分成制契约下的棘轮效应分析

通过委托代理相关理论,对分成制中的棘轮效应进行了研究,给出了分成制下存在棘轮效应的原因,并针对其原因,提出了公司应确定一个固定的提成比例并确保其长期有效,以此来激励经理在各个阶段都努力工作等具体的激励措施。从而在强化分成制对经理的激励作用条件下,尽量弱化棘轮效应的负面作用。     

分成制契约下的棘轮效应分析

通过委托代理相关理论,对分成制中的棘轮效应进行了研究,给出了分成制下存在棘轮效应的原因,并针对其原因,提出了公司应确定一个固定的提成比例并确保其长期有效,以此来激励经理在各个阶段都努力工作等具体的激励措施.从而在强化分成制对经理的激励作用条件下,尽量弱化棘轮效应的负面作用.     

企业家人力资本约束：自我、制度、市场

现代经济理论认为，企业是人力资本与物质资本的合作契约，企业家人力资本对企业的生存和发展起着重要作用．知识经济时代，经理革命背景下，公司经理权滥用的可能性不断加大，不能仅仅依靠企业家激励制度中的约束机制来制约企业家，而必须在激励制度的基础上构建专门的企业家人力资本约束制度，使激励制度和约束制度配合使用，达到解决公司经理权滥用问题、全面激励与约束企业家的目的。     

股权激励的四种相关理论

现代公司的两大特征是公司所有权结构的广泛分散和只拥有少量股权的经理人员对公司具有控制权。在所有权与控制权分离的情况下，公司资源可能被用来最大化经理人员的利益而不是股东的利益。为解决高级经理人员激励问题，早在20世纪30年代，美国企业就开始把一定的股权授予经理人员，将经理人员的收益与公司的长期发展计划联系起来，对股权制度安排进行了实践性的探索。从理论上来讲，企业经理人股权激励约束机制的基础主要是经济学中的契约理论、委托——代理理论和人力资本理论以及管理学中的激励理论。     

公司信息透明度治理作用的相关研究综述

本文认为,透明的公司信息除了通过降低投资者的估计风险和提高证券流动性来降低外部融资成本以外,还具有公司治理功能。信息透明度的公司治理功能,即信息透明度有助于解决代理冲突问题和信息不对称问题,促进经理激励契约的约束有效性,保护投资者的利益。这对于中国证券市场上投资者保护及信息披露机制等方面的制度建设和资本市场健康发展有深远意义。     

公司信息透明度治理作用的相关研究综述

本文认为，透明的公司信息除了通过降低投资者的估计风险和提高证券流动性来降低外部融资成本以外。还具有公司治理功能。信息透明度的公司治理功能，即信息透明度有助于解决代理冲突问题和信息不对称问题，促进经理激励契约的约束有效性，保护投资者的利益。这对于中国证券市场上投资者保护及信息披露机制等方面的制度建设和资本市场健康发展有深远意义。     

公司治理、契约安排与税务筹划

在委托代理分析框架下,税务筹划作为一种理财行为,不可避免地受到契约安排和公司治理的制约和影响。本文从公司治理、契约安排角度深入分析了税务筹划的治理机制与供给机制,提出了诱导性契约安排与激励相结合的公司治理模式,设计了履约成本最低化的契约安排模型,为税务筹划治理效率的提高奠定了基础。     

试论企业会计政策选择的效率性

企业的会计政策选择具有效率性 ,可以降低契约成本 ,但也为经理人员的机会主义行为打开了大门。本文通过对保证会计政策选择成为有效率的制度安排范式的一系列激励约束机制的剖析 ,来预测和解释我国企业会计政策选择的机会主义现象 ,并在此基础上得出结论 :企业会计选择的“自由度”应与企业的治理结构及其所处的环境相适应。一、企业会计选择的效率性分析在财产观或定约观下 ,企业并非独立存在的主体 ,它只不过是若干契约的结合。契约的订立和实施往往涉及到会计数字 ,比如雇员（包括经理人员）的提升和报酬以会计基础的考核指标如净收入为…     

高校校办企业激励与约束机制问题研究

1校办企业激励与约束机制的理论依据 1.1建立校办企业约束与激励机制的经济学理论 现代企业(典型形式为股份制企业)的产权制度的安排更多表现为企业所有权与经营权的分离.根据现代企业理论,在两权分离的情况下,资本所有者必须建立激励约束机制的实践基础是所有者与经营者委托代理关系的产生及其之间非对称信息的存在.在资本所有权与控制权相分离的条件下,资本所有者作为委托人拥有剩余索取权,其所追求的目标是资本增值和资本收益最大化.拥有公司经营管理权的经理人员作为所有者的代理人,除了追求更高的货币收益外,还力图实现尽可能多的非货币收益.为此,从经济学的基本理论出发,资本所有者必须为现代企业的经营者建立激励约束机制.     

经理报酬激励研究综述与展望

本文对经理报酬决定的经济与非经济因素进行了总结,分析了已有关于经理报酬研究的局限性;对未来研究作了展望:关注经理报酬激励、公司业绩和公司治理之间内生关系;采用公司战略导向的报酬契约观;关注经理报酬契约与未来业绩之间的关系;在经理报酬契约中采用相对业绩评价;采用面板数据的固定效应模型;关注非经济因素的影响;重新审视线性报酬函数的合理性。     

RISK‐COPING,LAND TENURE AND LAND MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Over the last decades, a significant amount of literature has been published on informal risk‐coping in developing countries. In this paper, we review how informal risk‐coping has been addressed in the land tenure literature from two main perspectives: a first stream of research looks at how customary tenure and communal property perform key informal risk‐coping functions. A second subset of this literature analyses how informal risk‐coping creates land market imperfections through sharecropping or distress sales. The segmentation of the literature results from the Demsetzian property rights framework. Further research on risk‐coping and land tenure would benefit from examining recent work on property regimes.     

促进自主知识产权发展的国际经验

文章认为,鉴于知识产权在经济发展中的重要作用,很多国家都采取措施发展自主知识产权,主要有：制定实施国家知识产权战略、促进知识产权创造、加强知识产权管理、强化知识产权保护、推进知识产权应用,以及实施知识产权人才战略等。总结这些经验,对我国有重大的启示意义。     

国有资产的监管与委托-代理、激励-约束分析

所有权与经营权分离,是现代企业的一个重要特征,国有企业也不例外。在所有者与经营者分离的情况下,由于信息不对称、契约不完全以及双方利益的不一致性,使得委托-代理问题难以避免。国有企业的特殊性,使得委托-代理问题更加复杂化。     

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE? AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE COROLLARY OF THE COASE THEOREM

Applying the corollary of the Coase Theorem to the development market developed in Lai et al. (2007a) , we evaluate the proposition that procedural steps to use resources are not contingent on property rights assignment, unless the associated transaction costs are positive or property rights are ambiguous. Using aggregate statistics regarding planning applications for residential use, property prices, construction costs, share prices, interest rates, and application success rates in Hong Kong from 1985 to 2005, we evaluated, using regression techniques, the null hypothesis that there was no change in the relationship between readiness for submission of planning applications and property prices in response to changes in the time limits imposed on planning permissions . The relationship was more pronounced or strengthened (less obvious or weakened) when time limits were first imposed and shorter (longer). This can be explained in terms of the transaction costs of switching resource allocation according to the time limit.     

A policy proposal for natural resource management in the rainforest of Madre de Dios,Peru: The concession system and land tenure reform

Madre de Dios in south-eastern Peru, like other tropical regions, faces important threats that are resulting in a loss of forest resources. The predominant types of land tenure in the rural zones of Madre de Dios are mining, agricultural and forestry concessions of land given by each Ministry to the settlers. Concessionaires fail to act as owners, because concession contracts do not guarantee secure property rights. Short-term non-sustainable land uses are favored over sustained management practices. The way in which people use the natural resources depends upon the allocation of rights over those resources. Considering communal property as a policy proposal: a system of land tenure which does not facilitate legal titling of the lands occupied by settlers and loggers will continue to hinder the possibility of developing sustainable long-term management strategies. In this article, the main proposal for a policy reform is that the land tenure system of concessions currently employed by the Peruvian government must be replaced with the assignment of legal communal land titles to the settlers' communities (not to isolated individuals) who are currently occupying forest lands in the region. The communal land titles would create an incentive for privately motivated group management of the forests, which could help reverse some of the wasteful and indiscriminate uses of land currently government-owned.     

Property Rights Assignment: Conflict and the Implementability of Rules

The paper studies the assignment of property rights. By assignment I mean a social mechanism that transfers a valuable resource from an “unowned” state to an “owned” state (for example, a first-possession rule). I argue that any assignment mechanism faces an implementation constraint with one exception, namely the assignment by conflict. I characterize this constraint and show that under some conditions population growth facilitates rule-based assignments because appropriation by conflict becomes more costly. In other cases, however, this effect is reversed. The model may give some insights regarding the emergence and the disappearance of the open-field system in medieval Europe which, paradoxically, both have been attributed to population growth. This paper is dedicated to Horst Hegmann. For helpful and insightful comments in discussions and on the paper I thank Roderick Hay, Horst Hegmann, Christopher Kingston, Guy Kirsch, Krishna Ladha, Marc Law, Anton Miglo, Douglass North, and John Nye. I also thank the editor Amihai Glazer and two anonymous referees for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Real Estate as Institutional Fact: Towards A Philosophy of Everyday Objects

A bstract . Rigorous tools which are well known to philosophers can be put to use in the analyses of many concepts pertaining to social reality. This paper attempts to apply the distinction between brute and institutional facts advanced by John Searle to the analysis of property rights over land. It might be commonplace to suggest that all rights are entities whose existence is an institutional fact, i.e., it is the result of human conventions. In the case of property rights, it is not merely at this level that institutional reality confronts us. The object over which the property right falls, a land parcel, is itself an entity whose existence is an institutional fact. This doubly institutional character of property rights makes it easier to see that property rights over land have many important differences with other sorts of property rights. Of course, some of these differences have been pointed out before, say, by appealing to the seminal distinction between movables and immovables, but never with the rigor or the justification that I attempt here. As a result of taking seriously the nature of the object over which the right falls, we can see that property rights over land have more in common with other sorts of relationships, such as political conceptions of sovereignty, than with other forms of property rights. Real estate is just one of a myriad of social objects that we encounter every day. The ontology developed here is but one example of how philosophical analysis of everyday objects enriches our understanding of the social world, and offers us tools for clearer, practical treatment of these objects.     

Effective Control Rights in Vertical R&D Collaboration

Because of increasing technological complexity of new products, the manufacturers of final products more often seek access to external sources of knowledge at the early, market‐distant stages of innovation processes. However, they are confronted with a specifically high danger of moral hazard. Traditional management instruments fail to control that danger mainly for two reasons. First, the supplier activities are not transparent. Second, market‐distant R&D results are credence goods whose quality cannot be evaluated, not even ex post. It is the theory of incomplete contracts that solves the problem by allocating the so‐called control rights to the supplier. These rights primarily regulate the assignment of the intellectual property rights, the control of the R&D process, and the marketing of the final products that are based on the delivered R&D results. To date, we do not have any empirical evidence about the relative effectiveness of these control rights. Moreover, studies on incomplete contracts in R&D alliances only focused on the collaboration between biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. Our study fills these gaps. On the basis of a sample of French and German R&D suppliers, we find that only enforceable intellectual property rights assigned to the supplier effectively control moral hazard. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

房地产市场中的政府行为外部效应解析

1988年建立的土地有偿使用制度,实现了我国土地产权的市场化,对培育土地市场和促进经济发展发挥了重要作用,但土地产权的界定不够明晰,缺少外部效应内部化的政策机制,引发土地市场的一系列问题.借助新制度经济学的分析框架,从土地产权的角度分析了政府行为对土地市场的影响,并运用特征价格法,对广州市地铁二号线和内环路建设的实例,分析评价了政府行为对土地价值的影响.最后从完善土地产权的角度探讨了政府在土地市场中的角色和作用,指出由于缺乏对政府行为引起的"得益"和"受损"的应对机制,导致政府利益受损和土地市场的不公平与不确定性,需从土地产权角度出发,完善相关政策.     

上市公司财权配置的动态性研究

现代企业理论认为,企业所有权安排是一个动态调整的过程,同时也是财权配置的基本逻辑,它决定了财权配置具有动态演变性。本文分析了资本结构、公司各权利主体之间的博弈、公司规模及组织方式、技术及环境等因素是如何影响财权的动态配置。通过企业财权配置的状态依存性与相机治理机制来实现财权的配置与再配置,在此基础上,构建动态性财权配置的一般框架,旨在为上市公司财权的动态配置提供参考。