Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?

Abstract. This paper explores how the introduction of an experience-rated system of unemployment insurance affects employment and welfare in a model where implicit contracts between firms and workers give rise to wage rigidities and unemployment. In the literature, it has been argued that experience-rated systems of unemployment insurance may reduce long-term employment as firms anticipate the higher costs of layoffs implied by experience rating. Our analysis shows that the introduction of experience rating may increase or decrease long-term employment but it unambiguously raises welfare.     

Employment protection reform in search economies

The design of employment protection legislation (EPL) is of particular importance in the European debate on the contours of labor-market reform. In this article we appeal to an equilibrium unemployment model to investigate the virtues of EPL reform which reduces the red tape and legal costs associated with layoffs and introduces a U.S.-style experience-rating system, which we model as a combination of a layoff tax and a payroll subsidy. The reform considered shows that it is possible to improve the efficiency of employment protection policies without affecting the extent of worker protection on the labor market. These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that experience rating is desirable, not only as an integral component of unemployment-compensation finance, as most studies acknowledge, but also as part and parcel of a virtuous EPL system.     

Reforming Social Welfare in Germany: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract. In this paper, the effects of social assistance reform proposals are discussed for the case of Germany using a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates a discrete choice model of labour supply. This allows us to identify general equilibrium effects of the reforms on wages and unemployment. The simulation results show that general equilibrium wage reactions mitigate labour supply effects and that unemployment in fact decreases. Wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The simulations indicate that major cuts in welfare payments are necessary to produce substantial employment effects.     

SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS REGULATIONS AND DYNAMIC LABOUR DEMAND: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

We present a dynamic labour demand model where we evaluate the impact of employment regulations on permanent and temporary employment. We consider three different kinds of regulations, namely firing costs, hiring costs and a constraint on temporary contracts. These regulations differently affect the size and composition of employment. The theoretical results are interpreted and questioned on the basis of empirical evidence on the employment effects of the regulation reforms that occurred in the major European countries in the period 1983–1999. The empirical analysis is based on a new set of time‐varying indicators on permanent employment protection, fixed‐term contracts and temporary agency work regulations. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that fixed‐term contracts have been effective stepping‐stones to permanent jobs during the period under observation. On the contrary, flexible temporary agency work regulations seem to induce a substitution of permanent with temporary contracts.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EXPERIENCE RATING: INSURANCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY*

Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience‐rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, firms may reduce their severance payments by more than the UI benefit. We build a model where competitive firms offer contracts with severance payments to risk‐averse workers. Frictions in the labor market lead to incomplete insurance. This article shows that less than full‐experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.     

A Pure Theory of Job Security and Labour Income Risk

Models of labour market equilibrium where forward-looking decisions maximize both profits and labour income on a risk-neutral basis offer valuable insights into the effects of employment protection legislation. Since risk-neutral behaviour in the labour market presumes perfect insurance, however, job security provisions plays no useful role in such models. This paper studies a stylized model of dynamic labour market interactions where labour reallocation costs are partly financed by uninsured workers' consumption flows. In the resulting second-best equilibrium, provisions that shift labour reallocation costs to risk-neutral employers can increase productive efficiency if their administrative dead-weight costs are not too large, and increase workers' welfare as long as employers' firing costs at least partly finance workers' mobility.     

Unemployment,long-term employment relations and the determination of unit labour cost growth in US manufacturing industries

This paper examines the effect that unemployment and long-term employment relations exert on the determination of unit labour costs. The paper proceeds in three sections. Section one analyses the relationship between labour market conditions and unit labour costs by developping a simple model of a firm that relies upon dismissal threats to elicit work effort. The comparative static properties of this model suggest that a tightening of labour markets may result in an increase in unit labour costs. In addition, it is argued that the labour market disequilibrium that occurs at full employment levels of unemployment will likely result in an increase in the growth rate of unit labour costs. The second section of the paper reviews diverse theories of long-term employment relations (LTERs), each of which suggest that the presence of LTERs ought to reduce the effect that labour market conditions exert on unit labour costs. The third section of the paper presents empirical estimates of the effect unemployment and LTERs exert on unit labour costs. The central empirical findings can be briefly summarized. First, movements towards full employment increase the growth rate of wages, reduce the growth rate of labour productivity and increase the growth rate of unit labour costs. Secondly, where long-term employment relations are prevalent, the effect of unemployment on wage, labour productivity, and unit labour cost growth is diminished. The paper concludes by discussing the implications these findings have for effort regulation models and the macroeconomic foundations of microeconomic labour market structures     

Unemployment and product market competition in a Cournot model with efficiency wages

This paper analyzes the impact of product market competition on unemployment, wage and welfare in a model where unemployment is caused by the efficiency wage consideration and oligopolistic firms compete in quantity. It is shown that while more intense competition in the product market increases output and reduces price, it does not necessarily lead to a lower unemployment rate or a higher wage for workers. Depending on the technologies, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the level of employment (respectively, wage, welfare) is not always monotonic, and, in some instances, has an inverted U‐shape.     

Why has unemployment risen in the New South Africa?1

We document the rise in unemployment in South Africa since the transition in 1994. We describe how changes in labour supply interacted with stagnant labour demand to produce unemployment rates that peaked between 2001 and 2003. Meanwhile, compositional changes in employment at the sectoral level widened the gap between the skill‐level of the employed and the unemployed. Using nationally representative panel data, we show that stable unemployment rates mask high individual‐level transition rates in labour market status. Our analysis highlights several key constraints to addressing unemployment in South Africa. We conclude that unemployment is near equilibrium levels and is unlikely to self‐correct without policy intervention.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Managerial capital,occupational choice and inequality in a global economy

This study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.     

The Effects of Marginal Employment on Subsequent Labour Market Outcomes

Abstract. Unemployed workers in Austria do not lose their unemployment benefits (UI) if they work in a job where their earnings are below a certain threshold [‘marginal employment’ (ME)]. ME might improve their labour market status by signalling effort, or worsen it through reduced job‐search effort. Those who work in ME while claiming UI have less employment and lower earnings afterwards than those who do not. The penalty lessens over time but is still present after three years.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

Labour mobility during transitionEvidence from Georgia1

This article deals with labour mobility in Georgia during economic transition. We use quarterly 1998–99 panel data to examine mobility across six labour market statuses (inactivity, unemployment, formal wage employment, informal wage employment, self‐employment and farming). Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis of labour market segmentation. Formal employment is preferred to informal employment. Unemployment is largely a queuing device for individuals with higher education waiting for formal jobs. Some self‐employment is subsistence activities and consistent with a segmented labour market, while other is high risk and potentially high return activities. Age, gender and education are significant determinants of labour mobility. Finally, informal employment serves as a buffer in times of recession – with farming and informal wage employment absorbing labour shed by other statuses during the Russian financial crisis.     

Layoffs,wages and unemployment insurance

The influence of unemployment insurance on wage and layoff behavior is analyzed in the context of optimal labor contracts. Responses of contract terms to changes in economic parameters are shown to depend in general on the nature of the initial contract, the degree of workers' risk aversion, and the resolution of bargaining conflict. Layoffs are not necessarily reduced by an increase in experience rating or a reduction in the UI benefit. Product demand fluctuations tend to induce procyclical employment fluctuations but not wage fluctuation. An implication of optimal contracts with private insurance suggests a reason for government intervention in UI provision.     

Non‐wage benefits,costs of turnover and labour attachment

Like firms in established market economies, many Russian firms provide non‐wage benefits to their workers, such as housing, medical care or day care. This article explains the provision of benefits as a strategic choice for firms in the presence of labour and service market imperfections. Analysing unique survey data for 404 industrial establishments from 40 Russian regions, the authors provide strong evidence that non‐wage benefits are used by firms to attach workers and thereby reduce the costs of labour turnover in the face of tight labour markets. It is also shown that this attachment strategy works due to imperfections in the regional markets for social services.     

JOB FLOWS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT MODEL WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILL TRAINING*

We introduce productivity enhancing firm‐specific skill training into the labour search model in which the firm‐specific skill training intensity and the job destruction rate are endogenously determined. It is shown that the higher the intensity of such training, the lower the rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction. The paper's model provides a theoretical framework to understand the often mentioned peculiarity of the Japanese labour market; prevalently low rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction in Japan are due to its training system which promotes workers to acquire firm‐specific skills.     

Regional unemployment and human capital in transition economies1

Differences in regional unemployment in post‐communist economies are large and persistent. We show that within‐country regional variation in inherited human capital in four such economies explains the bulk of regional variation in unemployment; we explore potential explanations. Our evidence suggests that internal skill‐biased migration and the flow of foreign direct investment are not working as adjustment mechanisms but rather help explain the lack of convergence in regional unemployment rates. Although this capital and labour mobility pattern is consistent with the presence of regional skill spillovers, we find little support for this hypothesis. Instead, the observed migration pattern appears to arise from different skill‐specific adjustments to regional shocks brought about in part by labour‐market institutions such as guaranteed welfare income.     

How important is employment protection legislation for Foreign Direct Investment flows in Central and Eastern European countries?1

In this article we investigate empirically the importance of labour market conditions and in particular the role of employment protection legislation as determinants of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). We find that FDI flows are significantly higher in countries with relatively low unit labour costs. We also find that employment protection legislation does not exert a statistically significant impact on FDI flows. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that transition economies attract FDI via low production costs whereas indirect costs related to the rigidity of the labour market are less relevant.     

Beyond Eurosclerosis

Europe no longer suffers from Eurosclerosis; unemployment, notably long-term unemployment, had decreased substantially for more than a decade. Mobility across labour market states increased in those countries where unemployment has been falling the most. Institutional reforms -- such as declining employment protection for new entrants in the labour market and less generous unemployment benefits -- account for this increase in mobility. Focusing on these reforms, we rationalize why EU workers, including those with permanent contracts, are increasingly unhappy about labour market conditions in spite of the disappearance of mass unemployment in Europe. Due to these perceptions, policy reversals cannot be ruled out. Governments wishing to minimize the risk of going back to Eurosclerosis should move towards flexicurity configurations, compensating workers for higher risks of job loss, and introduce tenure tracks to the labour market, preventing the development of dual labour market structures. This would avoid dissipating the employment gains of the last decade during this recession.
--- Tito Boeri and Pietro Garibaldi