加拿大并购反垄断审查中的效率因素分析——以Hillsdown Holdings并购案为例

加拿大反垄断当局对并购进行反垄断控制的法律依据是《竞争法》和《并购实施指南》,其并购反垄断控制政策要求并购可能带来的效率在加拿大境内实现的部分能够补偿该项并购给加拿大生产者和消费者带来的福利净损失,并对能够纳入反垄断当局评估分析的效率因素进行详细界定。由于效率难以观察和证实,在早期的司法实践中,效率因素对于竞争管理局的并购评估审查判定影响有限。20世纪90年代以后,加拿大反垄断当局对于效率的态度逐步趋于友好,效率因素对于反垄断当局最终判定的影响越来越大。     

基于单边效应影响因素的横向并购控制分析

单边效应是并购可能产生的一种反竞争效应,结果可能会提高价格、降低产量、减少社会福利.影响单边效应的因素很多,但对于不同行业、不同的并购,这些因素的重要程度不同.文章在分析单边效应的基础上,对反垄断审查应该在什么情况下重点关注哪些因素给予说明.     

大型互联网平台扼杀式并购规制的完善与变革

互联网平台发展壮大的同时垄断问题也引起全世界反垄断执法机构的关注。尽管《反垄断法》的修订回应了公众对数字领域垄断问题的部分关切,但传统事先申报标准无法满足互联网平台反垄断执法需求,且实质性审查制度在新业态下陷入失灵,大量大型平台企业并购初创企业案件长期逃脱反垄断审查。为此,可以通过修正申报标准、完善相关市场界定、重塑反竞争评估、优先适用行为性限制条件以及构建长效监管机制来规制扼杀式并购行为。     

欧盟反垄断立法体系中效率抗辩的历史沿革及对我国启示

合并是有利有弊的.大多数企业合并因为能够使企业更有效率地经营,而实际上给竞争和消费者带来好处.以欧美为代表的西方发达国家开始认真考虑"合并能够产生的效率",这一点逐渐成为各国反垄断审查中的重要考量因素.     

应建立国外投资国家安全审查制度

在鼓励、允许外商投资的产业中,我国仍然需要对外国投资并购行为进行反垄断审查、经济安全审查,特别是要关注外资并购行业排头兵企业、并购与之有竞争关系企业的行为     

从汇源并购案看中国反垄断法律的缺陷

可口可乐并购汇源作为中国《反垄断法》实施以来首个未通过反垄断审查的案例。整个审查过程暴露出《反垄断法》自身的缺陷及实施中的不足。正是由于这些不足，直接导致中国商务部认定可口可乐收购汇源可能导致妨碍竞争的“三个标准”备受质疑。     

跨国并购与中国啤酒行业福利效应的实证分析

以实证的方法研究了跨国并购影响中国啤酒行业市场结构的福利效应,结果表明：跨国并购在一定程度上促进了中国啤酒行业市场集中度的提高,一定程度上促使啤酒行业过度竞争的市场结构演变为垄断竞争市场结构,同时新的竞争格局与福利效应之间存在高度正相关关系。     

行业协会对横向垄断协议执法效率的影响研究

反垄断执法工作是我国确立竞争政策基础地位、维护社会福利的保障,而行业协会作为重要的制度性设计,在我国市场与政府之间扮演着重要角色。为研究行业协会与反垄断执法之间的关联,探索提升反垄断执法效率的有效路径并进一步优化我国反垄断政策,本文基于位列《反垄断法》监管首位的横向垄断协议案件数据,利用生存分析方法实证检验了行业协会对反垄断执法效率的影响及作用机制。研究发现,组织型行业协会对反垄断执法效率产生了正向影响,而协调型行业协会对反垄断执法效率产生了负向影响。其中,执法配合机制是行业协会影响执法效率的内在渠道,而外在举报机制具有对行业协会的威慑引导作用,削弱了协调型行业协会对执法效率的抑制作用,加强了组织型行业协会的促进作用。本文的研究结论为我国反垄断执法提供了微观层面的经验证据,也为行业协会的自身完善及其各项经济职能的有效发挥提供了有益参考。     

外资并购反垄断控制的困惑与解决思路

有关的效应分析表明,外资并购对我国经济发展有着多方面的积极影响,但是也可能导致外资垄断势力的形成。本文从国际竞争和经济安全两个角度,对外资并购反垄断控制问题进行了分析。结论认为,随着加入WTO后国民待遇原则的普遍实施,我国政府在外资并购反垄断控制中将面临“两难选择”的困惑。为此,本文最后提出了相应的解决思路。     

外资并购在我国的发展趋势、问题与对策研究

近年来,我国外资并购规模逐步扩大,国企、民营企业都成为外资并购的主要对象,跨国公司通过并购实现竞争优势在国内的延伸,并购的主要行业由制造业向服务业转移。外资并购在我国产生了垄断、产业安全以及机会主义行为、削弱产业自主创新能力等问题,其中市场经济体制不完善是导致外资并购诸多问题的根源。必须在完善市场经济体制的基础上建立对外资并购的反垄断、产业安全影响等的审查机制。     

产品范围选择、替代关系调整与兼并效应分析

文章考察了横向兼并所形成的新企业进行产品范围选择以及替代关系调整时,兼并行为所产生的效应问题：通过一个3企业的两阶段博弈研究了兼并行为对行业内各企业的净利润以及对社会福利所产生的影响。结果表明企业普遍存在兼并动机;兼并所形成的新企业选择保留原有产品范围时,如果替代系数降低的幅度比较大,整个社会的福利将会增加。     

Leading and Merging: Convex Costs,Stackelberg, and the Merger Paradox

This paper examines the consequences of a Stackelberg leader merging with followers when costs are convex. Such mergers are always profitable for the participants, and the followers often do better merging than remaining excluded rivals. This resolution of the merger paradox cannot be generated either by Stackelberg leadership without convex costs or by convex costs without leadership. In addition, with convex costs, a merger with the leader can actually harm excluded rivals (suggesting why they might object to the merger) and increase social welfare.     

The Welfare Goal of Antitrust Laws in Asia: for whom should the law toil?

It is argued that an antitrust law should include a clear, long‐term, economy‐wide welfare goal. For any country—especially for developing countries—legislating to promote the competitive process, it is essential to include in the law a clearly‐specified objects clause to guide administrative and judicial conduct. Without a clear objects clause, firms, competition agencies, and the courts will not have any guidance as to the government's overarching goal when it passed the legislation. This uncertainty will lead to inefficient regulation; will run the risk of special interests being accommodated; and will lead to the likelihood of false positives and negatives being made by regulators and the courts. We review the antitrust laws in some Asian economies and find that most of them have not incorporated a clear objects clause in their statutes.     

威廉姆森的兼并福利权衡模型与启示

本文针对当前关于兼并与反垄断的争议 ,详细介绍了著名的威廉姆森福利权衡模型 ,并就中国的国情进行了探讨 ,提出了一些建议。     

最低工资制在完全与不完全市场中的影响——一个理论分析框架

本文通过构建一个包含产品市场和劳动力市场的模型,分析了最低工资制度在社会、经济等方面的影响,并得出以下结论:如果企业是市场工资率的被动接受者,则推行最低工资制度在促进劳动者福利提升的同时,会以减损社会总福利为代价,同时社会总产出水平下降;如果企业对市场工资率有影响能力,则通过最低工资制度提高就业者工资率水平,这不仅会促进劳动者福利的提升,同时也会造成社会总福利的改进,社会总产出水平上升。以此为基础,结合当前中国的社会实际,对于最低工资制度的实施提供了相关的政策建议。     

Profitable Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition

This paper investigates the profitability and locational effects of mergers when Cournot firms compete in spatially differentiated markets. A two-firm merger is generally profitable because the merged partners can coordinate their location decisions. The merged firm locates its plants outside the market quartiles with distance from the market center being an increasing function of the number of nonmerged firms remaining at the market center. Profitable two-firm mergers reduce competitive pressure, leading to higher prices and reduced consumer surplus. The merger increases total surplus by increased locational efficiency and the increased profits of the merged and nonmerged firms.     

网络效应下优势厂商的兼并行为选择

基于Salop模型,分析了存在网络效应的市场中具有成本优势的厂商如何进行兼并,兼并后是否保留被兼并品牌,以及兼并行为对社会福利的影响。结果表明,在网络效应较弱并且优势厂商的成本优势也不明显时,厂商倾向于放弃被兼并品牌的兼并,优势很大时则会选择不兼并。网络效应的增强会使得优势厂商更倾向于兼并且保留被兼并品牌,并且不论网络效应的大小,保留被兼并品牌的兼并会增加社会福利,放弃被兼并品牌的兼并会减少社会福利。     

Spatial Price Discrimination and Merger: The N-Firm Case

The consequences of merger are analyzed in an N-firm model of spatial price discrimination. The merger occurs with known probability after location decisions have been made. The possibility of merger alters locations, generates inefficiency, and increases the profit of the merging firms. In the case of corner mergers, but never in the case of interior mergers, the possibility of merger may also reduce the profit of the excluded firms.     

The Economic Effect Of Competition Law Enforcement: The Case Of The Netherlands

Summary  In this paper we try to bridge the gap between the outcome ambitions of competition policy in terms of welfare gains and consumer surplus and the longer term effects of competition policy on growth and employment. First of all, an overview is given of the different definitions of welfare. We explain why maximising the consumer surplus is an important part of the mission statement for most competition authorities. In the second part of the paper we estimate the impact of the introduction of the competition law on economic development. The effects of antitrust policies, merger control and energy regulation on the consumer surplus appear substantial. This increase in consumer surplus can be interpreted as a cut in the “market power wedge” which, from a modelling point of view, is comparable to a cut in the tax wedge. A model simulation for the Netherlands shows that the economy responded positively to this increase in the consumer surplus. We find that production has grown by an extra 0.5% and that employment has increased by 0.4% as a result of the enforcement of the Competition Law. The authors are respectively Chief Economist of the NMa and senior advisor at the Office of the Chief Economist of the NMa. This paper is the background paper for the presentation with the same title at the conference “Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement”, held in The Hague, 17 and 18 October 2007. The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.