基于需求与储量相关条件下的供应链协调研究

供应链模型由一个制造商和零售商组成,其中制造商向零售商供应商品,零售商面临客户的商品需求与储量相关。在该模型中,制造商欲通过批发价和储量成本补偿方式来协调分散式供应链并赢利,使供应链分散式时的系统总储量等于集中控制时的储量水平。假定商品需求是依赖储量的函数和一个储量成本补偿。在单个零售商情形下,制造商需要增大批发价及支付给零售商的储量成本补贴来协调整个渠道并盈利。当两个及多个零售商竞争时,假定市场需求依赖于总储量水平,零售商按照储量比例分割市场。     

Efficient replenishment in the distribution channel

Efficient replenishment (ER), a business process that involves the reduction of order cost to facilitate deliveries of goods from the manufacturer to the retailer, is becoming increasingly important in distribution channel management. While a well-executed ER program is expected to lower total channel costs and increase channel profit, very little is known about how this incremental channel profit is distributed between the manufacturer and the retailer and how it varies across the two common channel relationship structures, retailer price leadership and manufacturer price leadership.In this paper, we develop the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer gain more or less from the adoption of ER based on a game theoretic channel model of bilateral monopoly under the two channel relationship structures. We develop analytic results on the impact of ER on purchase quantity, price and the distribution of profits in three cases, namely, (1) when only the retailer adopts ER, (2) when both the manufacturer and the retailer adopt ER, and (3) when the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically integrated in the distribution channel, which adopts ER.The results, which can be generalized for all demand functions, show that the manufacturer benefits from the retailer's adoption of ER only when the manufacturer's holding cost relative to the retailer's is sufficiently large, relative to its order cost relative to the retailer's. By adopting ER, the retailer gains more than what the manufacturer gains even if the manufacturer is the price leader. Both the parties are likely to gain more if they both adopt ER than if only the retailer adopts ER. The incremental channel profit due to the retailer's ER adoption is highest in a vertically integrated distribution channel and is greater in a retailer-led channel relationship than in a manufacturer-led relationship.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

Category management,product assortment,and consumer welfare

In this article, we endogenize product assortment decisions under a category management (CM) framework in a channel setup. We find that (1) product assortment is polarized more under CM than under a non-CM regime; (2) the price of a high-end (low-end) product in an assortment increases (decreases) under CM than under a non-CM regime; and (3) a high-quality manufacturer makes more profit than a low-quality manufacturer. In our model, the manufacturer’s choice of quality and its polarization is driven by the existence and the decisions of the retailer (CM or non-CM). Finally, we have an interesting result on consumer welfare. We find that the total consumer welfare, as measured by consumer surplus, worsens under CM only when there is sufficient heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes.     

Information asymmetry, pricing strategy and firm's performance in the retailer- multi-channel manufacturer supply chain

In this research paper, we assume a retailer-multi-channel manufacturer (with online and traditional retail channels) supply chain where both the multi-channel manufacturer and the retailer have private information about the state of consumer demand. In this setting, we examine the effect of an information sharing strategy on both firms' performance. Our results show that the multi-channel manufacturer always benefits from an information sharing strategy. When the product is highly compatible with the online channel, information sharing becomes much more valuable to the multi-channel manufacturer. On the other hand, the retailer's performance is not impacted by an information sharing strategy. Thus, a bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing for the multi-channel manufacturer and retailer so that an information sharing equilibrium can be reached. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify probable paths of future research.     

A Negotiation Model for Inducing Higher Service in a Distribution Channel

This paper analyzes, in the context of negotiation, the problem of coordination and conflict resolution between the manufacturer (Seller) and the retailers (Buyers) for a two-tier inventory system. The retailers capture demand (from customers) and therefore are responsible for the level of service offered by the system. The larger the inventory that a retailer has of a particular product, the lower the probability of running out of stock and therefore, avoid the possibility of a lost sale for the manufacturer. A conflict arises (and therefore the negotiation process starts) when the manufacturer wants the retailer to increase the level of service while retailers are satisfied with the status quo. Using the Nash bargaining solution, we develop a theoretical framework that incorporates behavioral dimensions and predicts the outcome of “sharing” the profit. The results indicate the advantage of developing long term relationships among the members of the distribution channel to minimize the uncertainty and therefore the source of conflict.     

Pricing,greening, and transparency decisions considering the impact of government subsidies and CSR behavior in supply chain decisions

In this paper, we analytically model different government subsidy strategies in a supply chain manufacturing and selling a green product. We model the interaction between greening degree and transparency level set by a manufacturer and its impact on not only the supply chain, but also consumers and the government. The supply chain is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer can choose two different strategies. First, he only cares about his production profit; and second, he concerns with CSR in addition to his production profit. We develop a new transparency-based index of consumer satisfaction to model how the market reacts to manufacturer CSR decisions. The government decide three different subsidy strategies. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is developed and solved to analytically derive managerial insights. As a result, if the transparency cost coefficient is sufficiently high, the greening degree and transparency level in CSR concerns strategy are higher than when the manufacturer is not concerned with corporate social responsibility. In addition, when the transparency cost coefficient is sufficiently high, the profit of supply chain members and government are equal in both strategies. We give a real-world example of Iranian brick industry.     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

Decomposing the effect of advertising: What happens in the retail channel?

The diverging interests of manufacturers and retailers famously give rise to the double marginalization problem but have consequences far beyond pricing. Advertising is another marketing instrument that is under the control of the manufacturer but its ultimate effect on consumer demand also depends on retailers’ pricing decisions. We decompose the effect of advertising in the channel and highlight an additional route through which advertising affects sales, namely via the changes in the retail price that a strategic retailer makes in response to changes in demand following manufacturer advertising. The total demand effect of advertising thus comprises the direct effects of advertising on market shares, and the indirect effects coming through adjustments that the retailer makes to the in-store prices of all the brands in a given product category in response to the shifted demand due to advertising. We match advertising data for four different categories (both food and non-food) to store-level scanner panel data, which also include information on wholesale prices. Controlling for wholesale prices, we establish in a reduced-form model that the retailer reacts to manufacturer advertising by changing retail prices instead of simply imposing a constant markup on the wholesale price. To further explore the role of the strategic response of the retailer in a systematic fashion and quantify the effects derived in the decomposition, we estimate a discrete-choice model of demand and determine the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. We find that the indirect effect of advertising through retailer prices is about half the size of the direct effect, and thus substantively affects advertising effectiveness.     

Strategic Role of Retailer Bundling in a Distribution Channel

We study retailer bundling in a distribution channel when the manufacturer for one bundled product can strategically set the wholesale price. We show that the retailer can use a bundling option as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the manufacturer in form of a lower wholesale price. This finding contributes a novel rationale for retailer bundling to the bundling literature. Whenever the bundling option causes this concession-extraction effect, the retailer always benefits from the lower wholesale price. The manufacturer, nevertheless, does not necessarily suffer because bundling can lead to a higher consumer demand. We also show that the manufacturer's marginal production cost plays a critical role in driving the retailer's bundling decision, concession extraction behavior and consequently the total channel profit.     

需求不确定对单周期产品的生产商—零售商供应链的影响

在单周期产品的生产商—零售商的供应链中,由于市场存在着激烈的竞争,市场需求的不确定性必然会对供应链双方的决策产生很大的影响。借助传统的报童模型,建立Stackberg博奕模型,考虑了一个供应商面对两个不同零售商时的情景,分别分析了当零售商决策依据是最大化期望利润和当两零售商的市场需求相关时,以及在零售商的决策依据是在给定利润水平时最大化其概率的情况下,市场需求不确定会对供应链双方产生怎样的影响。     

Optimal Returns Policy under Demand Uncertainty

Multiple categories of retail products suffer limited shelf life, demand uncertainty, and, in some cases, long lead times. To provide retailers with an incentive to increase the stocking quantity of such products, manufacturers may offer an option to return unsold items at wholesale or less than wholesale prices. This article extends the additive price-dependent demand model in three ways. First, partial returns are optimal for the manufacturer but do not induce higher stocking quantities compared with when the manufacturer offers no returns. Second, in terms of the effect of investment in demand-enhancing activities, when retailers invest, they set higher resale prices, but an optimal partial returns policy still does not induce higher stocking quantity, whereas when manufacturers invest, the optimal returns policy induces higher stocking quantity. Third, when the manufacturer and retailer have different expectations of demand uncertainty, the retailer's estimate influences the expected profits for both, whereas the manufacturer's estimate has a major impact on its profits only.     

The Property Rights Theory of the Firm and Mixed Competition: A Counter-Example in the US Health Care Industry

We present a counter-example to the conventional property rights theory of the firm, which indicates that not-for-profit firms are incapable of directly competing against strictly profit-maximizing firms without the presence of barriers to entry, outside assistance, changing profit status or economies of scale and scope. We employ a modified Bertrand duopoly model of mixed competition in the health care industry to show that, even when these four conditions do not hold, not-for-profit firms may still be able to compete and possibly dominate the market. Consequently, market fundamentals, rather than market intervention, regulation or uncertainty, determine a not-for-profit provider's success or failure in the market. A necessary requirement is that the not-for-profit manager must care about non-pecuniary benefits but be willing to accept lower than normal returns. Moreover, under specific cost and demand conditions, a not-for-profit's ability to compete may actually be enhanced by increasing its production of non-pecuniary benefits.     

Coupon Trading and its Impacts on Consumer Purchase and Firm Profits

When a retailer distributes manufacturer coupons to consumers without perfectly identifying their product valuations, consumers may have incentives to trade coupons. We develop a model to capture the coupon trading phenomenon and compare three scenarios: (I) no coupon, (II) coupon without trading, and (III) coupon with trading. We find that coupon trading can increase the profits of either the retailer or the manufacturers, but not at the same time. The retailer benefits from coupon trading when the coupon market is competitive and consumer hassle cost is low, while the manufacturers benefit from coupon trading when the coupon market is uncompetitive and consumer hassle cost is high. In addition, coupon trading does not always increase total demand. Firms benefit from coupon trading by charging higher prices, which leads to a decreased total demand. As a result, consumers end up with a higher average cost under coupon trading. We also compare coupon trading with improved coupon targeting, and find that coupon trading may allow firms to gain higher profits than improved coupon targeting. Further, we extend the main model to a competitive setting where the products are substitutable, and find that the main results still hold. Finally, we employ numerical analysis to identify the optimal coupon face values in different scenarios, and the results suggest that coupon trading combined with incentive mechanisms may lead to Pareto improvement for the channel as a whole.     

Attack and defend: the role of targeting in a distribution channel

This paper studies the role of targeting in a distribution channel composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. In channel interactions, the manufacturer can deploy targeted advertising while the retailer can initiate targeted pricing. Using a game-theoretic framework, we find the following results: (1) Targeted advertising increases the manufacturers profit at the expense of the retailer; (2) The retailer may be worse off using targeted pricing; (3) Targeted pricing discourages the manufacturer from launching targeted advertising which is a more severe threat to the retailer. Therefore, the retailer may optimally use targeted pricing, even when it hurts profit, to defend against the attack of targeted advertising by the manufacturer.     

How a novel option contract helps a green product to enter a traditional product's retailing channel: A mathematical modeling approach

Multi-sourcing is a practical strategy in retail channels that allows retailers facing uncertainties to respond more effectively to consumers' needs by distributing market demand across multiple supply sources. In this respect, this research investigates a price-setting retailing channel, including two manufacturers (a traditional manufacturer and a green manufacturer) and one retailer where end-of-life products can be collected. The retailer faces an uncertain price-dependent demand and sets orders from both supply directions based on a low-cost ordering approach. The primary purpose of this study is to develop an optimal solution to allow the green product to enter the retailing channel of the non-green product. Accordingly, this research develops and compares two different contractual mechanisms from the standpoint of the green manufacturer/retailer and the supply chain (SC): (1) a penalty-based contract and (2) a modified call option contract mixed with a cost-sharing mechanism. The main contribution of the current paper is to investigate an option contract for the effective management of a closed-loop supply chain and combine it with a cost-sharing contract as a new approach. Another contribution is that the developed model considers two practical channels for collecting and returning obsolete products to the green manufacturer: (1) the retailer is responsible for collecting and returning obsolete products, and (2) collecting and returning obsolete products is outsourced to a third-party logistics provider (3PL). Eventually, the models' efficiency is verified by investigating different numerical experiments, discovering that the proposed reservation-based contract outperforms the penalty-based contract for both parties' profitability and retailing channel's improvement. Besides, the present study finds that hiring 3PL significantly increases the green manufacturer's profit compared to other scenarios.     

A Simulation Model Of Multi‐Echelon Retail Inventory With Cross‐Channel Product Returns

This study explores the relationship between a retailer's product returns processing structure and Multi‐Echelon inventory system performance under cross‐channel and same‐channel product returns policies with nonstationary demand. Our research contributes to the growing body of reverse logistics literature, offering insight into how a retailer's logistical returns management strategy can impact inventory effectiveness in cross‐channel retail environments. Adopting a contingency framework, we develop research hypotheses which we test through experimentation on a Multi‐Echelon retail inventory system within a discrete‐event simulation. Model parameters are derived from data collected from a large U.S. retailer of consumer durable and nondurable goods. We find an amplifying effect of a cross‐channel returns policy on the positive relationship between a decentralized returns processing structure and inventory effectiveness. Further, through our analysis of nonstationarity in demand and resulting returns, we uncover strong main and interaction effects that seasonal demand variation can have on inventory outcomes, even under only moderate levels of seasonality. Our results highlight the need for firms to align logistical structures for returns processing with the returns policy and the external environment, while also lending credence to calls within the logistics literature for improved modeling of nonstationary demand in inventory management research.     

Pure Components versus Pure Bundling in a Marketing Channel

This paper examines how channel interactions influence product bundling decisions by channel members. Specifically, what products or bundles should be offered, at what prices, and by which channel members, in equilibrium. To answer this, we analyze Stackelberg games between a manufacturer and retailer, with pricing and bundling as decision variables, under discrete and uniform continuous distributions of reservation prices. We find that selling pure components by both manufacturer and retailer is the equilibrium except in a narrow region of the parameter space. However, if the manufacturer can sell bundles and prevent unbundling, then such a bundling strategy is optimal in many cases. Interestingly, the channel and retailer also benefit from this strategy.     

Forecast information and traditional retailer performance in a dual-channel competitive market

Independent firms in a dual-channel competitive market are expected to have their own information about the nature of the market. In this research, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine the value of forecast information about consumers' willingness to pay. The model is based on a simultaneously played Bertrand game. Our results indicate that the profits of online as well as traditional retailers always increase with forecast accuracy, and that forecast accuracy has a greater effect on the performance of the traditional retailer than on that of the online retailer. Our results also show that the difference in profit between that of the traditional retailer and the online retailer increases with forecast accuracy. In addition we find that forecast accuracy is much more valuable to the traditional retailer when there is an increasing volatility in the market, an increasing level of consumer valuation of the product, and an increasing intensity in market competition. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify directions of future research.     

Do channel members value the multiple-cooperation strategy?

When the manufacturer distributes his products through online and traditional channels, what type of innovative marketing strategy can be utilized to solve the channel conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating a triple cooperative strategy for channel members to employ in a manufacturer – retailer dual-channel supply chain. Our results show that when the product is less compatible with online channel than with traditional channel, channel members can utilize a triple cooperative strategy to improve channel coordination and their individual performances effectively and efficiently. First, the manufacturer can utilize supportive retail sales effort as a valuable coordination mechanism to improve the performances of all channel members in the dual-channel distribution. Second, a channel coordinative price strategy can be utilized to further improve the performance of whole channel. Finally, a profit sharing mechanism is needed to create a Pareto result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the value of triple cooperative strategy in a manufacturer – two competitive retailers supply chain and derive the optimum marketing strategy.