. We call this the direct effect of familiarity. However, an increase in familiarity also has an indirect effect, since it gives the rival firm a stronger incentive to decrease price in order to encourage searching, in turn increasing overall competition. The effect of familiarity on profits depends on the magnitudes of these effects, and it is moderated by the level of quality differentiation between products. For very high or very low levels of differentiation, the results are relatively straightforward. However, when the level of differentiation is moderate, the results are more nuanced, with the higher-quality firm realizing higher profits from more familiarity, even if it must lower prices due to the indirect effect. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, overall competition may be higher when firms are more quality differentiated. This is driven by the fact that higher quality differences bolster the indirect effect, with a lower quality firm providing deeper price cuts to counter increased familiarity of a high quality rival. We conclude by examining how changes in the cost of searching impact equilibrium outcomes.

     

Consumer deliberation and quality signaling

Consumers are often uncertain about their product valuation before purchase. They may bear the uncertainty and purchase the product without deliberation. Alternatively, consumers can incur a deliberation cost to find out their true valuation and then make their purchase decision. This paper proposes that consumer deliberation about product valuation can be an endogenous mechanism to enable credible quality signaling. We demonstrate this point in a simple setup in which product quality influences the probability that the product has high valuation. We show that with endogenous deliberation there may exist a unique separating equilibrium in which the high-quality firm induces consumer deliberation by setting a high price whereas the low-quality firm prevents deliberation by charging a low price. Compared to the case of complete information, the price of the high-quality firm can be distorted upward to facilitate consumer deliberation, or distorted downward to avoid the low-quality firm’s imitation. In an extension we show that dissipative advertising can facilitate quality signaling. The high-quality firm can utilize advertising spending to avert imitation from the low-quality firm without distorting price downward, earning a higher profit than that without advertising. However, advertising mitigates the distortion at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Weathering consumer pricing sensitivity: The importance of customer contact and personalized services in the financial services industry

In a low-cost switching environment, certain firm actions undertaken by service employees can improve consumer loyalty, satisfaction and reduce price sensitivity. Interestingly, consumers' satisfaction levels can actually increase when experiencing a price increase. Counterintuitively, when consumers experience a price decrease, their loyalty decreases, suggesting that it might be in the firm's best interest to not offer such pricing discounts as these customers may be hypersensitive to price. Overall, it appears much easier for service employees to positively influence customer satisfaction than customer loyalty; satisfied consumers do not necessarily become loyal consumers.     

Self-Sabotage and Durable-Goods Monopoly

We analyze a simple two-period linear demand durable-goods monopoly model with “self-sabotage.” The firm has the ability to sabotage its own production by increasing its future (period two) manufacturing costs. We find that an uncommitted monopoly seller has an incentive to engage in such self-sabotage, while a committed seller or renter has no such incentive. Unlike the previous papers on self-sabotage, we show this occurs even though the firm faces no rivals in the output market. In our durable-goods setting, the incentive for self-sabotage arises from the seller’s commitment problem with period-one buyers (the so-called Coase conjecture). Interestingly, we also find that this sort of self-sabotage can not only be profit enhancing for the uncommitted firm, but may also increase social welfare (in contrast to the earlier models on self-sabotage.)     

Effect of service recovery on customers’ perceived justice,satisfaction, and word-of-mouth intentions on online shopping websites

As consumers become better informed and more demanding about their purchase of services, service provider's failure to satisfy all consumers during delivery of service is unavoidable. Consequently, to alleviate consumer dissatisfaction that results from service failure has become important. However, empirical consensus has been lacking on the effects of various service recovery activities. Thus, this study examines the impact of different types of service recovery on customers’ perceptions of justice, post-recovery satisfaction, and word-of-mouth (WOM) intentions. The results indicated that consumers’ perceptions of distributive and interactional justice differ by the types of service recovery and supported significant relationships among perceptions of justice, satisfaction, and WOM intentions. The results implied that consumers respond differently to different types of service recovery and that consumers particularly favor apology among types of service recovery.